Dup

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Some Reflections on Soviet-American Relations
Merle Fainsod 1093

A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices
Ted Gurr 1104

Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America
Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant 1125

Protest as a Political Resource
Michael Lipsky 1144

Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political Party Organization
M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert 1159

Coalition Politics in North India
Paul R. Brass 1174

Sources of Local Political Involvement
Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble 1192

Malapportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures
Allan G. Pulsipher and James L. Weatherby, Jr. 1207

Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures
Ira Sharkansky 1220

The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis
Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride 1232

The Recruitment of Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons
Allan Kornberg and Hal H. Winsborough 1242

Research Notes

A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling
Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte 1258

A Note on Censorship
Gordon Tullock 1265

Communications to the Editor 1268

Book Reviews and Notes
Richard F. Fenno (ed.) 1274

Announcements 1408

Index to Volume LXII
Nancy B. Edgerton and Mary H. Grossman 1410

LIBRARY
San Francisco College for Women
Lone Mountain
San Francisco 18, California

VOL. LXII December, 1968 NO. 4

Published Quarterly by

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

From Commentary To College Classrooms

You can have samples free

of the most important articles to appear in "one of the world's best edited periodicals." (C. P. Snow)

List the five Commentary Reports, on your letterhead, that you would consider for classroom adoption and we'll send them right out.

Special Reports:

☐ **The Dominican Revolt.** Theodore Draper. New paperback based on his administration-shaking article in Commentary $2.50

☐ **American Reactions to The Six-Day War.** Robert Alter, Arthur Hertzberg, Milton Himmelfarb, Martin Peretz $1.00

☐ **Liberal Anti-Communism Revisited.** A symposium: Lionel Abel, David T. Bazelon, Daniel Bell, Lewis A. Coser, Paul Goodman, Michael Harrington, Sidney Hook, Irving Howe, Murray Kempton, Robert Lowell, Dwight MacDonald, William Phillips, Robert Pickus, Philip Rahv, Harold Rosenberg, Richard H. Rovere, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Stephen Spender, Diana Trilling, Lionel Trilling, Dennis H. Wrong $1.00

Quantity discounts for classroom purchases: 25-49 copies less 10%; 50-99 copies less 15%; 100-299 copies less 20%; 300-499 copies less 30%; 500-1,000 copies less 40%; more than 1,000 copies less 50%.

Write for the Commentary Classroom Magazine Subscription Plan too.

☐ **The American Presidency**—A Defective Institution?—Andrew Hacker .... 50¢
☐ **The Origins of Human Bonds**—Selma Fraiberg .... 50¢
☐ **The Legacy of Che Guevara**—Norman Gall .... 50¢
☐ **The Shape of American Politics**—Richard N. Goodwin .... 50¢
☐ **A Guide to Reagan Country**—The Political Culture of Southern California—James Q. Wilson .... 50¢
☐ **"Bonn Is Not Weimar"**—Reflections on the Radical Right in Germany—Walter Laqueur .... 50¢
☐ **Counterrevolutionary America**—Robert L. Heilbroner .... 50¢
☐ **The President and the Negro:** The Moment Lost—Daniel P. Moynihan .... 50¢
☐ **Communism in Asia**—Donald S. Zagoria .... 50¢
☐ **The Failure of the Warren Report**—Alexander M. Bickel .... 50¢
☐ **The Unremembered Genocide**—Marjorie Housepian .... 50¢
☐ **In Defense of 'Black Power'**—David Danzig .... 50¢
☐ **Black Power and Coalition Politics**—Bayard Rustin .... 50¢
☐ **Church and State: How High a Wall?**—Milton Himmelfarb .... 50¢
☐ **The Problem of the New Left**—Tom Kahn .... 50¢
☐ **The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracy**—Norman Cohn .... 50¢
☐ **The Arab Refugees**—A Zionist View—Marie Syrkin .... 50¢
☐ **Conservatism After Goldwater**—David Danzig .... 50¢
☐ **The Meaning of Negro Strategy**—David Danzig .... 50¢
☐ **The State of Soviet Jewry**—Maurice Friedberg; **Soviet Anti-Semitism:** An Exchange—Bertrand Russell & Aron Vergelis .... 50¢
☐ **Up From Apathy**—The Woodlawn Experiment—Charles E. Silberman .... 50¢
☐ **The Failure of Urban Renewal**—A Critique and Some Proposals—Herbert J. Gans 50¢
☐ **Five Years of Castro's Cuba**—Theodore Draper .... 50¢
☐ **Public School 165**—Richard Schickel .... 50¢
☐ **The Watts 'Manifesto' and the McCone Report**—Bayard Rustin .... 50¢
☐ **From Protest to Politics:** The Future of the Civil Rights Movement—Bayard Rustin 50¢
☐ **The American Reading Problem**—Selma Fraiberg .... 50¢
☐ **Big Business and the Democrats**—David T. Bazelon .... 50¢
☐ **Mutual Aid and the Negro**—John Slawson .... 50¢
☐ **The Trial of Jesus**—Paul Winter .... 50¢
☐ **China's Strategy** . . . A Critique—Donald S. Zagoria .... 50¢
☐ **The Future of Capitalism**—Robert L. Heilbroner .... 50¢
☐ **Chinese Visions and American Policies**—Benjamin Schwartz .... 50¢
☐ **The Negro and the New York Schools**—Midge Decter .... 50¢
☐ **Intermarriage and the Jewish Future**—Marshall Sklare .... 50¢
☐ **American Catholicism After the Council**—Michael Novak .... 50¢
☐ **Lessons of the 'Long Hot Summer'**—Bayard Rustin .... 50¢
☐ **My Negro Problem—and Ours**—Norman Podhoretz .... 50¢
☐ **Negroes and Jews:** The New Challenge to Pluralism—Nathan Glazer .... 50¢
☐ **The John Birch Society**—Fundamentalism on the Right—Alan F. Westin .... 50¢

Write to: John Gladstone

Commentary Report

165 E. 56th St., New York, N. Y. 10022

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

The first volume in the

AMERICAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR SERIES

David J. Danelski, Editor, Yale University

CONGRESS: TWO DECADES OF ANALYSIS

RALPH K. HUITT and ROBERT L. PEABODY

Brings together six of Dr. Huitt's landmark articles on the U.S. Senate and the executive-legislative process, together with an original introductory essay by Dr. Peabody, who comprehensively assesses Congressional research since World War II. Selective bibliography. *Ready in February. $3.50 (tentative); paper*

Ready in January

THE NEW COMMUNISMS

DAN N. JACOBS

Original essays by noted authorities. A focus on the breakdown in the solidarity of the international Communist movement. Treats the ideological and the practical factors that triggered this dissolution; examines the varieties of Communism, based on national interest, that have evolved in various countries. Extensive introduction provides a framework; conclusion. *326 pp.; $8.00 cloth; $5.00 paper*

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS: An Introduction

HOWARD A. SCARROW

A focus on the major comparative concepts of political systems and related methodological techniques. Unites the comparative study of national and sub-national political systems; delineates the functional and causal modes of explanatory analysis; shows the relationship between the two modes of explanatory analysis and the methodological problems of evidence; discusses problems surrounding some of the field's major concepts; shows the relationship of political science to sociology; discusses comparative politics as a specialized field within political science. *146 pp.; $2.95; paper*

●

Ready in March

THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY SYSTEM

THOMAS E. CRONIN and SANFORD D. GREENBERG

For the first time, two recent White House aides focus specifically on the presidential advisory system through essays and research papers by political scientists as well as former science, economic, budget, and foreign policy advisors. The book comprehensively examines the formal and informal, institutionalized and ad hoc advisory support staffs for the presidency, as well as the role they play in the presidential policy-making process.
$6.00 cloth; $3.25 paper (tentative)

1817 Harper & Row, Publishers · 49 E. 33d St., New York

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Now Available . . . Fifth Edition

BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY
# of the
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

published: August, 1968

- Complete, up-to-date reference volume containing biographical information and names and addresses of approximately 12,000 individual APSA members—political scientists, federal, state and local government officials, businessmen, attorneys, journalists—a cross-section of persons in the United States and abroad who have a continuing interest in the study and development of the art and science of government.
- Compiled and produced by automated processes from questionnaires submitted by members.
- Appendices include a geographical listing and a classification of members by fields of interest.

ORDER NOW:

- Institutions and libraries may order copies at $25.00 clothbound, $18.50 paperback.
- Individual members may order copies at $17.50 clothbound, $12.50 paperback.

MAIL ORDER TO: Biographical Directory Order Dept.
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Published quarterly by The American Political Science Association

EDITORIAL BOARD

Austin Ranney, *Managing Editor, University of Wisconsin*

Fred I. Greenstein, *Wesleyan University*
Harvey C. Mansfield, *Columbia University*
Warren E. Miller, *University of Michigan*
Walter F. Murphy, *Princeton University*
Melvin Richter, *City University of New York*
John E. Turner, *University of Minnesota*
Vernon Van Dyke, *University of Iowa*
Myron Weiner, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

EDITORIAL ASSOCIATES

Richard F. Fenno, *Book Review Editor, University of Rochester*
Nancy B. Edgerton, *Madison*
Mary H. Grossman, *Madison*

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Managing Editor, APSR
North Hall, University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Executive Director, APSA
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

The American Political Science Review, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are $15.00 a year ($6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students; five-year limitation). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $3.75 per copy; for *back issues* prior to 1963 address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003; subsequent to 1963 send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the Review, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the month before publication.

Address correspondence about contributions to the Review to Austin Ranney, North Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 53706. All manuscripts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

Address books intended for review to Richard F. Fenno, 575 Mount Hope Avenue, Rochester, New York 14620; information, including News and Notes, for the Association's newsletter *P. S.*, should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence to the Executive Director at the Washington office.

Articles and notes appearing in the Review before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature. The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *International Index to Periodicals* index current issues. Microfilm of the Review, beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A *Cumulative Index* of the Review, Volumes 1-57: 1906-1963, may be obtained from Northwestern University Press, 1735 Benson, Evanston, Illinois.

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1968, by The American Political Science Association

LIBRARY
San Francisco College for Women
Lone Mountain
San Francisco 18, California

CHANGES WITHIN A DISCIPLINE



UNICEF, photo by Bernard Gerin

Everyone approaches a problem from a different angle. Some jump right into the middle of it. Some find they have loose ends that don't fit. And some come out on top of the problem. Political scientists know the story: one person will attempt to build a structural framework and make the specifics fit, and another will take the specifics and builds a structure. Regardless of style all political theorists try to keep abreast of current theories and methodology. THE **PRENTICE-HALL** texts on political theory are published with this in mind. Variety of theory and method makes the discipline challenging.

Featured in 1968

THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY Fourth Edition, 1968 Edited by Marion D. Irish, The American University and James W. Protho, University of North Carolina
1968, 704 pp., $8.95 (68570-1)

COMPUTERS AND THE POLICY-MAKING COMMUNITY: Applications to International Relations Edited by Davis B. Bobrow, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Judah L. Schwartz
November 1968, 368 pp., $12.50 (16559-7)

SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY POWER By Willis D. Hawley, University of California, Berkeley, and Frederick M. Wirt, Dennison University
1968, 156 pp., $5.25 (79690-4)

SOME CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF MODERNIZATION By David E. Apter, University of California, Berkeley
1968, 416 pp., $7.95 (82203-1)

Coming in January 1969

OF POWERS AND THEIR POLITICS By Arthur Lee Burns, The Australian National University, Canberra In The Contemporary Political Theory Series
1969 approx. 304 pp., $7.50 (63056-6)

A THEORY OF POLITICAL EXCHANGE: Economic Reasoning in Political Analysis By Robert L. Curry, Sacramento State College and Lawrence Wade, University of California, Davis
1969, approx. 156 pp., $5.95 (91463-0)

For further information, write Box 903

PRENTICE-HALL

ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, N. J. 07632

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

The American
Political Science Review

VOL. LXII DECEMBER, 1968 NO. 4

SOME REFLECTIONS ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS*

MERLE FAINSOD
Harvard University

As World War II drew to a close, the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition—Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill—assembled at Yalta to ponder the future. Already, sharp clashes at the conference table over the future fate of Poland and Eastern Europe cast a sombre spell over the proceedings. But the necessities of the alliance still served to suppress differences and to emphasize a search for consensus. At a tripartite dinner meeting on 8 February 1945, President Roosevelt, ever hopeful, described the relations of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States "as that of a family" and spoke of a future in which their common objectives would be "to give to every man, woman, and child on this earth the possibility of security and well-being."[1] Marshal Stalin, perhaps more realistic, "remarked that it was not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there was a joint aim to defeat the common enemy which was clear to everyone. . . . the difficult task came after the war when diverse interests tended to divide the allies."[2] Nevertheless, he expressed himself as "confident that the present alliance would meet this test also and that it was our duty to see that it would, and that our relations in peacetime should be as strong as they had been in war." Prime Minister Churchill somewhat grandiloquently spoke of "standing on the crest of a hill with the glories of future possibilities stretching before us. He said that in the modern world the function of leadership was to lead the people out from the forests into the broad sunlit plains of peace and happiness. He felt this prize was nearer our grasp than any time before in history and it would be a tragedy for which history would never forgive us if we let this prize slip from our grasp through inertia or carelessness."[3]

In retrospect, it is almost too easy to dismiss the pronouncements of Roosevelt as naïve, the declarations of Stalin as misleading, and the effusions of Churchill as meaningless banquet oratory. Yet, harsh as history's judgment may turn out to be on the aftermath of Yalta, there remains a sense of a great opportunity tragically lost, of statesmen not unaware of their responsibilities, but denied the possibilities of fulfilling them because of the very different visions of national interest and world order which guided their thoughts and actions.

On the American side two sharply contrasting views of post-war relations with the Soviet Union emerged as the time approached for peace-making. The more sanguine school envisaged no insuperable barriers to a satisfactory post-war relationship with the Soviet Union. Indeed, it assumed that American willingness to recognize Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe and to provide aid in Soviet post-war reconstruction would disarm Soviet suspicions, change the attitudes of its leaders toward collaboration with the West, and build the basis of a permanent peace. On the other hand, those who prided themselves on their realism saw the expansion of Soviet power in the post-war world as a force which had to be checked and restrained.[4] Persuaded, as George Kennan was later to put it, that the Kremlin's "main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power," the conclusion followed that "the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."[5] This doctrine of containment, which was to be adopted as the basis of American policy toward the Soviet Union in the post-war period, clearly meant that the United States would "regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena."[6] While the existence of this rivalry did not exclude an uneasy coexis-

---

* Presidential address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 5, 1968.

[1] U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, 1955) p. 798.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid*, pp. 798–799.

[4] Whatever may have been Stalin's long range goals, his actions in the closing days of the war and the immediate post-war period clearly revealed that he was determined to assume a dominant position in Eastern Europe and to regain the Far Eastern Tsarist territories lost in the Russo-Japanese War. But his claims were even

---

more far-reaching. They included a demand for a military base on the Turkish Straits which would enable the Soviet Union to control access to the Black Sea, trusteeship of one of the former Italian North African colonies which would establish the Soviet Union as a Mediterranean power, participation in control of the Ruhr as well as unilateral control of the East Zone of Germany, and an insistence on prolonging Soviet occupation of Iranian territory. It could be, and indeed was, argued that none of these actions directly affected American interests. But, as Harriman put it in a wartime dispatch (September 20, 1944) to the Secretary of State, "What frightens me however is that when a country begins to extend its influence by strong arm methods beyond its borders under the guise of security it is difficult to see how a line can be drawn. If the policy is accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to penetrate her immediate neighbors for security, penetration of the next immediate neighbors becomes at a certain time equally logical." It was out of the fear of further penetration that the policy of containment was born.

In theory, at least, Stalin might have pursued an alternative course which would have eased the task of post-war collaboration with his wartime allies. Had he limited his expansionist claims and permitted regimes based on local preferences to emerge in Eastern Europe, the way might have been opened for a large American post-war reconstruction loan to aid in the rebuilding of the Soviet economy. Yet to state an option in this form is to fail to come to grips with Stalin's commitments and calculations. Deeply suspicious of his capitalist partners, he could not even conceive of entrusting his future security to their goodwill or good nature. As his Politburo associate, Mikhaiel Kalinin put it in an August 1945 address to a conference of party propagandists: "Even now after the greatest victory known to history we cannot for one minute forget the basic fact that our country remains the one socialist state in the world . . . . The victory achieved does not mean that all dangers to our state structure and social order have disappeared. Only the more concrete, most immediate danger, which threatened us from Hitlerite Germany, has disappeared. In order that the danger of war may really disappear for a long time, it is necessary to consolidate our victory."

To consolidate the victory meant installing "friendly" regimes wherever the writ of Soviet power ran, and in the last analysis the only "friendly" regimes that could be fully trusted were Communist-dominated ones. As Stalin stated in an unusual moment of frankness, "A freely elected government in any of these countries would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot allow." Assured by Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference that there would be no American troops left in Europe two years after the war, he counted on the dissipation of American military forces to open up new opportunities for the Soviet Union as the dominant continental military power. At the same time he did not overestimate his strength and sought to avoid direct challenges which maximized the risk of war. Urged by Tito to help drive the Anglo-Americans out of Trieste, he gave the Yugoslavs diplomatic support, but stopped short of military action. In a revealing exchange with the Yugoslavs, he declared: "Since all other methods were exhausted, the Soviet Union had only one other method left for gaining Trieste for Yugoslavia—to start war with the Anglo-Americans over Trieste and take it by force. The Yugoslav comrades could not fail to realize that after such a hard war the USSR could not enter another." Nor did Stalin at first believe that the policies which he was espousing necessarily meant that he would have to forego Western aid in Soviet post-war reconstruction. Convinced that the United States faced the prospect of large-scale unemployment and a major economic crisis at the end of the war, he apparently calculated that the Americans would be driven to extend sizable credits on favorable terms by their need to find outlets for their exports. In this, as in other appraisals of American reactions, Stalin turned out to be mistaken. The result was to force him back on his own resources, to lead him to exploit to the utmost such war booty and reparations as were available to him and to launch a new industrialization drive at home with its attendant sacrifice of living standards to guarantee the "homeland . . . against all possible accidents."

---

[5] George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," reprinted in A Foreign Affairs Reader, Philip E. Mosely, (ed.), *The Soviet Union 1922–1962*, (New York, Praeger, 1963), pp. 177–178.

[6] *Ibid*, p. 183.

tence of the two systems, its effect was necessarily to increase the strains of the Soviet-American relationship and to open up the prospect of a series of dangerous confrontations wherever Soviet and American interests impinged or collided.

From the beginning, the doctrine of containment had its critics. Voices on the right denounced it for its passivity and lack of aggressiveness. They argued that containment was essentially a negative and static policy, that it left the initiative with the Soviet Union, and that the main object of American policy ought to be to roll back the Soviet advance and liberate areas captured by the Communists. Perhaps the most articulate spokesman for this point of view was John Foster Dulles, though once ensconced in power as Secretary of State he did more than any one else to demonstrate that it was empty rhetoric. Put to the test of responding to the East German rising of 1953, the Hungarian revolution of 1956, and repeated calls to unleash Chiang-Kai-Shek, he proved it was easier to condemn containment than to abandon it.

On the other hand, there were some like Walter Lippmann who criticized the doctrine of containment from a different vantage point. Writing in 1947, Lippmann saw containment as implying "unending intervention in all the countries that are supposed to contain the Soviet Union"[7] and feared that it would involve the United States in commitments which would strain its resources to the breaking point. Lippmann refused to accept the then prevalent view that the Soviet Union was bent on world domination. Arguing that Soviet objectives were limited and amenable to compromise, Lippmann called for an effort to ease the tensions of the Cold War by neutralizing Germany and withdrawing Soviet and Western forces from Central Europe. George Kennan, the father of the doctrine of containment, shared many of Lippmann's misgivings about the way in which containment was being interpreted by American officialdom.[8] Because he believed that American policy makers were over-emphasizing the military threat from the Soviet Union, Kennan regarded military assistance to nations such as Turkey, which bordered on the Soviet Union, as unduly provocative. Because he believed that American foreign policy should only be concerned with areas vital to American security, he also objected to open-ended commitments to oppose Communism anywhere and everywhere. Nor, in Kennan's view, did containment exclude efforts to lessen tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the post-Stalinist period Kennan became an ardent advocate of Lippmann's proposals for the neutralization of Germany and disengagement in Central Europe.

As post-war relations between the Soviet Union and the United States deteriorated, the warnings and pleas of the Lippmanns and Kennans went unheeded. The lessons of the first Berlin crisis and the Korean War were read as dictating a policy of building American positions of military strength wherever a threat of Communist aggression presented itself. The results were predictable. A stalemate of sorts was achieved. But meanwhile both sides embarked on a desperate arms race. Both sides sought to strengthen and solidify their own systems of alliances while probing for weaknesses in the camps of their antagonists. Both sides sought to exploit the power vacuum created by decolonization to carve out new areas of support and influence. And both sides on occasion tested each other's resolution by acts of brinksmanship that threatened to set the whole world on fire. The Cuban missile crisis epitomized the dangers of confrontation in a thermonuclear age. Surely no one who endured that week with its eerie sense of a doomsday clock ticking relentlessly away will ever forget that the rivalry of the two most powerful nations on earth had reached a point where there was a serious possibility of their mutual extinction. Nor was the lesson lost on Moscow. Khrushchev summed it up in a memorable sentence: "There was a smell of burning in the air."[9]

We have reason to be profoundly grateful that this and other crises in Soviet-American relations have thus far been surmounted without a nuclear catastrophe. We have been compelled in recent years to learn a great deal about the art of crisis management; perhaps the time has come to address ourselves to the art of crisis prevention.

The question which I should like to pose this evening is whether we and the Soviet Union stand condemned to behave, in J. Robert Oppenheimer's metaphor, like two deadly scorpions in a bottle, "each capable of killing ing the other, but only at the risk of his own life,"[10] or whether we can find a basis for living together peacefully by a joint recognition that our survival depends on the prevention of total war.

---

[7] Quoted in Walter Lafeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1966* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), p. 55.

[8] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (Boston: Atlantic, Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 354–367.

[9] *Pravda*, December 13, 1962.

Let me begin, where foreign policy begins, with the two political systems and cultures that we are considering. In a much-quoted passage in *Democracy in America*, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1835:

> "There are, at the present time, two great nations in the world which seem to tend towards the same end, although they started from different points: I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and whilst the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly assumed a most prominent place among the nations . . . ."
>
> "All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits, and only to be charged with the maintenance of their power; but these are still in the act of growth; all the others are stopped, or continue to advance with great difficulty; these are proceeding with ease and with celerity along a path to which the human eye can assign no term. The American struggles against the natural obstacles which oppose him; the adversaries of the Russian are men; the former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its weapons and its arts; the conquests of the one are therefore gained by the ploughshare; those of the other by the sword. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the citizens; the Russian centres all the authority of society in a single arm; the principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter servitude. Their starting point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."[11]

I cite this passage not because I subscribe to de Tocqueville's catalogue of American virtues and Russian vices, but because in an almost uncanny way, de Tocqueville more than a century ago, not only caught the dynamic quality of the two societies but pointed up the antithesis between a pluralist and an authority-dominated culture which present-day proponents of the theory of convergence tend to obscure. Because industrial societies tend to be alike in many respects, it does not follow that they will be alike in all respects. Political ideas and movements have a vitality all their own; their development is not unilaterally determined by the discipline of the assembly line.

The Soviet political system is the outgrowth and projection of an authority-dominated culture; its ruling party elite arrogates to itself the right to determine the policies and programs which guide the destinies of the state. Its primary domestic objective has been rapid industrialization; indeed its historic achievement has been the transformation of a relatively backward society into an industrial and military super-power by authoritarian means. It has given priority to the development of heavy industry, science, and armaments while stinting on investments in agriculture, housing, and consumer goods. Its most fundamental concern has been its own survival and security, and it has based its security on a monopoly of political power and the building of industrial and military strength. Its suspicion and distrust of the so-called capitalist world have strong ideological roots in Marxism-Leninism; these have in turn been reinforced by the experiences of the Allied intervention and blockade during the Civil War, the Nazi invasion, and the Cold War. Its Leninist legacy had been a messianic dream of the triumph of Communism on a world scale, though messianism has waned as Soviet national interests have come to the forefront and met resistance from both Communist and non-Communist states. The imperial domain inherited from the Czars has become the focal point of a new Soviet patriotism; the Soviet leaders, like the Czars before them, have manifested a special interest in expanding Russian influence in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Straits, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Mongolian and Manchurian borderlands.

At the same time a half century of Soviet rule has produced changes in Soviet society that impose brakes and restraints on the forward thrust of Soviet foreign policy. Revolutions have their own natural history. Over time they exhaust their revolutionary drive, and demands set in for normalization. The social changes which revolutions effect congeal into vested interests in the post-revolutionary status quo. The result in the Soviet Union has been to create a highly bureaucratized and stratified society resistant to change. While the economy is still capable of reasonably rapid growth, technological progress in such new industrial fields as automation, computers, petro-chemicals, and industrial research and development has lagged behind the United

---

[10] J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 4, July 1953, p. 529.

[11] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Colonial Press, 1899), Vol. 1, pp. 441–442.

States, and problems of planning and industrial management have become increasingly intricate and difficult. The appetite for bourgeois amenities has never been sharper. After decades of deprivation and sacrifice under Stalin, the Soviet leadership is under increasing pressure to raise the living standards of its own people and to invest more heavily in its relatively backward agricultural sector. The generations that have come to maturity since Stalin's death can no longer be put off with promises of a future Utopia; they look for benefits in the here and now. And some among the scientific and creative intelligentsia have expressed open dissatisfaction with the policy of arrested de-Stalinization which the current leadership is following. They call for an end to literary trials and judicial arbitrariness, for a lifting of censorship, for a greater exchange of information on an international scale, for the right to travel abroad, and for a larger role in the shaping of their own destinies. "Today," in the words of the distinguished Soviet physicist Andrei D. Sakharov, "the key to a progressive restructuring of the system of government in the interests of mankind lies in intellectual freedom."[12] These demands arouse no enthusiasm in high Soviet party circles; they see the call for more freedom as a threat to their own power. Indeed, one of the primary reasons behind the decision of the Soviet Union and its client states to invade Czechoslovakia was the fear that the contagion of progressive liberalization would spread, not merely to neighboring Communist states, but to the Soviet Union itself. In the wake of events in Czechoslovakia one can only anticipate that the Soviet leadership will put even greater stress on the dangers from without in order to justify the suppression of the threat within.

The problems and dilemmas of the Soviet regime are not limited to domestic policy. As the historic leader and most powerful nation in what used to be called the Communist camp, the Soviet Union has proved powerless to arrest its crumbling structure. Yugoslavia asserted its independence early. China and Albania can now be counted Soviet enemies. Rumania has declared her economic independence and oriented much of her trade westwards. Czechoslovakia's valiant struggle to regain her freedom in both domestic and foreign affairs could only be suppressed by brute force. Cuba is committed to its own brand of revolutionary guerrilla strategy. North Korea and North Vietnam represent arenas of combat in which both the Soviet and the Chinese leadership contend for influence. Only Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and East Germany can still be numbered among the Soviet faithful, and in the case of Hungary and Poland at least, the events of the year 1956 serve as a reminder of the tenuousness of their loyalty. Meanwhile, Communist parties throughout the world, from the largest to the smallest, have been emboldened to find their own voices and have not hesitated to disassociate themselves from Soviet policies when to do so served their own interest. The result is that world Communism is a house divided. There are no longer one, but many Communist truths. Nationalism has proved a corrosive force in eroding unity among Communist nations and parties. It should, perhaps, come as no great surprise that so powerful a force as nationalism should reappear in a Communist guise, but for those who have taken professions of brotherhood among Communist nations at face value, it has nevertheless come as a profound shock.

These developments have had two contradictory consequences for Soviet policy. They have left the Soviet Union with the problem of legitimizing its credentials as a revolutionary power; the aid extended to Cuba and North Vietnam serve this purpose. At a more fundamental level, they have exposed the brittleness of Bloc solidarity and thrown the Soviet Union back on its own resources. Its rhetoric continues to invoke the revolutionary phraseology of Marxism-Leninism. Its actual behavior is increasingly indistinguishable from that of any other Great Power.

As a Great Power its interests are worldwide, but its basic concerns focus on Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, and more particularly the areas bordering on the Soviet Union. The border states of Eastern Europe are deemed a vital part of the Soviet defense zone. Here the Soviet leadership insists on a tier of "friendly"—that is, Communist—states joined in a defense pact with the Soviet Union. It is opposed to any form of Western "bridge-building" to Eastern Europe which seeks to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and its East European allies.

The so-called Bonn-Washington axis is seen as the greatest threat to Soviet interests in Europe. With vivid memories of the massive destruction wrought on Russian soil by German armies in both World Wars, the Soviet

---

[12] See his essay, "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Co-existence, and Intellectual Freedom," *The New York Times*, July 22, 1968. This is one of many such statements which are denied publication in the Soviet Union, but which nevertheless circulate privately among the intelligentsia.

Union is prepared to do everything in its power to keep Germany divided, to press for the general recognition of East Germany's sovereignty, to isolate West Germany, and to deny it nuclear weapons. Its constant stress on the strength of revanchist forces in West Germany is designed to serve as a reminder to its East European allies that their true interests lie in relying on Soviet protection. The Soviet attitude toward the American presence in Europe has an element of ambiguity. The dominant line is to call for the withdrawal of American troops from West Germany, the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the adoption of a new European security arrangement from which the United States would be excluded and in which Soviet influence would be paramount. But there are also occasional indications of grudging acceptance of the American presence and intimations that it may even play a stabilizing role in restraining Bonn's revanchist ambitions. The flirtation with de Gaulle provides an opportunity to weaken American influence in Europe, to disrupt NATO, and to isolate West Germany. But de Gaulle's Grand Design for a powerful French-led European Third Force arouses no enthusiasm in Moscow, which suspects with some reason that it may be directed equally against the Soviet Union and the United States.

Soviet policy in the Middle East is aimed at turning the flank of NATO and CENTO and becoming the dominant protector of Arab interests in the region. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, one-time American client states, are being wooed with offers of both economic and military aid in the hope of inducing them to adopt a more friendly orientation toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet alignment with the Arab states, also cemented by extensive military as well as economic aid, is directed, not merely at Israel, but even more at the elimination of Western influence in the area.

On its Far Eastern and Central Asian borders, the Soviet Union confronts China, still relatively weak in military and economic terms, but nevertheless a power which has already demonstrated a nuclear weapons potential, which has placed its irredentist claims against the Soviet Union on record, and which, over the longer term, may develop into a formidable antagonist. Although hopes for the restoration of Sino-Soviet friendship after the passing of Mao are still expressed by the Soviet press, they are not asserted with much conviction. There is no disposition to underplay the threat from China. In language which would do our own Right-Wingers proud, an authoritative Soviet commentator, writing under the pseudonym of "Ernst Henry," recently outlined what he called the "Mao plan" for world domination. Said this commentator, "Mao proposes to include in his Reich—in addition to China itself—Korea, the Mongolian People's Republic, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, and several other countries in the area. In the second stage of 'the storm from the East,' expansion is planned in the direction of the Indian subcontinent, Soviet Central Asia, the Soviet Far East and the Near East. What is anticipated on paper for the third stage is not yet clear. But the plan is not restricted to the 'Maoization of Asia.' We shall gaze proudly upon five continents, one of Mao-tse-tung's myrmidons declares."[13]

Faced with these vaulting ambitions, the Soviet Union has adopted a policy which we can readily recognize as our old friend, containment. It has strengthened its military units along the borders of the Soviet Far East, Central Asia, and Outer Mongolia, and it has provided military aid to India as well as aid to Pakistan to counter Chinese influence. Indeed, even the extensive military and economic aid which it has supplied to North Vietnam may be viewed, not merely as a demonstration of its willingness to come to the assistance of a brother Communist state in order to help it expel the American "imperialists," but also as an effort to decrease the North Vietnamese dependence on China and to reinforce historic Vietnamese resistance to Chinese domination.

Compared to the Soviet involvement in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, Soviet interests in other areas may be described as secondary. Like the United States, it has used trade, military and economic aid, technical assistance and cultural penetration in order to heighten its influence in the underdeveloped world, but in contrast to the diffuse American aid effort, the Soviet program has focused heavily on selected target countries. In the interest of improving relations with nationalist leaders in the new states, it has discouraged premature revolutionary bids for power by local Communists and concentrated instead on building up support within the ruling nationalist movements. It has sought to channel its aid to promote national democratic regimes—that is to say, regimes which stress a socialist path of development and can be counted on to support Soviet foreign policy objectives. But, like the United States, it has discovered that even very large scale military and economic aid can yield disappointing political results, and its experience in Indonesia and Ghana has been particularly disenchanting. Together with the United States, it has also discovered that most of the leaders of the new nations treasure their own independence above all other values, and that they welcome Soviet-American competition in aid-giving primarily as an opportunity to broaden their field of maneuver in order to promote their own interests.

---

[13] Ernst Henry (pseud.), "The View from the Pamirs," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, September 27 and October 4, 1967.

Thus, the Soviet Union finds itself in a position well described by Maxim Litvinov, for many years Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, in his 1929 report to the Soviet Central Executive Committee:

> "Unlike other Commissariats, the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs cannot, unfortunately, put forward a five-year plan of work, a plan for the development of foreign policy . . . . In . . . drawing up the plan of economic development we start from our own aspirations and wishes, from a calculation of our potentialities, and from the firm principles of our entire policy, but in examining the development of foreign policy we have to deal with a number of factors that are scarcely subject to calculation, with a number of elements outside our control and the scope of our action. International affairs are composed not only of our own aspirations and actions, but of those of a large number of countries . . . pursuing other aims than ours, and using other means to achieve those aims than we allow."[14]

Like the United States, the Soviet Union must contend with a world in flux moving in directions which it may hope to influence, but which it cannot fully anticipate nor control. The solid, monolithic Communist bloc of Stalin's dream is no more; national communisms are on the rise, and the largest of these, China, is a sworn antagonist of the Soviet Union. The interests of the Soviet Union collide with the United States on many fronts, but where the containment of China is involved, they also run parallel and merge. The equation of Soviet-American relations has become infinitely more complex than it gave the appearance of being in the simple days of a bipolar world.

The question for both the United States and the Soviet Union is not merely whether they can recognize these new complexities, but whether they can make constructive use of them to achieve a more satisfactory relationship. Recent events in Czechoslovakia do not create a propitious climate for such an effort. Nor can it be said that the American electorate is currently much interested in grappling with the problem. There is a widespread feeling of frustration growing out of America's multiple foreign involvements, a sense that the United States is over-committed abroad and under-committed at home. Racial conflict, riots and burnings in the black ghettos, the decay of the inner cities, the long-neglected demands of the black community and other minority groups for improved treatment, and the shockingly high incidence of poverty, crime, and violence have persuaded many Americans that the time has come for the United States to set its own house in order. The morass of Vietnam has significantly sharpened the feeling that America is over-extended. Balance-of-payment difficulties, disarray in NATO, the belief that allies are not carrying their fair share of the common burden, and disillusionment with foreign aid programs all contribute to a new mood of neo-isolationism. Its results are visible in cutbacks in foreign aid appropriations, in demands for the withdrawal of American troops from West Germany, and above all, in a widespread insistence that the Vietnamese war be brought to a quick end.

Meanwhile, American commitments continue to be global in scope. In Latin America the United States is a party to a hemispheric collective self-defense treaty and joint defense arrangements, though President Johnson's effort in the wake of the 1965 Dominican crisis to proclaim a new doctrine of unilateral American intervention to prevent the spread of Communism in the Western hemisphere, while approved by the House, was not accepted by the Senate. Under the terms of the NATO pact the United States is pledged to come to the aid of its NATO partners in the event of an armed attack against any one of them. Its responsibilities in Germany include the defense of West Berlin and a pledge to work for German unification. In the Middle East the United States has agreed to furnish military equipment to Israel, as well as to "moderate" Arab states; under the Eisenhower doctrine proclaimed in 1957 and approved by the Congress the President may send military forces to any nation in the Middle

---

[14] From the report by Maxim Litvinov, Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the Central Executive Committee, December 4, 1929, translated in Jane Degras, *Soviet Documents in Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), Vol. 2, p. 408.

East which requests help in preserving "its independence and integrity." The United States is not a party to CENTO, but in effect it provides backstop support for that organization through its bilateral military aid treaties with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. In Southeast Asia the SEATO pact provides a basis for American intervention to resist armed aggression and counter subversive activities in the Philippines and Thailand, as well as South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, provided that the threatened government approves. The American Seventh Fleet stands guard in the Formosa Straits to assure the security of Taiwan and the Pescadores under the terms of a mutual defense pact with Chiang-Kai-Shek. Japan is bound to the United States by a mutual security pact which provides for the continuation of American military bases on Japanese soil, and a similar treaty commits the United States to the defense of South Korea. Under the terms of the so-called ANZUS Treaty the United States guarantees the security of both Australia and New Zealand.

These wide-ranging commitments, inspired variously by fear of aggression from the Soviet Union, Communist China, and local subversive Communist movements, place a heavy burden on Americans which many appear increasingly disinclined to bear. They note a spiralling defense budget of more than 80 billion dollars imposing sharp limits on the resources which are made available to solve America's own social problems, while the pressing needs of the poor nations of the world also suffer neglect. They see the casualty figures from Vietnam, not as abstract statistics but as the dead, the maimed, and the missing in their own families and neighborhoods. They watch with apprehension as those dear to them are called up for military service, and they fear that their country's self-appointed role as a world policeman may involve them in conflicts that will make Vietnam look like a minor skirmish. Some ask whether the United States cannot limit its commitments without endangering its vital interests and whether even the shocking Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia should be permitted to deter efforts to find terms of accommodation with the Soviet Union and other Communist states.

But such sentiments are by no means universally shared by Americans. Thus former President Eisenhower in his message to the 1968 Republican National Convention warned against a "growing disposition" toward "wishful thinking" which expressed itself in a search for "surface accommodations" with the Communists. In Eisenhower's words, "Abroad, in every major sector, we confront a formidable foe—an expansionist tyranny which respects only toughness and strength. Today the Communists reach ruthlessly for domination over Southeast Asia. . . . In the Middle East, month by month they move closer to testing our resolution. The same is true in Korea. Constantly they stir new troubles in every area of weakness they can ferret out in Eastern Europe, in Africa and Latin America . . . they continue to expand their military power."[15] And the tocsin which he sounded was no retreat.

Meanwhile, a number of steps have been taken which move in the direction of a Soviet-American detente. In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis arrangements were made for a direct line between Moscow and Washington, in order as President Kennedy put it, "to avoid on each side the dangerous delays, misunderstandings, and misreadings of the other's actions which might occur at a time of crisis."[16] This action was followed by the conclusion of a treaty outlawing nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, but leaving the parties free to conduct underground tests. In 1967 an Outer Space Treaty was approved prohibiting, among other things, the stationing of nuclear weapons in orbit. The very important non-proliferation treaty signed this year is accompanied by assurances from both the Soviet Union and the United States that they will come to the aid of any signatory non-nuclear weapon state that is threatened with nuclear aggression, an action which would presumably give India the assurance of protection against a Chinese nuclear attack. Explorations are under way to impose mutually agreed limits on the production of both offensive and anti-ballistic missiles. During the course of the past year both countries also reached an agreement to assist astronauts downed in either country, signed a consular treaty, inaugurated direct flights between New York and Moscow, and, after some delay, renewed their cultural exchange agreement.

Opinions will differ as to whether these are more than "surface accommodations." Certainly large and important issues continue to separate the United States from the Soviet Union. But these agreements do suggest that there are shared interests as well as great differences. The question is whether the interests that we hold in common provide a sufficient basis for a continuing search for a detente. The pursuit of such a goal is not likely to be easy. For however great may be the resistance of the Russians, a part of the trouble lies within ourselves. We are a nation torn by conflicting pressures, wavering between hopes for peace and fear of Communism, weary of foreign entanglements and yet fearful of abandoning them, more confident in our means than clear about our purposes, sure of our good intentions and frustrated when others do not recognize them, accustomed to victory and feeling betrayed when we must settle for less, believing that every problem must have a solution and baffled when none is forthcoming, impatient with long drawn-out negotiations yet compelled to learn how to make creative use of them if we wish to survive.

---

[15] *New York Times*, August 6, 1968.

[16] President John F. Kennedy, "Toward a Strategy of Peace," (Commencement Address at American University, Washington, D. C., June 10, 1963), reprinted in Council on Foreign Relations, Richard P. Stebbins (ed.), *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, 1963 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 121.

What then are the common interests of the Soviet Union and the United States on which we can build? The most basic is that neither of us would survive a nuclear conflict between us. President Kennedy summed it up well in his American University speech: "Today, should total war break out again—no matter how—our two countries would become the primary targets. It is an ironical but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours."[17] Nor does Moscow dissent from this appraisal. As Khrushchev put it in an address to the East German Party Congress: "There is no doubt that if a thermonuclear war were unleashed by the imperialist maniacs, the capitalist system that gave rise to the war would perish in it. But would the socialist countries and the cause of the struggle for socialism throughout the world gain from a world thermonuclear catastrophe? Only people who deliberately close their eyes to the facts can think this. As far as Marxist-Leninists are concerned, they cannot think in terms of a Communist civilization built upon the ruin of the world's cultural centers, on ravaged earth contaminated by thermonuclear fallout. This is not to mention the fact that for many people there would be no socialism at all, since they would have been removed from the face of our planet."[18]

At the same time, both of the thermonuclear super powers are under great pressure to find, if they can, a solution to the problem of defense against thermonuclear striking power. Both are seeking and will be seeking in areas of science still unknown and unexplored the secret of their future security. Given the dynamic quality of military technology in the last decades, it would be a rash prophet indeed who would predict that the world has seen the end of innovation in weaponry. Yet there appears to be a widespread consensus in both the Soviet and American scientific-technical communities that the technology and tactics of nuclear attack have so far outstripped the technology of defense that the obstacles to an effective missile defense, at the present time, are virtually insurmountable. Some military theoreticians may still dream of a situation in which a combination of overwhelming superiority in attack weapons and an effective missile defense may enable one or the other side to launch a preemptive attack with impunity. But most American experts would agree with the Soviet academician, A. D. Sakharov, who recently observed, "Fortunately for the stability of the world, the difference between the technical-economic potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States is not so great that one of the sides could undertake a 'preventive aggression' without an almost inevitable risk of a destructive retaliatory blow. This situation would not be changed by a broadening of the arms race through the development of anti-missile defenses."[19]

If these propositions are accepted as valid, they would suggest that the United States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in adopting a moratorium on the construction of anti-missile systems, in limiting the arms race in offensive weapons, and in seeking to "avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war."[20]

The Soviet Union and the United States also share a common concern about Chinese nuclear developments and territorial ambitions. This concern has already led to parallel actions providing both military and economic support to India at the time of the Sino-Indian border conflict, to efforts independently pursued to ease Indian-Pakistani rivalry and to counter Chinese penetration in Pakistan, and, as has already been indicated, to joint guarantees under the non-proliferation treaty designed to prevent a nuclear power like China from directing its nuclear force against its non-nuclear neighbors. These actions do not necessarily mean, as Peking has charged, that a Soviet-American alliance is in the making. When two rivals join to ward off a threat from a third who menaces them both, their differences do not automatically disappear. They may submerge their differences in the interests of common action, but each may still hope to emerge as the ultimate victor.

---

[17] *Ibid,* p. 119.

[18] *Pravda,* January 17, 1963.

[19] *New York Times,* July 22, 1968.

[20] President John F. Kennedy, *op. cit.,* p. 120.

Yet it is precisely because there can be no victor in a thermonuclear war that we must find new ways of muting the frictions and tensions that have characterized the Soviet-American relationship. As we look round the world from West Berlin and Germany through the Middle East to Southeast Asia, we see crises and confrontations looming before us in every direction. Is it beyond the wit of man to find ways of dealing with them before they burst upon us? I hope that I will not be misunderstood as suggesting that the United States and the Soviet Union can between them solve all the world's problems or that they can once and for all achieve a grand settlement of their differences. In a world of movement and change, where power configurations within and among nations shift over time, and the ambitions of sovereign nations clash, it is utopian to expect that conflicts can be eliminated. What is at issue is whether they can be moderated. Are there fresh initiatives which can be taken now which will avert future Soviet-American confrontations?

Let us look briefly at a few of the world's danger points. Clearly one of the most troublesome issues is presented by the problem of German unification and the future of West Berlin. Equally clearly, no progress is likely to be made in resolving this issue as long as the Soviet Union continues to adhere to a policy of two Germanys and regards Western proposals for unification through free elections as ill-disguised attempts to liquidate the Communist regime of East Germany and to tie the whole of Germany to the West. Are there other approaches to the problem of German unification, which can win both Soviet and Western acceptance, as well as the approval of the two existing German regimes? Is it too late to reconsider proposals for the neutralization of Germany as a condition of unification? Can a basis be laid for unification by an agreed mutual withdrawal of troops? Can unification be made acceptable within the context of a European community, free of both Soviet and American domination? I fully realize that each of these questions raises a host of problems, and indeed that the most formidable obstacle to unification is the fact that the two parts of Germany embody such diametrically opposed political systems. It may be that unification will come only when the evolution of social and political forces in both East and West Germany prepares the way for it. I would only urge that where old formulas have brought us to a dead end the time may be ripe for fresh initiatives.

When we turn to the Middle East, the sense of an impending and almost unavoidable collision of Soviet and American power is heavy upon us. The decision of the Soviet Union after the six-day war to rearm its Arab clients has been met, if not matched, by American military aid to Israel. Efforts to reach agreement on a limitation of arms shipments to the area have thus far enjoyed no success. Soviet military personnel in increasing numbers are training Arab military forces, the Soviet Mediterranean fleet has been enlarged, naval bases have been established in Arab ports, the Soviet air lift capacity has been improved, and the possibility of direct Soviet military intervention in the area cannot be disregarded. Hopes of achieving a peace settlement between the Arabs and Israelis have centered on a resolution unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on November 22, 1967 which laid down certain principles to be accepted by both sides, including the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from occupied territories, the termination of all claims of belligerency, the right of freedom of navigation, a just settlement of the refugee problem, and the guarantee of the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area. Thus far the efforts of Ambassador Jarring, the United Nations Special Representative, to obtain agreement on a settlement in accordance with the resolution have not borne fruit. Arab terrorism and Israeli reprisal raids continue. The Israelis call for direct negotiations and a formal peace treaty with the Arabs. Leaders of the Arab cause refuse to recognize Israel and talk of reopening a holy war to put an end to the State of Israel.

Are there initiatives which the United States can still take in negotiations with the Soviet Union to prevent the Middle Eastern crisis from flaring up into a major confrontation? Is it too late to renew efforts to impose agreed limits on arms shipments to the rival parties? Can a joint arrangement be reached to refrain from direct military intervention in the area? Is there sufficient common interest in avoiding a major confrontation in the Middle East to provide a basis for joint pressure on both the Arabs and the Israelis to moderate their most extreme positions in the interest of a workable settlement? Again, I repeat that I am under no illusions about the difficulties which stand in the way of the success of such efforts. I can only plead that not to try at all is a sure guarantee of failure.

Finally, let us turn to Southeast Asia. It is commonly assumed, and I believe correctly, that the termination of the war in Vietnam and the withdrawal of American troops would contribute to an easing of Soviet-American relations. But we would still be left with the problem of defining our future role in Southeast Asia and our obligations, such as they may be, to Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, not to mention Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Would we, for example, dispatch troops to Laos to prevent a complete Pathet Lao take-over or send large military contingents to Thailand to help suppress a growing guerrilla movement? After our experience in Vietnam, it would appear most unlikely. Our proclaimed purpose in Southeast Asia is to assist nations whose self-determination is threatened and who want to help themselves. In practice this has meant providing help to non-Communist governments endangered by internal or external Communist subversion. In Vietnam this policy collided with the determination of both the Soviet Union and Communist China to help North Vietnam and the Viet Cong to overthrow the Saigon government and expel the Americans. Clearly, there can be no basis for a common Soviet-American policy in Southeast Asia as long as the United States is ready to suppress any bid to expand Communist power and the Soviet Union is prepared to assist so-called national liberation movements which the United States regards as thin veneers for Communist take-overs. Short of a mutual agreement to refrain from such intervention, perhaps the most that can be hoped for in the way of concerted policy is that the United States and the Soviet Union will take parallel actions in areas accessible to each of them to counter an expansion of Chinese power and influence in the region.

So far I have spoken mainly of conflicts and how they might be muted. But there are also opportunities for cooperation which have only begun to be explored. A start has been made in collaborative endeavor in Antarctica, in agreements for exchanges in scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and other fields, and in attendance and exchange of views by Soviet and American scientists and scholars at both national and international scientific conferences. But there are many other substantive fields in which collaboration would serve the interests of both nations. They include the exploration of space and of the ocean floor, attacks on the pollution of the environment, work on irrigation and the desalting of water, the establishment of a global satellite communications system, weather forecasting, medicine, population control, increasing food supplies, and many others. The scientific community in both nations would eagerly welcome such cooperation.

Meanwhile, Soviet-American relations are still entangled in a complex web of rival ambitions and shared concerns. Both Soviet and American policy makers have been made vividly aware of the suicidal implications of a thermonuclear conflict; the result has been to increase pressure on both sides to behave with restraint in major confrontations of power. Both the Soviet Union and the United States feel threatened by the long-term potential of Communist China; the result has been to force them to think of themselves as possible allies as well as rivals.

With these developments in mind, it would be pleasant to end this discussion on the note that a war between the United States and the Soviet Union is now unthinkable. Moscow is more cautious. Its formulation is that war is not fatalistically inevitable. But even that is progress. For it opens the way to action directed at the prevention of conflict rather than to its passive acceptance. As the philosopher Karl Jaspers once wisely put it: "Anyone who regards an impending war as certain is helping on its occurrence, precisely through his certainty. Any one who regards peace as certain grows carefree and unintentionally impels us into war. Only he who sees the peril, and does not for one instant forget it, is able to behave in a rational fashion and to do what is possible to exorcise it."

"It is of crucial significance for the course of events whether the individual can endure to remain in suspense; or whether he flees into certainties. . . . The most compelling element in our lives is the fact that we do not know the future, but contribute toward its realization and see it loom before us incalculable in its entirety."[21]

Let me conclude in the words of President Kennedy: "There is no single, simple key to . . . peace, no grand or magic formula to be adopted by one or two powers. Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process, a way of solving problems."[22]

---

[21] Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 151.

[22] President John F. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

A CAUSAL MODEL OF CIVIL STRIFE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS USING NEW INDICES[1]

TED GURR
Princeton University

This article describes some results of a successful attempt to assess and refine a causal model of the general conditions of several forms of civil strife, using cross-sectional analyses of data collected for 114 polities. The theoretical argument, which is discussed in detail elsewhere, stipulates a set of variables said to determine the likelihood and magnitude of civil strife.[2] Considerable effort was given here to devising indices that represent the theoretical variables more closely than the readily-available aggregate indices often used in quantitative cross-national research. One consequence is an unusually high degree of statistical explanation: measures of five independent variables jointly account for two-thirds of the variance among nations in magnitude of civil strife ($R = .80$, $R^2 = .64$).

It should be noted at the outset that this study does not attempt to isolate the set of conditions that leads specifically to "revolution," nor to assess the social or political impact of any given act of strife except as that impact is reflected in measures of "magnitude" of strife. The relevance of this kind of research to the classic concern of political scholarship with revolution is its attempt at identification and systematic analysis of conditions that dispose men to strife generally, revolution included.

I. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The basic theoretical proposition is that a psychological variable, relative deprivation, is the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind, and that the more widespread and intense deprivation is among members of a population, the greater is the magnitude of strife in one or another form. Relative deprivation is defined as actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep). The underlying causal mechanism is derived from psychological theory and evidence to the effect that one innate response to perceived deprivation is discontent or anger, and that anger is a motivating state for which aggression is an inherently satisfying response. The term relative deprivation is used below to denote the perceived discrepancy, discontent to denote the motivating state which is the postulated response to it. The relationship between discontent and participation in strife is however mediated by a number of intervening social conditions. The initial theoretical model stipulated three such societal variables that are explored here, namely coercive potential, institutionalization, and social facilitation.[3] Results of a previous attempt to operationalize

---

[1] This is a revised version of a paper read at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 5–9 The research was supported in part by the Center for Research in Social Systems (formerly SORO), The American University, and by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense. This support implies neither sponsor approval of this article and its conclusions nor the author's approval of policies of the U.S. government toward civil strife. The assistance of Charles Ruttenberg throughout the process of research design, data collection, and analysis is gratefully acknowledged. Substantial portions of the data were collected by Joel Prager and Lois Wasserspring. The author owes special thanks to Harry Eckstein for his advice and encouragement. Bruce M. Russett and Raymond Tanter provided useful criticisms of the paper in draft form. Research was carried out at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

[2] Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, 20 (January 1968), 245–278.

[3] Coercive potential is labelled "retribution" in *ibid.* The theoretical model also stipulates a set of variables that determines the intensity of deprivation. In the research reported in the present article, deprivation was operationalized directly rather than by reference to its component variables. The causal mechanism of the theory is the frustration-aggression relationship, which the author has attempted to modify and apply to collective strife in the light of recent empirical and theoretical work, e.g., Leonard Berkowitz, *Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), and Aubrey J. Yates, *Frustration and Conflict* (New York: Wiley, 1962).



some of these variables and relate them to strife suggested that a fourth variable whose effects should be controlled is the legitimacy of the political regime in which strife occurs.[4]

The initial model, sketched in simplified form in Figure 1, specified no hierarchical or causal interactions among the mediating variables. Each was assumed to have an independent effect on the fundamental relationship between deprivation and strife. The theoretical arguments with reference to each variable are briefly stated here.

Great importance is attributed in psychological theory and equally, in theoretical and empirical studies of revolutionary behavior, to the inhibiting effects of punishment or coercion, actual or threatened, on the outcome of deprivation. The relationship is not necessarily a linear one whereby increasing levels of coercion are associated with declining levels of violence. Psychological evidence suggests that if an aggressive response to deprivation is thwarted by fear of punishment, this interference is itself a deprivation and increases the instigation to aggression. Comparative studies of civil strife suggest a curvilinear relationship whereby medium levels of coercion, indexed for example by military participation ratios or ratings of regime repressiveness, are associated with the highest magnitudes of strife. Only very high levels of coercion appear to limit effectively the extent of strife.[5] No systematic comparative study has examined whether the curvilinear relationship also holds for levels of coercion actually applied. Comparative studies have, however, emphasized the importance of the loyalty of coercive forces to the regime as a factor of equal or greater importance than the size of those forces in deterring strife, and this relationship is almost certainly linear, i.e., the greater the loyalty of coercive forces, the more effective they are, *ceteris paribus,* in deterring strife.[6] Two measures of coercion are used in this study: *coercive force size,* which is hypothesized to vary curvilinearly with levels of strife, and coercive force size weighted for the degree of loyalty of coercive forces to the regime, referred to throughout as *coercive potential,* which is expected to have a linear relationship with strife.

The second intervening variable is *institutionalization,* i.e., the extent to which societal structures beyond the primary level are broad in scope, command substantial resources and/or personnel, and are stable and persisting. Representative of the diverse arguments about the role of associational structures in minimizing strife are Huntington on the necessity of political institutionalization for political stability, Kornhauser on the need for structures intervening between mass and elite to minimize mass movements, and a variety of authors on the long-range tendencies of labor organizations to minimize violent economically-based conflict.[7] Two underlying psychological processes are likely to affect the intensity of and responses to discontent. One is that the existence of such structures increases men's value opportunities, i.e., their repertory of alternative ways to attain value satisfaction. A complementary function is that of displacement: labor unions, political parties, and a range of other associations may provide the discontented with routinized and typically non-violent means for expressing their discontents.[8] The proposed relationship is linear: the greater the institutionalization, the lower the magnitude of strife is likely to be.

---

[4] Ted Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, *The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 28, April 1967).

[5] See Douglas Bwy, "Governmental Instability in Latin America: The Preliminary Test of a Causal Model of the Impulse to 'Extra-Legal' Change," paper read at the American Psychological Association Annual Convention, New York, September 2–6, 1966; Jennifer Walton, "Correlates of Coerciveness and Permissiveness of National Political Systems: A Cross-National Study," (M.A. thesis, San Diego State College, 1965); Gurr and Ruttenberg, *The Conditions of Civil Violence* . . . , 81–84.

[6] See, for example, Chalmers Johnson, *Revolution and the Social System* (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1964), pp. 14–22.

[7] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics,* 17 (April 1965), 386–430; William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1959); and Arthur M. Ross and George W. Hartmann, *Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict* (New York: Wiley, 1960), among others.

[8] Gurr, "Psychological Factors. . ."

Given the existence of widespread discontent in a population, a great number of social and environmental conditions may be present that facilitate the outbreak and persistence of strife. They may be categorized according to their inferred psychological effects, for example, according to whether they facilitate interaction among the discontented, or provide the discontented with a sense that violent responses to deprivation are justified, or give them the means to make such responses with maximum effect, or shelter them from retribution.[9] Two aspects of facilitation are treated separately in this study: *past levels of civil strife* and *social and structural facilitation* per se. The theoretical basis for the first of these variables is that populations in which strife is chronic tend to develop, by an interaction process, a set of beliefs justifying violent responses to deprivation; the French tradition of urban "revolution" is a striking example. Social and structural facilitation (referred to below as "facilitation") comprises aspects of organizational and environmental facilitation of strife, and the provision of external assistance. The operational hypotheses are that the greater the levels of past strife, and of social and structural facilitation, the greater is the magnitude of strife.

Two considerations suggested the incorporation of the fourth intervening variable examined in this study, *legitimacy of the regime.* A study of strife for the years 1961–1963 identified a number of nations that had less strife than might be expected on the basis of characteristics they shared with more strife-ridden polities.[10] One apparent common denominator among them was a high degree of popular support for the regime. This appeared consistent with Merelman's recently-proposed learning-theory rationale for legitimacy, to the effect that people comply with directives of the regime in order to gain both the symbolic rewards of governmental action and the actual rewards with which government first associated itself, an argument that applies equally well to acceptance of deprivation and is compatible with experimental findings, in work on the frustration-aggression relationship, that people are less aggressive when they perceive frustration to be reasonable or justifiable.[11] The proposed relationship of legitimacy as an intervening variable is linear: the greater is regime legitimacy at a given level of deprivation, the less the magnitude of consequent strife.

II. OPERATIONAL MEASURES

The universe of analysis chosen for evaluating the model comprised 114 distinct national and colonial political entities, each of which had a population of one million or more in 1962.[12] Data on civil strife were collected for 1961 through 1965. Cross-sectional multiple and partial correlation techniques were used. The use of product-moment correlation coefficients was justified on grounds of their necessity for multiple regression, although not all the indicators formally meet the order-of-measurement requirements of the techniques used.

Because of the very considerable difficulties of operationalizing a number of the variables, and the fact that most of the indicators constructed are new, this article gives relatively close attention to the data collection and scaling procedures.

With the exception of magnitude of strife and its components, the underlying variables examined in this study are unmeasured and must be inferred from indicators. In most instances they are in fact unmeasureable by aggregate data, since they relate in the instance of deprivation-induced discontent to a state of mind, and in the case of the intervening variables to conditions that have their effect only insofar as the discontented perceive them, and moreover perceive them as relevant to their response to deprivation. Following Blalock's recommendation that "when dealing with unmeasured variables it will usually be advisable to make use of more than one indicator for each underlying variable," each of the summary measures used in this study is derived by combining two to seven indicators of the underlying variable. This procedure has not only the advantage Blalock attributes to it, namely of minimizing the effects of confounding variables, but also facilitates incorporation of various empirically-discrete conditions that have theoretically-identical effects.[13]

---

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] Gurr and Ruttenberg, *The Conditions of Civil Violence . . .*, 100–106.

[11] Richard M. Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," this REVIEW, 60 (September 1966); see also the work of Pastore and of Kregarman and Worchel, reviewed in Berkowitz, *op. cit.*, *passim.*

[12] Five polities meeting these criteria were excluded: Laos on grounds that at no time in the 1960's did it have even the forms of a unified regime, and Albania, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam for lack of sufficient reliable data. The universe nonetheless includes polities with more than 98 percent of the world's population.

[13] Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 166–167, italicized in original.

Magnitude of Civil Strife

The dependent variable of the theoretical model is magnitude of civil strife. Civil strife is defined as all collective, nongovernmental attacks on persons or property that occur within the boundaries of an autonomous or colonial political unit. By "nongovernmental" is meant acts by subjects and citizens who are not employees or agents of the regime, as well as acts of such employees or agents contrary to role norms, such as mutinies and coups d'état. Operationally the definition is qualified by the inclusion of symbolic demonstrative attacks on political persons or policies, e.g., political demonstrations, and by the exclusion of turmoil and internal war events in which less than 100 persons take part.

A three-fold typology of civil strife is also employed, based on an empirical typology of civil strife events identified by Rummel, Tanter, and others in a series of factor analyses. The general categories, and representative subcategories, are

1. *Turmoil:* relatively spontaneous, unstructured mass strife, including demonstrations, political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions.
2. *Conspiracy:* intensively organized, relatively small-scale civil strife, including political assassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coups, mutinies, and plots and purges, the last two on grounds that they are evidence of planned strife.
3. *Internal war:* large-scale, organized, focused civil strife, almost always accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars, civil wars, private wars, and large-scale revolts.[14]

Various measures of the relative extent of civil strife have been used in recent literature, among them counts by country of number of strife events of various types, factor scores derived from such typologies, number of deaths from violent strife, man-days of participation in strife, and scaling procedures that take account of both number of events and their severity.[15] One can infer from frustration-aggression theory that no single measure of magnitude of aggression, individual or collective, is likely to be sufficient. It is likely that high levels of discontent may be expressed either in intense, short-lived violence or in more protracted but less severe strife. Moreover, the proportion of a collectivity that participates in civil strife ought to vary with the modal intensity of discontent: mild discontent will motivate few to participate, whereas rage is likely to galvanize large segments of a collectivity into action.

Three aspects of civil strife thus ought to be taken into account in specifying its magnitude:

1. *Pervasiveness:* the extent of participation by the affected population, operationally defined for this study as the sum of the estimated number of participants in all acts of strife as a proportion of the total population of each polity, expressed in terms of participants per 100,000 population.
2. *Duration:* the persistence of strife, indexed here by the sum of the spans of time of all strife events in each polity, whatever the relative scale of the events, expressed in days.
3. *Intensity:* the human cost of strife, indexed here by the total estimated casualties, dead and injured, in all strife events in each

---

[14] In each of a number of analyses by Rummel and others a set of "domestic conflict" measures was factor analyzed. Turmoil, indexed by riots and demonstrations, is found to be a distinct dimension in all the analyses; two other factors, labelled by Rummel "revolution" and "subversion," are in some cases separate and in others combined. Principal components of the "revolution" dimension are coups, palace revolutions, plots, and purges; the category is labelled here conspiracy. Guerrilla war and terrorism are major components of the "subversion" dimension, here labelled internal war. See Rudolph J. Rummel, "A Field Theory of Social Action With Application to Conflict Within Nations," *Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research*, X (1965), 189–195; and Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1955–1960: Turmoil and Internal War," *Peace Research Society Papers*, III (1965), 159–183. The subcategories used here are adapted, with their operational definitions, from Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," *Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research*, VIII (1963), 25–26.

[15] See, for example, Rummel, *op. cit.*; Tanter, *op. cit.*; Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," *World Politics*, 16 (April 1964), 442–454; Charles Tilly and James Rule, *Measuring Political Upheaval* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1965); and Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948–1962: A Cross-National Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (September 1966), 249–271.

polity as a proportion of the total population, expressed as casualties per 10,000,000 population.

To approximate these requirements an extensive data-collection and -estimation effort was undertaken. Coding sheets and a coding manual were devised for recording a variety of information about any strife event, and a large number of sources scanned and coded to get as full as possible a representation of the strife events that occurred in the 114 polities in the 1961–1965 period. Three sources were systematically searched for data: the *New York Times* (via its *Index*), *Newsyear* (the annual volumes of *Facts on File*), and *Africa Digest.* This information was supplemented from a variety of other sources, among them *The Annual Register of World Events, Africa Diary: Weekly Record of Events in Africa, Hispanic-American Report*, and country and case studies. Some 1100 strife events were thus identified, coded, and the data punched onto IBM cards.[16] Many small-scale strife events, and some larger ones, probably went unreported in these sources and hence are not included in this civil strife data bank. Moreover, much reported and estimated data is in varying degrees inaccurate. However, neither random nor systematic error seem sufficient to affect in any substantial way the analyses or conclusions reported here; the data are adequate for the purposes to which they are put.[17]

Data estimation procedures were used to circumvent the substantial missing-data problem. Methods for determining number of initiators serve as examples. The coding sheet itself contained two "number of initiator" scales. The first was a modified geometric progression of two used to record proximate estimates of initiators, its first interval being 1 to 40, its highest 55,001 to 110,000; for purposes of summing such estimates to obtain total number of initiators, the midpoint of each interval was used. The second scale was used for recording rough estimates, sometimes coder estimates, of number of initiators, ranging from "less than 100" (set equal to 40 for purposes of computing totals) to "10,001 to 100,000" (set equal to 40,000). Data for events for which no estimate could be made were supplied by calculating and inserting means for the appropriate subcategory of event, e.g., if a riot was coded "no basis for judging" for number of initiators, it was assigned the average number of initiators of all riots for which estimates were available.

"Duration" posed little difficulty, being coded on a geometric progression whose first two intervals were "one-half day or less" and "one-half to one day," and whose upper intervals were four to nine months, nine to fifteen months, etc. No event was assigned a duration of more than five years, though some began before and/or persisted after the 1961–1965 period.

Casualties were coded similarly to number of initiators, the principal missing-data component being estimates of injuries. The ratio of injuries to deaths was calculated for all events of each subcategory for which both data were available—the general ratio for all well-reported strife being 12:1—and was used to estimate injuries for all such events for which "deaths" but not injuries estimates were given.[18]

---

[16] Information coded, in addition to that required for the three measures specified, included the socio-economic class(es) of the initiators, the social context in which they acted, the category of events, the targets and apparent motives of action, the number and role of coercive forces, and the extent and types of external support for initiators and regime, if any. Although no formal reliability tests were undertaken, the four coders did extensive practice coding on the same set of materials prior to coding and reviewed points of disagreement, and the author reviewed all coding sheets for internal consistency and, where necessary, recoding or search for additional information. It should be noted that the 1100 "events" include many cumulated reports, e.g., civil rights demonstrations in the U.S. were treated as a single set of events, all European-OAS terrorism in Algeria as a single event, etc.

[17] It has been suggested that strife in countries with press restrictions is under-reported. As a check on this type of systematic error a nine-point measure of press freedom was incorporated in initial analyses; the measure is from Raymond B. Nixon, "Freedom in the World's Press: A Fresh Appraisal With New Data," *Journalism Quarterly* (Winter 1965), 3–14. The correlations of this measure, in which high scores reflect low press freedom, with some measures of strife are: Duration, +19; Intensity, +17; Pervasiveness, −16; Total magnitude of strife, +11. The first two are significant at the .05 level, the third at .10. In effect, *more* strife tends to be reported from polities with low press freedom, not less, as might be expected. The results almost certainly reflect the association of high levels of economic development and press freedom in the Western nations, which tend to have less strife than the developing nations.

[18] The missing-data procedures gave implausibly-high estimates for initiators and casualties for

Strife events occurred in 104 of the 114 polities during the 1961–65 period. Pervasiveness, Duration, and Intensity scores were calculated separately, following the guidelines specified above, for turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war for each country, and for all strife taken together for each polity. All the distributions were highly skewed, hence were subjected to a log (X+1) transformation. To obtain combined magnitude scores for turmoil, conspiracy, internal war, and all strife, the three component logged scores were added, divided by eight to obtain their eighth root, and the anti-log used as the polity magnitude-of-strife score. The distributions remained skewed, but substantially so only in the case of internal war, which by our definitions occurred in only 25 of the 114 polities.[19]

Measures of Deprivation

A very large number of conditions are likely to impose some degree of relative deprivation on some proportion of a nation's citizens. Similarly, all men are likely to be discontented about some of their conditions of life at some point in time. On the basis of prior theoretical and empirical work, however, it was possible to construct, and subsequently to combine, a set of cross-nationally comparable indices of conditions that by inference cause pervasive and intense types of deprivation, relying in part on aggregate data and in part on indices constructed by coding narrative and historical material. In the initial stages of data collection a large number of measures were constructed, some of them representing short-term and some persisting conditions, some of each relating to economic, political, and sociocultural deprivation. Whenever possible, separate measures were included of the intensity of inferred deprivation and of its pervasiveness, i.e., of the proportion of population presumably affected, plus a third measure combining the two elements. A correlation matrix for 48 such measures and a variety of strife measures was generated, and 13 representative deprivation measures selected for combination.[20] The general rationale for the two general types of measures, short-term and persisting deprivation, and the measures finally selected, are summarized below.

Persisting Deprivation: In the very long run men's expectations about the goods and conditions of life to which they are entitled tend to adjust to what they are capable of attaining. In the shorter span, however, some groups may persistently demand and expect values, such as greater economic opportunity, political autonomy, or freedom of religious expression, that their societies will not or cannot provide.

(1) *Economic discrimination* is defined as systematic exclusion of social groups from higher economic value positions on ascriptive bases. For each polity the proportion of population so discriminated against, if any, was specified to the nearest .05, and the intensity of deprivation coded on a four-point scale (see below). The proportion and the intensity score were multiplied to obtain a polity score.

(2) *Political discrimination* is similarly defined in terms of systematic limitation in form, norm, or practice of social groups' opportunities to participate in political activities or to attain elite positions on the basis of ascribed characteristics. Proportionality and intensity scores were determined and combined in the same manner as economic discrimination scores. The "intensity" scales were defined as follows:

Intensity Score	*Economic Discrimination*	*Political Discrimination*
1	Most higher economic value positions, *or* some specific classes of economic activity, are closed to the group.	Some significant political elite positions are closed to the group, *or* some participatory activities (party membership, voting, etc.).

---

a number of events. In subsequent and comparable analysis it seems advisable to rely on estimates of deaths alone, rather than casualties, and to insert means derived from comparable events *in comparable countries* rather than such events in all countries.

[19] Tables are available on request from the author listing the 114 countries, their strife scores, the summary measures of deprivation and mediating conditions discussed below, and the data sources.

[20] The 48 deprivation measures, with only one statistically significant exception, were positively associated with strife, most of them at a relatively low level. The thirteen were selected with regard to their representativeness, relatively high correlations with the dependent variables, and low intercorrelations.

Intensity Score	*Economic Discrimination*	*Political Discrimination*
2	Most higher and some medium economic value positions are closed, *or* many specific classes of economic activity.	Most or all political elite positions are closed *or* most participatory activities, *or* some of both.
3	Most higher and most medium economic value positions are closed.	Most or all political elite positions and some participatory activities are closed.
4	Almost all higher, medium, and some lower economic value positions are closed.	Most or all political elite positions and most or all participatory activities are closed.

(3) *Potential separatism* was indexed by multiplying the proportional size of historically-separatist regional or ethnic groups by a four-point intensity measure.[21] The intensity of separatist deprivation was scored as follows:

Intensity Score	*Type of Inferred Separatism*
1	The separatist region or group was incorporated in the polity by its own request or mutual agreement.
2	The separatist region or group was assigned to the polity by international agreement or by fiat of a former colonial or governing power, except when (3) or (4) below holds.
3	The separatist region or group was forcibly assimilated into the polity prior to the twentieth century, *or* was forcibly conquered by a former colonial power prior to the twentieth century.
4	The separatist region or group was forcibly assimilated into the polity during the twentieth century, *or* was forcibly reassimilated in the twentieth century after a period of autonomy due to rebellion or other circumstance.

(4) *Dependence on private foreign capital,* indexed by negative net factor payments abroad as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product in the late 1950's, is assumed to be a chronic source of dissatisfaction in an era characterized by economic nationalism. The greater the proportion of national product that accrues to foreign suppliers of goods or capital, the greater the inferred intensity of deprivation; the extent of such deprivation was assumed equal to the proportion of population engaged in the monetary economy. The polity score is the extent score × the intensity score.[22]

(5) *Religious cleavages* are a chronic source of deprivation-inducing conflict. The scale for intensity of religious cleavage takes account both of number of organized religious groups with two percent or more of total population (the major Christian and Muslim subdivisions are counted as separate groups) and of the duration of their coexistence, the greater that duration the less the inferred intensity. The extent measure is the proportion of the population belonging to any organized religious group. The polity score is the product of the two scores.

(6) *Lack of educational opportunity* was indexed, in proportionality terms only, by subtracting primary plus secondary school enrollment ratios ca. 1960 from 100. Education is so widely regarded as an essential first step for individual socio-economic advancement that one can infer deprivation among the uneducated, and among the parents of children who cannot attend school if not yet among the children themselves.

Six indicators of persisting deprivation were combined to obtain a single long-run deprivation measure.

These six measures all had distributions approaching normality, and correlations with several strife measures ranging from .09 to .27. To combine them they were weighted to bring their means into approximate correspondence, and each polity's scores added and then averaged to circumvent the missing data problem.

Short-Term Deprivation: Any sharp increase in peoples' expectations that is unaccompanied by the perception of an increase in value capabilities, or any abrupt limitation on what they have or can hope to obtain, constitute relative deprivation. We inferred that short-term, relative declines in system economic and political performance were likely to be perceived as increased deprivation for substantial numbers of people. Indices were devised of five kinds of short-term economic deprivation and two of political deprivation.

[21] Coding judgments for both discrimination indices and for separatism were made on the basis of country studies. The proportionality measures are versions of indices reported in Ted Gurr, *New Error-Compensated Measures for Comparing Nations* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1966), 67–90.

[22] A crude measure of the proportion of each polity's population engaged in the monetary economy, to the nearest .10, was constructed for the purpose of weighting this and some other measures. The measure was based primarily on labor census data.

(1) *Short-term trends in trade value, 1957–60 compared with 1950–57:* The percentage change of trade value, exports+imports, for 1957–60 was compared with the rate for 1950–1957, and any relative decrease in the later period was treated as an indicator of short-term economic deprivation. Decreases were scaled so that polities with lower rates of increase in the earlier period received greater deprivation scores than those with high rates.

(2) *Short-term trends in trade value, 1960–63 compared with 1950–60:* Procedures identical with (1), above, were used. Both measures were incorporated in the final analysis because both were markedly correlated with strife measures but had a relatively low intercorrelation of .18.[23]

(3) *Inflation 1960–63 compared with 1958–61:* Data on cost-of-living indices were scaled and combined in such a way that the highest deprivation scores were assigned to polities with substantial and worsening inflation in the 1958–63 period, the lowest scores (0) to polities with stable or declining costs-of-living throughout the period.

(4) *1960–63 GNP growth rates compared with 1950's growth rate:* Economic growth rate data were scaled so that polities having low rates in the 1950's and even lower rates in the early 1960's received the highest deprivation scores; those with moderate rates in the 1950's but substantial relative decline in the early 1960's received somewhat lower deprivation scores; and those with steadily high, or moderate but steadily increasing, rates received zero deprivation scores.

(5) *Adverse economic conditions 1960–63:* To supplement aggregate data indicators of economic deprivation, several summary news sources were searched for evaluative statements about adverse internal economic conditions such as crop failures, unemployment, export market slumps, drought, etc. Each such description was coded on the following intensity and extent scales:

"Severity" (Intensity) Scores		*"Proportion Affected" (Extent) Scores*	
Moderate	=1	One region or city, *or* a small economic sector	=0.2
Substantial, *or* moderate and persisting for more than one year	=2	Several regions or cities, *or* several economic sectors	=0.5
Severe, *or* substantial and persisting for more than one year	=3	Much of country, *or* several major or one dominant economic sector	=0.7
Severe *and* persisting for more than one year	=4	Whole country, *or* all economic sectors	=1.0

The score for each such condition is the product of the extent and intensity scores; the score for each polity for each year is the sum of the "condition" scores; and the score used for the summary index is the sum of annual scores for 1960 through 1963. The sources used were *Hispanic-American Report* for Latin America and the *Annual Register* for other polities.[24]

(6) *New restrictions on political participation and representation by the regime* were coded from the same sources for the same years. Seventeen types of action were defined on *a priori* grounds as value-depriving political restrictions, including harrassment and banning of parties of various sizes, banning of political activity, and improper dismissal of elected assemblies and executives. These were ranked on a nine-point intensity scale.[25] The extent measure was the politically-participatory proportion of the population, crudely estimated to the nearest .10 on the basis of voting participa-

---

[23] The two measures will be used in subsequent analyses to examine time-lag relationships between short-term economic deprivation and strife. The trade data, obtained primarily from United Nations sources, was converted to U.S. currency when necessary to maintain comparability over time.

[24] The *Hispanic-American Report* is much more comprehensive a source, hence the mean deprivation scores for Latin America were much higher than those for other polities. As a crude adjustment, the Latin American polity scores were divided by a constant so that their mean approximated that of other polities. The same procedure was followed for indices 6 and 7, below. Analyses of regional clusters of polities, not reported here, provide a check on the adequacy of the procedure.

[25] Types of restrictive actions, and their scale values, are as follows:

1	Amalgamation of splinter party with larger party
1	Restriction or harrassment of splinter party
2	Banning of splinter party
2	Amalgamation of minority party with larger party
2	Restriction or harrassment of minority party
3	Banning of minority party
3	Amalgamation of a major party with another major party
3	Restriction or harrassment of major party
4	Banning of major party
4	Improper dismissal of regional representative body
4	Improper dismissal of elected regional executive
5	Ban on party activities, parties allowed to continue their organizational existence
5	Improper dismissal of national legislature, with provision for calling new one within a year
5	Improper dismissal of elected chief executive, with provision for replacement within a year
6	Dissolution of all parties, ban on all political activity
6	Improper dismissal of national legislature, no short-term provision for reestablishment
6	Improper dismissal of elected chief executive, no short term provision for reelection

tion levels and, in lieu of voting data, on the basis of urbanization and literacy levels. The score for each action identified is the product of the intensity and extent scores; the annual polity score the sum of "action" scores; and the summary index the sum of annual scores for 1960–63.

(7) *New value-depriving policies of governments 1960–63* were defined as any new programs or actions that appeared to take away some significant proportion of attained values from a numerically or socially significant group, for example land reform, tax increases, restrictions on trade, limitations of civil liberties, restrictive actions against ethnic, religious, or economic groups, and so forth. Two aspects of such policies were taken into account in scaling for intensity: the degree of deprivation imposed, and their equality of application. The "degree of deprivation" scale values are: small = 1, moderate = 2, substantial = 3, most or all = 4. The "equality of application" scale values are: uniform = 1, discriminatory = 2. The intensity score is the product of values on these two scales. The most intensely depriving policies are assumed to be those intentionally discriminatory and designed to deprive the affected group of most or all the relevant value, e.g. seizure of all property of absentee landlords without compensation (score = 8). Deprivation is inferred to be least intense if the policy is uniformly applicable to all the affected class of citizens and deprives them of only a small part of the value, e.g. a five percent increase in corporation tax rates (score = 1). The extent measure is a crude estimate of the proportion of the adult population likely to be directly affected, the permissible values being .01, .02, .05, .10, .20, .40, .60, .80 and 1.00. The score for each policy identified is the product of the intensity and extent scores; the annual polity score the sum of "policy" scores; and the summary index the sum of annual scores for 1960–63. The sources are the same as for (6) and (7).[26]

Three summary short-term deprivation scores were calculated for each polity from these seven indices. The five economic variables were multiplied by constants so that their means were approximately equal and averaged to circumvent the missing-data problem. This is the "short-term economic deprivation" index referred to below. The summary measures of politically-related deprivation were similarly combined to obtain a summary "short-term political deprivation" measure. The two measures were then added to comprise a single "short-term deprivation" measure for the purposes of some subsequent analyses.

Measures of the Mediating Variables

Coercive Potential and Size of Coercive Forces: A composite index was constructed to take into account four aspects of the regime's apparent potential for controlling strife. Two of the component indices represent the manpower resources available to the regime, namely military and internal security forces participation ratios, i.e., military personnel per 10,000 adults ca. 1960 (n = 112), and internal security forces per 10,000 adults (n = 102). The two distributions were normalized and their means brought into correspondence by rescaling them using 10-interval geometric progressions. The other two component indices deal respectively with the degree of *past loyalty of coercive forces to the regime*, and the extent of *illicit coercive-force participation in strife in the 1960–65 period.*

The rationale for the five-point coercive-force loyalty scale, below, is that the more recently coercive forces had attacked the regime, the less efficacious they would be perceived to be by those who might initiate strife—and the more likely they might be to do so again themselves. Countries were scored on the basis of information from a variety of historical sources.

Loyalty Score	*Regime Status and Military Attempts to Seize Control of the Regime*
5	As of 1960 the polity or its metropolitan power had been autonomous for 25 years or more and had experienced no military intervention since 1910.
4	As of 1960 the polity or its metropolitan power had been autonomous for 5 to 24 years and had experienced no military intervention during that period; *or* had been autonomous for a longer period but experienced military intervention between 1910 and 1934.
3	The polity last experienced military intervention between 1935 and 1950, inclusive.
2	The polity last experienced military intervention between 1951 and 1957, inclusive.
1	The polity last experienced military intervention between 1958 and 1960, inclusive.

---

[26] The annual scores for (5), (6), and (7) are being used in a series of time-lagged and cross-panel correlation analyses, not reported here, in further tests of causal relationships.

For 28 polities that became independent after 1957 no "loyalty" score was assigned unless the military or police did in fact intervene between independence and the end of 1960. For purposes of calculating the summary score, below, a military loyalty score for these polities was derived from the "legitimacy" score.

Insofar as the military or police themselves illicitly initiated strife in the 1961–65 period, they lost all deterrent effect. To quantify the extent of such involvement, all military or police participation in strife was determined from the data bank of 1100 events and for each polity a "coercive forces strife participation" score calculated, by weighting each involvement in a mutiny or a turmoil event as one and each involvement in any other event (typically coups and civil wars) as two, and summing for each country.

All four of the "coercive potential" measures were correlated in the predicted direction with several preliminary measures of strife levels. The participation ratios had low but consistently negative correlations with strife; the "loyalty" and "strife participation" indices had correlations of the order of −40 and +40 with strife respectively.[27] The composite "coercive potential" score was calculated by the following formula:

$$\text{Coercive potential} = 10 \cdot \sqrt{\frac{L[2(\text{HiR}) + 1(\text{loR})]}{1 + P}}$$

where

L = "loyalty" score;
HiR = the higher of the scaled military and security forces participation ratios;[28]
loR = the lower of the participation ratios; and
P = "coercive forces strife participation" score.

The effect of the formula is to give the highest coercive potential scores to countries with large coercive forces characterized by both historical and concurrent loyalty to the regime. The more recently and extensively such forces have been involved in strife, however, the lower their coercive potential score.

A second coercion measure was included in the final analysis to permit a further test of the curvilinearity hypothesis. The measure used is the expression in brackets in the coercive potential formula above, i.e., a weighted measure of the relative sizes of military and internal security forces (*coercive force size*).

Institutionalization: Indices of institutional strength and stability which I found in previous analyses to be negatively associated with strife are the *ratio of labor union membership to nonagricultural employment, central government budgeted expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product*, ca. *1962*, and the *stability of the political party system*.[29] A ten-interval geometric progression was used to normalize the first of these indices, the second was multiplied by 100 and rounded to the nearest 10. To index characteristics of party systems two scales were used, one relating to the number of parties, the other to party system stability per se:

No. of parties score	*Characteristics*
0	no parties, or all parties illegal or ineffective
1	one or several parties, membership sharply restricted on ascriptive bases (typically along ethnic lines) to less than twenty percent of the population
2	one party with no formal or substantial informal restrictions on memberships
3	one party dominant
4	two-party (reasonable expectation of party rotation)
5	multi-party

Party system stability score	*Party System Characteristics*
0	no parties, or membership restricted on ascriptive bases to less than twenty percent of population
1	unstable

---

[27] These are product-moment correlation coefficients, the strife measures including measures of duration, pervasiveness, intensity, and total magnitude of strife for 1961–65. The last two strife measures are defined differently from those employed in the present analysis, but are derived from the same 1100-event data bank.

[28] If one or the other ratio was missing, it was assumed equal to the known ratio. Internal security force ratios for 94 polities are reported in Gurr, *New Error-Compensated Measures for Comparing Nations*, 111–126.

[29] The first two indices are reported in *ibid.*, 33–66, 91–110. Correlations among all three and strife measures are reported in Gurr and Ruttenberg, *The Conditions of Civil Violence, passim.* The party characteristics are recoded from Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963), raw characteristics 41 and 43.

Party system stability score	*Party System Characteristics*
2	all parties relatively new (founded after 1945), long-range stability not yet ascertainable
3	moderately stable
4	stable

Scores on these two scales were combined on an 8-point scale using party stability as the primary indicator of institutionalization but giving highest scores at each stability level to systems with larger numbers of party structures.

The summary institutionalization measure was constructed using this formula:

$$\text{Institutionalization} = 3\,(\text{hiI}) + 2\,(\text{midI}) + \text{loI},$$

where hiI = the highest of the three institutionalization scores, etc. This procedure gives greatest weight to the most institutionalized sector of society on the assumption that high institutionalization in one sector compensates for lower levels in others. The highest scores are attained by the Eastern European Communist states while the scores of the Western European democracies are slightly lower. The lowest-scoring polities are Ethiopia, Haiti, Nepal, and Yemen.

Facilitation: Two aspects of facilitation were indexed separately: *past levels of civil strife* and "*social and structural facilitation*" per se. The "past levels of strife" measure was derived from the Eckstein data on frequency of internal wars of various types in the period 1946–59; although its reliability is only moderate it covers a longer period and a larger number of polities than other available data.[30] Data were collected for those of the 114 polities not included in the Eckstein tabulation, using the same procedure, a *New York Times Index* count, and recollected for a few others. Weights were assigned to events in various categories, e.g. riots = 1, coups = 5, and a summary score for each polity calculated. The distribution was normalized with a log $(X+1)$ transformation.

The terrain and transportation network of a country constitute a basic structural limitation on the capabilities of insurgents for maintaining a durable insurrection. A complex "inaccessibility" index was constructed taking account of the extent of transportation networks related to area, population density, and the extent of waste, forest, and mountainous terrain; the highest inaccessibility scores were received by polities like Bolivia, Sudan, and Yemen, which have limited transportation networks and large portions of rugged terrain.[31]

A crucial "social" variable that facilitates strife is the extent to which the discontented can and do organize for collective action. The relative strength of Communist Party organizations was used as a partial index, taking into account both the number of party members per 10,000 population and the status of the party. Unfortunately no comparable data could be obtained for extremist parties of the right. Party-membership ratios were rescaled to an 11-point scale based on a geometric progression of 2. The party status scale, below, is based on the premise that illegal parties are more facilitative of strife because their membership is likely, because of the exigencies of repression, to be more dedicated, better organized, and committed to the more violent forms of conflict. Factionalized parties are assumed to be more facilitative because they offer more numerous organizational foci for action.

Score	*Communist party status and characteristics*
0	In power *or* nonexistent.
1	Out of power; no serious factionalization or multiple organization; party permitted to participate in electoral activities.
2	Out of power; multiple factions or organizations; party permitted to participate in electoral activities.
3	Out of power; party excluded from electoral activities but other party activities tolerated.
4	Out of power; no serious factionalization or multiple organization; party illegal and/or actively suppressed.
5	Out of power; multiple factions or organizations; party illegal and/or actively suppressed.

The score for each polity is the scaled membership ratio times the party status score.

The third measure of facilitation is the extent of external support for initiators of strife in the 1961–65 period. Each strife event in the 1100-event data bank was coded for the degree of support for initiators (if any) and for the number of nations supporting the initiators in any of these ways. The scale points for "degree of support" are provision of arms and supplies (=1), refuge (=2), facilities and training (=3), military advisors and mercenaries (=4), and large (1,000+) military units (=5). The event support score is the "degree" score times the "number of nations" score, these scores then being summed for all events for each polity to obtain a polity score. This measure alone has a relatively high correlation with strife level measures, ranging from .3 to .4; its two extreme outliers, South Vietnam and the Congo, are also among the three extreme outliers on the total magnitude of strife distribution.

---

[30] Harry Eckstein, "Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation," in Ithiel de Sola Pool *et al.*, *Social Science Research and National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, March 5, 1963).

[31] Inaccessibility appears to be an almost-but-not-quite necessary condition for protracted internal wars. With one exception all such internal wars in the post-1945 period occurred in polities with high or very high scores on this index; the exception, a notable one, is Cuba.

The three social and structural facilitation measures were weighted to bring their means into approximate correspondence, several missing-data items estimated, and the weighted measures added to obtain the composite index.

Legitimacy: The legitimacy of a regime can be defined behaviorally in terms of popular compliance, and psychologically by reference to the extent to which its directives are regarded by its citizens as properly made and worthy of obedience. In lieu of evidence on compliance or allegiance necessary to operationalize the concept directly, I combined one indicator of an inferred cause of legitimacy, the circumstances under which the regime attained its present form, with an indicator of an inferred effect, the durability of the regime. The "character" of the regime was scored on a seven-point scale:

Character Score	*Origins of national political institutions*
7	Institutions are wholly or primarily accretive and autochthinous; reformations, if any, had indigenous roots (although limited foreign elements may have been assimilated into indigenous institutions).
6	Institutions are a mixture of substantial autochthinous and foreign elements, e.g. polities with externally-derived parliamentary and/or bureaucratic systems grafted to a traditional monarchy.
5	Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were deliberately chosen by indigenous leaders, and have been adapted over time to indigenous political conditions. (By adaptation is meant either the modification of regime institutions themselves or development of intermediate institutions to incorporate politically the bulk of the population.)
4	Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, have been adapted over time to indigenous political conditions, but were inculcated under the tutelage of a foreign power rather than chosen by indigenous leaders of their own volition.
3	Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were deliberately chosen by indigenous leaders, but have *not* been adapted over time to indigenous political conditions.
2	Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were inculcated under the tutelage of a foreign power, and have not been adapted to indigenous political conditions.
1	Institutions are imposed by, and maintained under threat of sanctions by, foreign powers (including polities under colonial rule as of 1965).

A similar scale, based on the number of generations the regime had persisted as of 1960 without substantial, abrupt reformation, was constructed for durability:

Durability Score	*Last major reformation of institutions before 1960*
7	More than eight generations before 1960 (before 1800).
6	Four to eight generations (1801–1880).
5	Two to four generations (1881–1920).
4	One to two generations (1921–1940).
3	One-half to one generation (1941–1950).
2	One-quarter to one-half generation (1951–1955).
1	Institutions originated between 1956 and 1960, or were in 1960 in the process of transition.

Examples of coding decisions about "major reformations" are that France experienced such a change in 1957; that most French tropical African polities date their basic institutional structures from the 1946 reforms, not the year of formal independence; that the Canadian regime dates from 1867, when dominion status was attained; and that many Latin American regimes, despite performance of musical chairs at the executive level, attained their basic institutional structures at various (historically specified and coded) points in the mid- or late nineteenth century.

The summary legitimacy index was constructed by summing and rescaling the "character" and "durability" scores.[32]

III. RESULTS OF CORRELATION AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS

The results of four multiple regression analyses are discussed in this paper, one of them in detail. The dependent variables in the four analyses are, respectively, total magnitude of civil strife, magnitude of conspiracy, magnitude of internal war, and magnitude of turmoil. The correlations between the ten summary independent variables and these four strife measures are given in Table I. The independent variables all correlate with the dependent variables in the predicted direction, with the exception of coercive force size. The r's for the remaining nine independent variables are significant at the .01 level except for four correlates of internal war, three of which are significant at the .05 level.

The hypothetical curvilinear relationship between coercive force size and total magnitude of strife (TMCS) is examined graphically in Figures 2 and 3, each of which is a smoothed curve of deciles of the independent variable plotted against TMCS. Figure 2, based on all 114 polities, suggests an apparent tendency, among countries with relatively small forces, for strife to increase with the size of those forces, and also a slight increase in TMCS at very high levels of coercive forces.[33] It is quite likely that countries with protracted political violence expand their coercive forces to meet it. It also seems likely that armies in countries facing foreign threats cause less dissatisfaction—by their presence or actions—than armies in states not significantly involved in international conflict. Both factors might contaminate the proposed curvilinear relationship, so countries with either or both characteristics were removed and the relationship plotted for the remaining 69 countries; the results, in Figure 3, show curvilinearity even more distinctly. Figure 4 indicates that the measure of coercive force potential, in which size is weighted for military loyalty to the regime, is essentially linear, as predicted. The latter measure is used in the multiple regression analyses, below.

Eight of the ten independent variables (excluding coercive force size and short-term deprivation, the sum of the two specific short-term deprivation measures) are included in the multiple regression analyses summarized in Table 2. The variables yield considerable and significant multiple correlation coefficients (R), including a high R of .806 for total magnitude of strife ($R^2 = .650$); a moderately high R for conspiracy of .630 ($R^2 = .397$); a similar R for internal war of .648 ($R^2 = .420$); and a somewhat lower R for turmoil of .533 ($R^2 = .284$).[34] There are several possible explanations for the finding that total magnitude of strife is accounted for nearly twice as well as the several forms of strife. One technical factor is that all the class-of-strife measures have greater distributional irregularities than does TMCS,

---

[32] The following rescaling was used; the sum of the "durability" and "character" scores being given on the upper line, the final legitimacy score on the lower:

Sum:	3,4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13,14
Legitimacy:	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

[33] The S-shape of this relationship is considerably more pronounced when coercive-force size is related to total magnitude of turmoil; see Ted Gurr, "Why Urban Disorder? Perspectives from the Comparative Study of Civil Strife," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 10 (March-April 1968).

[34] Significant computational errors in internal war and TMCS scores of several countries were identified and corrected after completion of the analyses reported here. Robert van den Helm of Princeton University has analyzed the corrected data, using the combined short-term deprivation measure in lieu of the two separate measures, with these multiple regression results: for TMCS, $R^2 = .638$; conspiracy, $R^2 = .391$; internal war, $R^2 = .472$; and turmoil, $R^2 = .284$. The significant increase in the degree of explanation for internal war is the result of increased correlations between magnitude of internal war and short-term deprivation (from .28 in Table 1 to .34); facilitation (from .57 to .61); and legitimacy (from $-.23$ to $-.26$). The r between magnitudes of turmoil and internal war increases from .17 to .23, the r between TMCS and internal war from .79 to .86. No other results of the analyses reported here are significantly affected by the reanalysis. The actual TMCS scores shown in Table 3 are corrected ones.

TABLE 1. CORRELATES OF CIVIL STRIFE[a]

Variable[b]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1 Economic deprivation (+)		$\underline{48}$	$\underline{83}$	−02	−17	−16	$-\underline{36}$	−09	$\underline{26}$	$\underline{32}$	$\underline{34}$	$\underline{31}$	$\underline{25}$	$\underline{44}$
2 Political deprivation (+)			$\underline{88}$	08	−18	03	$-\underline{37}$	−20	$\underline{33}$	$\underline{27}$	$\underline{44}$	18	$\underline{30}$	$\underline{38}$
3 Short-term deprivation (+)[c]				04	−20	−07	$-\underline{42}$	−17	$\underline{34}$	$\underline{34}$	$\underline{46}$	$\underline{28}$	$\underline{32}$	$\underline{48}$
4 Persisting deprivation (+)					−04	−21	−14	$-\underline{37}$	−04	17	$\underline{29}$	$\underline{26}$	$\underline{27}$	$\underline{36}$
5 Legitimacy (−)						$\underline{25}$	$\underline{48}$	02	−05	−15	$-\underline{29}$	−23	$-\underline{29}$	$-\underline{37}$
6 Coercive force size (±)							$\underline{53}$	$\underline{27}$	$\underline{31}$	04	−23	−11	−01	−14
7 Coercive potential (−)								$\underline{41}$	−14	$-\underline{37}$	$-\underline{44}$	$-\underline{39}$	$-\underline{35}$	$-\underline{51}$
8 Institutionalization (−)									−19	$-\underline{40}$	$-\underline{35}$	−23	$-\underline{26}$	$-\underline{33}$
9 Past strife levels (+)										$\underline{41}$	$\underline{24}$	16	$\underline{30}$	$\underline{30}$
10 Facilitation (+)											$\underline{42}$	$\underline{57}$	$\underline{30}$	$\underline{67}$
11 Magnitude of conspiracy												$\underline{30}$	$\underline{32}$	$\underline{59}$
12 Magnitude of internal war													17	$\underline{79}$
13 Magnitude of turmoil														$\underline{61}$
14 Total magnitude of strife														

[a] Product moment correlation coefficients, multiplied by 100. Underlined r's are significant, for $n=114$, at the .01 level. Correlations between 18 and 23, inclusive, are significant at the .05 level.

[b] The proposed relationships between the independent variables, nos. 1 to 10, and the strife measures are shown in parentheses, the ± for coercive force size signifying a proposed curvilinear relationship. Examination of the r's between the independent and dependent variables, in the box, shows that all are in the predicted direction with the anticipated exception of coercive force size, and that all but one are significant at the .05 level.

[c] Short-term deprivation is the sum of scores on the short-term economic and short-term political deprivation measures. The separate short-term deprivation measures were used in the regression analyses reported below; the summary measure was used in the causal inference analysis.

hence TMCS should be somewhat better explained. It is also possible that the categorization employed has less empirical merit than other work has suggested, i.e., that conspiracy, internal war, and turmoil are not sharply distinct forms of civil strife. To qualify this possibility, the correlation matrix in Table 1 suggests that the forms of strife are only weakly related in magnitude—the highest r among the three is .32—but it may still be that they are more strongly related in likelihood, and hence that the universe of strife is more homogenous than the typology suggests. The least-predicted class of strife—turmoil—might be better accounted for if turmoil events in the context of internal wars, e.g., riots and localized rebellions in such polities as the Congo and South Vietnam, were categorized as aspects of the internal wars in these countries rather than turmoil per se. The most likely substantive interpretation of the relatively low predictability of turmoil, however, is that much turmoil is a response to a variety of locally-incident deprivations and social conditions of a sort not represented in the indices used in this study.

The multiple regression equation for total magnitude of strife was used to calculate predicted magnitude of strife scores. Only ten polities have predicted scores that differ from



FIG. 2. Magnitude of civil strife and coercive force size, 114 polities.

their actual scores by more than one standard deviation (7.70 units of TMCS). These polities, and three others that have discrepancies approaching one standard deviation, are listed in Table 3.

In five of the thirteen polities—the Congo, Indonesia, Zambia, Rwanda, and Yemen—there is probably systematic error from data-estimation procedures. All of these countries had intense but inadequately-reported civil violence for which only rough and quite possibly exaggerated estimates of deaths were available. When estimates of "wounded" were added to deaths estimates, using a ratio of about twelve to one based on better-reported but smaller-scale events (see above), the result was almost certainly a gross inflation of actual casualties, and hence inflation of TMCS scores. The high actual TMCS score for Israel is the result of a questionable coding judgment about the extent and duration of extremist Orthodox religious conflict. More substantive questions are raised by some of the countries. Paraguay, Argentina, Ecuador, and Volta all could be argued to have had an unrealized potential for strife: in fact both Argentina and Ecuador experienced coups in the mid-1960's that according to their initiators were preventive or protective in nature, and early in 1966 the government of Volta succumbed to rioting followed by a coup. In the Dominican Republic, the Congo, and Rwanda the unexpectedly high levels of violence followed the collapse of rigid, authoritarian regimes; one can infer a time-lag effect from the deprivation incurred under the old regimes. These are special explanations rather than general ones however. The lack of apparent substantive similarities among the thirteen poorly-predicted polities suggests that the analysis has included measures of most if not all the general determinants of magnitudes of civil strife.



FIG. 3. Magnitude of civil strife and coercive force size, 69 low-conflict polities.

IV. A REVISED CAUSAL MODEL

One striking result of the regression analyses is that the partial correlations of several of the variables tend to disappear when the other variables are introduced (see Table 2). The short-term deprivation measures consistently decline in consequence, in most instances falling below the .05 level of significance. Institutionalization is in all analyses controlled for by



FIG. 4. Magnitude of civil strife and coercive potential.

Note: The vertical axes in Figures 2, 3 and 4 give the average magnitude of civil strife scores for deciles of countries with coercive forces of increasing size (Figures 2 and 3) and for deciles of countries with increasingly large coercive forces relative to their loyalty. The range of TMCS scores for the 114 polities is 0.0 to 48.7, their mean 9.0, and their standard deviation 7.7. Units on the horizontal axes represent numbers of cases, not proportional increases in force size/loyalty; the figures represent the scores of the extreme cases. Eleven rather than ten groupings of cases were used in computations for Figures 2 and 4; the curves of all three figures were smoothed by averaging successive pairs of decile scores.

TABLE 2. MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS: SIMPLE CORRELATIONS, PARTIAL CORRELATIONS, AND STANDARD WEIGHTS[a]

Dependent Variables	Independent Variables								
	Econ. Dep.	Pol. Dep.	Per. Dep.	Coerce	Instit.	Past CS	SS Facil.	Legit.	R, R^2
Total Magnitude of Strife:									
Simple r's	44	38	36	−51	−33	30	67	−37	
Partial r's	24	(09)	39	−17	(07)	(04)	55	−26	R =.806
Constant	− 3.11								
Weights	.177	.066	.271	− .140	.056	.024	.481	− .184	R^2 =.650
Magnitude of Conspiracy:									
Simple r's	34	44	29	−44	−35	24	42	−29	
Partial r's	(10)	24	22	(−11)	(−09)	(03)	19	(−15)	R =.630
Constant	1.10								
Weights	.094	.238	.194	− .120	− .088	.026	.181	− .135	R^2 =.397
Magnitude of Internal War:									
Simple r's	31	18	26	−39	−23	16	57	−23	
Partial r's	(14)	(−08)	22	−17	(11)	(−07)	48	(−07)	R =.648
Constant	− 3.66								
Weights	.128	− .073	.186	− .179	.102	− .066	.513	− .063	R^2 =.420
Magnitude of Turmoil:									
Simple r's	25	30	27	−35	−26	30	30	−29	
Partial r's	(07)	(08)	23	(−09)	(−05)	21	(04)	−19	R =.533
Constant	1.37								
Weights	.072	.085	.223	− .102	− .056	.205	.043	− .192	R^2 =.284

[a] Simple correlations from Table 1 are repeated here to facilitate comparisons. Partial correlations in parentheses have standard (beta) weights that are significant at less than the .05 level, using the one-tailed T test with n =114. Since this analysis is concerned with what is, effectively, the entire universe of polities, all the correlations are in one sense "significant," but those in parentheses are of substantially less consequence than the others. The weights are reported to facilitate comparisons of the relative importance of the independent variables; because of the use of a variety of scaling and combination procedures for both independent and dependent variables, the weights do not permit direct interpretations, for example, of the effects of a one-unit decrease in intensity of economic discrimination on extent of turmoil.

the other variables. One or the other of the two facilitation variables declines to zero in each analysis, "past levels of strife" vanishing in three of the four. Coercive potential and legitimacy also decline in their relation to strife rather sharply. The only variable that is consistently unaffected by the introduction of the control variables specified by the model is persisting deprivation. A preliminary analysis of the behavior of first- and second-order partials suggests what causal interactions and sequences may be involved in these results. The causal path analysis is concerned principally with the sources of the total magnitude of strife, examining the causal sequences of the the specific forms of strife only when they appear to deviate from that of all strife.

A basic supposition for the evaluation of causal models is that, if X_1 is an indirect cause of X_3 whose effects are mediated by an intervening variable X_2, then if X_2's effects are controlled the resulting partial correlation between X_1 and X_3 should be approximately zero. Similarly, if several intervening variables are specified, controlling for all of them or for the last in a causal chain should, if the causal model is not to be falsified, result in a partial correlation not significantly different from zero.[35]

The initial model of the causes of civil strife (Figure 1) postulated that all the mediating variables intervened separately and simultaneously between deprivation and strife. The results indicate that this supposition is only partly correct: none of the mediating variables appear to affect the relationship between *persisting deprivation* and strife, i.e., there is a certain inevitability about the association between such deprivation and strife. Persisting deprivation is moreover equally potent as a source of conspiracy, internal war, and turmoil. With the partial and weak exception of institutionalization, no patterns of societal arrangements nor coercive potential that are included in the model have any consistent effect on its impact.

---

[35] These and other fundamental arguments about causal inference are well summarized in Blalock, *Causal Inferences . . .*, Chapters 2 and 3. A partial correlation coefficient can be most easily regarded as the correlation between X and Z after the portions of X and Z that are accounted for by Y are removed, or held constant. The results discussed below are based on the use of only one of a variety of related causal inference techniques and are open to further, more refined analysis and interpretation. For other applicable approaches see, for example, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., *Mathematics and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), Chapters 5 and 6.

The effects of short-term deprivation on strife are substantially different—and, it should be added, uncorrelated with persisting deprivation. The intervening variables do tend to control for short-term deprivation's effects. To determine which one or ones exercise primary control, first-order partials were calculated for the several postulated intervening variables, with these results.

1) The simple r between short-term deprivation and strife = .48[36]
2) The partial r between short term deprivation and strife is: when the control variable is:

.46	Institutionalization
.45	Legitimacy
.42	Past strife
.36	Facilitation
.34	Coercive potential

Only the last two constitute a significant reduction, and moreover when they are combined, the second-order partial, $r_{dS\cdot fc,} = .27$, i.e., *coercive potential* and *facilitation* are the only consequential intervening variables affecting the outcome of short-term deprivation. Short-term deprivation taken alone accounts for $(.48)^2 = .23$ of the magnitude of strife; controlling for coercive potential and facilitation reduces the proportion of strife directly accounted for to $(.27)^2 = .07$, a relatively small but still significant amount.

The same controlling effects of coercive potential and facilitation on short-term deprivation occur among the three generic forms of strife. It is worth noting that when the mediating variables are controlled, short-term economic deprivation still accounts directly for a portion of strife, internal war in particular, while political deprivation contributes significantly to conspiracy. These relationships may reflect contamination of the independent and dependent variables because of their partial temporal overlap. Some short-term economic deprivation in the early 1960's may be attributable to protracted internal wars, and successful conspirators may impose politically-depriving policies once they are in power. The relationship between short-term deprivation of both types and the magnitude of turmoil, however, is effectively mediated or controlled by characteristics of the society and its response to strife.

The relationships among the mediating variables remain to be examined. Institutionalization has no significant relation to any measure of strife when the other variables are controlled, and in the case of magnitude of total strife and of internal war a weak *positive* relationship emerges, i.e., there is a slight though not statistically significant tendency for high institutionalization to be associated with higher levels of strife. A computation of partials between institutionalization and the other three mediating variables indicates that institutionalization has a preceding or causal relationship both to coercive potential and to the facilitation variables, as shown in the

TABLE 3. POLITIES WITH LEAST-PREDICTED TOTAL MAGNITUDE OF CIVIL STRIFE[a]

Polity	Predicted TMCS	Actual TMCS[b]	Residual
Congo-Kinshasa	31.6	48.7	+17.1
Rwanda	12.7	28.2	+15.5
Yemen	9.4	23.6	+14.2
Indonesia	23.8	33.7	+ 9.9
Dominican Republic	12.1	21.9	+ 9.8
Italy	3.1	12.3	+ 9.2
Belgium	2.4	10.5	+ 8.1
Zambia	8.1	15.5	+ 7.4
Israel	6.9	14.0	+ 7.1
Argentina	20.5	13.2	− 7.3
Ecuador	18.6	10.1	− 8.5
Volta	9.3	0.0	− 9.3
Paraguay	17.2	5.0	−12.2

[a] See text. A negative residual indicates that a polity had less strife than would be predicted on the basis of the characteristics it shares with other polities; a positive residual indicates more than predicted strife.

[b] Corrected scores. See footnote 34.

---

[36] To simplify evaluation of the effects of the control variables, the summary short-term deprivation variable was employed rather than its economic and political components separately.

revised model in Figure 3. Polities with high levels of institutionalization tend to have high coercive potential and to have few of the conditions that facilitate strife.

Legitimacy apparently has a causal relationship with strife independent either of deprivation or the other intervening variables. About half of the initial correlation between legitimacy and strife is accounted for by the apparent causal relation between legitimacy and coercive potential, i.e., legitmate regimes tend to have large and, most importantly, loyal military and police establishments. Separately from this, however, high legitimacy is significantly associated with low levels of strife, a finding consistent with the postulate that political legitimacy itself is a desired value, one whose absence constitutes a deprivation that incites men to take violent action against their regimes. The relationship is relatively strongest for total magnitude of strife, less so for turmoil and conspiracy, and inconsequential for internal war.

Coercive potential appears in several respects to be a crucial variable in the revised causal model: it is evidently attributable in part to both levels of institutionalization and of legitimacy, and has a major mediating effect on short-term deprivation. Nonetheless, when all variables are controlled (see Table 2), the partial *r* between coercive potential and strife is sharply reduced, in two instances below the .05 level of significance. This is in part due to the effects of legitimacy, which is causally linked to both strife and coercive potential.[37] The other major intervening variable is facilitation ($r_{cs} = -.52$; $r_{cs \cdot f} = -.40$, where c = coercive potential, s = strife, and f = social and structural facilitation), i.e., whether or not facilitative conditions exist for civil strife is partly dependent upon the coercive potential of the regime, and thus indirectly dependent upon legitimacy as well. (The relationship is evidently between coercive potential on the one hand and the "Communist party status" and the "external support for initiators" components of facilitation on the other; coercive potential cannot have any consequential effects on "physical inaccessibility.")



FIG. 5. Revised causal model of the determinants of magnitude of civil strife. The proportion at the top of each cell is the simple r^2 between the variable and civil strife, i.e. the proportion of strife accounted for by each variable separately. The percentages are the proportion of explained variance accounted for by each variable when the effects of all others are controlled, determined by squaring each partial r, summing the squares, and expressing each as a percentage of the sum. The explained variance, R^2, is .65.

This completes the revision of the causal model with the exception of the second component of facilitation, *past strife levels*. This variable has a consistently lower relationship with strife than other variables, with the exception of the turmoil analysis. Moreover its partial correlation is reduced to zero in these analyses, with the same exception, the sole significant controlling variable being *social and structural facilitation*. Among the causes of turmoil, however, social and structural facilitation is controlled for by several variables—principally past strife, coercive potential, and institutionalization—whereas past strife remains significant when other effects are partialled out. Both findings support the theoretical argument that suggested the "past strife" measure: a history of chronic strife apparently reflects, and contributes to, attitudes that directly facilitate future turmoil, and indirectly acts to facilitate general levels of strife.

The revised model, with proportional weights inserted, is sketched in Figure 5. The most proximate and potent variable is social and structural facilitation, which accounts for nearly half the explained variance. The deprivation variables account directly for over one-third the magnitude of strife, legitimacy and institutionalization for one-eighth. But these proportions refer only to direct effects, and in the case of both coercive potential and facilitation part of that direct effect, i.e., the illicit participation of the military in strife and the provision of foreign support for initiators, can be determined only from the characteristics of strife itself.[38] The more remote causes of strife, namely deprivation, institutionalization, legitimacy, and prior strife, are the more fundamental and persisting ones. Some additional regression analyses provide some comparisons. Four of the independent variables relate to inferred states of mind: the two short-term deprivation measures, persisting deprivation, and legitimacy. The R based on these variables is .65, compared with .81 when the remaining four variables are added. The R based on the three deprivation variables alone is .60. These analyses show that all "states-of-mind" conditions contribute significantly to magnitude of strife, but that long-term deprivation has a partial controlling effect on political deprivation. The inference is that short-term political deprivation, as indexed in this study, is most likely to lead to strife if it summates with conditions of persisting deprivation.

---

[37] Analysis of the correlation coefficients does not indicate definitively that legitimacy contributes to coercive potential rather than vice versa; nor would it be impossible to argue, on the basis of the partial r's alone, that short-term deprivation is a weak intervening variable between coercive potential and facilitation, on the one hand, and strife on the other. It is the plausibility of the theoretical arguments, in each case, that gives deciding force to the interpretation proposed. For a comparable argument see Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling," elsewhere in this issue of this REVIEW.

We can also ask, and answer, the question, To what extent do the remaining four mediating conditions alone account for magnitude of strife? The variables coercive potential, facilitation, institutionalization, and past strife give a multiple R of .73, with almost all the explained variance accounted for by the first two variables. This result should provide aid and comfort to those concerned with "levels of analysis" problems: research of this sort can focus on aggregative, societal characteristics—which the mediating variables represent—and the (inferred) psychological level can be ignored with relatively little loss of statistical explanatory power. Why these variables are strongly operative and others, like levels of development and type of political system, are relatively weak still needs answering; the answer may be to treat psychological variables as unoperationalized assumptions, or to replace them with variables whose rationale is strictly in terms of effects of social structure or processes on stability.

A further problem is identification of the set of variables that provides the most parsimonious account of magnitude of civil strife. As one approach to the answer, Figure 5 implies that three variables can be eliminated: coercive potential, institutionalization, and past strife, all of which have no consequential direct effects on TMCS. The remaining five variables—the "state of mind" variables and facilitation—give an R of .80 and R^2 of .64, results almost identical to those obtained when all eight variables are included.[39] Four of the five variables included contribute substantially to the regression equation; as expected, the effects of short-term deprivation, political deprivation in particular, are partially controlled. One important observation is that *social and structural facilitation*, though it is substantially the strongest explanatory variable,[40] has here, as in Figure 5, only a moderate direct controlling effect on short-term deprivation. One interpretation is that some of the effects of facilitation on TMCS are independent of deprivation. Two of its three component measures, Communist Party status and external support for initiators, have in common a "tactical" element, i.e., one can infer that underlying them are calculations about gains to be achieved through the employment of strife. This tactical element is not wholly independent of deprivation, inasmuch as three of the four correlations between facilitation and deprivation measures are significant, ranging from .17 to .34 (see Table 1). The basic proposition of this study, that relative deprivation is a necessary precondition for strife, is not challenged by these observations. They do, however, suggest that tactical motives for civil strife are of sufficient importance that they deserve separate operational attention comparable to the conceptual attention given them by conflict theorists.[41]

---

[38] Tanter has examined time-lag effects between a number of measures of foreign economic and military assistance for the regime and magnitude of civil violence in 1961–63 for Latin American nations and finds generally weak relationships. The only consequential positive relationship, an indirect one, is between levels of U.S. military assistance and subsequent strife. Raymond Tanter, "Toward A Theory of Conflict Behavior in Latin America." (Paper read to the International Political Science Association, Brussels, September, 1967).

[39] In a reanalysis using corrected data (see footnote 34), four variables—the combined short-term deprivation measure, persisting deprivation, legitimacy, and facilitation—given an R^2 of .629.

[40] The partial r's for these five variables are: economic deprivation, .27; political deprivation, .13; persisting deprivation, .39; legitimacy, .36; facilitation, .61.

[41] For example Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); Lewis Coser, *The Functions*

A number of additional causal inference analyses can be made which might lead to modifications of these conclusions, and of the causal model in Figure 5. Other articles will report the results of causal analyses of various subsets of the universe of polities, and of the causal sequences that can be identified for the several forms of strife.[42]

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Quantitative comparative research cannot flourish in a theoretical vacuum, even if it makes use of an armamentarium of techniques of causal inference. This article may not be proof of that assertion, but it should suggest the usefulness of beginning with a theoretical model based on previous substantive work. The theoretical model of the causes of civil strife employed here dictated the construction of a number of aggregate indicators of not-easily-operationalized variables for 114 polities. Eight summary indicators proved to account jointly for two-thirds the variance among nations in relative magnitudes of civil strife during 1961–65 ($R^2=.65$). Of greater theoretical consequence, the initial analysis of partial correlation coefficients makes possible a number of more precise statements about the causal interactions among the theoretical variables.

The fundamental proposition that strife varies directly in magnitude with the intensity of relative deprivation is strongly supported; the three deprivation variables alone provide an R of .60 ($R^2= .36$), and when a fourth state-of-mind variable, legitimacy, is added the R^2 increases to .43. One criticism of this research, and of other cross-national studies of strife that make inferences about collective manifestations of psychological variables, is that the results are not a "direct" test of the relevance of such variables, since the indices of psychological variables are derived from aggregate data rather than being obtained, for example, from cross-national surveys. It is unquestionably necessary to test all hypotheses, including psychological ones, in a variety of ways, for example to determine whether the inferentially-deprived groups are those most likely to engage in strife, and to ask highly frustrated individuals whether they would, or have, taken part in collective violence. No scientific proposition is ever *directly* confirmed or disconfirmed, but some tests are less indirect than others. However, there is only one scientifically acceptable alternative to regarding the results reported here as strong indirect evidence for the psychological propositions relating deprivation and legitimacy to civil violence. That is to provide some reasonably parsimonious, alternative explanations (substantive or technical) of the fact that indices of inferred collective states of mind account for two-thirds of the explained variance (43 percent compared with 65 percent for all variables) in total magnitude of strife.

The effects of the intervening or mediating variables on the disposition to civil violence proved considerably more complex than those of the deprivation variables. Regime legitimacy apparently has no consequential mediating effect on deprivation but acts much as deprivation itself does: low levels of legitimacy, or by inference feelings of illegitimacy, apparently motivate men to collective violence. Levels of institutionalization, as reflected in high levels of unionization, party system stability, and large public sectors, have no direct mediating effect on deprivation; they are however important determinants of coercive potential and of social facilitation, variables which in turn crucially affect the outcome of short-term deprivation. Social and structural facilitation is the most potent of the intervening variables and appears to have some independent effect on magnitudes of strife. One inference is that the index of this variable reflects tactical decisions to engage in strife as a means of goal attainment. The measure of past levels of strife, 1946–1959, provides a partial test of what might be called the null hypotheses of human conflict, that the best predictor of future conflict is the level of past conflict.[43] The measure has relatively weak relationships with magnitude of strife measures for 1961–65 and is an important mediating variable only among the causes of turmoil.

One striking finding is that nations' levels of persisting deprivation are consistently and directly related to their levels of strife. Depri-

---

of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956); and Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).

[42] See Gurr, "Why Urban Disorder?" for a causal inference analysis of the sources of turmoil. The turmoil model differs principally in that "past strife levels" has the primary mediating role that facilitation has in the TMCS model.

[43] The test is less than precise because the measures are not comparable; the past strife measure is based on an arbitrary weighting of counts of number of events, whereas the magnitude of strife measures reflect levels of participation, duration, and intensity.

vation attributable to such conditions as discrimination, political separatism, economic dependence, and religious cleavages tends to contribute at a relatively moderate but constant rate to civil strife whatever may be done to encourage, deter, or divert it, short only of removing its underlying conditions. One other result has important implications for theory, and also for policy, if it is supported by further research. The relation between coercive force size (the relative size of military and internal security forces) and the magnitude of civil violence is distinctly curvilinear: as the level of resources devoted to coercive forces increases, the magnitude of violence also tends to increase up to a certain point, and only at relatively high levels of coercive force does strife tend to decline. Moreover at the outer limit the relationship again tends to change direction: countries with the very largest coercive forces tend to have more strife than those with somewhat smaller forces. When one eliminates from analysis the countries that have experienced protracted internal or external conflict, the basic curvilinear relationship remains. The adage that force solves nothing seems supported; in fact force may make things worse.

MEASURING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEM STABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA*

Ernest A. Duff
Randolph-Macon Woman's College

John F. McCamant
University of Denver

This article considers the social and political factors that influence the stability/instability of the political system and attempts to measure some of these factors in the political systems of Latin America.

I. INTRODUCTION

The world-wide trends of urbanization, industrialization, and increased communications impel all political systems to change, whatever their level of development or the state of their institutions. A stable political system may be defined as one which can manage change within its structures. In a stable system, the pattern of interactions is not subject to large or radical change, and the political actors can depend upon certain procedures and relationships, which adjust to the changing requirements of the society. Stability results, on the one hand, from the views that the population have of their political system and, on the other hand, from the strength of the system itself. In a stable political system, the members of the system consider it to be both legitimate and effective,[1] and the system, in turn, must have the power and ability to meet the demands and needs of the society as well as the flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances. An unstable political system is simply the converse of the stable system. It has difficulties in managing change, and when instability becomes extreme, it is subject to profound and radical changes in its structures. Instability is brought about by a population that considers the political system to be illegitimate and/or ineffective, and by political institutions which cannot meet the needs and demands of the society and which lack the capacity to adjust.

Stability/instability is a condition of the political system at a particular time which may manifest itself differently in different systems. Stability is manifested simply by the absence of those interesting events that are reported by the news media. Instability may be reflected in increased repression by the authorities, by violent or non-violent demonstrations, by runaway inflation, by coups d'etat, by civil war, or ultimately by social revolution. The nature of the manifestation depends on the political culture, the peculiar balance of political forces, the sequence of events, and the decisions of key actors. Violent social revolution is the most definite and unambiguous manifestation of system instability, but it is an event which has occurred in few countries. The precise meaning of other manifestations in terms of system instability is less clear. A coup d'etat will take place in Ecuador, with its tradition of military intervention, under less provocation than it will in Colombia. Instability produces pressures which in a democracy will be met by a policy that gives in to all demands and leads to inflation while in a dictatorship the demands are suppressed, coming to the surface only in the form of anomic demonstrations. On other occasions instability may remain latent or unexpressed. The criteria for and manifestations of political stability/instability in democratic and authoritarian systems are shown in Table 1.

The degree of system stability/instability changes continuously over time, but the manifestations of instability move discontinuously. That is to say the various manifestations will erupt for a period and then die down. A country may be apparently quiet when in fact it is ripe for revolution. Nevertheless a society cannot bear a state of violence for very long before it exhausts itself and calms down—even though it may remain basically unstable because the dissatisfactions and incapacities remain. It is important to know whether a country has manifested its instability, whether it contains more instability than it has manifested, or whether it is, in fact, stable.

Two examples from recent Latin American history demonstrate the value of an estimation of the basic stability/instability present in a political system. The Dominican Republic

---

* This article is a by-product of cooperation of the authors in the Rockefeller Foundation University Development Program at the Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia in 1966–1967.

[1] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1959), Chapter 3.

TABLE 1. CRITERIA FOR AND MANIFESTATIONS OF SYSTEM STABILITY/INSTABILITY

Stable

Criteria	Manifestations	
	Democracy	*Dictatorship*
Welfare > Social Mobilization. High rate of economic growth. Equal income distribution. High political capability. Broad-based institutionalized political parties.	Continue as democracy.	No increase in coercion, with option available for evolution to democratic system.

Unstable

Criteria	Manifestations	
	Democracy	*Dictatorship*
Welfare < Social Mobilization. Low rate of economic growth. Unequal income distribution. Low political capability. Narrow personalistic political parties.	Inflation. Personnel changes. Increasing support of extremist solutions. Decentralized violence. Military intervention. Guerrilla warfare. Social Revolution.	Inflation. Increase in level of coercion. Decentralized violence. Coup d'etat. Guerrilla warfare. Social Revolution.

manifested little instability for thirty years under the dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo. His assassination led to a succession crisis because the procedures and institutions for promoting new leadership were undeveloped. In April, 1965, after a number of coups, fighting broke out between rival military factions. Under such chaotic conditions a small organized group could easily take control and make a social revolution *if the conditions were ripe for revolution*. The United States intervened to prevent such a possibility on the assumption that a social revolution adverse to the national interests of the United States was a definite possiblity. The evidence developed in this article indicates that the conditions of stability/instability in the Dominican Republic in 1965 were entirely different than they were in Cuba in 1958 and there was little danger that the small conflict would escalate.

Panama underwent a succession crisis in 1968 due to peculiar personality circumstances, and at one time commentators were making some dire predictions about the future course of events in that country. In the end, Panama settled its crisis with little violence which never went out of control. Similar circumstances in other countries might have brought an explosion. The seriousness of these crises depends upon the instability present in the system, and knowledge of this condition will allow one to predict the probable seriousness of future manifestations and to understand past manifestations.

An analysis of political stability/instability requires two types of data: the attitudes of the population and the capabilities of the political system. The capabilities of the political system can be estimated from the public information about the actions of the system. The attitudes of the population present a more difficult problem. Both the theory and the empirical data are lacking. When the theory is developed it will still be a Herculean task to carry out the empirical investigation in a large number of countries.[2] However, we can assume that the attitudes result from real social conditions that we do have knowledge of, and by measuring these conditions we can have a rough estimate of these attitudes. We have no sophisticated psychological theory but will rely on the simple proposition that if people want something and cannot obtain it, they become dissatisfied.[3]

---

[2] In addition to the work involved, political resistance may prevent survey work. See Irving L. Horowitz, "The Life and Death of Project Camelot," and Kalman H. Silvert, "American Academic Ethics and Social Research Abroad," both reprinted in U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 89th Cong. 2nd Sess., *International Education: Past, Present, Problems, and Prospects* (Washington: GPO, 1967).

The demands that the population places on its political system are of two types: political-political for a form of political system that fits their ideas of authority and allows them the type and amount of participation desired, and political-economic for goods and services to be delivered by the political system and more general welfare conditions for which they hold the political system responsible.

The demands for a legitimate form of government and participation are most difficult to ascertain. Although democratic forms have been considered legitimate in Latin America for more than a century and a half by many intellectual leaders, it is not altogether certain that the uneducated majorities really desired these forms. Furthermore, the liberal democratic model has received challenges from both the left and the right. In no cases are the desires uniform within a country and the divisions are as important as the majority desires. The correspondence between demands and the forms of the political system is a question that we will not be able to explore empirically in the latter part of this article because our ignorance is still too great on these matters. The later analysis will therefore focus on more readily quantifiable aspects.

Information on economic conditions, although still inexact and incomplete, is more readily available than information on political conditions. Both political and economic factors are important in determining system stability, but in Latin America the economic problems are futher from being resolved than are the political, and therefore are more crucial in the stability/instability equation. The purely political factors are not ignored completely, however, as they are an important part of political capabilities, which will be discussed. Nevertheless, we admit to a materialistic bias in this essay, which is due to two causes: our belief that economic factors are most important in Latin America today, and the absence of information on political-political demands.

A developed economic system manages to satisfy the material demands of the population thereby lessening the number and intensity of demands directed against the political system. Development also allows the political system to obtain additional resources from the society to enable it to respond to demands. As the political system meets more of the material demands placed upon it, it develops supports within the society. The logic of this simple proposition is such that one would expect not only a strong correlation between the level of economic development and system stability, but a perfect correlation. This is not, however, the case in developing systems.[4] In Latin America, for example, Cuba, Argentina, and Venezuela are among the leaders in economic development, but both their history of democratic government and political stability leave much to be desired. The reason for this imperfect correlation is that the economic development thesis can only be applied *ceteris paribus*.

The most important reason why economic development sometimes fails to produce political stability is that while the economy is making it possible for the political and economic systems to satisfy the demands of the population, it is also raising the level of expectations. As men pass from the traditional society they come widely to believe that the external world is sytematically capable of productive manipulation.[5] Not only do they learn to control their material environment, but they also learn to control their social and political environment. With economic growth and the passing of the traditional society both the objective needs and the population's consciousness of these needs increase. The process that brings this increase in the level of political demands is called social mobilization.[6] Both the increase in societal welfare and in social mobilization move in the same direction, but they often increase at different rates. It is important to measure them separately and to attempt to measure the relative development of each. The higher the level of societal welfare the better the prospects for political stability, while the higher the level of social mobilization (and consequently of demands upon the political system), the poorer the prospects for political stability. Therefore, one of the probabilistic determinants of political stability within a political system will be the disparity between the level of societal welfare and social mobilization.

---

[3] Our proposition finds considerable justification in the discussion of Ted Gurr in "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, 20 (Jan., 1968), 245–278. See also his article in the present issue of this REVIEW.

[4] The correlation is much better on a world-wide basis. See Lipset, *op. cit.*, Chapter 2; Bruce M. Russett, *Trends in World Politics* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), Chapter 8; and Gabriel Almond and James C. Coleman, *Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

[5] Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960), pp. 4–6.

[6] Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, 55 (Sept., 1961), 493–514.

Social mobilization continues at a steady pace while the rate of growth of societal welfare fluctuates and may even be negative. Thus a sustained and substantial rate of economic growth is necessary in order to keep societal welfare ahead of social mobilization. The economic growth rate also has some directly political connotations. Whether or not a political system is responsible for economic growth, people in the post-World War II world have decided that lack of economic growth is the fault of the government. Stagnation or recession thus increases the demands on the government but does not increase the resources available to meet those demands. On the other hand, a dynamic economy leads to higher employment, greater economic mobility, new opportunities for the ambitious within the economic system and lower demands on the political system. Moreover, since government revenues expand roughly in proportion to economic growth, the government in a growing economy has increasing resources to perform services and make investments.

A relatively equal distribution of income also tends to promote political stability. The poor provide the potential for extraordinary political instability. As they have no commitments to any of the society's institutions, they make excellent potential followers for those who would overthrow the system. The size of this "culture of poverty," then, is an indication of the stability/instability of the system.[7] Disparity of income among those who more fully participate in the society may also generate dissatisfaction with the performance of the political system.

The relative difference of a society's wealth and political mobilization, the distribution of the wealth, and the rate of change in the economy establish the environmental limits within which the political system operates. Nevertheless, the political system has its own sphere of autonomy and can respond to the environment in a variety of ways. The ways in which it reacts depend upon its political capabilities,[8] while at the same time an effective party system and capable leadership are also important in organizing demands, eliciting supports, and generating loyalty to the system. Each of these factors results from a long history of political interaction and requires a concentrated effort of many years to change.

The taxing power of the government is a key factor in measuring system stability. It indicates, on one hand, the level of material support being received by the political systems, while on the other hand, it indicates the extent of resources available to the system for the satisfaction of demands. Today the developing countries can also turn to the international environment for material resources in the form of public loans and grants. A system that can extract at a high level from both the domestic and international environments can buy support with benefits and jobs, give more general services to the population, and maintain police and military forces which give credence to its authority.[9]

The way in which a government distributes its services is also important. A government that spends a large proportion of its budget on education, health, and housing for the general population develops long-range support of the society while investing in human resources, which is probably the best way to promote sustained economic development.[10] The extractive and distributive capabilities of the political systems must, therefore, also be included in any measurement of system stability. The regulative, symbolic, and responsive capabilities of a political system are also important, but they are more difficult to measure. In the analysis of Latin American political systems that follows, we assume that the extractive and distributive capabilities reflect the general range of the total capability of the political systems.

The most important political structure

---

[7] Oscar Lewis, "The Culture of Poverty," *Scientific American*, 215 (Oct., 1966), 19–26. The "culture of poverty," in the terms of our discussion, is the culture belonging to the uprooted and poor population in a socially mobilized society. The participants in this culture, while themselves only partially mobilized, can be swept quickly into political movements that appeal to their objective and psychological needs.

[8] Gabriel Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," *World Politics*, 18 (Jan., 1965), 183–214.

[9] Russett, *op. cit.*, pp. 121–135.

[10] Theodore W. Schultz, *The Economic Value of Education* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). A discussion of the importance of education in the economic development of Central America is presented in John F. McCamant, *Development Assistance in Central America* (New York: Praeger, 1968), Chapter 7.

outside of the formal institutions of government that may influence the level of system stability is the political party. In the developing countries many political parties are little more than the campaign organization of presidential aspirants. Even when the leader has great popular appeal, it cannot be said that such a political party has a stabilizing effect. To produce this effect, a political party must be institutionalized—that is, have a life independent of its leader—and must be capable of integrating different sectors of the population.[11] Although it is most difficult to quantify these characteristics, they are as real as any of the measurable items discussed earlier. Samuel P. Huntington suggests the following criteria to test the extent of institutionalization of an organization: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherency.[12] Additionally, parties which serve as instruments of national integration can be identified through a study of their ideology and organization, as well as an examination of their past record in this area.

The institutionalized party of national integration serves a number of functions important to the stability of the system. The party organizes and reinforces the commitment of individuals to the political process. The leaders soon develop a vested interest in the system through the perquisites that they obtain from the system as representatives of a political party. In turn, the leaders devote considerable energy and time to maintain a following, and in so doing develop satisfying symbols and provide opportunities for expression of demands and complaints. An institutionalized party also recruits membership and searches for competent and attractive leadership. At the same time the institutionalized party is continuously developing and defining policy alternatives that will be endorsed by its following and attract new supporters. In an operative democratic system, the commitment to the party overflows into a commitment to the system in which the party has a stake. In a non-democratic system the effect holds only for the party or parties that share the power of the government.

Thus, far, the relationship of political stability/instability to the balance between societal welfare and social mobilization, income distribution, economic growth, system capabilities and political organization has been presented with no attempt to implement the theory. It should be possible, however, to utilize available social, political, and economic indicators to predict, on a comparative basis, the prospects for political stability of a group of political systems. In order to demonstrate the theory, while at the same time demonstrating the facility and practicability of this type of political measurement we propose to measure the relative prospects for political stability of nineteen Latin American political systems. Although a precise measure of the Cuban situation is not possible because of missing data, the relative stability of the political system in 1958 is also considered.

II. METHODOLOGY

No attempt has been made to find an absolute value of probability of system stability. Rather, the analysis is limited to measuring the relationship of the Latin American political systems with each other. In order to compare and combine the position of each country within the different criteria, it is necessary to establish a common index or scale for the various statistics used.[13] Then it is necessary to make some decisions as to the importance of each factor within each combined index and in the final score of relative system stability.

The information available allows us to do more than simply establish the rank of each country within each factor; it allows us to establish the interval between countries. One method of putting all the statistics on a common scale would be to give the highest statistic within each factor a score of one hundred, the lowest zero, and give each other statistic the score of its relative position between one hundred and zero. The principle weakness of this method is that the length of the interval between country scores is completely determined by the two extremes. If one country were extremely low in one factor, all the other countries would have a high score, whereas, if one country were extremely high, it would depress the score of all the others. If there were both high and low scores, the interval between the other would be small, and and the extreme positions would not be reflected in the score because no score could surpass one hundred or be less than zero. Therefore, we decided to use a more complicated mathematical method that would avoid these distortions. On each factor, the Latin American mean and the average variation measured in standard deviation were found, and the score given to each country was its distance, either negative or positive, from the mean measured in number of standard deviations.[14]

---

[11] Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

[12] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, 18 (April, 1965), 386–430.

[13] It is usual at this point to make an apology for Latin American statistics. Without a doubt the statistics used in this essay are not entirely reliable, but they have been gathered through standardized procedures developed by the Organization of American States and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and other United Nation Agencies. The emphasis on planning since 1960 has given considerable impulse to the improvement of the statistical procedures. Therefore we think that whatever inaccuracies exist are not of such magnitude as to discredit their use. For a fuller discussion of the use of aggregate data see, Ronald V. McGranahan, "Comparative Social Research in the United Nations," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Comparing Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

After the statistics in each factor were translated into the common index of standard deviations from the Latin American mean, it was still necessary to determine the importance of each factor in the combined indexes and in the final score of sytem stability. No mathematical solution would help solve this methodological problem.[15] It was necessary to make more or less arbitrary decisions based on our judgment. In the combined indexes of social mobilization and societal welfare, the decisions were not overly crucial as all the factors were highly correlated with each other, and the weight of each or even the exclusion of one would not make a great deal of difference. In combining the various indexes into the final score, the decisions were all important because the score of a country differed greatly from one criterion to the next. For instance, Uruguay has a better-than-average record on the collection of taxes but it has had a very poor economic growth record in recent years. How much is domestic extractive capability worth relevant to economic growth in the determination of system stability? The authors decided that the political capabilities should be given equal weight to the environment scores. The societal welfare minus social mobilization score was given twice the weight of the score on recent economic growth. The formula for the final score is:

$$\text{System Stability} = \frac{4x_1 + 2x_2 + 3x_3 + 3x_4}{12}$$

where: System Stability is given as an average number of standard deviations from the Latin American mean;

x_1 is societal welfare minus social mobilization;
x_2 is recent economic growth;
x_3 is extractive capability measured in per cent of GDP collected in taxes plus foreign grants and loans measured in percentage of GDP;
x_4 is distributive capability measured by percentage of GDP spent on public education.

Two of the factors discussed in the previous section, income distribution and institutionalized parties, could not be given quantitative scores, and therefore could not be included in the final system stability score. These factors, however, are discussed and used in the political system profiles.

III. APPLICATION TO LATIN AMERICA

Effects of Environment on the Political System. The authors selected as indexes for the level of societal welfare within the nineteen societies the following: gross domestic product per capita for 1965, a combined index representing the level of health services, a combined index representing the level of educational opportunities, and a combined index representing the level of nutrition for the society. Per capita GDP was chosen and given a weight of fifty per cent on the combined welfare scale because it, more than any other single figure, represents the level of goods and services available for distribution within a society.[16]

In view of some of the limitations in translating GDP measured in respective national currencies into a common international stan-

---

[14] The population standard deviation was used in preference to the sample standard deviation. The formula for the mean is:

$$M = \Sigma Xi/N$$

The formula for the standard deviation is:

$$s\sqrt{=\Sigma(Xi-M)^2/N}$$

[15] A multiple regression analysis could be made if there were available system stability scores arrived at independently of the analysis here. Unfortunately none are available, and even if a multiple regression were possible it would not identify the real causal relationships. At this point, one can only judge whether the correct weight has been given the factors by whether the final score fits the historical qualitative data on Latin American politics.

[16] Russett, *op. cit.*, pp. 112–114.

dard and because the GDP does not measure the distribution of the goods and services throughout a society, the welfare index also includes components which measure the extent to which the society fulfills some more basic human needs. First, the level of health services has been measured by medical doctors per 10,000 inhabitants and hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants. Second, the level of educational opportunities and services was measured by the percentage of population fifteen years and older classified as literate and the percentage of population between the ages of thirteen and nineteen enrolled in secondary schools. The secondary school figure was chosen because of its close relation with figures for university education and because primary education figures are, in many cases, distorted by inclusion of adult education, vocational education, and the like. The final modifier of the GDP scale is the nutrition index, composed of daily calorie intake per capita and average daily protein intake per capita. Each of these non-GDP indexes was given a weight of sixteen and two-thirds of the total welfare index, thus making their combined weight equal to that of the GDP index. The results of the societal welfare measurement are shown in Table 2. After the indexes were combined, the result was again converted to the standard deviation scale.

The social mobilization index was constructed in a similar manner, utilizing data considered to be sound, converting this data to a standard deviation scale, and then combining the various indexes into one. The combined index is composed of three factors: Exposure to mass media (itself composed of three fac-

TABLE 2. SOCIETAL WELFARE

Country	Gross domestic product per capita (U. S. $)	Per cent of Literacy[a]	Per cent of Population aged 13–18 in school	Daily calories per capita	Daily proteins per capita (grams)	Doctors per 10,000 persons	Hospital beds per 10,000 persons	Final societal welfare score in standard deviations
Argentina	$645	91.4	40	2,660	77.2	14.6	6.4	1.95
Uruguay	560	90.3	39	2,970	94.5	11.9	6.7	1.85
Venezuela	835	79.3	28	2,360	58.2	8.1	3.2	1.68
Chile	410	83.6	33	2,370	79.4	7.3	4.5	.70
Panama	495	80.3	33	2,270	59.3	5.0	3.8	.63
Mexico	435	72.1	17	2,640	73.4	6.9	2.2	.44
Costa Rica	405	84.0	25	2,460	53.8	4.7	4.5	.39
Brazil	220	61.5	22	2,850	68.6	4.5	3.0	−.20
Paraguay	205	77.0	15	2,580	66.0	5.2	2.2	−.35
Nicaragua	305	49.7	12	2,325	62.0	3.8	2.2	−.37
Dominican Republic	300	60.0	11	2.040	49.7	5.2	2.9	−.43
Colombia	265	62.3	22	2,130	48.6	4.0	2.7	−.46
Peru	285	60.2	23	2,240	57.1	4.4	2.4	−.53
Guatemala	315	38.0	9	2,160	58.0	1.5	2.6	−.55
El Salvador	260	44.0	16	2,120	58.0	2.7	2.3	−.66
Ecuador	215	67.5	15	1,890	48.5	2.7	2.3	−.78
Honduras	215	44.6	7	2,070	53.0	1.6	2.0	−.93
Bolivia	145	37.0	18	1,810	47.3	3.0	2.4	−1.12
Haiti	63	20.0	5	1,875	—	0.7	0.6	−1.78
Mean	346	63.9	21	2,306	61.8	5.2	3.1	
Standard Deviation	186	19.7	10	321	12.3	3.1	1.3	

Sources:

Inter-American Development Bank. *Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America.* Social Progress Trust Fund: Sixth Annual Report, 1966. Washington, D. C., 1967. Calorie intake figures for Haiti and Nicaragua: *Progreso '67.* Vision, Incorporated. New York, 1967.

[a] Year varies from 1960 to 1965, depending on year of latest census.

tors), membership in labor unions as a percentage of economically active population, and percentage of population living in urban areas. The combined mass media index registers the number of daily newspapers delivered per 1,000 inhabitants, radio receivers per 1,000 inhabitants, and television receivers per 1,000 inhabitants. Our aim was to develop separate indexes of welfare and social mobilization and we restricted the two indexes as far as possible to criteria that were distinct. Even so the correlation coefficient between the two indexes is .92. Table 3 shows the data and the index of social mobilization.

A measurement of the difference between the society's position on the two indexes produces the basic measurement of the effects in terms of prospective political stability. The results of this measurement are shown in Figure 1. Costa Rica stands alone with by far the greatest positive differential, and therefore a greater probability of political stability. In descending order the countries with a positive measure are: Panama, Paraguay, Guatemala,

TABLE 3. SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

Country	Newspapers delivered per 1,000 persons	Radio receivers per 1,000 persons	T.V. receivers per 1,000 persons	% Economically active population in labor unions	% Urbanization	Social Mobilization score in standard deviations
Venezuela	78[a]	196	70	67[c]	67	2.07
Uruguay	314	309	65	21[c]	73	1.94
Argentina	146[a]	282	68	34	72	1.82
Chile	118[a]	187	7	21	68	.81
Mexico	112	184	33	20	55	.61
Peru	47	169	15	19[c]	47	.10
Panama	75[a]	198	41	5	47	.07
Brazil	54	95	29	11	50	−.02
Colombia	52	183	17	7[c]	53	−.10
El Salvador	47[b]	140	11	5[c]	39	−.45
Bolivia	26	137	0	14[c]	35	−.49
Costa Rica	77[a]	89	25	7	34	−.50
Ecuador	52	104	2	7[c]	38	−.55
Nicaragua	49[a]	63	6	4[c]	42	−.56
Dominican Republic	27	40	6	23	30	−.57
Guatemala	31	54	12	1	34	−.85
Paraguay	12	86	0	4[c]	33	−.87
Honduras	19[a]	58	3	4[c]	26	−1.09
Haiti	6	13	1	0	16	−1.52
Mean	71	131	22	14	45	
Standard deviation	66	80	22	20	16	

Sources:

1. Newspapers delivered, radio receivers, and TV receivers. United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, *Statistical Bulletin for Latin America,* New York: September, 1966.
2. Labor union membership: Latin American Center, University of California at Los Angeles. *Statistical Abstract of Latin America:* 1964. Los Angeles: 1965.
3. Urbanization: Inter-American Development Bank. *Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America,* Washington, D. C.: 1967.

[a] Partial data.

[b] Provisional data.

[c] Economically active population estimated for 1960 from figure reported at latest census on assumption that economically active population changed in proportion to change in total population.



FIG. 1. Societal welfare-social mobilization differential

Nicaragua, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and Argentina. Countries where social mobilization is relatively higher than societal welfare and hence have a negative measure are: Uruguay, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, El Salvador, Haiti, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia. The differentials were converted into a standard deviation scale to be combined with the other criteria.

A necessary modification of environmental effects was introduced through the construction of an index of economic growth over the last ten years. In the index the growth during the period 1961–1966 was given twice the weight of the period 1955–1960 as the more recent period will produce greater results in terms of dissatisfaction or satisfaction with the performance of the society, increase the ability of the government to respond to demands and ultimately ameliorate the destabilizing effects of any disequilibrium between social mobilization and societal welfare. The results of the comparison of rates of recent economic growth are shown in Table 4. Panama, Mexico, Chile, El Salvador, Peru and Nicaragua, according to the weighted average, have grown at more than the 2.5 per cent per capita called for by the Alliance for Progress. Brazil, Venezuela, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Bolivia have all achieved a higher than 2.0 per cent growth rate, similarly weighted. At the other extreme, Paraguay has had zero per capita growth, and Uruguay and Haiti have had negative rates.

Unfortunately, the data on income distribution are not sufficiently complete to allow us to include them in the numerical indexes on system stability. The information available is presented here and will be used in the stability profiles given in the conclusion, as omission of the factor entirely would leave a valuable piece of information unexploited. The best measure of income distribution is the percentage of income received by various percentages of persons, ordered in income groups, and this information has been estimated for six countries.

Table 5 presents the data on the six countries in order of their relative equality of income distribution. The range of inequality is great. According to the data, Ecuador has the most equitable distribution of income, with the richest five-per cent of the population receiving only ten times as much income, on the average, as the lowest fifty per cent. Argentina, Chile, and Colombia have almost identical distribution profiles. Mexico and Venezuela appear to have very inequitable income distributions.

Characteristics of the Political System. "The extractive capability of a political system refers to the range of system performance in drawing material and human resources from the domestic and international environment."[17] Our interest is in capability which means potential as well as actual performance. The potential for drawing human resources from the environment is essentially untested because the Latin American states have not been

---

[17] Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 195.

TABLE 4. ECONOMIC GROWTH

Country	Annual increase in per capita GDP: 1955–1960 (%)	Annual increase in per capita GDP: 1961–1966 (%) (double weight)	Economic growth score in standard deviations
Panama	1.7	4.8	1.21
Mexico	3.0	2.8	.72
Chile	1.9	3.1	.63
El Salvador	1.3	3.4	.63
Peru	2.1	3.0	.63
Nicaragua	−1.2	4.4	.54
Brazil	2.8	2.2[a]	.47
Venezuela	2.8	2.0	.40
Guatemala	2.4	2.2	.39
Costa Rica	1.5	2.6	.38
Bolivia	−2.5	4.4	.31
Honduras	1.4	1.8	.07
Ecuador	1.4	1.6	.00
Argentina	0.9	1.6	−.09
Colombia	1.2	1.2	−.18
Dominican Republic	−0.4	0.7	−.65
Paraguay	−0.3	0.2	−.79
Uruguay	−1.3	−0.3	−1.17
Haiti	0.6[b]	−7.7	−3.50

Sources:

1. 1955–1960 economic growth. Naciones Unidas. Comision Economica para America Latina. *La Economia de America Latina en 1965.*
2. 1961–1966 economic growth. Inter-American Development Bank. *Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America.* Washington, D. C.: 1968

[a] 1960–1965 growth rate from Naciones Unidas, *Estudio Economico de America Latina: 1965.*

[b] Data not available. Estimate of Caribbean area growth from Economic Comission for Latin America, *Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-War Period.*

involved in any situation where general mobilization was required to defend the state. On the other hand, each government has pushed close to its political limits in the extraction of material resources from the domestic environment. Present performance in taxation, then, is a good estimate of the domestic extractive capability. The same is true concerning the international extractive capability; the present level of economic cooperation is as high as the present international political system will support.

Precise data on tax revenues is obtainable only for the central governments, but that figure considerably distorts the total because the Latin American countries vary greatly in the taxation powers each leaves to the regional and municipal governments. Therefore, rougher estimates of total tax revenue are better reflections of extractive capability than are more exact reports of central government tax revenue. Fortunately, the Inter American Development Bank's report, *Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America,* makes estimates or provides the information from which estimates can be made in order to obtain the percentage of total revenue in gross domestic product for 1966. Brazil with its strong state governments has the largest percentage of tax revenue outside of the central government. Non-central government entities in Ecuador possess thirty per cent of that country's domestic extractive capability. Regional and local governments in Argentina and Colombia also have sizeable taxation powers. The federal system in Mexico, on the other hand, leaves only ten per cent of the extractive capability to other than the central government.

TABLE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME

Country	Per cent of Income to Population Sectors			Ratio of Upper Range Income to Lower Range Income
	50%	45%	5%	
Ecuador	24	51	25	10.0
Argentina	20	49	31	15.5
Chile	16	59	25	15.6
Colombia	18	53	29	16.0
Mexico	16	47	37	23.0
Venezuela	11	59	30	27.0

Sources:

1. Per cent of national income received by population sectors; Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, Mexico. United Nations, *The Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-War Period,* New York, 1964.
2. Per cent of income received by population sectors; Argentina. Naciones Unidas, *Boletin Economico de America Latina.* Vol. XI, No. 1, April, 1966. New York.
3. Per cent of income received by population sectors; Colombia. Joint Tax Program of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank. *Fiscal Survey of Colombia.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.

The results of the statistics on taxation as a percentage of gross domestic product found in Table 6 show a group of countries—Chile, Brazil, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay with a relatively high domestic extractive capability from 20.2 per cent to 14.0 per cent, and then break to Venezuela at 12.5 per cent. The second group of countries is spaced evenly down to Guatemala which manages to extract only 8.3 per cent of the production of the country in taxes. It is difficult to find any societal conditions that can explain the distribution. The top of the list includes both rich and poor countries, countries with local autonomy, Brazil and Ecuador, and countries highly centralized, Chile, Uruguay, and the Dominican Republic. The distribution seems to reflect purely political phenomena: certain countries have developed a higher degree of governmental authority than have others. Brazil and Ecuador have used the authority of state and local governments to increase the authority of the whole political system. Chile and Uruguay have developed their authority through a long tradition of responding to the wishes and needs of their citizens. The Dominican Republic has a record of strong authoritarian government backed by a unified military.

TABLE 6. GOVERNMENT EXTRACTIVE CAPABILITY

Country	Total taxes collected by all government levels 1966, as % GDP	Average annual grants and loans from U.S. and International Agencies 1962–1966 as % of 1965 GDP	Total Domestic and international extractive capability	Total extractive capability in standard deviations
Chile	20.2[a]	5.3	25.5	2.44
Dominican Republic	14.5[b]	6.1	20.6	1.27
Ecuador	15.8[c]	4.2	20.0	1.12
Brazil	17.4[d]	2.2	19.6	1.02
Bolivia	8.8[a]	10.7	19.5	1.00
Costa Rica	11.2[c]	4.9	16.1	.19
Nicaragua	11.5[c]	4.6	16.1	.19
Panama	11.4[a]	4.3	15.7	.10
Uruguay	14.0[a]	1.5	15.5	.05
Peru	12.3[a]	3.0	15.3	.00
Paraguay	9.3	5.3	14.6	−.17
Venezuela	12.5[a]	1.3	13.8	−.36
Colombia	10.0[e]	3.7	13.7	−.38
El Salvador	9.8[a]	3.5	13.3	−.48
Honduras	9.9[a]	3.2	13.1	−.53
Argentina	11.0[f]	0.7	11.7	−.86
Mexico	8.9[c]	1.7	10.6	−1.12
Guatemala	8.3[c]	1.1	9.4	−1.41
Haiti	5.9[a]	1.4	7.3	−1.91

Sources:

1. Domestic extractive capability. Inter-American Development Bank. *Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America.* Washington, 1968.
2. International extractive capability. U. S. Agency for International Development. Statistics and Reports Division. *U. S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations.* Washington, 1967.

[a] Central government tax revenue only. Other tax revenue known to be small.

[b] 1966 central government revenue plus 2.1 per cent estimated as municipal taxes.

[c] Reported total revenue for 1965 with change in central government revenue in 1966.

[d] Total government revenue for 1964.

[e] Central government revenue increased by percentage of local and departmental taxes reported for 1960 in Joint Tax Program of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank. *Fiscal Survey of Colombia.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.

[f] Estimated from 1966 central government tax revenue with adjustment for proportion of other tax revenue reported for 1964.

At the low end of the range are the two extremely poor countries, Haiti and Bolivia, which undoubtedly find economic as well as political limits to their taxation power because such a large proportion of their population is near subsistence level. Honduras, Paraguay, and Guatemala are less poor, but are low in their level of political mobilization. However, Guatemala holds on to its low position by virtue of a totally disorganized and divided body politic, which is the result of partial revolution and counter revolution. The position of Mexico seems inexplicable on the basis of its reputation.

The Latin American nations have found another source of material resources in the last fifteen years which has significantly altered their total extractive capability. Nowhere is this better exemplified than in Bolivia, where the government extracts only 8.8 per cent of its gross domestic product in taxes, but extracts from the international environment a sum equivalent to 10.7 per cent of its gross domestic product. The data from which this international extractive capability is calculated is the annual average loans and grants from public United States and international economic and military assistance programs between fiscal years 1962 and 1966. This sum represents the material resources which the government can draw upon in the short run to augment the domestic material resources at its disposal.

As the international extractive capability does not correlate with the domestic capability, it has the affect of reordering the ranking considerably. Bolivia rises from the rank of of seventeenth to fifth. Ecuador, Chile, and the Dominican Republic have high scores on both categories. Argentina, Mexico, and Guatemala with low scores on both accounts are pushed further to the bottom. In the Central Ameri-

TABLE 7. GOVERNMENT DISTRIBUTIVE CAPABILITY

Country	Total Government Expenditures on Education as per cent of national income	Distributive Capability in Standard Deviations
Peru	4.9	1.90
Panama	4.7	1.70
Costa Rica	4.6	1.60
Venezuela	4.3	1.30
Chile	3.5	.50
Colombia	3.3	.30
Argentina	3.3	.30
Uruguay	3.1	.10
Dominican Republic	3.1	.10
Brazil	3.0	.00
El Salvador	2.9	− .10
Mexico	2.8	− .20
Paraguay	2.4	− .60
Ecuador	2.4	− .60
Honduras	2.3	− .70
Bolivia	2.2	− .80
Nicaragua	1.8	−1.20
Guatemala	1.6	−1.40
Haiti	1.1	−1.90
Mean	3.0	
Standard Deviation	1.0	

Source: United Nations. UNESCO. *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1965*. New York, 1966.

can countries and Paraguay a strong international extractive capability compensates for a mediocre domestic capability.

The distributive capability of the government lends itself much less easily to a quantitative formulation than does the extractive capability. The extractive capability limits the size of the distributive capability, but we are interested in further information on how the funds that the government obtains are used in the society.

Education is a public service which is rendered more widely than any other service except the police service. It is an investment with a high economic return, and tends to equalize opportunities. Thus expenditures on public education as a percentage of national income seem to be the single best index of the capability of the government to distribute benefits widely and in a manner that will promote economic development and a more equal distribution of income.

It is necessary to find more than central government statistics here too because education is often a local responsibility. UNESCO reports the total expenditures on public education at all levels as a percentage of national income, and this is used as the index of governmental distributive capability. It is important to note that educational expenditures are not highly correlated with extractive capability. Countries that bring in the highest percentage in taxes do not necessarily spend a larger percentage of the national product on education. Thus, the index chosen for distributive capability measures something quite distinct from the measure chosen for extractive capability even though both are given as a percentage of the society's production or income.

The index on the distributive capability is found in Table 7. Peru, Panama, Costa Rica and Venezuela are spending more than four per cent of their national income on public education. At the other end of the scale are Paraguay, Ecuador, Honduras, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Haiti which are spending half as much or less. All countries are spending close to twice the percentage in the 1960's than they did a decade before. There is a higher correlation between this index and societal welfare than was the case in extractive capability, but the correlation is still low. Political characteristics seem more important than economic. All of the countries with some tradition in democratic government are near the top of the scale and those with a tradition of dictatorship are toward the bottom. The Dominican Republic in ninth position and Mexico in twelfth position are a partial exception to this rule.

Peru and Panama, the two countries that are spending most on education in relation to their income, present an interesting question to students of Latin American politics because both are countries where the established oligarchy purportedly still plays an important role in politics, and where well organized reformist parties have yet to take power. Parties are frankly personalist in both countries. However, the oligarchy is competing openly and vigorously for the votes of the population. Education appears to be a policy which all classes favor and also one that is a popular vote-getter.

Great differences in political party development exist among the political systems of Latin America, and to fail to give consideration to this factor would greatly distort our conclusions. However, the matter is too complex to present in any detail in this article, and our observations are limited by the lack of detailed research. Latin American political party systems are classified in Table 8.

The political systems of Mexico, Venezuela, and Costa Rica clearly have produced institutionalized parties of the first rank which are capable of integrating the major sectors of the population. One or several parties in each country have proved adaptable, complex, autonomous, coherent, and capable of producing regenerative political leadership. The Party of the Institutional Revolution in Mexico has the oldest history, proving its adaptability, but it is less autonomous than the others, being very closely tied on one hand to peasant and industrial labor groups and on the other to the formal institutions of government. The two principal parties in Costa Rica, the Party of National Liberation and the National Union Party are less complex in their organization, but are more autonomous. The Democratic Action Party and COPEI in Venezuela are both well organized, but they both have yet to prove that they can bring on new generations of leaders.

The parties in Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, and Peru are in a second echelon because of various weaknesses. Chile until very recently lacked a party that could effectively integrate the nation, but the ascendance of the Christian Democratic Party has filled this gap. When the Christian Democratic Party proves its adaptability in changing leadership, Chile will pass into the first rank. Uruguay has two old institutionalized parties in the *Colorados* and the *Blancos,* but the peculiar constitutional arrangements of Uruguay have encouraged party splintering into personalist factions. If the constitutional changes of December, 1966, bring about greater coherence in these two parties, Uruguay, too, will have to be placed at the top. Colombia also has two old and durable parties in the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. Both, however, are split into factions, again in part due to a peculiar constitutional arrangement, and at the local level organization is more personalist than institutional. Peru lacks traditional parties, but APRA must certainly be considered an institutional party and the Popular Action of Belaunde and the Christian Democrats seem to be on their way to developing as institutional parties. Nevertheless, Peru must still be placed in the second rank because of the tendency of parties to be organized around their leaders, rather than for leaders to be brought up within the party.

TABLE 8. POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Group I.	*Institutionalized Parties of National Integration* A. Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela B. Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Peru
Group II.	*Parties Weak in Complexity, Autonomy, Adaptability or Integration* Traditional: Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay Army Oriented: El Salvador, Brazil, Bolivia No Integration: Argentina
Group III.	*No Institutionalized Parties* Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Panama, Haiti

Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Argentina fall in the middle ranks, but it is difficult to order them. Each suffers from its own particular difficulties, and one cannot say which difficulty is the more serious. Argentina, for instance, has had institutionalized parties for half a century until they were dissolved by decree in 1966, but no party had been able to integrate the major sectors of the country; and today the Peronist labor groups remain as much out of the system as they did before Peron organized them. In Paraguay, Honduras, and Nicaragua, the traditional parties of the 19th century still exist but tend to be dominated by caudillos. Bolivia, since 1952, has been dominated by one institutionalized party which has integrated major groups in the country, but it is now split and the labor groups are outside the fold. The feuding of the original leaders has torn the seams of the party, and it is yet to be seen if new leaders will rise from within the party to mend the tears or whether it will fall apart. Parties in Brazil and El Salvador have never become institutionalized, and each now has a leadership of military officers who have established official parties.

In all of the above countries at least a semblance of party structure exists, but in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Ecuador, Panama, and Haiti, political parties are yet to organize the struggle for power. The Dominican Republic has had feuding leftist, moderate, and rightist factions, which are only beginning to coalesce into permanently organized groups. Guatemala may have emerged from a chaotic situation in the elections of 1966, when Julio Cesar Mendes Montenegro came to power under the banner of the Revolutionary Party.

Ecuador and Panama at the moment have nothing but personalist groupings. However, certain potential for organization exists in these two countries, which is not true in Haiti, where thugs and mystics group themselves around the person of François Duvalier and destroy all potential opposition.

IV. SYSTEM STABILITY PROFILES

The following system stability profiles are presented in the order of their quantitative measurements shown in Table 9. The non-quantifiable factors—the distribution of income within each society and the political party system—have not been used to reorder the final standings. However, where a country's ranking might be affected by a particularly high or low score in both of these factors, it is so indicated in the text.

1. *Costa Rica*

Score: With a final score of 1.28 s.d. above the Latin American mean, Costa Rica is more stable than all other political systems. Its institutionalized political parties would place it even further above its only rival, Panama. Except for a mediocre score on domestic extractive capability, Costa Rica is strongly positive on all indexes.

Manifestations: Since 1949 the Costa Rican government has changed hands four times through free elections. The country has little inflation, and few strikes or political demonstrations. Even the university students show no animosity toward North Americans.

TABLE 9. SYSTEM STABILITY SCORES[a]

Country	Welfare Minus Social Mobilization	Economic Growth	Extractive Capability	Distributive Capability	System Stability
Factor Weight	4	2	3	3	
Costa Rica	+2.30	+ .38	+ .19	+1.60	+1.28
Panama	+1.45	+1.21	+ .10	+1.70	+1.13
Chile	− .28	+ .63	+2.44	+ .50	+ .75
Dominican Republic	+ .36	− .65	+1.27	+ .10	+ .35
Brazil	− .46	+ .47	+1.02	.00	+ .18
Paraguay	+1.34	− .79	− .17	− .60	+ .12
Peru	−1.63	+ .63	.00	+1.90	+ .04
Nicaragua	+ .49	+ .54	+ .19	−1.20	+ .01
Venezuela	−1.01	+ .40	− .36	+1.30	− .03
Argentina	+ .34	− .09	− .86	+ .30	− .04
Ecuador	− .59	.00	−1.12	− .60	− .07
Honduras	+ .41	+ .07	− .53	− .70	− .16
El Salvador	− .54	+ .63	− .48	− .10	− .22
Uruguay	− .23	−1.17	+ .05	+ .10	− .23
Mexico	− .44	+ .72	−1.12	− .20	− .36
Colombia	− .93	− .18	− .36	+ .30	− .36
Guatemala	+ .77	+ .39	−1.41	−1.40	− .38
Bolivia	−1.63	+ .31	+1.00	− .80	− .44
Haiti	− .67	−3.50	−1.91	−1.90	−1.76

[a] All scores given in standard deviations.

Prediction: Continued democratic stability.

2. *Panama*

Score: Panama's score of .15 s.d. below Costa Rica is due to Panama's relatively greater social mobilization. A moderate extractive capability is balanced by the distribution of large sums on education. The lack of institutionalized political parties is Panama's greatest weakness.

Manifestations: Students have shown some signs of alienation and have expressed their discontent through anti-United States demonstrations. Political freedom has been continously maintained, however, and power has changed hands through free, if somewhat turbulent, elections. No inflation.

Prediction: Continued democratic stability with minor difficulties until the development of institutionalized political parties.

3. *Chile*

Score: Chile scores .38 s.d. below Panama, primarily because its social mobilization is greater than its societal welfare. Recent per capita economic growth has been satisfactory, and combined domestic and international extractive capability is considerably higher than that of all other Latin American countries. Institutionalized parties integrate various sectors of the population.

Manifestations: Political freedom and free elections enjoy a long tradition in Chile, and the system has instituted reforms through its democratic structures. Chile has thus far experienced little of the rural and urban violence endemic to some other Latin American countries, but it has had a high rate of inflation.

Prediction: Continued democratic stability with inflation and electoral strength of extreme left wing parties lessening if rapid economic growth continues.

4. *Dominican Republic*

Score: Both the welfare and the social mobilization indexes are somewhat below the Latin American mean, but welfare is slightly ahead of mobilization. The overall index is plus .35 s.d. primarily because of high domestic and international extractive capabilities, which allow the government to maintain a large, well-trained army and still provide funds for social welfare projects. Political parties are relatively disorganized.

Manifestations: A long period of dictatorial stability came to an end in 1961, and the system has only begun to restabilize itself under a new order, partly because it lacks institutionalized means of changing and maintaining power. Civil war broke out in 1965, but participation in it was concentrated in the capital. Election of a president who has links with the past dictatorship indicates that dissatisfactions do not run deep.

Prediction: The surface manifestations of discontent of 1965 will diminish. The military will continue to play a large political role but without need for extensive repression of political freedoms.

5. *Brazil*

Score: Brazil's plus .18 score stems primarily from an extremely strong domestic extractive capability. Other items appear to be average, except for a low international extractive capability. The political party system in Brazil is weak.

Manifestations: Democratic government took an intermission in 1964 when the political party system proved incapable of ordering democratic choices. Little blood was shed, however, and it was possible to take away some political freedom without resorting to large scale repression. Inflation has been very high, but is decreasing.

Prediction: A semi-democratic system should be able to survive the minor manifestations of discontent, with future stability depending in large part upon development of broad-based institutionalized political parties.

6. *Paraguay*

Score: Paraguay is a poor country, but it is even less mobilized, which gives it a positive environmental score. Its political capabilities are below average.

Manifestations: The population shows little manifest discontent under the strong rule of General Alfredo Stoessner. Dissatisfaction is expressed by high rates of emigration and inflation, which now seem to be under control. The system's capacity for reform is reflected in a large improvement in extractive capability, and continued political liberalization.

Prediction: If the progress of the last few years continues, and economic growth accelerates, there should be no increase in coercion, and the option of peaceful evolution toward a democratic system should present itself.

7. *Peru*

Score: Radios and labor unions have produced social mobilization at a rate faster than increases in welfare, and the result is a potentially tense social situation. The score on the environmental indexes is offset by the highest score on distributive capability of any Latin American government. New institutionalized parties seem to be taking hold.

Manifestations: Guerrilla activity has been brought under control. Moderate inflation continues. In 1962 a military takeover proved to be of short duration, and democratic government has been re-established.

Prediction: Continued democratic government with a strong probability of lessening military interference if present high rate of economic growth is maintained.

8. *Nicaragua*

Score: Environment indexes are fifth highest in the area, due to a relatively low level of social mobilization; but political capabilities are low, primarily because of low distributive capability. A high international extractive capability makes up for some of the deficiencies.

Manifestations: The Liberal party under the leadership of the Somoza family has dominated the system for thirty years. Suspicion of electoral manipulation exists, but some observers claim that the Liberal Party could win free elections. The spring 1967 elections were marked by several outbreaks of violence.

Prediction: The situation will remain uneasy, but improvements in political capabilities and continued economic growth should make it unnecessary to increase the present level of coercion.

9. *Venezuela*

Score: Although Venezuela's welfare is third highest in Latin America, its social mobilization is highest, primarily because of the almost total organization of labor. Extractive capability is low because the national population resists taxation, but the distributive capability is high. A negative factor not recorded in Venezuela's final score is a poor distribution of income, but an important positive factor, also not recorded, is the existence of institutionalized political parties.

Manifestations: After one hundred years of military rule and dictatorship, democratic government appears to have been finally established, but it has been subjected to attempted coups and guerrilla activity. These uses of violence to influence the political system have, however, been declining. Venezuela has experienced little inflation.

Prediction: Continued decline of violence and continuance of an uneasy democratic system. If economic growth slows to a point where social mobility diminishes, inequality of income will cause difficulties for the system.

10. *Argentina*

Score: Argentina is less mobilized than the otherwise similar society of Uruguay and enjoys a higher level of welfare. Recent economic growth has been low. The political capabilities of Argentina are low, especially in the collection of taxes. The final score is .04 s.d. below the Latin American mean. The lack of any political party which integrates organized labor into the political system, plus a worsening distribution of income would lower Argentina's score.

Manifestations: Since 1930 the Argentina political system has been subject to repeated military intervention and suppression of political liberties. The present situation is similar to that of thirty years ago, except that labor is better organized and is more persistent in asking for a voice in government. The latest military intervention seems to be increasing the amount of coercion in the system.

Prediction: Continued instability without deteriorating into a revolutionary situation.

11. *Ecuador*

Score: The one mitigating factor in an otherwise difficult situation in Ecuador is the system's high extractive capability. Ecuador is low on every other index, and without this high capability, which brings its average to minus .07 s.d., it would have placed below Mexico. The political party situation, not included in the final score, is quite poor. On the other hand, the distribution of income is quite a bit better than in most other Latin American countries.

Manifestations: Ecuador seems to be maintaining its historical record of governmental instability. More than any other country of Latin America, Ecuador seems to have institutionalized the coup d'etat as a means of changing government, and perhaps a coup in Ecuador is less an indication of political instability than in some other countries. Civil violence has been minimal.

Prediction: A continuation of institutionalized instability.

12. *Honduras*

Score: A moderate level of economic growth, coupled with a low level of mobilization, produces a positive environment index in Honduras despite a low level of welfare. Low political capabilities give Honduras a score of minus .16 s.d. The distribution of income in Honduras is probably better than average, and would raise the score somewhat if it were included.

Manifestations: After one change of political parties in power through free elections in 1958, Honduras reverted to its more traditional form of change by coup d'etat in 1963 and it appears that the level of coercion is increasing. Little inflation.

Prediction: System instability will continue to be expressed in an occasional coup d'etat with subsequent exile and repression of opposition groups.

13. *El Salvador*

Score: The population of El Salvador is more highly mobilized than the rest of Central America, but its welfare is lower than any of its neighbors except Honduras. The result is more tension within the society. Although its political capabilities are better than those of all its neighbors except Costa Rica, it comes out .22 s.d. below the Latin American mean. A recent rapid increase in educational expenditures has not, however, been counted in this score.

Manifestations: Political freedom has been restricted in El Salvador and leftist groups can operate only within limits. The military has been the strongest force in controlled but progressive developments since 1932. Coups d'etat alternate with electoral methods to bring about turnovers in military leadership. Little inflation.

Prediction: A limited amount of coercion must be applied in order to prevent latent instability from manifesting itself. If progressive governments continue with the modifications of recent years, it may be possible to lower the level of coercion in the future.

14. *Uruguay*

Score: The Uruguayan population is more highly urbanized and has a greater exposure to mass media than that of any other Latin American country, but although nutrition, health, and education services are high the national production of goods and services has stagnated. Per capita production has actually declined over the past ten years. A fairly capable political system does not compensate for the low environment score, and Uruguay's final score is .23 s.d. below the Latin American mean.

Manifestations: Instability has thus far been expressed through strikes, demonstrations, and inflation rather than through subversion. In December of 1966, Uruguay demonstrated the continued vitality of its political system by adopting a radical constitutional change using democratic procedures.

Prediction: Until the rate of economic growth improves, the solid democratic tradition of Uruguay will encounter increasing manifestations of instability in the form of a rising level of protest.

15. *Mexico*

Score: Even a high rate of economic growth has not overcome the excess of social mobilization over societal welfare in Mexico. Mexico's low political capabilities bring its final score down to minus .36. Mexico's distribution of income is also unequal—probably very similar to the situation in Guatemala—but Mexico has an institutionalized party of national integration, which makes it more stable than Guatemala. In the last few years Mexico has made some progress in improving its low level of political capabilities.

Manifestations: The situation seems to remain under control in Mexico in spite of what seems to be a potentially unstable situation. An important reason for this under-manifestation of instability is undoubtedly pride in the Mexican Revolution.[18] There are increasing outbreaks of decentralized violence.

Prediction: Instability, under-manifested in the past, would break out if the delicate political equilibrium were disturbed through an increase in opposition power or a breakdown in the unity of the government party.

16. *Colombia*

Score: Colombia's high level of urbanization is the primary factor which upsets the equilibrium between welfare and social mobilization. A low score on the environment index indicates a number of severe problems which the government must face, and unfortunately the political system does not have sufficient capability to deal with this difficult situation. Although Colombia is ahead of the Latin American mean on education expenditures, it is behind on taxation. Colombia has strong institutionalized parties but, unlike Mexico, it lacks the myth of the Revolution.

Manifestations: Colombia has been racked by rural violence for nearly twenty years. A military dictatorship ruled from 1953 to 1957. Rural violence although declining continues, and leftist groups appear to be attempting to exploit the situation. Colombia has experienced a moderate amount of inflation.

Prediction: Continued difficulties for the democratic system, but the system has presently exhausted its capacity for civil violence, and the party coalition has taken advantage of the situation to introduce reforms, which should reduce future instability.

17. *Guatemala*

Score: Guatemala is prosperous compared to its neighbors. This, coupled with a good rate of economic growth, gives it a mark of plus .64 s.d. on the societal index. However, the political capabilities of Guatemala are almost as low as those of Haiti. The unequal distribution of income would further lower its average score of minus .38 if it were included. The political party system is chaotic.

Manifestations: Since the overthrow of the Arbenz government in 1954, leftist groups have been suppressed, and the coup d'etat has been the most common means of choosing governors. A new government was elected in 1966, but it is faced with rightist pressures, the strongest guerrilla movement in Latin America, and an outbreak of political assassinations.

Prediction: Unless government capabilities improve (and there are some signs in that direction) and economic growth continues, the Guatemalan government will continue to face the choice of applying increased amounts of coercion or being overthrown. The situation is unstable.

18. *Bolivia*

Score: Bolivia is above the Latin American mean both in number of radios and percentage of economically active population in labor unions, but it is far below the mean in societal welfare. Only Bolivia's large international extractive capability prevents a much lower score. The ruling party has been unable to increase political capabilities to any great degree.

Manifestations: Bolivia has experienced all the indicators of system instability: revolution in 1952, runaway inflation, breakdown in the governing coalition, takeover by military in a coup d'etat, a guerrilla movement, and a large number of deaths from civil violence.

Prediction: The situation is so difficult that any government will be forced to choose between coercion and intense demonstrations of dissatisfaction. If the high level of development assistance were to drop, the situation would become even more more serious.

19. *Haiti*

Score: Social mobilization has increased over welfare less rapidly than in Peru or Bolivia, but Haiti is last on every other index. It has suffered both natural and man-made economic disasters that have drastically reduced its already low standard of living.

---

[18] This was brought out in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 66–67. Almond and Verba found ". . . a pattern of high system affect coupled with a rejection of actual performance of the government," and that, "Mexican pride in nation, thus, does seem to depend to some extent on the continuing symbolic identification with the Mexican Revolution."

Manifestations: Rule is by coercion. All political opposition is either in exile, imprisoned, or has been killed. Nevertheless, new revolts continue to erupt.

Prediction: A revolutionary situation exists in Haiti.

20. *Cuba in 1958*

The Cuban government of the 1950's kept worse statistics than any other Latin American government with the possible exception of Haiti, and it is impossible to develop a complete index on the Cuban situation of 1958. However, Cuba presented such an extreme situation that it is possible to come to some firm conclusions about its degree of system instability. Cuba's welfare index was higher than most other Latin American countries. A welfare index that takes into account all but nutrition gives Cuba in 1958 a score of +.29 s.d. or about the same level of societal welfare as Costa Rica in 1965.[19] However, its social mobilization was much higher than that of most other countries. Sixty per cent of the economically active population was organized into labor unions, an extreme situation found in very few countries of the world and rivalled only by Venezuela in Latin America. Exposure to public media was also very high; but urbanization was low, a factor perhaps offset by a heavy concentration of the rural population close to urban areas. When put in terms of our indexes, these circumstances mean that the difference between societal welfare and social mobilization was negative by a sum of minus 1.11, twice the difference of Bolivia, which gives a score in standard deviations of minus 3.42, an extreme deviation not found in any other instance in Latin America. Reliable data on economic growth are not available, but estimates indicate that growth was in the range of 2.5 per cent annually during the 1950's at about the same rate as population increase. In 1958 the gross national product actually declined.

The very serious tensions produced by societal conditions were reinforced by a poor situation in the political system. Again, much data is unavailable. Bank of Cuba figures indicate that total central government revenues were about 13 per cent of GDP, but data is not available to show how much of this was tax revenue.[20] In the period prior to 1959, international extractive capability was negligible. Reports that illiteracy was increasing and that fewer children of primary age were in school than before indicate a low distributive capability.[21] The personalist political parties of the 1930's and 1940's had been destroyed by Batista, and he had developed nothing to replace them.

All of the evidence, then, forces us to the conclusion that the situation in Cuba in 1958 would have produced a final score in system stability somewhat lower than Haiti's. Our prediction, then, would be extreme system instability; in short, revolution.

V. CONCLUSION

No independent numerical index of the manifestations of system stability/instability exists with which to compare the system stability score, and therefore it is not possible to test the theory developed here. However, some indicators do exist. Social revolution, the clearest manifestation of severe system instability, has occurred in three Latin American countries—Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba—all of which appear very low in the system stability scores. Mexico must have had a much lower score when it experienced its revolution because it has enjoyed the best economic growth record in Latin America since 1930. At the other extreme, Costa Rica with the highest system stability score in Latin America is the one country which all commentators agree has no chance of undergoing a social revolution.

Generally, the qualitative discussion of manifestations developed in the country profiles indicate that the system stability scores do measure a condition that is expressed in manifestations of one kind or another. Two obvious deviations exist—the Dominican Republic and Mexico—which have been interpreted to mean that the Dominican Republic has in recent years overmanifested its degree of instability and will settle down in the future, and Mexico has undermanifested its degree of instability and will become more unsettled in the future.

Other authors have developed indexes of some of the manifestations of instability. For instance, Charles Ruttenberg has developed an index of the total magnitude of civil violence, which measures the duration, pervasiveness, intensity and amplitude of civil violence of nearly all non-communist countries of the world for the years 1961–1963.[22] The short time period plus the underreporting in some countries places severe limitations on the index. A rank correlation analysis between Ruttenberg's index of civil violence and the system stability score produces a correlation of only .12. Bruce M. Russett and associates have calculated the number of deaths from group violence per million population which covers a wider time span, 1950 to 1962,[23] and which has a higher correlation with the system stability score with a coefficient of .26. Indexes of inflation show no correlation with the system stability score because the countries which appear low in system stability are also the ones most likely to suppress popular demands. Until more complete evidence is available on all the manifestations of system instability, the theory presented here must be considered neither invalidated nor supported by independent measures of manifestations.

---

[19] Data taken from same sources as for Tables 2 and 3 except that per capita gross domestic product was figured from data in *United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1963*.

[20] José M. Illán, *Cuba-Datos sobre una Economia en Ruinas* (Florida, 1963, privately published).

[21] For a fuller description see Dudley Seers et al., *Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1964).

The concept of system stability/instability does appear to be useful in understanding political systems. It is independent of the democratic-authoritarian dimension of the system but affects the direction of change of the political structures. Only a relatively stable system can control its structural change. At least in Latin America where a system can control its structural change, it will move toward a democratic system because the predominant political values support personal liberty. On the other hand, an unstable system is caught in difficult circumstances in which it loses its freedom of choice. External assistance can help these countries, but they lack the domestic resources to make gradual and controlled changes. Recognition and knowledge of this dimension of stability/instability thus adds to the understanding of the unfolding of events within a political system.

---

[22] Charles Ruttenberg, "Measures of Civil Violence," in Ted Gurr, *The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1967).

[23] Bruce M. Russett, et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

PROTEST AS A POLITICAL RESOURCE*

MICHAEL LIPSKY
The University of Wisconsin

The frequent resort to protest activity by relatively powerless groups in recent American politics suggests that protest represents an important aspect of minority group and low income group politics.[1] At the same time that Negro civil rights strategists have recognized the problem of using protest as a meaningful political instrument,[2] groups associated with the "war on poverty" have increasingly received publicity for protest activity. Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation, for example, continues to receive invitations to help organize low income communities because of its ability to mobilize poor people around the tactic of protest.[3] The riots which dominated urban affairs in the summer of 1967 appear not to have diminished the dependence of some groups on protest as a mode of political activity.

This article provides a theoretical perspective on protest activity as a political resource. The discussion is concentrated on the limitations inherent in protest which occur because of the need of protest leaders to appeal to four constituencies at the same time. As the concept of protest is developed here, it will be argued that protest leaders must nurture and sustain an organization comprised of people with whom they may or may not share common values. They must articulate goals and choose strategies so as to maximize their public exposure through communications media. They must maximize the impact of third parties in the political conflict. Finally, they must try to maximize chances of success among those capable of granting goals. The tensions inherent in manipulating these four constituencies at the same time form the basis of this discussion of protest as a political process. It is intended to place aspects of the civil rights movement in a framework which suggests links between protest organizations and the general political processes in which such organizations operate.

I. "PROTEST" CONCEPTUALIZED

Protest activity as it has been adopted by elements of the civil rights movement and others has not been studied extensively by social scientists. Some of the most suggestive writings have been done as case studies of protest movements in single southern cities.[4] These works generally lack a framework or theoretical focus which would encourage generalization from the cases. More systematic efforts have been attempted in approaching the dynamics of biracial committees in the South,[5] and comprehensively assessing the efficacy of Negro political involvement in Durham, N.C. and Philadelphia, Pa.[6] In their excellent assessment of Negro politics in the South, Matthews and Prothro have presented a thorough profile of Southern Negro students and their participation in civil rights activities.[7] Protest is also discussed in passing in recent explorations of the social-psychological dimensions of Negro ghetto politics[8] and the still highly suggestive, although pre-1960's, work on Negro political leadership by James Q. Wilson.[9] These and other less systematic works on contemporary Negro politics,[10] for all of their intuitive insights and valuable documentation, offer no theoretical formulations which encourage conceptualization about the interaction between recent Negro political activity and the political process.

---

* This article is an attempt to develop and explore the implications of a conceptual scheme for analyzing protest activity. It is based upon my studies of protest organizations in New York City, Washington, D.C., Chicago, San Francisco, and Mississippi, as well as extensive examination of written accounts of protest among low-income and Negro civil rights groups. I am grateful to Kenneth Dolbeare, Murray Edelman, and Rodney Stiefbold for their insightful comments on an earlier draft. This paper was developed while the author was a Staff Associate of the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin. I appreciate the assistance obtained during various phases of my research from the Rabinowitz Foundation, the New York State Legislative Internship Program, and the Brookings Institution.

[1] "Relatively powerless groups" may be defined as those groups which, relatively speaking, are lacking in conventional political resources. For the purposes of community studies, Robert Dahl has compiled a useful comprehensive list. See Dahl, "The Analysis of Influence in Local Communities," *Social Science and Community Action*, Charles R. Adrian, ed. (East Lansing, Michigan, 1960), p. 32. The difficulty in studying such groups is that relative powerlessness only becomes apparent under certain conditions. Extremely powerless groups not only lack political resources, but are also characterized by a minimal sense of political efficacy, upon which in part successful political organization depends. For reviews of the literature linking orientations of political efficacy to socioeconomic status, see Robert Lane, *Political Life* (New York, 1959), ch. 16; and Lester Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago, 1965), ch. 5. Further, to the extent that group cohesion is recognized as a necessary requisite for organized political action, then extremely powerless groups, lacking cohesion, will not even appear for observation. Hence the necessity of selecting for intensive study a protest movement where there can be some confidence that observable processes and results can be analyzed. Thus, if one conceives of a continuum on which political groups are placed according to their relative command of resources, the focus of this essay is on those groups which are near, but not at, the pole of powerlessness.

[2] See, e.g., Bayard Rustin, "From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement," *Commentary* (February, 1965), 25–31; and Stokely Carmichael, "Toward Black Liberation," *The Massachusetts Review* (Autumn, 1966.)

[3] On Alinsky's philosophy of community organization, see his *Reveille for Radicals* (Chicago, 1945); and Charles Silberman, *Crisis in Black and White* (New York, 1964), ch. 10.

Heretofore the best attempt to place Negro protest activity in a framework which would generate additional insights has been that of James Q. Wilson.[11] Wilson has suggested that protest activity be conceived as a problem of bargaining in which the basic problem is that Negro groups lack political resources to exchange. Wilson called this "the problem of the powerless."[12]

While many of Wilson's insights remain valid, his approach is limited in applicability because it defines protest in terms of mass action or response and as utilizing exclusively negative inducements in the bargaining process. Negative inducements are defined as inducements which are not absolutely preferred but are preferred over alternative possibilities.[13] Yet it might be argued that protest designed to appeal to groups which oppose suffering and exploitation, for example, might be offering positive inducements in bargaining. A few Negro students sitting at a lunch counter might be engaged in what would be called protest, and by their actions might be trying to appeal to other groups in the system with positive inducements. Additionally, Wilson's concentration on Negro civic action, and his exclusive interest in exploring the protest process to explain Negro civic action, tend to obscure comparison with protest activity which does not necessarily arise within the Negro community.

Assuming a somewhat different focus, protest activity is defined as a mode of political action oriented toward objection to one or more policies or conditions, characterized by showmanship or display of an unconventional nature, and undertaken to obtain rewards from political or economic systems while working within the systems. The "problem of the powerless" in protest activity is to activate "third parties" to enter the implicit or explicit bargaining arena in ways favorable to the protesters. This is one of the few ways in which they can "create" bargaining resources. It is intuitively unconvincing to suggest that fifteen people sitting uninvited in the Mayor's office have the power to move City Hall. A better formulation would suggest that the people sitting in may be able to appeal to a wider public to which the city administration is sensitive. Thus in successful protest activity the *reference publics* of protest *targets* may be conceived as explicitly or implicitly reacting to protest in such a way that target groups or individuals respond in ways favorable to the protesters.[14]

---

[4] See, e.g., Jack L. Walker, "Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of Negro Leadership in Atlanta, Georgia," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 7 (May, 1963), 99–124; Jack L. Walker, *Sit-Ins in Atlanta: A Study in the Negro Protest*, Eagleton Institute Case Studies, No. 34 (New York, 1964); John Ehle, *The Free Men* (New York, 1965) [Chapel Hill]; Daniel C. Thompson, *The Negro Leadership Class* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963) [New Orleans]; M. Elaine Burgess, *Negro Leadership in a Southern City* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1962) [Durham].

[5] Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg, *Racial Crisis in America: Leadership in Conflict* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964).

[6] William Keech, "The Negro Vote as a Political Resource: The Case of Durham," (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966); John H. Strange, "The Negro in Philadelphia Politics 1963–65," (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1966).

[7] Donald Matthews and James Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* (New York, 1966). Considerable insight on these data is provided in John Orbell, "Protest Participation among Southern Negro College Students," this REVIEW, 61 (June, 1967), 446–456.

[8] Kenneth Clark, *Dark Ghetto* (New York, 1965).

[9] *Negro Politics* (New York, 1960).

[10] A complete list would be voluminous. See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, *The New Equality* (New York, 1964); Arthur Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-in* (New York, 1966).

[11] "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 3 (September, 1961), 291–303. The reader will recognize the author's debt to this highly suggestive article, not least Wilson's recognition of the utility of the bargaining framework for examining protest activity.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 291.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 291–292.

It should be emphasized that the focus here is on protest by relatively powerless groups. Illustrations can be summoned, for example, of activity designated as "protest" involving high status pressure groups or hundreds of thousands of people. While such instances may share some of the characteristics of protest activity, they may not represent examples of developing political resources by relatively powerless groups because the protesting groups may already command political resources by virtue of status, numbers or cohesion.

It is appropriate also to distinguish between the relatively restricted use of the concept of protest adopted here and closely related political strategies which are often designated as "protest" in popular usage. Where groups already possess sufficient resources with which to bargain, as in the case of some economic boycotts and labor strikes, they may be said to engage in "direct confrontation."[15] Similarly, protest which represents efforts to "activate reference publics" should be distinguished from "alliance formation," where third parties are induced to join the conflict, but where the value orientations of third parties are sufficiently similar to those of the protesting group that concerted or coordinated action is possible. Alliance formation is particularly desirable for relatively powerless groups if they seek to join the decision-making process as participants.

The distinction between activating reference publics and alliance formation is made on the assumption that where goal orientations among protest groups and the reference publics of target groups are similar, the political dynamics of petitioning target groups are different than when such goal orientations are relatively divergent. Clearly the more similar the goal orientations, the greater the likelihood of protest success, other things being equal. This discussion is intended to highlight, however, those instances where goal orientations of reference publics depart significantly, in direction or intensity, from the goals of protest groups.

Say that to protest some situation, A would like to enter a bargaining situation with B. But A has nothing B wants, and thus cannot bargain. A then attempts to create political resources by activating other groups to enter the conflict. A then organizes to take action against B with respect to certain goals. *Information concerning these goals must be conveyed through communications media* (C, D, and E) to F, G, and H, which are B's *reference publics.* In response to the reactions of F, G, and H, or in anticipation of their reactions, B responds, *in some way,* to the protesters' demands. This formulation requires the conceptualization of protest activity when undertaken to create bargaining resources as a political process which requires communication and is characterized by a multiplicity of constituencies for protest leadership.

A schematic representation of the process of protest as utilized by relatively powerless groups is presented in Figure 1. In contrast to a simplistic pressure group model which would posit a direct relationship between pressure group and pressured, the following discussion is guided by the assumption (derived from observation) that protest is a highly indirect process in which communications media and the reference publics of protest targets play critical roles. It is also a process characterized by reciprocal relations, in which protest leaders frame strategies according to their perception of the needs of (many) other actors.

In this view protest constituents limit the options of protest leaders at the same time that the protest leader influences their perception of the strategies and rhetoric which they will support. Protest activity is filtered through

---

[14] See E. E. Schattschneider's discussion of expanding the scope of the conflict, *The Semisovereign People* (New York, 1960). Another way in which bargaining resources may be "created" is to increase the relative cohesion of groups, or to increase the perception of group solidarity as a precondition to greater cohesion. This appears to be the primary goal of political activity which is generally designated "community organization." Negro activists appear to recognize the utility of this strategy in their advocacy of "black power." In some instances protest activity may be designed in part to accomplish this goal in addition to activating reference publics.

[15] For an example of "direct confrontation," one might study the three-month Negro boycott of white merchants in Natchez, Miss., which resulted in capitulation to boycott demands by city government leaders. See *The New York Times,* December 4, 1965, p. 1.


SYMBOLIC REWARDS
PROTEST CONSTITUENTS
(A)
COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA
REFERENCE PUBLICS OF PROTEST TARGET (including communications media)
(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)
PROTEST LEADER
PROTEST TARGET
(B)
SYMBOLIC ASPECTS OF MATERIAL REWARDS
MATERIAL REWARDS

FIG. 1. Schematic representation of the process of protest by relatively powerless groups.

the communications media in influencing the perceptions of the reference publics of protest targets. To the extent that the influence of reference publics is supportive of protest goals, target groups will dispense symbolic or material rewards. Material rewards are communicated directly to protest constituents. Symbolic rewards are communicated in part to protest constituents, but primarily are communicated to the reference publics of target groups, who provide the major stimuli for public policy pronouncements.

The study of protest as adopted by relatively powerless groups should provide insights into the structure and behavior of groups involved in civil rights politics and associated with the "war on poverty." It should direct attention toward the ways in which administrative agencies respond to "crises." Additionally, the study of protest as a political resource should influence some general conceptualizations of American political pluralism. Robert Dahl, for example, describes the "normal American political process" as

> one in which there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of decision.[16]

Although he agrees that control over decisions is unevenly divided in the population, Dahl writes:

> When I say that a group is heard "effectively" I mean more than the simple fact that it makes a noise; I mean that one or more officials are not only ready to listen to the noise, but expect to suffer in some significant way if they do not placate the group, its leaders, or its most vociferous members. To satisfy the group may require one or more of a great variety of actions by the responsive leader: pressure for substantive policies, appointments, graft, respect, expression of the appropriate emotions, or the right combination of reciprocal noises.[17]

These statements, which in some ways resemble David Truman's discussion of the power of "potential groups,"[18] can be illuminated by the study of protest activity in three ways. First, what are the probabilities that relatively powerless groups can make themselves heard effectively? In what ways will such groups be heard or "steadily appeased"?[19] Concentration on the process of protest activity may reveal the extent to which, and the conditions under which, relatively powerless groups are likely to prove effective. Protest undertaken to obstruct policy decisions, for example, may enjoy greater success probabilities than protest undertaken in an effort to evoke constructive policy innovations.[20]

---

[16] *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, 1956), pp. 145–146.

[17] *Ibid.*

Second, does it make sense to suggest that all groups which make noises will receive responses from public officials? Perhaps the groups which make noises do not have to be satisfied at all, but it is other groups which receive assurances or recognition. Third, what are the probabilities that groups which make noises will receive tangible rewards, rather than symbolic assurances?[21] Dahl lumps these rewards together in the same paragraph, but dispensation of tangible rewards clearly has a different impact upon groups than the dispensation of symbolic rewards. Dahl is undoubtedly correct when he suggests that the relative fluidity of American politics is a critical characteristic of the American political system.[22] But he is less precise and less convincing when it comes to analyzing the extent to which the system is indeed responsive to the relatively powerless groups of the "average citizen."[23]

The following sections are an attempt to demonstrate the utility of the conceptualization of the protest process presented above. This will be done by exploring the problems encountered and the strains generated by protest leaders in interacting with four constituencies. It will be useful to concentrate attention on the maintenance and enhancement needs not only of the large formal organizations which dominate city politics,[24] but also of the ad hoc protest groups which engage them in civic controversy. It will also prove rewarding to examine the role requirements of individuals in leadership positions as they perceive the problems of constituency manipulation. In concluding remarks some implications of the study of protest for the pluralist description of American politics will be suggested.[25]

II. PROTEST LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL BASE

The organizational maintenance needs of relatively powerless, low income, ad hoc protest groups center around the tension generated by the need for leadership to offer symbolic and intangible inducements to protest participation when immediate, material rewards cannot be anticipated, and the need to provide at least the promise of material rewards. Protest leaders must try to evoke responses from other actors in the political process, at the same time that they pay attention to participant organizational needs. Thus relatively deprived groups in the political system not only receive symbolic reassurance while material rewards from the system are withheld,[26] but protest leaders have a stake in perpetuating the notion that relatively powerless groups retain political efficacy despite what in many cases is obvious evidence to the contrary.

---

[18] *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), p. 104.

[19] See Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, p. 146.

[20] Observations that all groups can influence public policy at some stage of the political process are frequently made about the role of "veto groups" in American politics. See *Ibid.*, pp. 104 ff. See also David Reisman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, 1950), pp. 211 ff., for an earlier discussion of veto-group politics. Yet protest should be evaluated when it is adopted to obtain assertive as well as defensive goals.

[21] See Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana, Ill., 1964), ch. 2.

[22] See Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961), pp. 305 ff.

[23] In a recent formulation, Dahl reiterates the theme of wide dispersion of influence. "More than other systems, [democracies] . . . try to disperse influence widely to their citizens by means of the suffrage, elections, freedom of speech, press, and assembly, the right of opponents to criticize the conduct of government, the right to organize political parties, and in other ways." *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago, 1967), p. 373. Here, however, he concentrates more on the availability of options to all groups in the system, rather than on the relative probabilities that all groups in fact have access to the political process. See pp. 372 ff.

[24] See Edward Banfield, *Political Influence* (New York, 1961), p. 263. The analysis of organizational incentive structure which heavily influences Banfield's formulation is Chester Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass., 1938).

[25] In the following attempt to develop the implications of this conceptualization of protest activity, I have drawn upon extensive field observations and bibliographical research. Undoubtedly, however, individual assertions, while representing my best judgment concerning the available evidence, in the future may require modification as the result of further empirical research.

The tension embraced by protest leaders over the nature of inducements toward protest participation accounts in part for the style adopted and goals selected by protest leaders. Groups which seek psychological gratification from politics, but cannot or do not anticipate material political rewards, may be attracted to militant protest leaders. To these groups, angry rhetoric may prove a desirable quality in the short run. Where groups depend upon the political system for tangible benefits, or where participation in the system provides intangible benefits, moderate leadership is likely to prevail. Wilson has observed similar tendencies among Negro leaders of large, formal organizations.[27] It is no less true for leadership of protest groups. Groups whose members derive tangible satisfactions from political participation will not condone leaders who are stubborn in compromise or appear to question the foundations of the system. This coincides with Truman's observation:

> Violation of the "rules of the game" normally will weaken a group's cohesion, reduce its status in the community, and expose it to the claims of other groups.[28]

On the other hand, the cohesion of relatively powerless groups may be strengthened by militant, ideological leadership which questions the rules of the game and challenges their legitimacy.

Cohesion is particularly important when protest leaders bargain directly with target groups. In that situation, leaders' ability to control protest constituents and guarantee their behavior represents a bargaining strength.[29] For this reason Wilson stressed the bargaining difficulties of Negro leaders who cannot guarantee constituent behavior, and pointed out the significance of the strategy of projecting the image of group solidarity when the reality of cohesion is a fiction.[30] Cohesion is less significant at other times. Divided leadership may prove productive by bargaining in tandem,[31] or by minimizing strain among groups in the protest process. Further, community divisions may prove less detrimental to protest aims when strong third parties have entered the dispute originally generated by protest organizations.

The intangible rewards of assuming certain postures toward the political system may not be sufficient to sustain an organizational base. It may be necessary to renew constantly the intangible rewards of participation. And to the extent that people participate in order to achieve tangible benefits, their interest in a protest organization may depend upon the organization's relative material success. Protest leaders may have to tailor their style to present participants with tangible successes, or with the appearance of success. Leaders may have to define the issues with concern for increasing their ability to sustain organizations. The potential for protest among protest group members may have to be manipulated by leadership if the group is to be sustained.[32]

The participants in protest organizations limit the flexibility of protest leadership. This obtains for two reasons. They restrict public actions by leaders who must continue to solicit active participant support, and they place restraints on the kinds of activities which can be considered appropriate for protest purposes. Poor participants cannot commonly be asked to engage in protest requiring air transportation. Participants may have anxieties related to their environment or historical situation which discourages engagement in some activities.

---

[26] As Edelman suggests, cited previously.

[27] *Negro Politics*, p. 290.

[28] *The Governmental Process*, p. 513.

[29] But cf. Thomas Schelling's discussion of "binding oneself," *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 22 ff.

[30] "The Strategy of Protest," p. 297.

[31] This is suggested by Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest," p. 298; St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, *Black Metropolis* (New York, 1962, rev. ed.), p. 731; Walker, "Protest and Negotiation," p. 122. Authors who argue that divided leadership is dysfunctional have been Clark, p. 156; and Tilman Cothran, "The Negro Protest Against Segregation in the South," *The Annals*, 357 (January, 1965), p. 72.

[32] This observation is confirmed by a student of the Southern civil rights movement:

> Negroes demand of protest leaders constant progress. The combination of long-standing discontent and a new-found belief in the possibility of change produces a constant state of tension and aggressiveness in the Negro community. But this discontent is vague and diffuse, not specific; the masses do not define the issues around which action shall revolve. This the leader must do.

Lewis Killian, "Leadership in the Desegregation Crises: An Institutional Analysis," in Muzafer Sherif (ed.), *Intergroup Relations and Leadership* (New York; 1962), p. 159.

They may be afraid of job losses, beatings by the police, or summary evictions. Negro protest in the Deep South has been inhibited by realistic expectations of retribution.[33] Protests over slum housing conditions are undermined by tenants who expect landlord retaliation for engaging in tenant organizing activity.[34] Political or ethical mores may conflict with a proposed course of action, diminishing participation.[35]

On the other hand, to the extent that fears are real, or that the larger community perceives protest participants as subject to these fears, protest may actually be strengthened. Communications media and potential allies will consider more soberly the complaints of people who are understood to be placing themselves in jeopardy. When young children and their parents made the arduous bus trip from Mississippi to Washington, D.C. to protest the jeopardizing of Head Start funds, the courage and expense represented by their effort created a respect and visibility for their position which might not have been achieved by local protest efforts.[36]

Protest activity may be undertaken by organizations with established relationship patterns, behavior norms, and role expectations. These organizations are likely to have greater access to other groups in the political system, and a demonstrated capacity to maintain themselves. Other protest groups, however, may be ad hoc arrangements without demonstrated internal or external relationship patterns. These groups will have different organizational problems, in response to which it is necessary to engage in different kinds of protest activity.

The scarcity of organizational resources also places limits upon the ability of relatively powerless groups to maintain the foundations upon which protest organizations develop. Relatively powerless groups, to engage in political activity of any kind, must command at least some resources. This is not tautological. Referring again to a continuum on which political groups are placed according to their relative command of resources, one may draw a line somewhere along the continuum representing a "threshold of civic group political participation." Clearly some groups along the continuum will possess some political resources (enough, say, to emerge for inspection) but not enough to exercise influence in civic affairs. Relatively powerless groups, to be influential, must cross the "threshold" to engage in politics. Although the availability of group resources is a critical consideration at all stages of the protest process, it is particularly important in explaining why some groups seem to "surface" with sufficient strength to command attention. The following discussion of some critical organizational resources should illuminate this point.

Skilled professionals frequently must be available to protest organizations. Lawyers, for example, play extremely important roles in enabling protest groups to utilize the judicial process and avail themselves of adequate preparation of court cases. Organizational reputation may depend upon a combination of ability to threaten the conventional political system and of exercising statutory rights in court. Availability of lawyers depends upon ability to pay fees and/or the attractiveness to lawyers of participation in protest group activity. Volunteer professional assistance may not prove adequate. One night a week volunteered by an aspiring politician in a housing clinic cannot satisfy the needs of a chaotic political movement.[37] The need for skilled professionals is not restricted to lawyers. For example, a group seeking to protest an urban renewal policy might require the services of architects and city planners in order to present a viable alternative to a city proposal.

---

[33] Significantly, southern Negro students who actively participated in the early phases of the sit-in movement "tended to be unusually optimistic about race relations and tolerant of whites [when compared with inactive Negro students]. They not only *were* better off, objectively speaking, than other Negroes but *felt* better off." Matthews and Prothro, *op. cit.*, p. 424.

[34] This is particularly the case in cities such as Washington, D.C., where landlord-tenant laws offer little protection against retaliatory eviction. See, e.g., Robert Schoshinski, "Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change," *Georgetown Law Journal*, 54 (Winter, 1966), 541 ff.

[35] Wilson regarded this as a chief reason for lack of protest activity in 1961. He wrote: ". . . some of the goals now being sought by Negroes are least applicable to those groups of Negroes most suited to protest action. Protest action involving such tactics as mass meetings, picketing, boycotts, and strikes rarely find enthusiastic participants among upper-income and higher status individuals": "The Strategy of Protest," p. 296.

[36] See *The New York Times*, February 12, 1966, p. 56.

[37] On housing clinic services provided by political clubs, see James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities* (Chicago, 1962), pp. 63–64, 176. On the need for lawyers among low income people, see e.g., *The Extension of Legal Services to the Poor*, Conference Proceedings (Washington, D.C., n.d.), esp. pp. 51–60; and "Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor," *Harvard Law Review*, 80 (February, 1967), 805–850.

Financial resources not only purchase legal assistance, but enable relatively powerless groups to conduct minimum programs of political activities. To the extent that constituents are unable or unwilling to pay even small membership dues, then financing the cost of mimeographing flyers, purchasing supplies, maintaining telephone service, paying rent, and meeting a modest payroll become major organizational problems. And to the extent that group finances are supplied by outside individual contributions or government or foundation grants, the long-term options of the group are sharply constrained by the necessity of orienting group goals and tactics to anticipate the potential objections of financial supporters.

Some dependence upon even minimal financial resources can be waived if organizations evoke passionate support from constituents. Secretarial help and block organizers will come forward to work without compensation if they support the cause of neighborhood organizations or gain intangible benefits based upon association with the group. Protest organizations may also depend upon skilled non-professionals, such as college students, whose access to people and political and economic institutions often assist protest groups in cutting across income lines to seek support. Experience with ad hoc political groups, however, suggests that this assistance is sporadic and undependable. Transient assistance is particularly typical of skilled, educated, and employable volunteers whose abilities can be applied widely. The die-hards of ad hoc political groups are often those people who have no place else to go, nothing else to do.

Constituent support will be affected by the nature of the protest target and whether protest activity is directed toward defensive or assertive goals. Obstructing specific public policies may be easier than successfully recommending constructive policy changes. Orientations toward defensive goals may require less constituent energy, and less command over resources of money, expertise and status.[38]

III. PROTEST LEADERSHIP AND COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

The communications media are extremely powerful in city politics. In granting or withholding publicity, in determining what information most people will have on most issues, and what alternatives they will consider in response to issues, the media truly, as Norton Long has put it, "set . . . the civic agenda."[39] To the extent that successful protest activity depends upon appealing to, and/or threatening, other groups in the community, the communications media set the limits of protest action. If protest tactics are not considered significant by the media, or if newspapers and television reporters or editors decide to overlook protest tactics, protest organizations will not succeed. Like the tree falling unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected.

A number of writers have noticed that the success of protest activity seems directly related to the amount of publicity it receives outside the immediate arena in which protest takes place. This view has not been stated systematically, but hints can be found in many sources. In the literature on civil rights politics, the relevance of publicity represents one of the few hypotheses available concerning the dynamics of successful protest activity.[40]

When protest tactics do receive coverage in the communications media, the way in which they are presented will influence all other actors in the system, including the protesters themselves. Conformity to standards of newsworthiness in political style, and knowledge of the prejudices and desires of the individuals who determine media coverage in political skills, represent crucial determinants of leadership effectiveness.

The organizational behavior of newspapers can partly be understood by examining the maintenance and enhancement needs which direct them toward projects of civic betterment and impressions of accomplishment.[41] But insight may also be gained by analyzing the role requirements of reporters, editors, and others who determine newspaper policy. Reporters, for example, are frequently motivated by the desire to contribute to civic affairs by their "objective" reporting of significant events; by the premium they place on accuracy; and by the credit which they receive for sensationalism and "scoops."

---

[38] An illustration of low income group protest organization mobilized for veto purposes is provided by Dahl in "The Case of the Metal Houses." See *Who Governs?*, pp. 192 ff.

[39] Norton Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," in Long, *The Polity*, Charles Press, ed. (Chicago, 1962), p. 153. See pp. 152–154. See also Roscoe C. Martin, Frank J. Munger, *et al.*, *Decisions in Syracuse: A Metropolitan Action Study* (Garden City, N.Y., 1965) (originally published: 1961), pp. 326–327.

[40] See, e.g., Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 134, and *passim*; Martin Oppenheimer, "The Southern Student Movement: Year I," *Journal of Negro Education*, 33 (Fall, 1964), p. 397; Cothran, *op. cit.*, p. 72; Pauli Murray, "Protest Against the Legal Status of the Negro," *The Annals*, 357 (January, 1965), p. 63; Allan P. Sindler, "Protest Against the Political Status of the Negroes," *The Annals*, 357 (January, 1965), p. 50.

[41] See Banfield, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

These requirements may be difficult to accommodate at the same time. Reporters demand newsworthiness of their subjects in the short run, but also require reliability and verifiability in the longer run. Factual accuracy may dampen newsworthiness. Sensationalism, attractive to some newspaper editors, may be inconsistent with reliable, verifiable narration of events. Newspapers at first may be attracted to sensationalism, and later demand verifiability in the interests of community harmony (and adherence to professional journalistic standards).

Most big city newspapers have reporters whose assignments permit them to cover aspects of city politics with some regularity. These reporters, whose "beats" may consist of "civil rights" or "poverty," sometimes develop close relationships with their news subjects. These relationships may develop symbiotic overtones because of the mutuality of interest between the reporter and the news subject. Reporters require fresh information on protest developments, while protest leaders have a vital interest in obtaining as much press coverage as possible.

Inflated reports of protest success may be understood in part by examining this relationship between reporter and protest leader. Both have role-oriented interests in projecting images of protest strength and threat. In circumstances of great excitement, when competition from other news media representatives is high, a reporter may find that he is less governed by the role requirement of verification and reliability than he is by his editor's demand for "scoops" and news with high audience appeal.[42]

On the other hand, the demands of the media may conflict with the needs of protest group maintenance. Consider the leader whose constituents are attracted solely by pragmatic statements not exceeding what they consider political "good taste." He is constrained from making militant demands which would isolate him from constituents. This constraint may cost him appeal in the press.[43] However, the leader whose organizing appeal requires militant rhetoric may obtain eager press coverage only to find that his inflamatory statements lead to alienation of potential allies and exclusion from the explicit bargaining process.[44]

News media do not report events in the same way. Television may select for broadcast only thirty seconds of a half-hour news conference. This coverage will probably focus on immediate events, without background or explanatory material. Newspapers may give more complete accounts of the same event. The most complete account may appear in the weekly edition of a neighborhood or ethnic newspaper. Differential coverage by news media, and differential news media habits in the general population,[45] are significant factors in permitting protest leaders to juggle conflicting demands of groups in the protest process.

Similar tensions exist in the leader's relationships with protest targets. Ideological postures may gain press coverage and constituency approval, but may alienate target groups with whom it would be desirable to bargain explicitly. Exclusion from the councils of decision-making may have important consequences, since the results of target group deliberations may satisfy activated reference publics without responding to protest goals. If activated reference publics are required to increase the bargaining position of the protest group, protest efforts thereafter will have diminished chances of success.

---

[42] For a case study of the interaction between protest leaders and newspaper reporters, see Michael Lipsky, "Rent Strikes in New York City: Protest Politics and the Power of the Poor," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1967), pp. 139–49. Bernard Cohen has analyzed the impact of the press on foreign policy from the perspective of reporters' role requirements: see his *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J., 1963), esp. chs. 2–3.

[43] An example of a protest conducted by middle-class women engaged in pragmatic protest over salvaging park space is provided in John B. Keeley, *Moses on the Green*, Inter-University Case Program, No. 45 (University, Ala., 1959).

[44] This was the complaint of Floyd McKissick, National Director of the Congress of Racial Equality, when he charged that ". . . there are only two kinds of statements a black man can make and expect that the white press will report. . . . First . . . is an attack on another black man. . . . The second is a statement that sounds radical, violent, extreme—the verbal equivalent of a riot. . . . [T]he Negro is being rewarded by the public media only if he turns on another Negro and uses his tongue as a switchblade, or only if he sounds outlandish, extremist or psychotic." Statement at the Convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 20, 1967, Washington, D.C., as reported in *The New York Times*, April 21, 1967, p. 22. See also the remarks of journalist Ted Poston, *ibid.*, April 26, 1965, p. 26.

[45] Matthews and Prothro found, for example, that in their south-wide Negro population sample, 38 percent read Negro-oriented magazines and 17 percent read newspapers written for Negroes. These media treat news of interest to Negroes more completely and sympathetically than do the general media. See pp. 248 ff.

IV. PROTEST LEADERSHIP AND "THIRD PARTIES"

I have argued that the essence of political protest consists of activating third parties to participate in controversy in ways favorable to protest goals. In previous sections I have attempted to analyze some of the tensions which result from protest leaders' attempts to activate reference publics of protest targets at the same time that they must retain the interest and support of protest organization participants. This phenomenon is in evidence when Negro leaders, recognized as such by public officials, find their support eroded in the Negro community because they have engaged in explicit bargaining situations with politicians. Negro leaders are thus faced with the dilemma that when they behave like other ethnic group representatives they are faced with loss of support from those whose intense activism has been aroused in the Negro community, yet whose support is vital if they are to remain credible as leaders to public officials.

The tensions resulting from conflicting maintenance needs of protest organizations and activated third parties present difficulties for protest leaders. One way in which these tensions can be minimized is by dividing leadership responsibilities. If more than one group is engaged in protest activity, protest leaders can, in effect, divide up public roles so as to reduce as much as possible the gap between the implicit demands of different groups for appropriate rhetoric, and what in fact is said. Thus divided leadership may perform the latent function of minimizing tensions among elements in the protest process by permitting different groups to listen selectively to protest spokesmen.[46]

Another way in which strain among different groups can be minimized is through successful public relations. Minimization of strain may depend upon ambiguity of action or statement, deception, or upon effective inter-group communication. Failure to clarify meaning, or falsification, may increase protest effectiveness. Effective intragroup communication may increase the likelihood that protest constituents will "understand" that ambiguous or false public statements have "special meaning" and need not be taken seriously. The Machiavellian circle is complete when we observe that although lying may be prudent, the appearance of integrity and forthrightness is desirable for public relations, since these values are widely shared.

It has been observed that "[t]he militant displays an unwillingness to perform those administrative tasks which are necessary to operate an organization. Probably the skills of the agitator and the skills of the administrator . . . are not incompatible, but few men can do both well."[47] These skills may or may not be incompatible as personality traits, but they indeed represent conflicting role demands on protest leadership. When a protest leader exhausts time and energy conducting frequent press conferences, arranging for politicians and celebrities to appear at rallies, delivering speeches to sympathetic local groups, college symposia and other forums, constantly picketing for publicity and generally making "contacts," he is unable to pursue the direction of office routine, clerical tasks, research and analysis, and other chores.

The difficulties of delegating routine tasks are probably directly related to the skill levels and previous administrative experiences of group members. In addition, to the extent that involvement in protest organizations is a function of rewards received or expected by individuals because of the excitement or entertainment value of participation, then the difficulties of delegating routine, relatively uninteresting chores to group members will be increased. Yet attention to such details affects the perception of protest groups by organizations whose support or assistance may be desired in the future. These considerations add to the protest leader's problem of risking alienation of protest participants because of potentially unpopular cooperation with the "power structure."

In the protest paradigm developed here, "third parties" refers both to the reference publics of target groups and, more narrowly, to the interest groups whose regular interaction with protest targets tends to develop into patterns of influence.[48] We have already discussed some of the problems associated with activating the reference publics of target groups. In discussing the constraints placed upon protest, attention may be focused upon the likelihood that groups seeking to create political resources through protest will be included in the explicit bargaining process with other pressure groups. For protest groups, these constraints are those which occur because of class and political style, status, and organizational resources.

---

[46] See footnote 31 above.

[47] Wilson, *Negro Politics*, p. 225.

[48] See Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City* (New York, 1960), pp. 257 ff. Also see Banfield, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

The established civic groups most likely to be concerned with the problems raised by relatively powerless groups are those devoted to service in the public welfare and those "liberally" oriented groups whose potential constituents are either drawn from the same class as the protest groups (such as some trade unions), or whose potential constituents are attracted to policies which appear to serve the interest of the lower class or minority groups (such as some reform political clubs).[49] These civic groups have frequently cultivated clientele relationships with city agencies over long periods. Their efforts have been reciprocated by agency officials anxious to develop constituencies to support and defend agency administrative and budgetary policies. In addition, clientele groups are expected to endorse and legitimize agency aggrandizement. These relationships have been developed by agency officials and civic groups for mutual benefit, and cannot be destroyed, abridged or avoided without cost.

Protest groups may well be able to raise the saliency of issues on the civic agenda through utilization of communications media and successful appeals or threats to wider publics, but admission to policy-making councils is frequently barred because of the angry, militant rhetorical style adopted by protest leaders. People in power do not like to sit down with rogues. Protest leaders are likely to have phrased demands in ways unacceptable to lawyers and other civic activists whose cautious attitude toward public policy may reflect not only their good intentions but their concern for property rights, due process, pragmatic legislating or judicial precedent.

Relatively powerless groups lack participation of individuals with high status whose endorsement of specific proposals lend them increased legitimacy. Good causes may always attract the support of high status individuals. But such individuals' willingness to devote time to the promotion of specific proposals is less likely than the one-shot endorsements which these people distribute more readily.

Similarly, protest organizations often lack the resources on which entry into the policy-making process depends. These resources include maintenance of a staff with expertise and experience in the policy area. This expertise may be in the areas of the law, planning and architecture, proposal writing, accounting, educational policy, federal grantsmanship or publicity. Combining experience with expertise is one way to create status in issue areas. The dispensing of information by interest groups has been widely noted as a major source of influence. Over time the experts develop status in their areas of competence somewhat independent of the influence which adheres to them as information-providers. Groups which cannot or do not engage lawyers to assist in proposing legislation, and do not engage in collecting reliable data, cannot participate in policy deliberations or consult in these matters. Protest oriented groups, whose primary talents are in dramatizing issues, cannot credibly attempt to present data considered "objective" or suggestions considered "responsible" by public officials. Few can be convincing as both advocate and arbiter at the same time.

V. PROTEST LEADERSHIP AND TARGET GROUPS

The probability of protest success may be approached by examining the maintenance needs of organizations likely to be designated as target groups.[50] For the sake of clarity, and because protest activity increasingly is directed toward government, I shall refer in the following paragraphs exclusively to government agencies at the municipal level. The assumption is retained, however, that the following generalizations are applicable to other potential target groups.

---

[49] See Wilson, *The Amateur Democrats*, previously cited. These groups are most likely to be characterized by broad scope of political interest and frequent intervention in politics. See Sayre and Kaufman, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

[50] Another approach, persuasively presented by Wilson, concentrates on protest success as a function of the relative unity and vulnerability of targets. See "The Strategy of Protest," pp. 293 ff. This insight helps explain, for example, why protest against housing segregation commonly takes the form of action directed against government (a unified target) rather than against individual homeowners (who present a dispersed target). One problem with this approach is that it tends to obscure the possibility that targets, as collections of individuals, may be divided in evaluation of and sympathy for protest demands. Indeed, city agency administrators under some circumstances act as partisans in protest conflicts. As such, they frequently appear ambivalent toward protest goals: sympathetic to the ends while concerned that the means employed in protest reflect negatively on their agencies.

Some of the constraints placed on protest leadership in influencing target groups have already been mentioned in preceding sections. The lack of status and resources that inhibit protest groups from participating in policy-making conferences, for example, also helps prevent explicit bargaining between protest leaders and city officials. The strain between rhetoric which appeals to protest participants and public statements to which communications media and "third parties" respond favorably also exists with reference to target groups.

Yet there is a distinguishing feature of the maintenance needs and strategies of city agencies which specifically constrains protest organizations. This is the agency director's need to protect "the jurisdiction and income of his organization [by] . . . [m]anipulation of the external environment."[51] In so doing he may satisfy his reference groups without responding to protest group demands. At least six tactics are available to protest targets who are motivated to respond in some way to protest activity but seek primarily to satisfy their reference publics. These tactics may be employed whether or not target groups are "sincere" in responding to protest demands.

1. Target groups may dispense symbolic satisfactions. Appearances of activity and commitment to problems substitute for, or supplement, resource allocation and policy innovations which would constitute tangible responses to protest activity. If symbolic responses supplement tangible pay-offs, they are frequently coincidental, rather than intimately linked, to projection of response by protest targets. Typical in city politics of the symbolic response is the ribbon cutting, street corner ceremony or the walking tour press conference. These occasions are utilized not only to build agency constituencies,[52] but to satisfy agency reference publics that attention is being directed to problems of civic concern. In this sense publicist tactics may be seen as defensive maneuvers. Symbolic aspects of the actions of public officials can also be recognized in the commissioning of expensive studies and the rhetorical flourishes with which "massive attacks," "comprehensive programs," and "coordinated planning" are frequently promoted.

City agencies establish distinct apparatus and procedures for dealing with crises which may be provoked by protest groups. Housing-related departments in New York City may be cited for illustration. It is usually the case in these agencies that the Commissioner or a chief deputy, a press secretary and one or two other officials devote whatever time is necessary to collect information, determine policy and respond quickly to reports of "crises." This is functional for tenants, who, if they can generate enough concern, may be able to obtain short-cuts through lengthy agency procedures. It is also functional for officials who want to project images of action rather than merely receiving complaints. Concentrating attention on the maintenance needs of city politicians during protest crises suggests that pronouncements of public officials serve purposes independent of their dedication to alleviation of slum conditions.[53]

Independent of dispensation of tangible benefits to protest groups, public officials continue to respond primarily to their own reference publics. Murray Edelman has suggested that:

> Tangible resources and benefits are frequently not distributed to unorganized political group interests as promised in regulatory statutes and the propaganda attending their enactment.[54]

His analysis may be supplemented by suggesting that symbolic dispensations may not only serve to reassure unorganized political group interests, but may also contribute to reducing the anxiety level of organized interests and wider publics which are only tangentially involved in the issues.

2. Target groups may dispense token material satisfactions. When city agencies respond, with much publicity, to cases brought to their attention representing examples of the needs dramatized by protest organizations, they may appear to respond to protest demands while in fact only responding on a case basis, instead of a general basis. For the protesters served by agencies in this fashion it is of considerable advantage that agencies can be influenced by protest action. Yet it should not be ignored that in handling the "crisis" cases, public officials give the appearance of response

---

[51] Sayre and Kaufman, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

[52] See *ibid.*, pp. 253 ff.

[53] See Lipsky, *op. cit.*, chs. 5–6. The appearance of responsiveness may be given by city officials *in anticipation* of protest activity. This seems to have been the strategy of Mayor Richard Daley in his reaction to the announcement of Martin Luther King's plans to focus civil rights efforts on Chicago. See *The New York Times*, February 1, 1966, p. 11.

[54] See Edelman, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

to their reference publics, while mitigating demands for an expensive, complex *general* assault on problems represented by the cases to which responses are given. Token responses, whether or not accompanied by more general responses, are particularly attractive to reporters and television news directors, who are able to dramatize individual cases convincingly, but who may be unable to "capture" the essence of general deprivation or of general efforts to alleviate conditions of deprivation.

3. Target groups may organize and innovate internally in order to blunt the impetus of protest efforts. This tactic is closely related to No. 2 (above). If target groups can act constructively in the worst cases, they will then be able to pre-empt protest efforts by responding to the cases which best dramatize protest demands. Alternatively, they may designate all efforts which jeopardize agency reputations as "worst" cases, and devote extensive resources to these cases. In some ways extraordinary city efforts are precisely consistent with protest goals. At the same time extraordinary efforts in the most heavily dramatized cases or the most extreme cases effectively wear down the "cutting-edges" of protest efforts.

Many New York City agencies develop informal "crisis" arrangements not only to project publicity, as previously indicated, but to mobilize energies toward solving "crisis" cases. They may also develop policy innovations which allow them to respond more quickly to "crisis" situations. These innovations may be important to some city residents, for whom the problems of dealing with city bureaucracies can prove insurmountable. It might be said, indeed, that the goals of protest are to influence city agencies to handle every case with the same resources that characterize their dispatch of "crisis" cases.[55]

But such policies would demand major revenue inputs. This kind of qualitative policy change is difficult to achieve. Meanwhile, internal reallocation of resources only means that routine services must be neglected so that the "crisis" programs can be enhanced. If all cases are expedited, as in a typical "crisis" response, then none can be. Thus for purposes of general solutions, "crisis" resolving can be self-defeating unless accompanied by significantly greater resource allocation. It is not self-defeating, however, to the extent that the organizational goals of city agencies are to serve a clientele while minimizing negative publicity concerning agency vigilance and responsiveness.

4. Target groups may appear to be constrained in their ability to grant protest goals.[56] This may be directed toward making the protesters appear to be unreasonable in their demands, or to be well-meaning individuals who "just don't understand how complex running a city really is." Target groups may extend sympathy but claim that they lack resources, a mandate from constituents, and/or authority to respond to protest demands. Target groups may also evade protest demands by arguing that "If-I-give-it-to-you-I-have-to-give-it-to-everyone."

The tactic of appearing constrained is particularly effective with established civic groups because there is an undeniable element of truth to it. Everyone knows that cities are financially undernourished. Established civic groups expend great energies lobbying for higher levels of funding for their pet city agencies. Thus they recognize the validity of this constraint when posed by city officials. But it is not inconsistent to point out that funds for specific, relatively inexpensive programs, or for the expansion of existing programs, can often be found if pressure is increased. While constraints on city government flexibility may be extensive, they are not absolute. Protest targets nonetheless attempt to diminish the impact of protest demands by claiming relative impotence.

5. Target groups may use their extensive resources to discredit protest leaders and organizations. Utilizing their excellent access to the press, public officials may state or imply that leaders are unreliable, ineffective as leaders ("they don't really have the people behind them"), guilty of criminal behavior, potentially guilty of such behavior, or are some shade of "left-wing." Any of these allegations may serve to diminish the appeal of protest groups to potentially sympathetic third parties. City officials, in their frequent social and informal business interaction with leaders of established civic groups, may also communicate derogatory information concerning protest groups. Discrediting of protest groups may be undertaken by some city officials while others appear (perhaps authentically) to remain sympathetic to protest demands. These tactics may be engaged in by public officials whether or not there is any validity to the allegations.

6. Target groups may postpone action. The effect of postponement, if accompanied by symbolic assurances, is to remove immediate pressure and delay specific commitments to a future date. This familiar tactic is particularly effective in dealing with protest groups because of

---

[55] See Lipsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 156, 249 ff.

[56] On the strategy of appearing constrained, see Schelling, *op. cit.*, pp. 22 ff.

their inherent instability. Protest groups are usually comprised of individuals whose intense political activity cannot be sustained except in rare circumstances. Further, to the extent that protest depends upon activating reference publics through strategies which have some "shock" value, it becomes increasingly difficult to activate these groups. Additionally, protest activity is inherently unstable because of the strains placed upon protest leaders who must attempt to manage four constituencies (as described herein).

The most frequent method of postponing action is to commit a subject to "study." For the many reasons elaborated in these paragraphs, it is not likely that ad hoc protest groups will be around to review the recommendations which emerge from study. The greater the expertise and the greater the status of the group making the study, the less will protest groups be able to influence whatever policy emerges. Protest groups lack the skills and resource personnel to challenge expert recommendations effectively.

Sometimes surveys and special research are undertaken in part to evade immediate pressures. Sometimes not. Research efforts are particularly necessary to secure the support of established civic groups, which place high priority on orderly procedure and policy emerging from independent analysis. Yet it must be recognized that postponing policy commitments has a distinct impact on the nature of the pressures focused on policy-makers.

IV. CONCLUSION

In this analysis I have agreed with James Q. Wilson that protest is correctly conceived as a strategy utilized by relatively powerless groups in order to increase their bargaining ability. As such, I have argued, it is successful to the extent that the reference publics of protest targets can be activated to enter the conflict in ways favorable to protest goals. I have suggested a model of the protest process which may assist in ordering data and indicating the salience for research of a number of aspects of protest. These include the critical role of communications media, the differential impact of material and symbolic rewards on "feedback" in protest activity, and the reciprocal relationships of actors in the protest process.

An estimation of the limits to protest efficacy, I have argued further, can be gained by recognizing the problems encountered by protest leaders who somehow must balance the conflicting maintenance needs of four groups in the protest process. This approach transcends a focus devoted primarily to characterization of group goals and targets, by suggesting that even in an environment which is relatively favorable to specific protest goals, the tensions which must be embraced by protest leadership may ultimately overwhelm protest activity.

At the outset of this essay, it was held that conceptualizing the American political system as "slack" or "fluid," in the manner of Robert Dahl, appears inadequate because of (1) a vagueness centering on the likelihood that any group can make itself heard; (2) a possible confusion as to which groups tend to receive satisfaction from the rewards dispensed by public officials; and (3) a lumping together as equally relevant rewards which are tangible and those which are symbolic. To the extent that protest is engaged in by relatively powerless groups which must create resources with which to bargain, the analysis here suggests a number of reservations concerning the pluralist conceptualization of the "fluidity" of the American political system.

Relatively powerless groups cannot use protest with a high probability of success. They lack organizational resources, by definition. But even to create bargaining resources through activating third parties, some resources are necessary to sustain organization. More importantly, relatively powerless protest groups are constrained by the unresolvable conflicts which are forced upon protest leaders who must appeal simultaneously to four constituencies which place upon them antithetical demands.

When public officials recognize the legitimacy of protest activity, they may not direct public policy toward protest groups at all. Rather, public officials are likely to aim responses at the reference publics from which they originally take their cues. Edelman has suggested that regulatory policy in practice often consists of reassuring mass publics while at the same time dispensing specific, tangible values to narrow interest groups. It is suggested here that symbolic reassurances are dispensed as much to wide, potentially concerned publics which are not directly affected by regulatory policy, as they are to wide publics comprised of the downtrodden and the deprived, in whose name policy is often written.

Complementing Edelman, it is proposed here that in the process of protest symbolic reassurances are dispensed in large measure because these are the public policy outcomes and actions desired by the constituencies to which public officials are most responsive. Satisfying these wider publics, city officials can avoid pressures toward other policies placed upon them by protest organizations

Not only should there be some doubt as to which groups receive the symbolic recognitions which Dahl describes, but in failing to distinguish between the kinds of rewards dispensed to groups in the political system, Dahl avoids a fundamental question. It is literally fundamental because the kinds of rewards which can be obtained from politics, one might hypothesize, will have an impact upon the realistic appraisal of the efficacy of political activity. If among the groups least capable of organizing for political activity there is a history of organizing for protest, and if that activity, once engaged in, is rewarded primarily by the dispensation of symbolic gestures without perceptible changes in material conditions, then rational behavior might lead to expressions of apathy and lack of interest in politics or a rejection of conventional political channels as a meaningful arena of activity. In this sense this discussion of protest politics is consistent with Kenneth Clark's observations that the image of power, unaccompanied by material and observable rewards, leads to impressions of helplessness and reinforces political apathy in the ghetto.[57]

Recent commentary by political scientists and others regarding riots in American cities seems to focus in part on the extent to which relatively deprived groups may seek redress of legitimate grievances. Future research should continue assessment of the relationship between riots and the conditions under which access to the political system has been limited. In such research assessment of the ways in which access to public officials is obtained by relatively powerless groups through the protest process might be one important research focus.

The instability of protest activity outlined in this article also should inform contemporary political strategies. If the arguments presented here are persuasive, civil rights leaders who insist that protest activity is a shallow foundation on which to seek long-term, concrete gains may be judged essentially correct. But the arguments concerning the fickleness of the white liberal, or the ease of changing discriminatory laws relative to changing discriminatory institutions, only in part explain the instability of protest movements. An explanation which derives its strength from analysis of the political process suggests concentration on the problems of managing protest constituencies. Accordingly, Alinsky is probably on the soundest ground when he prescribes protest for the purpose of building organization. Ultimately, relatively powerless groups in most instances cannot depend upon activating other actors in the political process. Long-run success will depend upon the acquisition of stable political resources which do not rely for their use on third parties.

---

[57] Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 154 ff.

MOTIVATION, INCENTIVE SYSTEMS, AND THE POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION*

M. MARGARET CONWAY
University of Maryland

AND

FRANK B. FEIGERT
Knox College

I. MODELS OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

Several different models of local political party organization can be found in the accumulating studies of American local politics. One model is typified by the research of Forthal, Gosnell, Kent, and Salter, and presents a picture of the party organization as attracting and disciplining workers through material incentives, non-ideological in its appeals, and oriented toward obtaining votes for securing or maintaining the party in political control of the government.[1] An alternative model has been described in more recent research by Wilson, Hirschfield, and Carney.[2] They portray the party activist as being more ideologically oriented, responding to ideological rather than material incentives, and seeking governmental reform or improved governmental services. Changes in the environment have been identified as the causal forces for this change in political party organizational style. For example, Greenstein points out that urban party machines developed to provide required services for which demand was generated by rapid urbanization, disorganized governmental structures, and the needs of recent immigrants.[3] The research describing the material-incentive-motivated political machines was produced primarily during the 1920's and 1930's when the need for accommodation to urban problems of the type described existed to a greater degree than at present.

The social characteristics of the activists as well as the political style of the two types of party organizations described in the professional and amateur models also differ. The professional model presents a party organization whose members are male, oriented toward material rewards or a career in government, and exhibit little concern for issues. The amateur model presents a pattern of workers who are not oriented toward material rewards, tend to be of higher status in occupation, income, education, and life style, and who participate in politics in large part as a response to concern for particular issues.[4] Women are much more likely to be active in the amateur style party organization.[5]

Wilson suggests that over a period of time amateurs may assimilate the political style and motivational patterns of professionals.[6] Evidence of this is present in other studies. Eldersveld found in his study of Detroit party organizations that 74 per cent of the Democratic and 85 per cent of the Republican precinct committeemen began their party activity with impersonal or purposive motivations of moral, philosophical, or ideological satisfactions. However, only 7 per cent of the Democrats and 20 per cent of the Republicans reported those satisfac-

---

* Acknowledged are the financial support of the Computer Science Center, University of Maryland, the contributions of students in a survey research course to one of the studies on which this is based, and the assistance of Fran Feigert. Also acknowledged are the financial support provided to the senior author by the General Research Board of the Graduate School, University of Maryland, and to the junior author from the Faculty Research Fund of Knox College. The cooperation of the county chairmen and precinct chairmen of the two counties is appreciated by the authors.

[1] Sonya Forthal, *Cogwheels of Democracy: A Study of the Precinct Captain* (New York: William-Frederick Press, 1946); Harold F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937); Frank R. Kent, *The Great Game of Politics* (New York: Doubleday Doran, 1923); J. T. Salter, *Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935).

[2] James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Robert S. Hirshfield, Bert E. Swanson, and Blanche D. Blank, "A Profile of Political Activists in Manhattan," *Western Political Quarterly*, 15 (September, 1962), 489–506; Francis Carney, *The Rise of the Democratic Clubs in California*, Eagleton Foundation Case Studies in Practical Politics (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1958).

[3] Fred I. Greenstein, *The American Party System and the American People* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 39–41.

[4] Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 2–16.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 62–63.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

tions as being currently derived from party activity. The predominant satisfaction had become that derived from social contacts.[7]

Wilson argues that the sharp distinction between professionals and amateurs is continued through the amateur clubs, with additional evidence for his assertion being presented in Carney's study of the Democratic clubs in California and Blaisdell's study of the liberal reform movement in New York City.[8] One can argue that a particular environment might contribute to the retention of the amateur style in politics within the formal party organization. Party politics in an affluent community might tend toward an issue-oriented style of politics attractive to the amateur, with this style being maintained within the organization and retained by the organization worker over a considerable period of time.

Clark and Wilson, in an examination of the incentives available to organizations, indicate three types are possible: material or monetary; solidary, deriving from the act of participation itself through the conferring of status, prestige, etc.; and purposive, attained through achievement of organizational goals.[9] The type of incentive used by a party organization has implications for the internal functioning of the organization itself, for the relationship between the political party and the political system of which it is a part, and the interactions between the political system and the general social system.

Joseph Schlesinger has pointed out that a party organization using material incentives has the greatest flexibility both in establishing goals to be sought by the organization and in selecting the means to attain them.[10] As an organization moves from material to solidary to purposive incentives, it reduces flexibility in goal definition and strategy. Inflexibility within the organization due to the rigid adherence of organizational members to particular issue stands limits the ability of the political party to perform its functions within the political system[11] or act in its interactive role with the environmental social system.

A third model of party organization has been summarized by Schlesinger.[12] He argues that the basic unit of party organization is that evolving around a collective effort to capture a single public office; in other words, party organization at the local level often means an organization formed around a candidate for public office. The predominant orientation of the organization is seizing control of public office at some time, however far distant in the future that might be. Contributions to the nucleus may not be openly identifiable as organizational activity, and may be of a minimal (i.e., absolutely essential) or connective nature, such as the provision of leadership, issue formulation, communications functions, recruitment to party work and nomination for office, provisions of technical services, and the securing of funds. Whether effective party leadership is exercised by the public office holder or organizational leader is viewed by Schlesinger as a function of the degree of interparty competition and formal or traditional restraints on leadership. However, Schlesinger does not indicate the relationship between the locational focus of effective party leadership and the incentive which predominates in the party system of a locality. In what type of system are those who surround a potential candidate and form the nucleus of the party organization more likely to be motivated by material, solidary, or purposive incentives?

One may easily conceive of these three broad models of party organization as counterpoised, in effect, to the major orientations of the voter. Campbell *et al.* have repeatedly stressed that voters are oriented in three veins, toward the party, toward issues, and toward candidates.[13] While some voters are "pure types," most may be thought of as being somewhat mixed in their orientations. Similarly, the material, issue (purposive), and office-oriented organizations are "pure types," but in the typological sense only. Hence, when we specify a label for either a voter or a party organization we do not insist on a single orientation which necessarily excludes all others. Rather, we are speaking of the dominant tendency of that voter or organization. The interaction of the organizational and voter typologies remains a rich field for further exploration.[14]

---

[7] Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 277–292.

[8] Carney, *op. cit.*; Donald C. Blaisdell, *The Riverside Democrats*, Eagleton Institute Cases in Practical Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

[9] Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 6 (September, 1961), 134–137.

[10] Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Political Party Organization," in James G. March (ed.), *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 768.

[11] For a discussion of party functions, see, for example, Neil A. McDonald, *The Study of Political Parties* (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 22–26.

[12] Schlesinger, *loc. cit.*, pp. 767–769, 774–786.

[13] Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), pp. 88–143.

Several recent studies have examined the social and behavioral characteristics of party activists. Robert Salisbury, in a study of six clubs in St. Louis and St. Louis County, found that neither the professional nor amateur model fits his sample.[15] In social characteristics, club members interviewed more approximated the professional type, while in terms of primary group membership those interviewed fit neither the amateur nor the professional model. Club members tended to specialize in politics rather than being members of a number of organizations. Stimulus to participation was party related, of an habitual nature, and deriving perhaps from family socialization. Althoff and Patterson in a study of rural, Southern Illinois precinct committeemen found a pattern more in consonance with the professional than amateur in terms of occupational status, education, and income.[16] The precinct committeemen also had a high level of political aspirations. Motivations to party work were ignored, however, in an attempt to derive prevailing orientations of committeemen. These were found to be of either the campaign or organization type.

Another study of precinct committeemen conducted by Bowman and Boynton in selected non-metropolitan communities examined the political and social characteristics of the party officials. They found that party workers in the communities studied tended to come from white collar occupations, and forty per cent had a college education.[17] In terms of reasons for becoming active in politics, from 20 to 30 per cent of the individuals in their four sub-samples indicated purposive motivations.[18]

In his study of political party officials in Detroit, Eldersveld found distinct differences between the two parties in the social characteristics of precinct leaders. Republicans tended to draw precinct leadership from white collar occupations while the Democrats were more likely to be craftsmen or blue collar workers.[19] However, the Detroit parties were relatively open and clientele-oriented, with attempts made to recruit persons from groups predominantly within the opposition party's coalition to serve as party precinct leaders. This was done through both conscious party effort and informal extra-party activity, although much induction to party activity was self-generated.[20]

Which, if any, of these three models of party organization is appropriate? We shall concentrate on analyzing the conditions under which activists with particular patterns of social characteristics and motivations are to be found in the party organization at the precinct leader level.

What variables might account for differences in the personal characteristics of precinct leaders and in organizational style as they are reflected in the incentive systems to which party activists respond? Several can be suggested. One would anticipate that in a predominantly suburban, middle class area the incentive to political activity would not be solidary or material but would tend more toward purposive rewards. In an area with a less prosperous socioeconomic base, one might anticipate greater emphasis on material and also on solidary incentives for initial party activity. In other words, we hypothesize that the amateur style in politics tends to predominate in a particular type of social system, with both greater initial entry for purposive reasons and greater retention of initial purposive motivation among activists in the more affluent environment. This contrasts with Wilson's hypothesis that the activists entering the party for purposive satisfactions generally experience a decline in this incentive and an increase in the importance of solidary and material incentives.[21]

Another variable influencing differential patterns of incentives and personal characteristics might be the normal majority or minority status of the party within the effective political unit. The majority party would be more likely to be staffed with persons entering party activity for material reasons. Access to state patronage through being a member of the normally dominant party in a state might also result in differential degrees of the importance of material incentives within a county's political parties.

Eldersveld found a much greater emphasis on purposive reasons for originally becoming active in politics than did Bowman and Boynton.

---

[14] See, for example, Murray B. Levin and Murray Eden, "Political Strategy for the Alienated Voter," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Spring, 1962), 47–62.

[15] Robert H. Salisbury, "The Urban Party Organization Member," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 29 (Winter, 1965–1966), 553–561.

[16] Phillip Althoff and Samuel C. Patterson, "Political Activism in a Rural County," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 10 (February, 1966), p. 42.

[17] Lewis Bowman and G. R. Boynton, "Recruitment Patterns Among Local Party Officials: A Model and Some Preliminary Findings in Selected Locales," this REVIEW, 60 (September, 1966), 670–71.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 674.

[19] Eldersveld, *op. cit.*, pp. 54, 58.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 59–72.

[21] Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5.

Perhaps size or population density of the political unit is in some way related to the reasons for becoming active in politics; the increased size and complexity of the modern party organization in metropolitan areas may obscure the opportunities for material and solidary rewards. Another variable may be the degree to which non-partisan elections are used for the election of local officials, and, if they are used, the type of non-partisan system which exists. Use of the non-partisan system may inhibit recognition of opportunities for material reward or reduce access to this type of incentive.

II. THE DATA

We examine the hypothesized differences in personal characteristics and patterns of incentives by using survey data collected in two quite different political units, one an agricultural and industrial county located in northwest Illinois, the other a large suburban county outside Washington, D. C. populated primarily by commuters to the national capital and by workers in the research and development organizations located in the area. The survey of Montgomery County, Maryland, leaders was conducted during May, 1966; a response rate of 64 per cent was obtained. The Knox County study was conducted in the period from mid-April to mid-May, 1967, with a response rate of 62 per cent.[22] The research instrument included questions on social background, political socialization, recruitment to political activity, motivations, and role definition was well as a series of ideological and personality inventory questions.

Knox County, Illinois, is traditionally overwhelmingly Republican in its voting behavior, but also has a recently energized Democratic party organization. Scandinavian descendents have acquired a position of preeminence in local Republican politics. Republicans tend to be oriented toward a concern with local politics, while Democrats, with little hope of gaining local elective offices, concentrate on state, congressional, and other federal offices. In 1959 the median family income of Knox County was $5755, below the state median of $6566.

Montgomery County, Maryland, formerly was dominated by the Democratic party, and while voter registration still heavily favors the Democrats, the Republicans have had control of the county council since 1962, although they do not present a united stand in council votes on major issues. The Democrats traditionally have elected a majority of the county's legislative delegation. The primaries of both parties have had well organized and ideologically structured factions engaging in battle for nomination to local and state offices in recent years. In 1959 the county had the highest median family income in the United States, with a very high level of educational attainment and a preponderance of professional and other white collar occupations among its residents. In 1959 the the median family income in the county was $9317, compared with a state median of $6309. The two counties appear well suited for a test of the various models of party organization, for we can compare social characteristics and motivations to see if any consistent differences exist between party organizations operating in different environmental contexts.

III. FINDINGS

The amateur type in politics has been described as varying from the professional in his social characteristics as well as in his motivational drives. Table 1 indicates that the social characteristics of party precinct leaders are different in the two counties. A statistical test was used to assess the degree of association between type of county and each social characteristic of precinct leaders and between party affiliation within each county and each social characteristic.[23] Comparing the two counties, precinct chairmen differ in income, age, occupation, sex, and educational characteristics but not in race. Knox County activists are more likely to be affiliated with lower status religious denominations, to be older, to have lower income, to have considerably less education, and to be males than precinct leaders in Montgomery County. The precinct leaders differ in their occupational composition with far more in Montgomery County being professional men, employed as managers, officials, or proprietors of business

---

[22] The Montgomery County leaders were personally interviewed; the Knox County leaders responded to the same research instrument administered as mail questionnaires. Two problems generally exist in the use of mail questionnaires, these being the obtaining of an adequate response rate and the obtaining of a representative sample. The response rate for the Knox County leaders was sufficient and examination of the pattern of returned questionnaires indicated that representativeness in terms of party affiliation, socio-economic characteristics, and residential patterns was obtained.

[23] The statistical measure of association used is Kendall's tau. For a discussion of tau, see M. G. Kendall, *Rank Correlation Methods* (London: Charles Griffin and Company, 1955). In the analysis of social characteristics, Episcopal, Presbyterian and Congregational faiths are classified as high-status Protestant religions; all other Protestant religions are classified as low-status.

TABLE 1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PRECINCT CHAIRMEN, BY PARTY AND COUNTY

Characteristic	Montgomery County		Knox County	
	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Marital Status				
Married	95.0%	89.4%	87.1%	86.4%
Single	5.0	4.6	5.1	5.5
Widowed	—	3.0	3.7	8.1
Divorced	—	3.0	5.1	—
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Religion				
Jewish	20.0%	1.5%	2.6%	—
Catholic	8.3	18.2	28.2	5.4%
Protestant:				
High Status	18.3	47.0	17.9	16.2
Low Status	33.3	27.3	43.6	78.4
Other or None	20.0	6.1	7.7	—
	99.9[a]%	100.1[a]%	100.0%	100.0%
Age				
21–30	1.7%	9.1%	5.1%	5.4%
31–40	26.7	36.4	12.8	2.7
41–50	38.3	28.8	30.8	21.6
51–65	31.7	19.7	48.7	62.2
Over 65	1.7	6.1	2.6	8.1
	100.1[a]%	100.1[a]%	100.0%	100.0%
	$\tau = .179$	$\tau = .317$	$\tau = .223$	
Income				
Under $3,000	—	1.5%	2.6%	10.8%
$ 3,000– 4,999	5.1%	1.5	2.6	10.8
$ 5,000– 6,999	1.7	13.6	12.8	8.1
$ 7,000– 9,999	15.3	27.3	35.9	32.4
$10,000–14,999	33.9	31.8	28.2	32.4
$15,000–19,999	37.3	19.7	7.7	2.7
$20,000 and over	6.8	1.5	10.3	2.7
No response	—	3.0	—	—
	100.1[a]%	99.9[a]%	100.1[a]%	99.9[a]%
	$\tau = -.290$	$\tau = -.294$	$\tau = -.199$	
Education				
Less than 8th grade	1.7%	4.5%	2.6%	5.4%
Eighth grade completed	—	1.5	10.3	2.7
Some high school	—	1.5	12.8	24.3
Completed h.s.	8.5	6.1	41.0	40.5
Some college	11.9	25.8	12.8	13.5
Completed college	30.5	37.9	10.3	10.8
Work on advanced degree	11.9	4.5	2.6	2.7
Completed advanced degree	35.6	18.2	7.7	—
	100.1[a]%	100.0%	100.1[a]%	99.9[a]%
	$\tau = -.284$	$\tau = -.629$	$\tau = -.083$	

TABLE 1—(*Continued*)

Characteristic	Montgomery County		Knox County	
	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Occupation				
Professional	41.7%	36.4%	12.8%	5.4%
Farmers	—	1.5	7.7	16.2
Managers, Officials or Proprietors	8.3	10.7	2.6	2.7
Clerical	5.0	4.5	5.1	10.8
Sales	8.3	9.1	5.1	27.0
Craftsmen, Foremen and kindred	1.7	1.5	38.5	2.7
Operatives	—	3.0	10.3	2.7
Private household workers	—	—	—	—
Service workers	—	—	—	8.1
Farm laborers and Foremen	1.7	—	—	2.7
Laborers	6.7	1.5	12.8	—
Students	3.3	1.5	—	2.7
Housewives	20.0	16.7	2.6	5.4
Retired or Unemployed	3.3	9.1	2.6	5.4
Not reported	—	4.5	—	8.1
	100.0%	100.0%	100.1[a]%	99.9[a]%
	$\tau=.0846$	$\tau=.122$	$\tau=.105$	
Sex				
Male	60.0%	68.1%	89.8%	87.2%
Female	40.0	32.9	10.2	12.8
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Race				
White	96.7%	98.5%	100.0%	97.3%
Negro	3.3	1.5	—	2.7
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	60	66	39	37

[a] Totals in all tables may not equal 100.0% because of rounding.

enterprises, or unemployed housewives. Certainly, in their socio-economic characteristics, the composition of the precinct leaders in Montgomery County approximates the amateur model, and we conclude that the county with the stronger economic base does more closely approximate this model.

Assuredly, differences do exist between the two parties in each county. Within Knox County, Republican and Democratic activists differ in religious affiliation and age but not in other characteristics examined. In Montgomery County, Republican and Democratic activists differ in age, income level, and educational development. While both parties have precinct chairmen drawn from relatively high income families, the Democrats appear to constitute a more affluent group than the Republicans. In both counties, activists in the traditional minority party tend to be younger than their counterparts in the majority party.

Several questions were asked which make it possible to evaluate the motivations perceived by the precinct leaders themselves as effective stimuli at various key points in their political careers. The activists were asked questions about their motivations for initial entry into political activity and for becoming a precinct committeeman. Each was also asked what satisfactions he believed the average precinct leader derived from his role and what he himself would miss most if he quit his post as a precinct

TABLE 2. REASON WHICH BEST EXPLAINS WHY BECAME ACTIVE IN POLITICS

Reason	Montgomery County		Knox County	
	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Personal Friendship for a Candidate	6.6%	1.5%	10.3%	10.8%
Way of Life	11.7	4.5	20.5	8.1
Attachment to Party	10.0	16.7	23.1	18.9
Enjoyment of Social Contacts	—	—	2.6	10.8
Enjoyment of Campaign Excitement	1.7	—	—	8.1
Build Personal Position in Politics	—	—	2.6	—
Influence Policies	30.0	42.4	17.9	16.2
Be Close to People Doing Important Things	—	—	2.6	2.7
Business Contacts	—	1.5	—	—
Community Recognition	—	4.5	—	—
Civic Duty	40.0	28.8	20.5	16.2
No Response	—	—	—	8.1
	100.0%	99.9%	100.1%	99.9%
N	60	66	39	37
	$\tau=.089$	$\tau=.281$	$\tau=.011$	

chairman. From these questions we can evaluate the activist's motivations for political activity at three key points in his political career, these three being initial entry, accepting the post of precinct leader, and current or on-going satisfactions. In this manner we can evaluate if in fact the leaders in two different socio-economic environments differ in their motivations at these three career stages.

The data in Table 2 indicate some interesting differences in the motivational patterns for initial entry into political work between precinct leaders in the two counties. Attachment to party, personal friendship with a candidate, and enjoyment of social contacts are cited by more activists in the rural county. Politics being regarded as part of a way of life is more likely to be given by Democrats as a reason for political activity, and more frequently in the rural county. However, the key differences are in the frequency with which the activists cited civic duty and desire to influence governmental policies as the principal reasons for their becoming politically active, with suburban county activists more frequently citing these reasons for initial party activity. Grouping explanations cited as most important into the motivational categories of ideological, other impersonal, social contacts, and other personal reasons, we find the distribution of major types of motivation for the best explanations of the activists' initial entry into politics as presented in Table 3.[24] Ranking the party organizations in terms of the frequency with which ideological and other impersonal reasons are given, the rankings are as follows:

Suburban County Republicans 87.9%
Suburban County Democrats 80.0%
Rural County Democrats 61.5%
Rural County Republicans 41.3%

---

[24] Social contacts consist of positive responses to desire to be close to people doing important things, friendship for a candidate, community recognition, enjoyment of campaign excitement, and enjoyment of social contacts. Other personal includes desire to build a personal position in politics, business contacts, and politics as a part of the respondent's way of life. Ideological consists of desire to influence governmental policy, and other impersonal consists of desire to fulfill civic responsibility and attachment to one's political party. Ideological and other impersonal satisfactions are roughly equivalent with Clark and Wilson's purposive category and social contacts with the solidary category. Other impersonal is loosely equivalent to material rewards, although building a personal position in politics undoubtedly includes ego-satisfying rewards as well as material rewards to be derived from the eventually attained political position.

TABLE 3. TYPE OF MOTIVATION CITED FOR INITIAL POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Motivation	Montgomery County		Knox County	
	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Ideological	30.0%	42.4%	17.9%	16.2%
Other Impersonal	50.0	45.4	43.6	35.1
Social Contacts	8.3	6.1	15.5	32.4
Other Personal	11.7	6.1	23.1	8.1
Not Ascertained	—	—	—	8.1
	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	99.9%
N	60	66	39	37
	$\tau = -.156$	$\tau = .305$	$\tau = .021$	

If the party is an organization formed around a candidate with members motivated by the purpose of electing the actual or potential candidate to office, we would expect to find a sizable number of party activists stating this as a principal reason for becoming active in politics. However, as Table 2 indicates, this factor appears minimal; approximately 11 per cent of the activists in Knox County indicated this was the principal reason for their becoming active in politics. Even fewer cited it in Montgomery County.

We cannot, for the two counties studied, reject the hypothesis that the set of motivations for initial entry into political party work is far more likely to be ideological or impersonal in nature in an affluent community. In the rural county, motives for initial political entry tend more to be purposive among leaders of the party which is traditionally subordinate electorally in the county but competitive in the state-wide contests. Further, both rural parties' activists are far more likely to have been stimulated in their original entry into party work by solidary or material motives than are the suburban activists. This may be due in part to the strong patronage powers available within the state. Illinois is second only to Pennsylvania in terms of this factor, as the gubernatorial party may have up to 21,000 positions available for appointment.[25] As a consequence, the Knox Democrats, although a decided minority at the polls, can "distribute" jobs among a broad variety of state agencies within the county.

The second stage of the precinct leaders' political career for which motivations to political activity was queried was reasons for accepting the post of precinct leader. Precinct committeemen from the two counties could be said to differ to a degree. In both counties they tended to give heavy emphasis to the same reasons, namely, concern with issues, desire to elect a particular candidate, or a generalized response of fulfilling citizen responsibilities. The one exception to this is the Knox County Republicans, where the third most frequently cited reason for activity was the prompting of friends. Table 4 indicates the per cent responding in each category. In each party in both counties, the most frequently cited reason for taking the precinct leader's post is civic duty. One must question whether or not this might be a rationalization of other motives. In all four sets of precinct leaders, the second most frequent response is a concern with issues, with approximately one-third of the Knox County leaders in both parties and the Democrats in the suburban county giving this response. For only one-fifth of the Republicans in Montgomery County is this the most important reason.

At the second stage in the precinct leaders' political careers for which we have information about motives, we find once again an indication of the inadequacy of the model viewing the party organization as a candidate-oriented social system. While for three of the four sets of leaders it is the third most frequently stated reason for accepting the post, the proportion citing it ranged from only one-twelfth to one-fifth. As a stimulus for taking the precinct leader post, candidate orientation appears to be a minor factor when viewed in relation to other stimuli.

Groups in the community have the opportunity to contribute to the recruitment process by initiating the idea of seeking the precinct chairman's office or supporting an already-made decision by an individual. We can inquire

---

[25] Austin Ranney, *Illinois Politics* (New York: New York University Press, prepared under the auspices of the Citizenship Clearing House, 1960), pp. 33–34; Frank J. Sorauf, "State Patronage in a Rural County," this REVIEW, 50 (December, 1956), 1046–1056.

TABLE 4. SINGLE FACTOR MOST IMPORTANT IN THE DECISION TO BECOME A PRECINCT CHAIRMAN

Factor	Montgomery County		Knox County	
	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Concern with Issues	30.0%	18.2%	30.8%	32.4%
Elect a Candidate	13.3	16.7	20.5	8.1
Family Influence	1.7	3.0	2.6	2.7
Friends' Influence	—	3.0	2.6	16.2
Employer's Influence	—	3.0	2.6	—
Union Influence	—	—	2.6	—
Civic Duty	45.0	50.0	33.3	40.5
Don't Know	—	—	5.1	—
Not Ascertained	6.7	6.1	—	—
	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	99.9%
N	60	66	39	37
	τ =.085	τ =.128	τ =.003	

if the individual's perception of group support in his seeking the post was related in any way to his major motivation for becoming a precinct leader. As Table 5 indicates, in Knox County those who report seeking the post because of a sense of civic duty are somewhat less likely to report the influence of party faction than those who indicate seeking the post for other reasons.

TABLE 5. RELATION OF REASON FOR ACCEPTING PRECINCT POST TO GROUP SUPPORT FOR ACCEPTING POST

Why Accepted Precinct Post	Type of Group Support											
	Montgomery County						Knox County					
	Party Faction	Friends	Other	None	Total	N	Party Faction	Friends	Other	None	Total	N
	(per cent)						(per cent)					
Republicans												
Issues	75.0	8.3	—	16.7	100	12	46.6	15.4	—	38.0	100	13
Elect a Candidate	90.9	—	—	9.1	100	11	—	—	—	100.0	100	3
Family Influence	50.0	50.0	—	—	100	2	—	—	—	100.0	100	1
Friends' Influence	50.0	—	—	50.0	100	2	40.0	40.0	—	20.0	100	6
Employer Influence	50.0	—	—	50.0	100	2	—	—	—	—	—	0
Union Influence	—	—	—	—	—	0	—	—	—	—	—	0
Civic Responsibility	69.7	9.1	12.1	9.1	100	33	35.7	14.3	7.1	42.9	100	14
Don't Know	—	—	—	—	—	0	—	—	—	—	—	0
Not Ascertained	100.0	—	—	—	100	4	—	—	—	—	—	0
Total						66						37
Democrats												
Issues	64.7	5.9	—	29.4	100	18	33.3	—	—	66.7	100	12
Elect a Candidate	62.5	—	—	37.5	100	8	62.5	—	—	37.5	100	8
Family Influence	—	100.0	—	—	100	1	100.0	—	—	—	100	1
Friends' Influence	50.0	50.0	—	—	100	2	—	—	—	100.0	100	1
Employer Influence	—	—	—	—	—	0	100.0	—	—	—	100	1
Union Influence	—	—	—	—	—	0	100.0	—	—	—	100	1
Civic Responsibility	70.4	11.1	—	18.5	100	27	38.5	—	—	61.5	100	13
Don't Know	—	—	—	—	—	0	100.0	—	—	—	100	2
Not Ascertained	100.0	—	—	—	100	4	—	—	—	—	—	0
Total						60						39

TABLE 6. WHAT WOULD MISS MOST IF QUIT PRECINCT CHAIRMAN POST, BY COUNTY AND PARTY

Factor	Montgomery County		Knox County	
	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Ideological	10.0%	6.1%	23.1%	21.6%
Other Impersonal	6.7	3.1	2.6	10.8
Social Contact	31.6	42.3	56.4	43.2
Other Personal	29.9	34.7	12.8	10.8
None	8.3	6.1	2.6	5.4
Not Ascertained	13.3	7.6	2.6	8.1
Total	99.8%	99.9%	100.1%	99.9%
N	60	66	39	37
	$\tau=.038$	$\tau=.211$	$\tau=.063$	

In contrast, in Montgomery County party factional support is indicated to a somewhat greater degree among those citing civic duty as their reason for accepting the precinct post than tends to be given by persons becoming precinct leaders for some other reason.

The activists were asked what they would miss most if they were to relinquish their precinct post; through this we can obtain an assessment of the rewards they perceive themselves to be receiving from their political office. In Montgomery County, the two parties are similar in their responses, with approximately two-thirds of the Democrats and three-fourths of the Republicans citing social contacts or other personal satisfactions as those which would be missed most if they were to quit their precinct post. The Democrats in Knox County show a similar response pattern, with the Republicans tending slightly more to cite ideological or impersonal factors. However, precinct leaders in the two counties do exhibit somewhat different patterns of current satisfactions. Three times as many in the suburban county as in the rural county indicate that other personal satisfactions, including business contacts and building a personal position in politics, would be missed most. Other research has indicated that the precinct post is a stepping stone to running for elective office in the suburban county.[26] In both counties, social contacts are cited as the satisfaction which would be missed most frequently by all parties, but especially by the minority party.

It must be pointed out that the high level of disillusionment with party precinct work found by Eldersveld in Detroit does not exist in any of the four party organizations studied. In Detroit, 15 per cent of the Democratic leaders and 22 per cent of the Republicans stated that they currently received no satisfactions from their work in the party.[27] In Knox County, 5.4 per cent of the Republicans and 2.6 per cent of the Democrats took a similar position; in Montgomery County 8.3 per cent of the Democrats and 6.1 per cent of the Republicans also state that no rewards are being received from their current party work. Why would the proportion of precinct leaders receiving no rewards from party work be so much lower in the two counties studied than in Detroit? It may be a function of the size of the political unit, with the rewards of a social nature being more within reach in the smaller unit.

Our hypothesis states that precinct leaders in the more affluent county who enter party work for ideological or other impersonal reasons will be better able to maintain this orientation than those who enter for solidary or material reasons. Eldersveld, in his study of Detroit precinct leaders, found that 68 per cent of the Democratic leaders and 57 per cent of the Republicans who entered political work with impersonal motivations changed to personalized motivations while 20 per cent of the Democrats and 21 per cent of the Republicans became disillusioned and indicated no current satisfactions received from their party work.[28] Political analysts have frequently indicated that the so-called reformers are unable to maintain their idealistic zeal, hence the eventual downfall of reform move-

---

[26] A recent study indicates that a very large proportion of both parties' candidates for the Maryland legislature in 1966 had previously served as precinct chairmen. Allen J. Cigler, unpublished research, University of Maryland, 1967.

[27] Eldersveld, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 287.

TABLE 7. RELATION OF WHAT WOULD MISS MOST IF QUIT PRECINCT POST TO REASON WHY FIRST BECAME ACTIVE IN POLITICS

Why First Became Active in Political Work	Why Would Miss Most If Quit															
	Montgomery County								Knox County							
	Ideological	Other Impersonal	Social Contacts	Other Personal	Nothing	N.A.	Total	N	Ideological	Other Impersonal	Social Contacts	Other Personal	Nothing	N.A.	Total	N
	(per cent)								(per cent)							
	Democrats								*Democrats*							
Ideological	22	11	28	28	6	6	101	18	28	—	53	14	—	14	99	7
Other Impersonal	7	7	23	30	13	20	100	30	18	12	52	12	6	—	100	17
Social Contacts	—	—	40	40	—	20	100	5	34	16	34	16	—	—	100	6
Other Personal	—	—	72	28	—	—	100	7	22	—	78	—	—	—	100	9
Not Ascertained	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0
							Total	60							Total	39
	Republicans								*Republicans*							
Ideological	11	7	35	35	3	7	100	28	16	—	34	—	16	34	100	6
Other Impersonal	3	—	46	40	3	7	99	30	15	23	54	—	—	8	100	13
Social Contacts	—	—	25	25	50	—	100	4	33	8	50	8	—	—	99	12
Other Personal	—	—	75	—	—	25	100	4	33	—	—	33	33	—	99	3
Not Ascertained	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0	—	—	—	33	66	—	99	3
							Total	66							Total	37

ments.[29] Table 7 presents the findings for the precinct leaders studies; a considerable change between original satisfactions and current perceived rewards occurred among the activists whose initial activity was motivated by purposive reasons.

In all four organizations approximately two-thirds or more of the precinct chairmen who entered for purposive reasons report that the satisfactions which would be missed most are other than purposive. The evolution away from purposive motivation is perhaps of greater importance to the functioning of the parties in Montgomery County, because a larger proportion of those entering party work did so for purposive reasons. Table 8 indicates the degree to which purposive motives originally stimulated political activity, the percentage in each party who declare purposive satisfactions to be their preeminent current reward for precinct leader activities, and the proportion of those who originally entered for purposive reasons *and* would miss most that type of incentive if they were to resign their post. Contrary to our hypothesis, the party leaders in the affluent county are less retentive of their initial purposive motivational pattern. Taking both ideological and other impersonal reasons for initial entry into political work, we find the lowest retention in the affluent county, and particularly in the traditional minority party in that county.

Several differences are apparent in the patterns of perceived satisfactions of other precinct chairmen, as presented in Table 9. The chairmen from the two counties differ to a considerable degree in their pattern of perceptions of the satisfactions derived by others from precinct work. Within Montgomery County, but not in Knox County, Republican and Democratic precinct leaders differ significantly in their perceptions of the satisfactions obtained by others from their political party office. In the

---

[29] The most colorful statement along these lines ("reformers only morning glories") is contained in William L. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 17–20.

TABLE 8. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PURPOSIVE MOTIVATIONS OVER TIME[a]

	Purposive Single Most Important Reason for Initial Activity	Would Miss Purposive Most if Quit	Initial Purposive Minus Current Purposive Satisfaction	Entered for Purposive Reason *and* Would Miss Purposive Most
		(per cent)		
Montgomery County				
Democrats	80.0	16.7	63.3	20.9
Republicans	87.9	9.1	78.8	12.5
Knox County				
Democrats	61.5	32.4	29.1	29.1
Republicans	51.3	25.9	25.4	34.6

[a] Purposive is identified as being ideological and other impersonal.

suburban Maryland county, precinct leaders of the two parties are slightly more similar in their evaluation of the degree to which their colleagues were stimulated to serve in the precinct organization as a result of ideological or other impersonal concerns, with 61.6 per cent of the Democrats and 43.8 per cent of the Republicans so perceiving their fellow precinct captains. However, Democrats much less frequently than Republicans concluded that social contacts were a primary motivation of their colleagues, and Republicans three times as frequently cite other personal satisfactions.

In Knox County, 62.1 per cent of the Democrats and only 36.3 per cent of the Republicans perceive other precinct leaders as being motivated by ideological or other impersonal drives. One can explain this in part as a result of the minority party position of the Democrats; material rewards in terms of patronage are not available from local politics and have just recently become more available as a reward for the county organization's increased effectiveness in state electoral contests. Why are the Democrats more likely to cite ideological factors or satisfactions? In Montgomery County one explanation could be the higher degree of largely ideologically-based factionalism within the Democratic party, which managed to produce three highly organized and ideologically-oriented slates for local and state offices during the 1966 primary. In Knox County, the scarcity of local as contrasted with state patronage could reduce the incidence of citing other personal satisfactions by a Democrat.

Eldersveld pointed out that two types of psychological processes may be found in the evaluation of others' satisfactions. One is projection, ascribing to others one's own satisfactions. The second is incorporation, whereby the individual takes as his own the perceived satisfactions of others. Eldersveld found minimal projection and incorporation, with leaders not tending to misperceive why others were in politics.[30] The pattern found in Detroit was a tendency to ascribe to others a greater degree of ideological motivation and commitment, with a pluralism of motivation actually existing. The same pluralism was found in the two sets of party organizations examined in this study.

A comparison can be made between the individual's motivation and his assessment of the motivations of others by comparing what the precinct leader states he would miss most if he

TABLE 9. PRECINCT LEADERS' PERCEPTIONS OF SATISFACTIONS DERIVED FROM PRECINCT WORK BY OTHER PRECINCT LEADERS

Satisfactions Derived by Other Precinct Leaders	Perceived By Montgomery County		Perceived By Knox County	
	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	Republican
Ideological	36.6%	27.2%	48.6%	33.7%
Other Impersonal	25.0	16.6	13.5	2.6
Social Contacts	13.4	9.1	21.6	40.4
Other Personal	25.0	42.3	8.1	20.7
None	—	1.5	8.1	2.6
Not Ascertained	—	3.0	—	—
Total	100.0%	99.7%	99.9%	100.0%
N	60	66	39	37
	$\tau = -.243$	$\tau = -.138$	$\tau = -.166$	

---

[30] Eldersveld, *op. cit.*, pp. 281–283.

TABLE 10. RELATION OF PERCEIVED SATISFACTIONS OF AVERAGE PRECINCT LEADER TO WHAT WOULD MISS MOST IF QUIT PARTY PRECINCT POST

What Would Miss Most if Gave Up Precinct Post	Perceived Satisfactions of Other Leaders															
	Montgomery County								Knox County							
	Ideological	Other Impersonal	Social Contacts	Other Personal	None	N.A.	Total	N	Ideological	Other Impersonal	Social Contacts	Other Personal	None	N.A.	Total	N
	(per cent)								(per cent)							
	Democrats								*Democrats*							
Ideological	67	16	16	—	—	—	99	6	67	11	11	11	—	—	100	9
Other Impersonal	50	25	25	—	—	—	100	4	—	67	33	—	—	—	100	3
Social Contacts	26	31	21	21	—	—	99	19	23	—	59	14	—	4	100	21
Other Personal	44	28	6	22	—	—	100	18	25	—	25	50	—	—	100	4
None	20	40	—	40	—	—	100	5	100	—	—	—	—	—	100	1
Not Ascertained	25	—	25	50	—	—	100	8	—	—	—	100	—	—	100	1
							Total	60							Total	39
	Republicans								*Republicans*							
Ideological	100	—	—	—	—	—	100	4	100	—	—	—	—	—	100	8
Other Impersonal	—	—	—	100	—	—	100	2	25	25	25	—	—	25	100	4
Social Contacts	21	21	14	43	—	—	99	28	38	12	44	6	—	—	100	16
Other Personal	26	13	9	47	—	4	99	23	25	25	—	50	—	—	100	4
None	—	25	—	50	25	—	100	4	50	50	—	—	—	—	100	2
Not Ascertained	40	20	—	20	—	20	100	5	33	—	—	—	—	67	100	3
							Total	66							Total	37

resigned his position with what he perceives the satisfactions of others to be. In Knox County, the Republicans who would miss most ideological or impersonal satisfactions tend to perceive others as enjoying most these same rewards. However, half of those Knox Republicans enjoying social or other personal rewards perceive others as motivated by the drive for purposive rewards. Knox County Democrats are much more likely to perceive others as deriving the same type of satisfactions from politics as the perceiver.

In Montgomery County, among the Democrats, the same pattern exists as among Knox Republicans. Those who would themselves most miss purposive rewards tend to perceive others as deriving this type of satisfaction from party work, while those who would miss most social or other personal rewards tend to perceive others as being motivated by ideological or other impersonal drives. Approximately two-thirds of those stimulated by social or other personal rewards perceive the satisfactions of the average precinct chairman to be ideological.

The Democrats in both counties indicate a high degree of projection. Examining Table 10 inversely in order to determine what proportion of those who thought other leaders are motivated by a particular satisfaction and who also themselves respond that they would miss most that particular satisfaction, we also find incorporation occurring. Examining the left-to-right diagonals in Table 10, this process of incorporation appears more prevalent among Knox County activists, particularly among the Democrats.

Only one precinct leader perceives the average leader as deriving no satisfactions from his party activities, and twelve state they would miss no satisfactions if they would quit their party post. Three from Knox County are so disillusioned with party work; all three perceive the average precinct leader's satisfactions to be purposive. Among the Montgomery County leaders who state that they would lose no rewards by leaving their precinct post, five are Democrats and four are Republicans. Three of the five Democrats and one of the four Republicans perceive the average precinct leader as deriving ideological or other impersonal satisfactions from his party work.

IV. CONCLUSION

We can draw several conclusions from this examination of motivations. Ideological motivation is significantly more frequently cited as being the most important reason for entry into political activity among both parties' precinct chairmen in the more affluent community, and less frequently cited by activists of the rural county party almost invincible in local elections. In the rural county, the initial motivation is more likely to be the purposive ideological or other impersonal types among the Democratic party activists who are less likely to capture local offices.

The reason for accepting the precinct post tends to be predominantly purposive among all four sets of precinct leaders. At least 45 per cent of the responses by each party group indicate ideological or other purposive satisfactions are perceived to be the principal rewards of other precinct leaders, but the leaders in the two counties, when grouped by county, do differ significantly in the patterns of explanations given as the single most important reason for their taking the precinct post.

In terms of what they would miss most if they quit the precinct chairmanship, the rural county activists are most likely to respond with ideological or other impersonal rewards. The response patterns indicate that sustaining motivations do differ significantly between precinct chairmen in the two counties; however, for all except the rural county Republicans, approximately two-thirds or more of the responses to the question of what they would miss most if the post were given up are of the personal, social, or material nature.

We conclude that the affluent community is more likely in both socio-economic characteristics and initial motivational patterns to approximate the amateur model. In terms of reasons for accepting the precinct post, there is a slight tendency for precinct leaders of the traditional majority party in each county to cite more frequently a purposive reason as being the single most important factor in the decision to accept the precinct office. Significant differences do exist in the pattern of sustaining motivations as measured by what the leaders state they would miss most if they resigned the precinct chairmanship. However, rural county leaders are more likely to cite ideological or other impersonal motivations, which is contrary to the hypothesized difference.

The hypothesis that the traditional majority party in the locality tends more toward initial and sustaining motivations of a solidary or material type is not confirmed by the comparisons between majority and minority parties. In both counties, the majority party activists indicate somewhat greater current satisfactions of a purposive type than do the minority party activists in the respective county.

Schlesinger expressed concern that purposive motivations inhibit the flexibility of the party organization and argued that material rewards which can be given to or withheld from individuals are more useful in inducing specific actions from workers to attain desired goals and also allow the party decision-makers the greatest flexibility in selecting party goals.[31] Sorauf has argued that parties in recent times have found it necessary to be more concerned with programs.[32] Our data indicate that programmatic appeals are a major basis for inducing initial entry into political activity, but ideological or other impersonal appeals generally do not sustain activists in their performance of the party precinct leader role.

Our findings lead us to reject the notion of a candidate-based party. This does not detract from the idea of the party as an organization with at least one of its major goals the election of candidates to party office. The function of electing a particular candidate can exist and workers can be motivated by presentation of rewards and sanctions even though the rewards most sought are not derived in terms of deliberately entering or continuing party work in order to elect a particular candidate.

In Montgomery County, Maryland, a very sizable shift from deriving purposive to social and material satisfactions is found to have occurred. We have argued that this increases the flexibility of the formal party organization in choice both of goals and of methods to be used to attain the goals. However, this should not be interpreted as leaving the party unbounded in the type of policies it may pursue or the candidates it may nominate.

Wilson argues that "the principal reward of politics to the amateur is the sense of having satisfied a felt obligation to participate . . . . ," while "the principal reward to the professional is to be found in the extrinsic satisfactions of participation—power, income, status, or the fun of the game."[33] The leaders of the amateur clubs must appear to be motivated by a desire for purposive satisfactions even if this type of motivation has been supplanted by others. In the long run, the amateur either loses interest or plays the game by professional rules.[34] Wilson suggests that the same process of change in motivational structure occurred among club members, with the initial motivation for joining being replaced by a secondary or supplementary motivation.[35] He suggests that amateur club members originally enter politics out of a sense of civic duty and then evolve toward the derivation of satisfactions from influencing policy or enjoyment of the political game. We suggest that there is no parallel in the motivations of precinct leaders. The range in the proportion of activists who state that the best explanation for their originally entering political work was their sense of civic obligation varied from 40.5 per cent among Montgomery County Democrats to 16.2 per cent among Knox Republicans. It does rank as the most frequently cited best explanation among Montgomery County Democratic activists, and civic duty was cited with great frequency as being very important in the decision to enter politics by the other sets of leaders. However, Knox County Democrats stated that attachment to party or other basic attachment to political activity was more important for their originally becoming active in party work. Republicans in Knox County more often respond that attachment to party was the basic or major factor in stimulating party activity. Among Montgomery County Republicans an interest in influencing governmental policies was more important than civic duty. We must conclude that while civic duty is cited with some frequency as the primary motivation for originally becoming politically active, a preponderant majority of the party activists in the counties studied do not enter politics for that reason. Wilson suggests that the shift in motivation is away from civic duty toward a desire to influence policy or enjoyment of the political game. We have found instead an initial emphasis in the suburban county on a desire to influence governmental policy and a shift to a wish for social or other impersonal rewards, with enjoyment of the political game, per se, only one of several types of social or personal rewards.

---

[31] Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 769–772.

[32] Frank J. Sorauf, *Political Parties in the American System* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), pp. 85, 151.

We find that the amateur model is more appropriate to the suburban county in describing the social characteristics and initial motivations of precinct leaders, but the model does not hold for sustaining motivations. Majority-minority status and the relative degree of competition appear useful for accounting for some motivational differences, particularly in the rural county. Although the factor has not been examined in this study, the nature of the party organization's top leadership may also contribute to the relative degree to which purposive satisfactions sustain precinct leaders' political activity.

---

[33] Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

COALITION POLITICS IN NORTH INDIA*

PAUL R. BRASS
University of Washington

The years 1964 and 1967 stand as two crucial landmarks in the democratic development of India's political systems both at the center and in the several states. In the three years since Nehru's death in May, 1964, Indian politics entered fully into a major test of legitimacy.[1] Since 1964, the national leadership of the Indian National Congress has three times demonstrated its ability to handle smoothly the first stage of India's process of legitimizing democratic political authority—that of transferring power from a charismatic leader to his successors within the dominant party.[2] After the 1967 General Elections, Indian politics moved to a second stage to confront the problems of transferring power from the previously dominant Congress to diverse parties and party coalitions in more than half the Indian states.[3]

The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications for party development in India of the ways in which power has been transferred from the Congress to multi-group coalitions in the three north Indian states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Punjab. Specifically, I am concerned with the structural characteristics of the developing party systems in the three states; with the roles played in the systems by parties, factions, and individuals; and with the impact of the ways in which the systems function upon government formation and stability. I will argue that north Indian political parties operate in systems in which inter-party ideological divisions are less decisive in the formation and breakup of governments than intra-party divisions. Under these conditions, opportunities exist for independents and party defectors to hold the balance and dictate terms to the established parties. The activities of such political entrepreneurs impart fluidity and flexibility to party politics in north India. They also raise the question whether the minimum conditions of stable government provided by the Congress in the first two decades of independent government in India can be provided in multi-party systems in which the Congress monopoly of power is broken.

I. NORTH INDIAN PARTY SYSTEMS

Until now, the predominant model used to describe the Indian party system has been that of one-party dominance. The model, developed by Rajni Kothari[4] and W. H. Morris-Jones[5] had two prominent features. The first was that the system provided inter-party competition but no alternation of power. The second was that the usual functions of opposition parties in a democracy were in India shared between opposition parties and groups within the Congress. That is, opposition parties acted essentially as catalysts for groups within the Congress to articulate discontent and bring about leadership changes in the dominant party.

---

* This paper is part of a larger project, on which the writer is presently engaged, on party systems and policy making in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Punjab. Research for the paper and the project as a whole was carried out in India during 1966–67 under grants from the American Institute of Indian Studies, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the University of Washington. An earlier draft of the paper was presented at the Punjab Studies Conference in East Lansing in February, 1968 and a later version at the APSA meetings in September. I have also benefited from comments on the paper by Mr. Harry Blair and by Professors Bruce Graham, Morris Morris and W. H. Morris-Jones. Frances Svensson assisted in the research.

[1] The analysis here has been influenced by Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), esp. pp. 407–412.

[2] The successions have been amply documented by Michael Brecher in *Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) and in "Succession in India 1967: The Routinization of Political Change," *Asian Survey*, 7 (July, 1967), 423–443.

[3] A transfer of power at the state level took place as early as 1957 in Kerala. However, Kerala has always been considered an exceptional state and its politics have been considered an aberration in a general pattern of Congress dominance. The change in 1967 is far more massive and is widely believed in India to presage the defeat of the Congress at the center. When and if this occurs, Indian democracy will enter its third test, that of transfer of power at the center.

[4] Rajni Kothari, "The Congress 'System' in India," *Asian Survey*, 4 (December, 1964), 1161–1173.

[5] Morris-Jones' views on the one-party dominant system are presented most systematically in his "Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter-relations in the Indian Party System," *Government and Opposition* 1 (August, 1966), 451–466. See also his *Government and Politics of India* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1964), ch. V, and "Parliament and the Dominant Party," *Parliamentary Affairs*, 17 (Summer, 1964), 296–307.

All models are simplifications of reality, which emphasize the factors considered to be determining forces in a system. The dominant party model emphasized the amorphousness of the Congress and its absorptive capacity. It paid less attention to contrary patterns of political behavior which have now become decisive. Before 1967, the alternations in power which had occurred in P.E.P.S.U. and in Kerala and the coalition governments which had existed in Orissa and in Andhra Pradesh might have been viewed as deviant cases. After 1967, transfers of power to non-Congress parties or coalitions occurred in more than half the Indian states.

Second, the model properly emphasized the importance of patterns of communication and interpenetration between the Congress and non-Congress organizations, which continue to exist in important respects. However, there have been two important features of those patterns of communication which now work against the maintenance of Congress dominance. First, inter-party communication has always been a two-way process. Factions in the Congress have sometimes capitalized upon issues raised by opposition parties to gain advantage in struggles for power within Congress. However, factional rivalry has often been sufficiently intense within the Congress and party loyalties so weak that opposing factions have been willing to carry their conflicts to the point of defeating the Congress organization or defecting from it.[6] Second, some opposition parties have been serious about taking power from the Congress and have been unwilling to act only by applying pressure on the "margin" of Congress power. During and after the 1967 elections, the opportunity came in many states for dissident factions in the Congress to win power outside the Congress by joining with opposition parties which were making a determined bid for power.

Third, the Congress "system" was never a single one-party dominant system. Rather, it consisted of a national party system with links to the states and seventeen regional multiparty systems in which the Congress was dominant. Each multi-party system had its own distinctive features, despite a common pattern of Congress dominance. In Kerala, Congress "dominance" existed only in the sense that the Congress continued to poll the largest number of votes in the state.

Finally, all the systems have contained not only parties and factions within parties, but significant non-party elements—both independents and individuals who have passed from one party to another in search of individual power and prestige.

In the aftermath of the 1967 elections, the Congress-dominated multi-party systems have been replaced in north India by highly complex systems in which parties, factions, and individuals all play important roles. The kinds of coalitions which emerged after the 1967 elections and which are likely to emerge in future depend upon the interactions of these three kinds of forces, which do not act in a random fashion, but according to the logic inherent in the particular balance of forces which exists at a given moment. The ability of the Congress to form a government now depends on its own internal cohesion and factional structure at the moment of opportunity, as well as upon the cohesion of the forces arrayed against it. Similarly, the ability of a non-Congress coalition to form a government depends upon the willingness of the parties to compromise their differences and to maintain greater cohesion than Congress. Finally, independents and defectors come into prominence whenever the balance between the Congress and alternative coalitions is close.

Congress Factions. After the elections, the Congress was reduced to a minority in the legislatures of the three north Indian states. Nevertheless, as the largest single party in each of the three states (see Table 1), it was open to the Congress to attempt either to form a minority government or to form a government with the support of independents or other parties. A brief review of the structure of factional conflict in the Congress in these three states at the time will show how variations in patterns of factional organization influenced the ability of the Congress to form a government.

In all three states, the Congress was affected by a continuing decline in organizational coherence and an intensification of internal factional strife. In the Punjab, the Congress organization was in complete disarray, still struggling to reacquire some organizational coherence in the aftermath of the dismissal in 1964 of a strong leader, Pratap Singh Kairon. The party was so fragmented that it could not select a leader before the opposition coalition was formed and had selected its leader. In a very delicately balanced house, where the first to act had the advantage, a diverse inter-party coali-

---

[6] See Paul R. Brass, *Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).

TABLE 1: PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL VALID VOTES AND SEATS WON BY PARTY IN THE 1967 ELECTIONS FOR THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN BIHAR, UTTAR PRADESH, AND PUNJAB

Party	Bihar		Uttar Pradesh		Punjab	
	Votes %	Seats No.	Votes %	Seats No.	Votes %	Seats No.
C.P.I. (M)	1.28	4	1.27	1	3.19	3
C.P.I.	6.91	24	3.23	13	5.27	5
S.S.P.	17.62	68	9.97	44	.72	1
P.S.P.	6.96	18	4.09	11	.51	0
CONGRESS	33.08	128	32.20	199	36.56	47
Swantantra	2.33	3	4.73	12	.51	0
Jan Sangh	10.42	26	21.67	98	9.84	9
Regional Parties						
J.K.D.[a]	3.33	13	—	—	—	—
Akali Dal (Sant)	—	—	—	—	24.68[b]	24
Akali Dal (Master)	—	—	—	—		2
Republican	0.18	1	4.14	10	1.79	3
Independents	17.88	33[a]	18.69	37	16.94	10
Total	99.99	318	99.99	425	100.01	104

Source: India, Election Commission. *Report on the Fourth General Elections in India, 1967*, Vol. II (Statistical).

[a] Thirteen independents in Bihar were actually associated with the J.K.D. so that the strength of the J.K.D. in the Bihar Assembly immediately after the elections was 26.

[b] Approximately 20% of the vote for the two Akali parties was won by the Sant Akali Dal.

tion was able to move faster and form a government before the Congress could muster its forces for an attempt.

In Bihar, there were four Congress leaders who reputedly hoped to become chief minister after the 1967 elections by defeating during the elections as many as possible of the Congress candidates supporting their rivals. After the elections, a contest for the leadership of the Congress Legislature Party was held between two of the "big four," Mahesh Prasad Sinha and Binodanand Jha, in which the latter was defeated by one vote. Although the Congress was relatively far from power in Bihar, with only 128 seats out of 318, Pandit Jha and 34 other Congress legislators made it clear in a statement released to the press that even if Mahesh Prasad Sinha had any idea of making an attempt to form a government, they would not support him.[7]

In Uttar Pradesh, in addition to the two long-standing, rival Gupta and Tripathi groups contending against each other, a third group of ostensible supporters of the outgoing chief minister, Mrs. Kripalani, had been formed.[8] However, the outgoing chief minister was "exiled" to Delhi, Kamalapathi Tripathi was defeated in the general elections, and C. B. Gupta was left as the clear choice for Leader. A situation of tri-group conflict had been transformed into single-group dominance, which made possible the unanimous election of C. B. Gupta as Leader of the Legislature party. Gupta, with what he thought was the backing of the whole party, succeeded in outwitting and outbidding an opposition coalition in gaining the support of the independents and in forming a government. However, that government was brought down within less than three weeks by a major defection from Congress ranks and was replaced by a non-Congress government.

---

[7] *Indian Nation*, March 5 and 7, 1967.

[8] On the origin and development of Congress groups in Uttar Pradesh, see Brass, *op. cit.*, ch. III, and Bruce Graham, "The Succession of Factional Systems in the Uttar Pradesh Congress, 1937–1967," (unpublished paper). For Bihar and Punjab, see Ramashray Roy, "Intra-Party Conflict in the Bihar Congress," *Asian Survey*, 6 (December, 1966), 706–715 and Paul Wallace, "The Political Party System of Punjab State (India): A Study of Factionalism," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1966).

Thus, the patterns of internal competition in the Congress varied significantly in the three states. In Punjab, the pattern was one of multi-group competition so chaotic as to prevent early election of a leader. In Bihar, multi-group competition coalesced into a temporary evenly-balanced polarity which made the election of a leader possible, but prevented him from leading the party effectively. In Uttar Pradesh, one group emerged dominant after the election, a leader was unanimously elected, who acted skillfully in forming a government, but then could not maintain cohesion in his own party to provide stable support for the government.

Inter-Party Competition. The one-party dominant system covered a wide variety of regional variations in the structure and features of inter-party competition. In the three north Indian states, the one-party dominant system has now been replaced by multi-party systems. The practical and theoretical question now raised by the rise of multi-party systems in north India is whether the developmental tendencies are toward immobilism or fluidity in the systems. There is a superficial resemblance between the north Indian party systems and Giovanni Sartori's model of a polarized, multipolar, and centrifugal party system,[9] but patterns of inter-party competition and coalition deviate significantly from what should be expected on the basis of the European precedents. Table 1 shows the 1967 election results for the legislative assemblies in north India. The Table, arranged loosely from Left to Right in the upper portion, with the CPI (Marxist) representing the extreme Left and Swatantra and Jan Sangh the extreme Right, shows that there is both extreme pluralism and a high degree of polarity (that is, in Sartori's use of the term "polarity," there is a very wide spectrum of opinion reflected among the legislative parties). The systems share with their European counterparts also the existence of a massive center, occupied by the Congress, and multiple lines of cleavage. The party system in each state is cleft by combinations of divisions of varying importance in each case along the following dimensions—socialism and conservatism, secularism and communalism, national orientation and regional orientation, pro-system and anti-system.

In all three north Indian states, the Congress occupies the center position which, from an ideological point of view, can be described as moderate nationalism, national unity, constitutionalism, planned development, and secularism. On either side of the Congress are more or less strong tendencies towards aggressive nationalism (Jan Sangh), regional autonomy (Akali Dal [Master]), anti-constitutionalism (CPI [M]), *laissez-faire* liberalism (Swatantra), and communalism (Jan Sangh and the Akali parties). Moreover, the electoral trend has been towards radicalization. The strength of the center has decreased and that of the extremes has increased over the four general elections.[10]

Despite the superficial resemblance of the north Indian party systems to the center-based European party systems, there are three distinctive features which differentiate them from their European counterparts. One is the absence of anti-system challenges from the Right and the decline of anti-system tendencies on the Left. There are no monarchical parties in north India nor can either Jan Sangh or the Akali Dal be considered fascist parties in the European sense. On the Left, the tendency in recent years has been towards increasing commitment of the CPI to the parliamentary system. Second, the formation of diverse multi-party coalition governments against the Congress after the elections distinguishes the north Indian party systems from the European systems, which have contained ideological rigidities limiting possible party coalitions. In the European systems described by Sartori, the extreme parties have been traditionally excluded from government while coalitions based on a dominant center party have enjoyed a monopoly of power. In north India, the extremes have been included and the center party at least temporarily excluded. Third, the north Indian party systems are characterized not only by extreme pluralism but by a very strong element of non-party voting for independents.

---

[9] Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in La Palombara and Weiner, *op. cit.*, ch. V. Sartori's model is derived from the party systems of contemporary Italy, the French Fourth Republic, and Weimar Germany. These systems are characterized by a "lack of basic consensus in which the distribution of opinion covers the maximum conceivable distance" (polarization), multiple lines of cleavage (multipolarity), and "growing radicalization" (centrifugal tendencies); see pp. 138–139. Sartori is not always clear and consistent in his definitions, but the model is far more useful than the conventional descriptions of European multiparty systems and is especially useful for purposes of comparison of and distinction among multiparty systems, which may vary considerably from one political system to another.

[10] From 1952 to 1967, the Congress share of the popular vote has declined from 41.47% to 33.1% in Bihar, while the combined Communist vote has gone from 1.1% to 8.2% and the Jan Sangh has increased from 1.2% to 10.4%. In Uttar Pradesh, Congress has declined from 47.9% to 32.2% while the Communist vote has gone from .9% to 4.5% and that of the Jan Sangh from 6.4% to 21.7%. In Punjab, Congress secured 34.8% of the vote in 1952, rose to a high of 47.5% in 1957, and declined to 36.6% in the reorganized Punjab. The Communist vote has been transmuted since 1952 in the Punjab from 5.3% to 8.5% while that of Jan Sangh has gone from 5.0% to 9.8%. Figures from India, Election Commission, *Report on the First General Elections in India, 1951–52* and *Report on the Fourth General Elections in India, 1967.*

Independents and Defectors. Table 1 shows that 33 independents were elected to the Bihar Assembly and that independents polled 17.9% of the total vote, more than any other single party except Congress and the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP). Even this figure does not accurately reflect the extent of independent voting and the number of independents elected in Bihar, for the Jan Kranti Dal (JKD) was a party composed of independents supported by the Raja of Ramgarh and Congress defectors who left the party before the election. The JKD has since then broken up. In Uttar Pradesh and Punjab, independents play a similarly large role in the political systems. Thirty-seven independents were elected in Uttar Pradesh and ten in Punjab, with the total independent vote in the two states reaching 18.7% and 16.9% respectively. In Uttar Pradesh, the independent vote was larger than that for all parties except Congress and Jan Sangh. In Punjab, it was larger than the vote for all parties except Congress and the Akali Dal. After the elections, the fluidity of the systems was increased further by party defections from the SSP in Bihar, from the Congress and other parties in Uttar Pradesh, and from Congress and the Akali Dal in Punjab.

Clearly, neither the one-party dominant system model nor the European-derived model of a center-based multi-party system applies to the complex and fluid systems which exist in north India. The one-party dominant system model no longer applies because the era of Congress dominance has ended. The model of a polarized multipolar party system does not apply because ideology does not play the same rigidifying role which it plays in Europe and because opportunists in the shape of independents and party defectors play a decisive balancing role in the systems. In the remainder of this paper, the roles played by ideology and opportunism in the north Indian party systems will be demonstrated as they affected the formation and breakup of the non-Congress governments in the three states.

II. THE FORMATION OF THE NON-CONGRESS GOVERNMENTS: THE EXCLUSION OF IDEOLOGY

The ways in which the non-Congress governments were formed differed significantly in the three states in terms of the parties forming the coalitions and the weight of particular parties in each coalition, in terms of the roles played by independents, and in terms of the extent to which defections from Congress to the opposed coalitions were involved. However, the three initial non-Congress governments had in common the fact that diverse party coalitions were put together covering the entire political spectrum. There is no doubt that, at least in terms of the principles expressed in party manifestoes, many of the parties which formed these coalitions are incompatible partners. Moreover, some of the parties hesitated, for ideological reasons, before entering the coalitions. Yet, ultimately all non-Congress parties joined in all three states, if not in the government itself, in the legislature parties formed to provide support to the government.

In all three states, the procedure followed was similar. In the week following the announcement of the election results, united legislature parties were formed, comprising all non-Congress parties and some of the independents. Minimum common programs were framed, comprising 33 points in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and 11 points in Punjab. The united legislature parties also elected leaders, who then began talks with the governors of their states preparatory to the formation of governments. In the meantime, the party leaders comprising the coalitions met together to discuss issues and problems as they arose and to negotiate on the distribution of portfolios. In all three states, "coordination committees" were formed which included the prominent organizational as well as legislative leaders of the various parties to coordinate both the views of the parties making up the coalitions and the views of the parliamentary and organizational wings of the mass parties.

The formation of diverse inter-party coalitions, involving in some cases alliances among parties which had till yesterday refused to cooperate against the Congress for ideological reasons, required some symbolic justification. Only the SSP leadership required no justification for their actions since they had consistently called for such alliances to defeat and remove the Congress from power both before and after the elections. The cynical view for the post-election alliances was simply that the "lure for office" had proved irresistible. However, there were many party leaders who were reluctant to join the coalitions for ideological and other reasons even after the elections. Discussions and interviews with party leaders and ministers in the three states and in Delhi indicated that, in addition to the desire for office, there were four main considerations and tendencies which influenced the decisions of the parties to coalesce—popular demand for such coalitions, the ability of the parties to formulate minimum common programs, pragmatic and accommodative tendencies in the parties, and the recognition of the necessity for adjustment to regional conditions.

Popular Demand. One of the most common reasons given by men from all parties in the three states for the formation of non-Congress coalition governments was that public opinion demanded it. While there can be legitimate grounds for skepticism about references to public opinion to justify party practices in an overwhelmingly rural and illiterate society, it is true that there was marked discontent against the Congress among articulate segments of public opinion in cities and towns throughout north India. There was, for example, widespread feeling among the middle classes that development programs had not proceeded at a sufficiently rapid pace during the twenty years of Congress rule and that corruption, fostered by venal Congress ministers, had become widespread in government and society. There were also more specific grievances—especially discontent over price increases on the part of students, teachers, and government employees; discontent among Muslims over their failure to achieve their demand for recognition of Urdu as the second official language in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar; and discontent among both Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab over the reorganization of the state and the way in which it was implemented. In addition, the elections took place at a time of major crisis or transformation in all three states—the worst famine in a century in Bihar; an unprecedented strike of half a million government employees in Uttar Pradesh; the reorganization of the Punjab and its trifurcation among three states.

The combination of all these factors produced a marked atmosphere of antagonism towards the Congress in the cities and towns and a desire for an alternative government. It was not simply that opposition party leaders felt impelled toward unity by the demand for change, but that once it became clear that an alternative to the Congress was possible, many party leaders felt it would have been politically dangerous to oppose such a change.[11]

The Common Programs. Although the party leaders, therefore, found a ready sanction in public opinion for the formation of non-Congress governments, they had still to face charges levelled by Congressmen and others that these coalitions represented unprincipled alliances among parties whose ideologies were incompatible. To such charges, the most frequent answer was that no compromise of basic principles was involved in the formation of the non-Congress governments because all parties had agreed upon minimum common programs which did not affect the ideologies of the parties. For example, ministers from the two most sharply opposed parties in the coalitions, Jan Sangh and the Communists, made comments such as the following in response to the question as to how such opposed parties could work together.

> People wanted an alternative to Congress. We prepared an agreed minimum program. Keeping our respective ideologies apart, we decided to implement the program. [Bihar Jan Sangh minister][12]
>
> On many major issues, we differ, but that is the concern of the central government—foreign policy, socialism. So, I don't think for many years to come, there will be very big differences between Jan Sangh and Communists. [Uttar Pradesh Communist minister][13]

---

[11] For example, an SSP minister commented upon the delay in the PSP's decision to join the non-Congress government in Bihar and their ultimate decision to do so in this way: "They [the PSP leaders] thought they would be nowhere if they went against the wishes of the people, who wanted non-Congress governments." A Jan Sangh minister in Bihar, asked how long he thought the non-Congress government would last, gave a reply which indicated a similar attitude towards public opinion: "I think it will last because we all are afraid of this public opinion. . . No party will dare to take the blame of deserting this government." A Jan Sangh minister in Punjab, asked why a non-Congress government had been formed instead of a coalition with the Congress, replied: "Everybody was opposed to Congress. The general swing is not with the Congress. If we go with the Congress, we are also doomed." Citations from interview documents BG 29: 13; BG 35: 27; PG 17: 3.

[12] Interview document BG 32: 5.

[13] Interview document UPII 30: 1.

The programs varied in the three states in terms of the number of points and the emphasis given to problems specific to each state, but the points can be classified into a number of categories: 1) concessions to various interest groups—students, teachers, government employees, supporters of Urdu; 2) rectifications of alleged Congress misdeeds—release of political prisoners, institution of judicial enquiries into charges of corruption against Congress ministers and into police firings under the Congress regime; 3) withdrawal of unpopular measures and taxes—grain procurement orders, previous increases in taxation, the land revenue; 4) provision of various agricultural benefits; 5) promises to provide efficient administration, eliminate corruption, and check rising prices. There is very little in programs such as these which affects the basic ideological viewpoints of the parties and, in fact, with the exception of one point in the Uttar Pradesh and Bihar programs, no substantial disagreements arose initially on any of these issues.

On only one issue, that of recognizing Urdu as the second official language of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, was there a stalemate. Several parties in the coalitions felt themselves committed by their previous statements to include this point in the common programs. Although the Jan Sangh joined the coalitions in these two states, the party refused to commit itself to this point and submitted a note of dissent. It is clear that this question touches Jan Sangh ideology and sentiment on a vital point, that of its view of national unity and integrity and its attitude toward the Muslim minority. Jan Sangh insistence on the issue supports the view long held of it that the party is more dogmatic on or at least more concerned with cultural and communal issues than with economic issues. Although Jan Sangh leaders indicated willingness to make specific concessions toward the encouragement of the Urdu language, they were not willing to provide the symbolic satisfaction to the Muslim minority of having Urdu declared as a second official language. Inter-party divergence on the issue also indicates the continued importance in north Indian politics of a major ideological cleavage between Jan Sangh and other parties. At the same time, the inclusion of the point on Urdu in the programs did not prevent the Jan Sangh from joining the coalitions nor did it prevent other parties from joining with the Jan Sangh even though this meant that the point could not be implemented by the coalition governments.

Pragmatic and Accommodative Tendencies in the Parties. Insofar as the parties joined together only because of popular demand and only on the basis of rather limited common programs, it is possible that the non-Congress governments may represent only a brief transition which may be followed by an ultimate ideological polarization. However, interviews with the ministers revealed pragmatic and accommodative strains in the parties which make it equally likely that future coalitional politics will retain their present fluidity. These strains were revealed both on specific policy issues confronting the state governments and in the general attitudes of party leaders toward accommodation with other parties. A Communist minister in Uttar Pradesh, questioned about his views on state trading in foodgrains—a major plank in the Communist party platform replied: "There is no other way but state trading, but none of us want to hasten our theories. Let's experiment even with free open market for two years; but, if we fail, let's try state trading."[14] A Jan Sangh minister in Bihar commented on the formation of the non-Congress government in Bihar and the attitude of Jan Sangh toward it in the following way: "So, all right and left have come together. We [Jan Sangh] are neither right nor left. We approach the problem straightaway."[15] In Punjab, where politics have tended toward communal polarization between Hindus and Sikhs during the last twenty years, the leader of the Akali opposition in the Punjab Assembly, who became chief minister of the state after the 1967 elections, remarked in October, 1966, that even if the Akalis were in a position to form an exclusively Akali government after the election, he would not favor it. Asked why not, he replied:

> Well, you see, to begin with, . . . the leaders in the center have already prejudiced people against the Akalis in spite of the fact that their behavior has been commendable throughout agitations, most non-violent. But still we would like to tell people in Punjab that we do not wish to form one-community government. Let everybody be satisfied with the government. . . so that we can unitedly work for prosperity of the state.[16]

Statements such as these were made by many other ministers interviewed. They suggest the possibility that ideological differences among parties in north Indian politics occur in the context of a political culture in which tendencies toward ideological rigidification are softened by pragmatism and mitigated by desires for accommodation.

Adjustment to Regional Multi-Party Systems. In addition to the influence of pragmatic and accommodative tendencies mitigating ideologi-

[14] Interview document UPII 30: 8.

[15] Interview document BG 35: 25.

[16] Interview document PG 6: 50.

cal differences, many party leaders saw a necessity for putting aside national principles and national ambitions to adjust to local conditions For example, the Jan Sangh opposed the reorganization of the Punjab and continues to oppose in principle the existence of linguistic states in India. Yet, on the issue of the disposition of the predominantly Hindu, but Punjabi-speaking city of Chandigarh, which remained a matter of serious controversy between Punjab and Hariana and among people in Chandigarh itself,[17] the Jan Sangh adjusted to local sentiment in each area. The Jan Sangh in Punjab does not oppose the inclusion of Chandigarh in Punjab; the Jan Sangh in Chandigarh favors the continuance of a separate status for the city; the Jan Sangh in Hariana favors its inclusion in Hariana.

One of the most thoughtful statements of the need to adjust to local conditions was provided by a PSP minister in Bihar, whose party engaged in considerable soul-searching and delay before entering the state party coalitions. The minister commented on the PSP decision to join in the following manner:

> If the PSP thinks, as it thought in past years, where a day will come and it will sweep off the Congress rule from a state or states or the whole nation, it would be wrong. No set formula in the fast-developing political situation can be applied throughout India. In the situations of Bihar and Bengal and also U.P. now, what is the picture? No one single party is able to gain a stable government. Monopoly of power enjoyed by the Congress is broken. A kind of power vacuum exists and Communists are very much on the scene. As we know the Communist party of either variety, it would not be a happy spectacle to see that the tool of administration is utilized to subvert democracy or national freedom. There are risks in joining a government run by so many parties pulling in different directions, but the PSP had to take these risks. It would be all right to take a purist stand, speak to the people about the party creed and programs and all that. But, according to me, this purism would be synonymous with pusillanimity and escape.[18]

This statement is noteworthy in three respects. It recognizes that an era has ended and that Indian politics are undergoing great changes whose ultimate direction is not clear and that the PSP as a party must play a role in the directing of those changes. There is, second, the presence of a strongly articulated ideological antagonism towards Communists. Third, despite this strong opposition to one party in the coalition, there is the reluctant recognition that the PSP is but one party among many, forced to operate in multi-party situations which vary from state to state.

Ideology and Party Politics in North India. There is no justification for concluding, on the basis of the rationales given by party leaders in north India for their participation in multi-party coalitions, that ideology is an insignificant force in north Indian politics. There is continued evidence of major ideological cleavages among the parties. Moreover, some of the parties believed that they would be able to implement portions of their programs even in the coalition governments and issue conflict between the parties played an important role after the formation of the non-Congress governments. The basic argument of this paper, however, is that political parties and party politicians showed a willingness either to ignore or to compromise on issues of principle, which they did not demonstrate on issues of power.

In the functioning of the non-Congress governments, two kinds of issues arose—those which divided parties and groups consistently over time on an intelligible basis, and those on which the lines of conflict were not entirely clear, but were proximately related to shifts of alignment affecting the fates of governments. The first category included such conflicts as those over the status of Urdu, over procurement of foodgrains, and over the abolition of the land revenue.

The Urdu issue continued to divide and distinguish the parties in the coalitions during the functioning of the non-Congress governments. The left parties, particularly, pressed for concessions to Urdu, including the declaration of Urdu as the second language in both Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Reports in the press referred to a crisis in the Bihar cabinet in August 1967 on the Urdu issue. However, the Jan Sangh remained firmly opposed to the declaration of Urdu as a second language, while permitting certain concessions to be made, such as the printing of important government notices in Urdu. No defections of parties or significant groups from the governments occurred on the issue in either Uttar Pradesh or Bihar.

Another issue which early appeared to threaten the survival of the Uttar Pradesh government occurred over the decision of the cabinet to procure 500,000 tons of foodgrains. Two separate threats to the stability of the Uttar Pradesh government arose on this issue—one from the organizational wing of the Jan Sangh, the predominant party in the coalition, and the second from an *ad hoc* legislative inter-party interest group of big farmer members of the legislative Assembly and Council. The Jan Sangh ministers maintained cabinet responsibility on the issue and succeeded in persuading members of their organizational wing to refrain from making public announcements opposing procurement. However, the objections of the inter-party legislative group, which itself included many Jan Sangh members, were satisfied only by a compromise whose effect was to reduce the amount of foodgrains to be procured from 500,000 tons to 200,000 tons. Again, however, no major defections from the government or from government supporters in the Assembly occurred on this issue.

---

[17] Under the reorganization, the old Punjab state was divided into four segments. A new Hindi-speaking, predominantly Hindu state of Hariana was created; the capital city of Chandigarh was made into a union territory; the hill areas of the old state were transferred to Himachal Pradesh; and, the remaining Punjabi-speaking, predominantly Sikh areas became the residual state of Punjab.

[18] Interview document BG 33: 10.

The most serious and prolonged issue of this type, which divided the parties on clear lines, occurred again in Uttar Pradesh on the land revenue issue. The demand for land revenue abolition was a major public commitment of the SSP especially and one to which all other parties had committed themselves in the formation of the common programs. In Punjab, land revenue was not a serious issue. In Bihar, the land revenue was remitted without prolonged controversy in the government. In Uttar Pradesh, however, the chief minister, Charan Singh, was a man who had well-formed views on the issues of both land revenue and state financial resources in general. He refused to agree to abolish the land revenue completely until alternative resources could be found. The result was a stalemate and crisis in the Uttar Pradesh government which threatened to bring the government down. An initial decision on the issue was taken by the Uttar Pradesh government in July, by which it was agreed that 50% of the land revenue would be abolished on holdings up to 6.25 acres, beginning after the current *kharif* crop. Internal divisions in the SSP on the issue developed, however, and the SSP continued to insist on further concessions. The crisis in the government continued for several months, leading ultimately to an SSP-CPI alliance on the issue and their joint resignations from the government. Again, however, on the land revenue issue, as on the procurement issue, a compromise was reached which permitted the return of the two parties to the government at the end of October, 1967.

The resolution of these three crises in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh suggest again that there are differences of principle between the major parties. For the new system of coalition politics to function effectively, some issues, such as that over recognition of Urdu, must be sidestepped, whereas others must be compromised. In the first two years of coalition politics in north India, these methods of dealing with principled inter-party divisions were used frequently and effectively to resolve cabinet crises.

Issues which were not so easily resolved, however, were those which were connected with intra-party factional divisions and personal conflicts and which affected the interrelationship of groups within the parties and their position in the governments. Such issues frequently arose only after a split in one of the parties or in government had occurred and they provided a basis for building support to bring a government down rather than a cause for internal government division. Even more difficult to resolve were those conflicts in which no discernible issue of principle could be detected, in which opportunists and political entrepreneurs traded their votes openly for ministerial office. In fact, the formation and fall of the non-Congress governments depended primarily on such issues and forces.

III. THE FORMATION AND FALL OF THE NON-CONGRESS GOVERNMENTS: PROBLEMS OF OPPORTUNISM, INTRA-PARTY DIVISIONS, AND LOCAL POWER[19]

From the 1967 elections up to July, 1968, eight governments had been formed, and seven had fallen in the three north Indian states. Although the details of each cabinet crisis varied and the fall of the Charan Singh government in Uttar Pradesh was uniquely complex, a fairly typical pattern of cabinet crisis developed. After the formation of each government, it became known that a prominent individual belonging to a faction in the Congress or in a non-Congress party was disaffected with the government because he was not satisfied with his place in the government or was not given a position in it. The disaffected leader then began to gather supporters, while criticizing the government in general terms for "corruption" or for failure to implement portions of the common program rapidly enough. Finally a prominent public event occurred or an issue was found which provided the leader with an immediate cause for defection with his loyal supporters.

The defecting leader was then given the opportunity to form a government, which in the last two years was either a non-Congress coalition or a minority government with Congress support. In either event, the defecting leader became the new chief minister, many of those who defected with him received ministerial office, and a new crisis soon began. In the interim between two governments, the opposing forces in the legislature continually bargained for the support of independents and potential party defectors. The game came to an end in Uttar Pradesh and in Bihar when the governors became convinced that no stable coalitions were possible and that the Assembly should be dissolved and new elections should be called.

---

[19] Except where otherwise cited, the information in this section has been derived from the *Statesman*, the *Searchlight*, the *National Herald*, and the *Tribune* (Ambala).

Patterns of conflict and alliance which developed in the legislatures of the three north Indian states revealed three distinctive features affecting the stability of governments—the key roles of independents and individual party defectors, the importance of intra-party divisions and cross-party alliances of factions, and the significance of inter-party conflicts over local power outside the legislature in the districts. These patterns can best be illustrated by reference to specific cabinet crises.

Bihar. The first non-Congress government in Bihar came to power with greater ease and more promise than its counterparts in either Uttar Pradesh or Punjab. It was an exclusively party coalition in which independents played no role and were not needed for support. Moreover the Congress was in a clear minority position with only 40% of the seats in the house and was badly divided. The non-Congress government had a relatively sound majority of 169 in a house of 318 and functioned with little open disagreement on issues of principle. Yet the government was brought down by a no-confidence motion on January 26, 1968 and was replaced on February 1 by a minority defectors' government with the support of the Congress. This ministry lasted until March 20 when it was replaced by a new non-Congress coalition government strengthened by the addition of 17 defectors from the Congress. This last government fell on June 25, 1968, after a major defection, and President's Rule was declared in the state.

All three cabinet crises were brought about by large-scale defections, the first two involving intra-party splits and the third involving the defection of an entire party from the government. In all three cases the precipitating causes of the crises were either non-principled factional divisions or questions of personal power and ambition. However, the three cases also reveal the diversity of social forces and cleavages which exist in the Bihar Assembly and around which factional groups can be built.

The first cabinet crisis involved a conflict between personal power and party interest in the SSP in which an attempt by the national party leadership to insist upon party interest failed against personal ambition and caste sentiment. The crisis arose when Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal, a prominent state SSP leader from a "backward caste," elected to the national parliament but not to the state Assembly, accepted a portfolio in the Bihar government. In order to remain in the ministry, Bindeshwari Prasad would have had to resign his parliamentary seat, which would then have had to be recontested by the SSP in a bye-election. When the induction of Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal into the Bihar cabinet came to his attention, it immediately annoyed the leader of the SSP, Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, who put the matter bluntly and publicly that Bindeshwari Prasad's action "amounted to using the party machinery to climb the ladder of power."[20]

In response to Dr. Lohia's accusation, Bindeshwari Prasad went to Delhi, was sworn in as a member of Parliament, had a long conversation with Dr. Lohia (who advised him to resign from the Bihar cabinet),[21] and then went back to Patna, where he showed no inclination whatsoever to resign his ministry. Moreover, his supporters from his own caste began sending telegrams to Dr. Lohia protesting the prospect of Bindeshwari Prasad's resignation and, privately, they informed the party leadership that there would be a split in the party on the part of Bindeshwari Prasad's supporters if he was forced to resign from the government.[22] Ultimately, the latter happened. On August 28, 1967, Bindeshwari Prasad finally resigned, but claimed to be taking with him 25 defectors from the united legislature party (SVD), including 18 from the SSP, and he succeeded in forming an alliance between his newly-formed Soshit Dal and the Congress by means of which the government was ultimately brought down. In the end, Bindeshwari Prasad transformed a personal discomfiture into ultimate victory in state politics when he was sworn in as chief minister of the state on February 1, 1968.

In justifying his original resignation and in building the support necessary to bring down and replace the united front government, Bindeshwari Prasad emphasized caste and community issues, thereby turning SSP party policy against itself. He charged, as Dr. Lohia also had done, that the state SSP had not followed party policy in failing to see to it that 60% of the cabinet positions were provided for backward classes, scheduled castes, Muslims, tribals and women. The charge was true, but it is important to note that the question of Bindeshwari Prasad's political morality was raised before the representation issue and that there was nothing in SSP party policy which required that Bindeshwari Prasad himself should be in the cabinet.

---

[20] *Indian Nation*, March 12, 1967.

[21] Interview document BG 31: 11.

[22] *Indian Nation*, March 20, 1967.

The Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal ministry was short-lived. It depended for its majority on the support of the Congress. However, the formation of the Mandal government and Congress support for it immediately became an issue in internal Congress politics. The dominant factions in the Bihar Congress, especially the followers of the previous chief minister, K. B. Sahay, supported the Mandal ministry, while several minority Congress factions, especially that of former chief minister Pandit Binodanand Jha, opposed. On March 19, with the defection of seventeen prominent Congress MLAs, the Mandal ministry was defeated. Bhola Paswan Shastri acted as the spokesman for the Congress defectors, was elected the new leader of the SVD on the following day, and formed a new SVD government on March 21.

The fall of the two Bihar governments have in common their close association with inner party divisions, in the SSP and in the Congress. The fall of the Paswan ministry occurred in a somewhat different manner and was related to the interests of a cohesive "party" in the Assembly, whose interests were identical with the interests of one man, the Raja of Ramgarh. The latter had been one of the greatest *zamindars* in Bihar before *zamindari* abolition. He and his family had played an active role in Bihar politics since independence, leading a group of personal followers which varied in number in the Assembly from 17 or 18 to nearly 50. His closest family members and dependents followed the Raja from his original Janata party into the Swatantra party for a time, then into the Congress, from Congress to the JKD and into the first non-Congress government, from the JKD/BKD to the Janata party again and into the Paswan ministry, and finally into opposition against the Paswan ministry causing its downfall.

The consistent bases of the Raja's actions in Bihar politics have been to maintain his group of personal followers and to find a position of prominence for himself in order to protect his interests and those of his family. Those interests include extensive mining properties and forest lands, the need for protection against the state government, which has long been prosecuting several cases against him in court on various charges, notably default of payments of his bills, for which the Raja is famous. In the first non-Congress government, the Raja insisted that he and his brother be given the portfolios of mines and minerals and forests. His demand was resisted by several parties in the coalition, but was ultimately conceded. The Paswan ministry accepted him into the cabinet, but refused to give him Mines and Minerals. On June 16, the Raja resigned from the ministry "on grounds of health," but the chief minister, who resigned ten days later, claimed that the issue was demands made by the Raja against the public interest which he as chief minister could not accept.

The ways in which the three Bihar governments fell indicate that there were three decisive factors affecting the stabilitity of cabinets—the personal ambitions of frustrated ministers, internal party divisions, and cross-party or single-party legislative interests, such as those of the middle castes or those of a great landlord-industrialist and his personal dependents. It is important to note that, on several occasions, the PSP and the SSP in Bihar resigned from government or refused to participate in governments until certain issues were agreed upon. However, none of the three cabinet crises could be attributed to the defection of a party on an issue of principle.

The importance of inner party divisions and legislative interest groups in the Bihar Assembly are reflected in the changes in party allegiance and the formation of new groups which occurred between March, 1967 and June, 1968, as shown below (Table 2).

The general tendency of the shifts is clear. Movement was predominantly from the established, relatively stable parties and from the independents to new legislative groups or revived parties such as Jharkhand (which had previously merged with Congress) and Janata (which had been the dominant force in the BKD). The legislative groups are either factional splinters from larger parties, united on a personal or personal-cum-interest basis, or parties representing particular interests, such as Janata or Jharkhand (a party of tribals).

It is premature to draw any conclusions about the comparative cohesion of the larger parties. At one extreme, the two Communist parties lost no members, whereas the Congress lost 18% of its membership. The percentage losses for the SSP, the Jan Sangh, and the PSP were 16%, 12%, and 11% respectively. More important for purposes of my argument is the very significant fluidity in the house revealed by the total number of defections. Altogether, 87 members in a house of 318 or more than 27%

of the membership changed their affiliation in a little more than a year.

Uttar Pradesh. In Bihar, the first non-Congress coalition was brought down after the defection of a minister frustrated in his attempts to achieve personal power. In Uttar Pradesh, the non-Congress coalition was made possible only by a major defection from the Congress by a prominent Congressman of forty years' standing in the party who went over to the opposition with sixteen of his followers on April 1, 1967. Charan Singh had been known in Uttar Pradesh Congress politics for the previous twenty years as a man of considerable political skill, but also of integrity and principle. It was generally recognized that Charan Singh had well-formed views, which he expressed with intellectual clarity on most public issues, especially those affecting agriculture. He was also known to have been politically and intellectually dissatisfied with his colleagues in the Congress for many years, especially with the leader of the party, C. B. Gupta, for whom he had no respect.

Charan Singh's defection falls into the category of defections which arise out of inner party conflicts and are related to issues in a diffuse way, but very specifically to questions of power. The proximate cause of Charan Singh's defection was the failure of negotiations between him and C. B. Gupta on the composition of the Gupta ministry. The sources of conflict between Charan Singh and C. B. Gupta go back ten years and more. The justification for the defection was the alleged corruption and administrative incompetence of the previous Congress regime and some of its members. The immediate consequence of the defection was to place Charan Singh and his closest followers in the seat of state power. Charan Singh and six (of 16) of his supporters were taken into the cabinet. The defectors were heavily overrepresented in the non-Congress government installed on April 5, 1967. Out of 28 ministers and deputy ministers, the 7 defectors who were taken into the ministry comprised 40% of the original defectors and 25% of the ministry compared, for example, to 8 Jan Sangh ministers representing only 8% of Jan Sangh strength in the house.

Neither the Congress nor the SVD government in Uttar Pradesh ever had a safe majority. Both governments depended from the beginning not only on party defections but on the shifting allegiances of independents. Initially, the Congress by itself had 198 seats compared to 188 seats for the combined opposition parties, with 37 independents holding the balance. In the week preceding the formation of the Congress government, there were hectic negotiations between the Congress and the SVD for the allegiances of the independents who frequently promised their support to both sides. Ultimately, the Governor determined through personal interrogation of party leaders and independents and through demands for clear indications from the independents of where they stood that the Congress had the better claim. Once the decision was made that the Congress would form the government, almost all the independents fell into line. In the first division in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly on March 17 on the election of the Speaker, the Congress secured 226 votes to 188 for the opposition, indicating either that 36 out of 37 independents had voted with the Congress or that the Congress had gained some votes from the opposition parties directly. The tables were, of course, turned on April 1 when Charan Singh crossed the floor with 16 of his supporters from the Congress. When the figures for independents and party defectors are added together, the extent of the fluidity revealed in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly up to that date comes to 54

TABLE 2. CHANGES IN PARTY AFFILIATION IN THE BIHAR ASSEMBLY FROM MARCH, 1967 TO JUNE, 1968

	Party Membership	
	March, 1967	June, 1968
Established Parties		
Congress	128	105
SSP	68	57
Jan Sangh	26	23
CPI	24	24
CPM	4	4
PSP	18	16
Swatantra	3	1
RPI	1	1
New Parties and Legislative Groups		
BKD (formerly JKD)	26	2
Soshit Dal	0	38
Lok Congress Dal	0	22
Janata	0	18
Independents	21	5
Jharkhand[a]	9	2

SOURCE: *Statesman* June 30, 1968.

[a] In March, 1967, the Jharkhand party members were in the Congress party so that the 9 members listed then were actually at the time included in the Congress strength of 128.

members in a house of 424, not counting 5 defectors claimed at one stage by the Congress from the opposition.

Charan Singh's SVD government revealed a greater variety of internal stresses than any of the other governments discussed in this paper. There were issue conflicts over Urdu, procurement and the land revenue There were problems of intra-party cohesion within the large parties making up the coalition and there were inter-party conflicts over questions of local power, of party-building in the districts. In fact it is difficult to identify unequivocally the decisive factors which led to the fall of the Uttar Pradesh government both because of the variety of internal strains and because Charan Singh ultimately resigned without a vote of no-confidence.

Between the months of November 1967 and February 1968 a three-way split developed among the parties in the cabinet. Charan Singh continued to be supported primarily by the group of defectors who had crossed the floor with him and by the smaller parties and independents in the coalition. The leadership of the chief minister was, however, increasingly opposed and thwarted by the actions of the CPI and the SSP on the one hand and by the Jan Sangh on the other hand. The disaffection of the three large parties with the chief minister was closely interwoven with intra-party divisions in the SSP and with an inter-party struggle for power between the Jan Sangh and all other components of the SVD.

A central source of strain arose out of attempts by the Jan Sangh ministers to use their portfolios particularly those of the cooperation, local self-government, and education departments, to nominate members of the Jan Sangh party to powerful district cooperative, local government and educational institutions. Open dissatisfaction with the actions of the Jan Sangh ministers was expressed on several occasions by members of all parties in the SVD. A second source of strain related to the efforts of a faction in the SSP led by Raj Narain, a member of parliament, to assert a dominant role in state SSP politics and in the SVD government. In these efforts, the SSP adopted agitational tactics to pressure the SVD government while continuing to support the government in the legislature.

The sequence of events which ultimately led to the resignation of Charan Singh began with the resignation of the CPI ministers on November 20, ostensibly because of differences with the chief minister on issues related to the use of the police in political agitations and the release of government employees and others who had been jailed for their activities in various agitations in the past. Although the CPI ministers withdrew from the government, they continued to support the government in the Assembly. The SSP contingent continued in the government until January 6, but increasingly oriented its activities toward public agitations on the land revenue issue, on the release of government employees held in detention, and on the demand for elimination of English from use for government purposes.

On January 6, the SSP ministers also resigned on these issues, but like the CPI continued to vote with the SVD in the Assembly. Although both the CPI and the SSP related their withdrawels to public issues, one persuasive interpretation of their motives was that the public issues were secondary and that the primary factor was "the discomfiture of the two parties" which "arose from the fear that the Jan Sangh by exploiting the portfolios in its control was worsting them in the struggle for political influence at the district and lower levels."[23] Under the circumstances, there was little profit for the two parties to remain in the government. Nor could they incur public displeasure and precipitate an undesired general election by bringing down the government. The only alternative, therefore, was to continue to support the government, but to build their party strength and public appeal by agitational methods. The withdrawal of two of the three large parties in the cabinet was followed within a few days by a split between Charan Singh and the Jan Sangh. The break came when the chief minister reshuffled the Jan Sangh portfolios without the consent of the party leaders, taking away from them both cooperation and local self-government, and replacing them with relatively less powerful and more innocuous portfolios, such as public works and animal husbandry. The Jan Sangh accepted the reshuffling without withdrawing from the government, but the party leaders now joined with some of the SSP leaders in calling for the resignation of Charan Singh and his replacement by a new leader.

The demand for a new leader intensified both inter-party and intra-party differences. Swatantra, the Republicans, the BKD, and the independents continued to support Charan Singh, while the Jan Sangh insisted upon his replacement. The SSP, the PSP, and the CPI divided on the issue. Charan Sangh resigned on February 18 and President's Rule was declared on February 26. Attempts by the SVD and the

---

[23] "Charan Singh's Shrewd Politics," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 3 (January 20, 1968), 183–184.

Congress to build internal cohesion and win the support of a majority in the Assembly were made over the next two months, but the Governor ultimately decided that no stable government was possible and dissolved the Assembly on April 16.

Three factors seem to have been predominant in the resignation of Charan Singh—the disaffection of the three large parties with Charan Singh personally, conflict between the Jan Sangh and all other forces in the government over local power, and the adoption by a faction in the SSP of an agitational role in state politics. In his letter of resignation, Charan Singh stressed his dissatisfaction with the faction in the SSP led by Raj Narain and his right as chief minister to reshuffle portfolios. Issues of principle between the parties played only a secondary role in the disintegration of the SVD coalition. The SVD coalition lost its cohesion primarily through personal conflicts over the leadership; through intra-party divisions on the leadership question which affected most of the parties in the coalition; and through inter-party conflict for power, outside the cabinet and the Assembly, in the districts where local party activists maintain a continuing struggle for local power.

Punjab. The formation of the first non-Congress government in Punjab, its fall, and the strains affecting the stability of the minority defector's government which replaced it with Congress support illustrate sharply the key roles played by independents, individual defectors, and intra-party divisions in the major parties. In Punjab, the initial balance between the Congress and the united front coalition was so close that even independents had to be rewarded with government posts to win their support. The non-congress front was able to elect a leader faster than the Congress and, simultaneously, to win over the support of five independents to give it a majority of 53 members in a house of 104. In order to insure the allegiance of the independents, four out of five were given ministerial positions. Even so, the majority of the united front remained tenuous and was continually threatened by the efforts of the Congress to win over independents, by the efforts of the Maharaja of Patiala to form a third alternative government under his own leadership, and by the threat of defections from within the Akali Dal, the leading party in the front. To ward off the threat of a defeat, the united front ministry felt obliged to offer a ministerial position to anyone willing to defect from the Congress. Six new supporters were acquired from the Congress in this way. In the process, two Akali legislators who were not taken in the ministry revolted and left the Akali Dal. Thus, the front leadership was caught in the position of being forced to offer ministries to independents and defectors from the Congress to maintain its majority, while it simultaneously lost the loyalty of party members who had not been similarly rewarded.

The early Akali defections proved to be a prelude to a more serious defection from within the government itself by the seniormost Akali minister in the cabinet after the chief minister. Lachhman Singh Gill had been a rival of Gurnam Singh, the chief minister, for leadership in the Akali party and was known to be dissatisfied with his own position and with the fact that his personal supporters had not received offices in the government. During the months from August through November, the united front government was affected by a variety of strains, including inter-party differences on policy issues as well as personal differences over portfolios. Inter-party conflict occurred on policies for scheduled castes, on the language issue, and on government policy toward labor agitations. The Republican party leaders expressed discontent on government policy toward scheduled castes, the Gill group in the Akali party demanded the elimination of Hindi from official use by the state government whereas the Jan Sangh favored continued use of Hindi, and the Communist party demanded a liberal policy toward labor agitations.

On November 23, Lachhman Singh Gill succeeded in combining a variety of discontented elements and in leading fifteen legislators out of the United Front, including five Sant Akalis, one Master Akali party member, six independents, and three Republicans. The Gill-led defection, therefore, combined the discontent of two minor parties, Republicans and Master Akalis, with discontent arising out of intra-party divisions and the personal discontent of independents. The decisive weight in the defection was, however, clearly with the dissident Akali faction and the independents, including among the latter several Congressmen who had previously defected from the Congress to the united front.

Gill combined his Akali and independent followers into a new legislative party, winning the support of the Congress for a new government under his leadership, and was sworn in as chief minister on November 26 with the support of the Congress, but without its participation in the government. The creation of the Gill government led to a new and complex division in the Punjab Assembly into four distinct groupings. The Gill ministry constituted one bloc in the Assembly and the remnant of the united front its bitter opponent. The Congress, however, divided internally into two inner party subcoalitions based on pre-existing groups in the party, now divided on the issue of support for the Gill ministry. Gian Singh Rarewala, the leader of the Congress legislative party and some of his allies and supporters began to express opposition to the Gill ministry. Rumors became increasingly common that the Rarewala group was interested in forming a Congress government with the support of some or all of the anti-Gill Akalis. However, a subcoalition in the Punjab Congress opposed to the leadership of the Gian Singh Rarewala group insisted upon continued support for the Gill ministry. In other words, the situation in the Punjab Congress was now similar to the position in the Bihar Congress at an earlier point, with a dissident group in the Congress opposed to a move toward power led by an opposing group in the party. In the middle of June 1968 the coalition pattern in the Punjab Assembly remained as described here, with the Gill ministry in an increasingly untenable position and division in the Congress moving toward a climax with a request by 23 out of 43 Congress MLAs to the Congress President for permission to remove Gian Singh Rarewala from his leadership of the Congress legislative party because of his moves to withdraw support from the Lachhman Singh Gill ministry.

Patterns of Coalition Politics in North India. The first two years of coalition politics in north India have revealed a complexity of patterns of conflict and alliance and a considerable diversity of political forces and interests in the legislative assemblies. There are, first, the large, organized parties which sought for the most part to provide stable governments in north India by putting aside their ideological differences. There were three main impediments which frustrated the attempts of the larger parties to dominate the assemblies. One was the limitation on the possible inter-party alliances imposed by the primary division in the assemblies between the Congress and the non-Congress parties. A second limitation followed from the first. The limitation of inter-party alliances to the non-Congress parties gave disproportionate weight in the governments to the newly formed legislative groups, which then sought to limit the dominance of the larger parties. Thus, in Utter Pradesh, Charan Singh and his Jan Congress came into conflict with the Jan Sangh in a struggle over portfolios, which finally contributed to the fall of the non-Congress government. The third impediment to the dominance of the large parties was the decisive importance of intra-party divisions, which affected coalition patterns in two ways. First, intra-party divisions frequently led to defections, most notably from the Congress, the SSP and the Akali Dal, which brought down the Congress government in Uttar Pradesh and the initial non-Congress governments in Bihar and Punjab. Second, intra-party divisions twice prevented the Congress from attempting to form coalition governments in Bihar and Punjab.

Thus, both inter-party and intra-party divisions placed limits on the possible coalitions which could be formed in the assemblies. It is worth stressing, however, that these limitations are variable. They are not the kinds of limitations which permanently restricted coalitions in the unstable party systems of Fourth Republic France, Weimar Germany, or contemporary Italy. Access to government power is open to all parties and groups in the Assembly provided the right bargains can be struck.

In addition to the large, organized parties, there is a wide variety of small parties and legislative groups in the assemblies of north India. Some of these smaller parties reflect social divisions, others reflect traditional bases of power, and still others are personal groups based upon factional association. In the first category of parties reflecting social divisions are parties such as Jharkhand in Bihar, representing the tribal peoples of Chota Nagpur, and the Republican party, which seeks to represent the low caste groups of north India. The best example of a party based on traditional influence is the Janata party of the Raja of Ramgarh in Bihar.

Then too, there are the *ad hoc* legislative groups of independents and party defectors, which are sometimes based on caste sentiment or on leader-follower ties or on alliances of mutual convenience. Under the regime of Congress dominance, the tendency in the assemblies was towards absorption of such groups into the Congress. In the new system of coalition politics, the tendency is towards proliferation of such groups, which are now in a position to bargain for portfolios with potential alliance partners among the bigger parties.

Finally, there are the independents and individual party defectors who are either local notables with ties only to their supporters in the constituencies or are men of little or no influence and stature who have nothing to lose and everything to gain by offering their votes in a closely balanced legislature in exchange for a minor portfolio in government. For such men, the stakes of political bargaining have also risen. When the Congress dominated the assemblies, independents might move into the Congress in order to receive the patronage of a faction leader in the party who might possibly provide benefits for his constituents and hopefully a Congress ticket for the next election. Now it is possible for any man in the assembly to become a minister.

In general, a comparison of the roles played by the large parties, on the one hand, and intra-party factions, small parties, and opportunists, on the other hand, suggests that the predominant influence of the large parties is toward stability whereas the predominant influence of intra-party and non-party forces is toward instability. In short, the stability of north Indian politics, parties, and governments is not threatened by ideological rigidities in the party systems but by looseness in the systems caused by the existence of large numbers of independents and the relative absence of strong party identifications. In any closely balanced legislature in north India, there will always be some independents or some party members who will be willing to change loyalties whether it be for the sake of principle, for the sake of a ministry or, in some cases, as one respondent put it, for the sake of a license to ply a truck.

IV. CONCLUSION

Many of the features of coalition politics which emerged in the aftermath of the decline of the Congress from its dominant position in north Indian politics existed during the heyday of Congress dominance. Intra-party divisions, party defections, shifting allegiances of independents, conflicts among Congress factions for local power through the control of key government departments, and the formation of legislative interest groups in the Assembly all occurred when Congress exercised a monopoly of power. Moreover, these kinds of strains frequently led to the toppling of Congress governments by dissident factions in the Congress. The difference then was that the arena of conflict and the diversity of interests and personal ambitions that could be expressed were limited to the Congress. Power at the state level was available only within the Congress. Movement into opposition was movement outside the arena of power. The arena has now become as broad as the legislative Assembly as a whole. The key change is now that all parties, groups, and organized interests have acquired access to power.

If we assume, as I believe we must, that the decline of the Congress is only partly reversible and that the return of Congress dominance throughout the Indian Union is the remotest of the possibilities to be considered for the future development of politics in India, then we are in need of new perspectives to deal meaningfully both with the complexity of the developing systems of coalition politics and with the variability of developing party systems in the Indian states generally. The pattern of coalition politics described here is simply too complex to be contained within the dominant party system model. Moreover, neither the patterns described here nor the dominant party system model are valid for some of the other Indian states, most notably Madras, where a single cohesive party, the DMK, has successfully replaced the Congress and where the development of a classic two-party system is a reasonable possibility. In brief, I am arguing that the Indian states provide a vast field for comparative studies of developing party systems, of which there are already a considerable variety in existence, and which can be compared both with each other and with party systems in other parts of the world. In this paper, I have attempted to describe the predominant tendencies and patterns of coalition politics in the developing party systems of north India. My argument can be summarized in the following points:

(1) Before the 1967 elections, the political regimes which dominated north Indian politics were best described as multi-party systems with one party, the Congress, dominant. Now that the Congress monopoly of power has been broken, the model of the one-party dominant system is no longer useful.[24] The formation of party coalitions and the stability of state party systems and state governments in north India have depended in the past two years and are likely to continue to depend in the immediate future upon the factional structure of the Congress, intra-party divisions in the other large parties, the relations among the parties, and the roles played by independents and party defectors.

Although north Indian state party systems resemble certain of the historical and contemporary European multi-party systems, they do not suffer from the rigidities of those systems. The predominant tendencies in the developing north Indian party systems are toward openness, fluidity, and inclusiveness. No parties have been excluded from the system or from government.

(2) The absence of rigidities in the systems does not mean that there are no anti-system parties in the states nor does it mean that ideology plays no role in party politics in these

---

[24] For the contrary view that "the dominant party system is . . . only modified by fresh forms of competition, not replaced," see W. H. Morris-Jones, "From Monopoly to Competition in India's Politics," *Asian Review*, I 1 (November, 1967), 1–12.

states. Ideological differences exist among the parties and each state party system varies in its ideological emphasis. However, ideology has not so far prevented the functioning of the systems. Ideological polarization in the state party systems cannot be ruled out in the long run, but the predominating tendencies do not lie in that direction at the moment. Inter-party conflicts on matters of principle were more easily reconciled in the past two years than inter-party conflicts which related to party power in the government and in the districts.

(3) Far from suffering from ideological rigidity, the systems display a high degree of looseness and fluidity. In Sartori's terms, these are "structured party systems,"[25] but the dominance of parties and party policies in the systems is limited by the key importance of non-principled intra-party divisions and by the presence of atomizing tendencies in the shape of large numbers of independents and political entrepreneurs. Until 1967, the Congress benefitted exclusively from the existence of such forces, which operated on the fringes of Congress power and were sometimes absorbed or used by factions in the Congress against each other. In the aftermath of the 1967 elections, the Congress is, as it were, suffering for its sins in this respect since the opportunists and entrepreneurs now have a wider field for maneuver and greater opportunities for achieving power.

The ways in which the north Indian party systems functioned in the past two years can be represented conveniently in the form of the following diagram.



The diagram brings out the central role played in the contemporary north Indian party systems by independents and potential party defectors, whose activities affect all parties. Indeed, even groups within the Congress are affected; for, although an entire group may leave the Congress to find opportunities elsewhere, a Congress group is itself a loose structure, from which individuals may detach themselves. The model also recognizes the continued importance of the Congress in the system as a whole and the fact that the Congress contains within it sub-groups, which may vary in number and in the extent of their mutual antipathies. The arrows on the outer ring of both sides of the circle represent the tensions among groups in the Congress and among parties in the non-Congress coalitions. In general, the arrows in the diagram are meant to reflect the fluidity of the system and the fact that independents and defectors, Congress groups and non-Congress parties, may at any time change sides.

The diagram also leaves open two other possible patterns of coalition politics which did not occur in the past two years, but are likely to become feasible when the pariah status of the Congress wears off. One is that the Congress may decide to play the role of a European center party and attempt to reestablish a relative monopoly of power by bringing into coalition smaller parties with narrow interests or similar ideology. The other possibility is that Congress may be forced to accept a position as only one party among many and adopt a strategy of openness to all or most parties. In fact, it is possible that the first development may occur in some states, the second development in other states, depending upon the relative strength of the Congress and the ideological balance in individual party systems. The return of the Congress to power is, in fact, a real possibility in all three states, but it is highly unlikely that the Congress will ever again be able to dominate the systems in the same way as in the past either throughout the Indian Union or in any single state in north India.

---

[25] Sartori distinguishes between a "structured party system" in which "at least one or two of the existing parties have acquired . . . a national platform, a unified symbol, and some stable organization also at the local level, so that they are perceived by the country at large as the natural foci and channels of the political system" and a system in which there is "party atomization," that is, "a highly fragmented pattern in which parties are mostly a facade covering loose and shifting coalitions of notables. In this stage the party system is still evanescent qua system: parties have no real platform, hardly a national spread, no centralized or coordinated organization, and even less anything resembling a stable organization." Sartori, *op. cit.*, pp. 167–168. What makes Indian party systems so interesting from a developmental point of view is that there are both structuring and tendencies toward atomization. My argument is that party development in India requires the consolidation of the predominance of the parties and the elimination of atomizing tendencies or at least the control of such tendencies so that they do not prevent the creation of conditions for stable and effective government.

The north Indian party systems which have replaced the Congress-dominant systems have proved incapable of providing stable, effective government in the first two years of coalition politics. The persistence of instability in the systems works against the interests of all the large parties and threatens to replace political leadership over policy making with bureaucratic rule. An alternative to chronic political instability and bureaucratic rule can arise only through the more effective organization of the large parties and increased coherence within them. Such a development is within the realm of possibility, but it is likely to be a labor of decades. The DMK in Madras has demonstrated that it is possible to build a disciplined, cohesive party organization in a developing society capable of taking power from the dominant party and ruling effectively. The nature and diversity of social divisions in north India make it unlikely that a single party will be able to emulate that feat. However, if the patterns of coalition politics which have been described in this paper are reliable guides to future political patterns in north India, then an increase in party organization and party ideology provides more likely conditions for government stability than a politics of power and personal ambition.

SOURCES OF LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

ROBERT R. ALFORD
University of Wisconsin

HARRY M. SCOBLE
University of California, Los Angeles

Despite the legal norm of universal adult citizenship in the United States, and thus the legitimacy of participation by all strata of society, the actual level of political involvement in local communities is not high and differs greatly from group to group. Our task here is to spell out some of the conditions of group membership which contribute to local political involvement. Our broader purpose is to argue the need to re-expand the theoretical framework for analysis of political participation and thus to correct the present imbalanced focus upon participation as an individual act.[1]

Thus we shall examine some structural, rather than psychological, conditions of local political involvement. In this we shall occasionally use some measures previously reported in other studies and conventionally regarded as tapping psychological attributes of individuals; but these we shall regard as defining sets of role-expectations or as locating categories of persons placed within a certain range of normative obligations; and, more importantly, we shall systematically compare the net effect (upon local political involvement) of such variables with that of the more conventionally defined structural variables.

I. DATA, ASSUMPTIONS, METHODS

Our data are drawn from an April, 1962 survey of the adult electorates of four middle-sized cities in Wisconsin. The overall response rate was 86 per cent; in no city did it fall below 83 per cent.[2] Here we shall ignore inter-city differences and instead aggregate the four separate samples into a composite sample (technically defined as a probability sample of the electorate of middle-sized cities in Wisconsin in 1962).

From the survey responses to questions on local political interest, local political information, public-meeting attendance, and local electoral turnout, we have constructed an index of local political involvement and this is our dependent variable. But before discussing that index in further detail, it is necessary first to state the theoretical assumptions entailed in using the index and also to identify certain important research questions which we cannot treat here.

First, construction of *an* index of local political involvement is based on the assumption that one may usefully treat the "local community" *as if* it were a single political system. We admit that individual citizens may perceive otherwise, that such differential perceptions may importantly influence political behaviors, etc., but that raises different questions (from the ones here) to be treated elsewhere. Second, we shall ignore variations in the four components of our index of involvement. It would be possible and useful to create and explore typologies (e.g., Apathetics, or uninterested nonvoters, Ritualists, or uninterested voters, and so on) but that again raises different research questions for the future. Thirdly, we shall not be able to treat here the question of prime interest to Dahl and other pluralists, of the situational context within which a specific *individual* is active/influential in a particular decision or an apparently apathetic individual suddenly emerges as a "meteor," in Wildavsky's term.[3] Finally, our concern here is with the *sources* of differential local involvement and we must reserve for the future questions of policy or systemic consequences. Thus, for present purposes, we assume only that it is empirically possible and theoretically useful to distinguish the generally highly involved from the generally uninvolved. Furthermore, since the dependent variable is based upon fourteen separate items (several of which involve reports of political behavior ranging over the lifetime, since maturity, of the individual), we assume we have isolated a category or "political stratum" of individuals more or less consistently involved and active in local affairs (i.e., we doubt we have misclassified many individuals because of situational peculiarities—to them—at the time of interview).

---

[1] The theoretical discussion of political participation from the viewpoint of an individual act may be seen in Angus Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); and in the useful summary of the literture in Lester Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965). The emphasis upon individual motivation is illustrated by Dahl's insistence (page 279) that "Instead of seeking to explain why citizens are not interested, concerned, and active, the task is to explain why a few citizens *are.*" (His emphasis.) It is perhaps more fully illustrated by Milbrath's approach (e.g., page 6) where he states that "taking any political action generally requires two decisions: one must decide to act or not to act; and one must also decide the direction of his action." Milbrath then discusses people "making up their minds," making "choices," their "understanding," and other social-psychological aspects of political action. Given this orientation, level of information, degree of opinionatedness, intensity of feeling, rationality and quality of deliberation, consistency of ideological orientation, and other pyschological concomitants of participation become the primary focus of analysis.

[2] Further details of the study may be found in Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble, "Community Leadership, Education and Political Behavior," *American Sociological Review*, 33 (April 1968), 259–272.

The composite index of local political involvement was constructed as follows. First, four separate indices were created: (1) an index of local political interest, evenly dividing the sample into "high" and "low" interest; (2) an index of local political information, again evenly dividing the sample into high/low; (3) an index of public-meeting attendance, dichotomized into "high" (25 per cent of the sample) and "low" (remainder); and (4) an index of local election turnout, also dichotomized into "high" (about 60 per cent of the sample) and "low" (remainder).[4] Then these were combined into five types: *Mobilized* (high on all four indices); *Potentially Mobilized* (high on interest, information and turnout, but low on attendance); *Moderate* (a residual catch-all for all cases not defined by the other four combinations); *Ritualistic* (low on all except voting); and *Apathetic* (low on all four).[5] The percentage distribution of the 1,635 cases is: 9, 18, 48, 12, and 12 per cents respectively. For convenience in analysis, we have collapsed the five types into a trichotomy and have focused on the extremes of "high" (Mobilized and Potentially Mobilized, 28 per cent of the sample) and "low" (Ritualistic and Apathetic, 24 per cent) in local political involvement.

Six categories of factors have been thought to be the principal sources of local political involvement: social status, organizational activity, community attachment, religion and ethnicity (relatively little studied independently of social status), political motivations or predispositions, and the sociopolitical environment within which one lives (which has also received little systematic attention).[6] These are our independent variables, concerning which it is important to note that none *logically* reduces to another (although one may be *caused* by another and thus have no independent effect).

For each independent variable, employing either the survey data or electoral and census statistics for city blocks and wards, at least two different indicators have been selected (with the single, obvious exception of religion) as follows: for *social status*: income, education, occupation; *organizational activity*: memberships and activity in voluntary associations, local party membership; *community attachment*: home ownership, length of residence, geographic mobility, a composite index measuring respondent's objective stake in the community, and an index measuring subjective attachment to the community; *religion and ethnicity*: religion, original nationality, father's birthplace, and generation(s) in the United States; *political predisposition*: indices of sense of local civic duty, political efficacy, and political alienation; and *sociopolitical environment*: presidential and local voting turnout and home ownership and housing quality rates for the ward in which respondent lived. Each indicator is more specifically defined in its appropriate table; also, since cutting points on all variables, including involvement, are arbitrary, it should be remembered that the percentages to reported have only relative—and not absolute—meaning.

---

[3] See Aaron Wildavsky, *Leadership in a Small Town* (Totowa: The Bedminster Press, 1964).

[4] To save space, the verbatim form of the items making up each index will not be presented here. (They may be obtained from the Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory or from the authors.) Briefly, the *index of local political interest* is based on five items asking: general interest in city politics; perception of major local problem(s); number of these; interest in decision(s) by city government or school board "in the past year;" and number of these. The *index of local political information* is based on four items asking: correct names of mayor, city clerk, school superintendent, and Republican Party (or Democratic Party) county chairman. The *index of attendance* is based on three questions asking, "within the past two years," if respondent had attended a public-issue discussion meeting, a political party meeting, and a city council (or school board) meeting. And the *index of local electoral turnout* is based on two items requesting reported frequency of voting in local general and in local primary elections "since you have qualified for voting . . . (and) wherever you have lived. . . ."

[5] Assumptions underlying the types are, for example, that an uninterested, uninformed voter is not a conspicuous local participant, whereas a non-attender who is nonetheless highly interested, informed, etc., is likely to leap quickly into action if he perceives an issue of concern.

[6] For a general survey of the literature using, with some terminological differences, these same six categories, see Milbrath, *op. cit.* In the analysis sections which follow, for reasons of space we cannot fully cite the literature (especially where repetitively replicative); we will, however, attempt to cite literature of both a complementary and a contradictory sort on the lesser-researched independent variables, especially social mobility, community attachment, religion and ethnicity, and political environment.

Finally, a brief description of our steps of procedure and mode of analysis is necessary. First, we computed the basic association between each indicator of each independent variable and the dependent variable (percentage high in local political involvement). These zero-order associations are familiar to all political scientists and are reported, serially, in the first six tables below.

Next, we made use of multivariate analysis (in part because we wished to avoid assumptions of normality and linearity normally required by more elaborate correlation and regression statistics) and for this we followed procedures recommended by James S. Coleman with regard to computation of "effect parameters."[7] Thus, while we have computed multivariate contingency tables, we need not reproduce them here because we can economically verbalize them in terms of several different effect-parameter summaries which we will employ in two different ways. The effect parameters to be used are termed gross effect, net effect, and joint (also maximum or extreme) effect. The gross effect is simply the percentage difference observable in the dependent variable prior to introduction of a second or third independent variable; it is similar (but not always identical) to the original zero-order association.[8] The net effect, defined as the *mean* difference obtaining among all relevant comparisons among all identical sub-categories created by intersections of two or more independent variables, is of greater theoretical importance because it is a measure of whether—and, if so, in what direction and by how much—the assumed "independent" variable indeed has an independent effect when simultaneously controlling for the effect(s) of one or more other independent variables. (But a "net effect" statistic is not "self-interpreting" for, as in any quantitative measure, "significance" has to be attributed in terms of more or less arbitrary conventions; ours—as "decision rules"—are stated below.) To illustrate with a concrete example, and to anticipate examination of social status indicators next, having demonstrated the obvious—that each is associated with the dependent variable—the question next arises as to mutual effects, of intercorrelation versus independence, of the indicators. The net-effect parameter is an *aid* for answering the question, when interpreted in terms of the following decision rules. First, if the direction of association (gross or net effect) is as expected, it is indicated by a plus sign. Second, if gross effect is greater than 15 percentage points but reduces, when controlled, to a net of five or less, we shall assume that the second or third factor accounts for the apparent influence of the first. Third, if signs are evenly split (positive *and* negative) and net effects are between zero and five, we shall assume there is no relation between the factors. Fourth, if one component difference is negative, but another has a magnitude of at least 20, we shall infer some kind of cancelling-out effect. And, finally, our basic rule: to assume that an indicator has an independent effect, the component differences must all be in the same (positive) direction and average to 10 or more percentage points. Used in accordance with these rules, gross- and especially net-effect parameters permit us to judge the relative importance of two or more indicators of the same independent variable (or of one or more indicators of two or more different variables).[9]

---

[7] See James S. Coleman, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 189–203. One reason Coleman advanced his alternative method may be simply stated: contingency tables, by the time one introduces three independent variables, become visually cumbersome, consume much space, and often elicit excessively subjective interpretation. An "effect parameter"—of the types defined and illustrated in our text—is a single, quantitative summary designed to avoid all three, interrelated problems.

[8] It is only similar (not identical) because of the frequent need to change cutting points of the same indicator when moving from zero- to higher-order analysis.

[9] Because the dependent variable was trichotomized (into "high," "moderate," and "low" local political involvement) rather than dichotomized, the use or arbitrary cutting points might unduly influence the relative association of independent variables with involvement. To check on precisely this, all multivariate analyses were run twice, using first "high" and then "low" involvement as the dependent variable. To save space in the text, effect parameters for "high" involvement only are reported—but in no case where these are "significant" (as defined) are they not also con-

Coleman's method also yields a third summary, termed joint (or maximum or extreme) effect. For example, in a four-variable table (with three independent variables), joint effect is measured by subtracting the "amount" of the dependent variable observed in the low-low-low cell from that in the high-high-high cell;but note that this is the *logical* extreme—if the maximum *mathematical* difference does not also occur between these two cells, then the method is inappropriate because the independent variables are not working in the presumed, cumulative fashion. Concretely, if one is interested in the relative importance of all motivational indicators compared with all social status indicators, joint effect is a simple, convenient yardstick for making such judgment; thus this measure will be employed later, in Table 7, when treating combined effects of indicators of the same and of different independent variables.

II. FINDINGS

Social Status

The expected, positive association of each of three indicators of social status with local political involvement is demonstrated in Table 1. To verbalize the obvious should be unnecessary, other than to point out that changes in the magnitude of the dependent variable in this table are among the very highest observed in our data; indeed two—those for occupation and especially education—rank among the three highest basic associations observed.

As computed from the multivariate analysis, gross effect parameters were: education +26, occupation +19, and income +12, and net effect parameters were: education +18, occupation +12, and income +14, That is, because of intercorrelations among the three status indicators, the basic association of each with involvement is reduced somewhat when controlled for the others; but none is wiped out or even substantially reduced.[10] And, as indicated by the net effects interpreted with our rules, each indicator has an independent effect upon the dependent behavior.

Most striking in this multivariate analysis is the increasing importance of each status indicator as more of them are high. That is, there is much less difference in political involvement among persons low in any two aspects than among those high in any two; and the greatest gap of all occurs between those with college education *and* nonmanual occupation *and* high income compared with persons in any other (two-high-only) category. This may indicate that both advantages and disadvantages conferred by social status are cumulative—"adding up" in combined effects on involvement. An alternative possibility is that as one "refines" crude survey analysis by defining variables by three indicators rather than one, he approaches much closer to the reality of status groups with established expectations of political participation for

TABLE 1. LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND SOCIAL STATUS

Per cent high in local political involvement

Education:	Eleven or less years	High School Graduate	Some College or More	Total
	13% (608)	23% (596)	43% (377)	24% (1581)

Occupation:	Manual	Non-manual	Total
	16% (843)	37% (635)	25% (1478)

Income:	Less than \$6,000	\$6,000 or More	Total
	16% (743)	32% (779)	24% (1522)

Education is based on report of highest grade of school or year of college completed. Those reporting some vocational training in addition to high school are classed with high school graduates, even if they did not graduate from high school.

Occupation is that of head of household. Nonmanual includes: professional, technical and kindred workers, post-high school students, managers, officials, and proprietors, clerical and kindred workers, and sales workers. Manual includes: craftsmen, foremen, operatives, laborers, and private household and service workers.

Income is estimated total family income from all sources "last year" (1961) and "high" income was defined as that exceeding the median family income for Wisconsin in 1960 (\$6,000).

---

firmed by effect parameters computed for "low" involvement.

[10] The net effect of income actually increases slightly over gross effect, due to concentration of the population in low education and manual occupation categories (a sub-total of 840 cases) plus the relatively small positive influence of having a high income if the other two aspects of social status are both low.

their members. Particularly in minority "categories" (e.g., 13 per cent of the sample falls into the highest status category), one may be delineating actual social groups, members of which are guided by norms of political behavior, not just statistical aggregates.

This possibility, that we are dealing with a status group with some historical continuity of socialization into political participation, raises the question of the influence of social mobility upon involvement. The multivariate analysis was rerun, now substituting father's occupation (nonmanual, manual, and farming) for the income indicator. Gross and net effects of education and *present* occupation remained as above; those for father's occupation were +5 and −1, respectively,[11] indicating no consistent, independent influence on involvement. But introduction of "farming" into considerations of an industrial phenomenon obscures more than it clarifies. If attention is restricted to inter-generational mobility defined solely in terms of modern (blue and white collar) occupations, then social mobility has both a modest yet differential effect on political behavior. That is, controlling for both education and present occupation, the political involvement of downward mobiles is the same as that of the stratum to which they have descended (and, of course, greatly less than that of the level left); whereas the level of political involvement of upward mobiles is higher (a partial "net effect" of +5) than that of the level left yet still lower (a partial "net effect" of −8) than that of the high-stationary stratum to which they are ascending. In a crude comparative sense, the political behavioral consequences of downward mobility are immediate and full (they have traversed 100 per cent of the "political distance" down); those of upward mobility are delayed and partial (for upward mobiles have climbed only about 40 per cent of the distance up). More theoretically, yet highly tentatively, we might infer two different processes at work: for downward mobiles, early adult resocialization effectively contradicts still earlier ("pro-participation") familial socialization; but for upward mobiles, earlier ("anti-participation") familial socialization tends more to carry over into adult life and to retard new learning in the acquisition of political roles more appropriate to new social status.[12]

But, howevermuch the social mobility findings are in the expected directions, we wish to stress that they are small and of considerably

---

[11] Net effect was here calculated on the assumption that farming is lower in status than the manual category; if one reverses the assumption the net effect parameter is +2.

[12] Unfortunately, this is not the first time that inquiry into social mobility has yielded somewhat unsatisfactory results. Since World War II, analysts have been interested in the political consequences of vertical social mobility. Research results have been highly variable and often conflicting, in part because of great variation in operational definitions of "mobility" and probably also because geographical mobility, often thought to accompany social mobility, has rarely been separated out of the inquiry. (Early conflicting results, including his own, may be found in V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961], pp. 145–148). It is also relevant to note that early inquiries focused primarily on *direction*, or ideological content, of political opinion as the dependent variable, whereas we are here concerned with the more neutral *amount* of political activity and involvement.

On what might be termed a para-political subject similar to ours, research has produced further confusion if not contradiction. On the one hand, socially mobile persons were found to be not as socially active as stationaries in studies by Gerhard E. Lenski, "Social Participation and Status Crystallization," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (Aug., 1956), 458–464, and by Peter M. Blau, "Social Mobility and Interpersonal Relations," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (June, 1956), 290–295. On the other hand, a third inquiry found no such relationship, for which see Richard Curtis, "Occupational Mobility and Membership in Voluntary Organizations: A Note on Research," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (Dec., 1959), 846–848.

More recently, we have found partial confirmation of our findings in the work of Jane H. Bayes, who made use of interview, mailed questionnaire, and aggregate electoral and census data on residents of Los Angeles County. (Bayes never explicitly specifies direction—including downward—of social mobility in her data; but because of the special demographic characteristics of the Los Angeles population, we assume that the greatest proportion of her cases of socially mobiles are upwardly mobile and thus that her findings lend support to that relevant portion of our data.) Having first established that socially active persons are also politically active, Bayes then demonstrated that: (1) in general, social mobility had no significant effect on organizational activity; (2) but when analysis was restricted to non-geographically-mobile residents, who had been raised in the county, then the social mobiles were significantly less active in organizations; (3) yet finally geographic mobility—alternatively defined by interstate movement, by intra-county resless importance than our replication of the well-established linkage between social status and political involvement independently for each of the three present-day indicators of status—a point to which we return in a later section.

Organizational Activity

Two of our measures of organizational activity (claimed number of voluntary memberships and reported levels of activity therein) are conventional, but the third measure is both unconventional and inherently ambiguous, because of the highly variable meanings of both "membership" and "local" party in American politics. Thus we claim for the latter only that it serves as an additional, specifically political measure either of organizational activity or at least of predisposition to identify oneself in organizational terms. See Table 2: as expected, each indicator initially exhibits quite a strong association with political involvement.

Multivariate analysis (involving dichotomizing both organizational memberships and activity) produced gross effect parameters of organizational activity +21, organizational membership +20, and party member +18; net effects—somewhat reduced as anticipated—were +12, +10, and +13 respectively. Again, each indicator had an important independent effect on political involvement. Moreover, persons organizationally active in two or more regards were considerably more highly involved than those less active—but this opens up discussion of joint effect, and comparisons among these, which we must defer until we have completed a a review of the six basic categories of independent variables. We will also defer to a subsequent section consideration of questions, which the reader may already have raised, as to whether social status, especially indicated by education, may not wholly account for organizational activity (whether sociologically *or* psychologically measured).

TABLE 2. LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY

Per cent high in local political involvement

Organizational Memberships:	Low	Medium	High	Total
	13% (697)	20% (371)	32% (515)	24% (1583)

Organizational Activity:	Low	Medium	High	Total
	10% (487)	21% (659)	47% (409)	25% (1555)

Local Party Member:	No	Yes	Total
	22% (1364)	40 (230)	24% (1594)

Organizational memberships are based on the question, "Which clubs and organizations like those on this card do you belong to?" (A flash-card was shown, listing eleven subject-matter categories plus a residual "other".) One (or no) membership was scored "low"; two as "medium"; and three or more as "high".

Organizational activity is based on reported frequency of attending meetings of each group belonged to (above); response categories were "usually, seldom, or never" (scored 2, 1, or 0 respectively); scores were summed; and "low" activity was defined as 1 or 0 (including no membership initially); "medium" was 2–4; and "high" activity a score of 5 or more.

Local Party Membership is from the question, "Do you consider yourself a member of a local political party?" (As noted in the text, this question is inherently ambiguous in at least two senses.)

Community Attachment

We conceived of community attachment as having both objective and subjective dimensions. Home ownership, long residence in the community (and/or geographic mobility), or having friends and relatives in the immediate area are considered objective indicators of community attachment, or integration. Their association with political involvement is shown in Table 3. It is evident that home ownership is the most unambiguously related to involvement. Length of residence exhibits a curvilinear relationship (to be anticipated because of the probable concealed correlation of age at the "high" end of the continuum). The combined index labelled "objective stake in the community" shows the expected effect in only modest amount and that of geographic mobility is even less.

---

idential mobility, and by length of residence—" *is more destructive* to previous social and civic obligations than is social or occupational movement within one geographic area." (Page 164; emphasis added.) See Jane H. Bayes, "Political Participation and Geographic Mobility" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, UCLA, 1967), especially chapters 6 and 7.

TABLE 3. LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND COMMUNITY ATTACHMENT

Per cent high in local political involvement

Home Ownership:	No	Yes	Total
	13% (524)	30% (1019)	24% (1543)

Length of Residence:	Less than 14 years	15 to 29 years	30 to 49 years	More than 50 years	Total
	15% (523)	26% (330)	33% (523)	23% (217)	24% (1593)

Objective Stake in Community:	Low	Medium	High	Total
	21% (559)	22% (452)	29% (493)	24% (1504)

Geographic Mobility:	Born *and* brought up outside Wisconsin	Born *or* brought up in Wisconsin	All life in Wisconsin	All life in city	Total
	23% (427)	32% (88)	24% (590)	26% (461)	25% (1566)

Home ownership is based on "Do you own, are you buying, or do you rent this house you are living in?

Length of residence is based on "How long have you lived in this city?"

Objective stake in community is based on five questions (one of which repeats home-ownership above, it should be noted). Respondents were given a score of 1 each if they had close relatives living within 25 miles of them, had one or more "best friends" living in the community, owned their house, owned any (other) property in the city, and if their spouse had any relatives in the area. A "low" score was 0 to 2, "medium" was 3, and "high" 4 or 5.

Geographic mobility is based on two questions, "Where were you born?" and "Where did you live most of the time between the ages of 5 and 15?"

These findings may seem somewhat surprising because one traditional hypothesis concerning sources of local political involvement focused on just such community attachment or social integration. But available data for testing have been somewhat limited.[13] However, before concluding that community attachment (other than home-ownership) plays very little role in producing involvement, we examined the associations of Table 3 more closely, selecting geographic mobility and length of residence for multivariate comparison. In the resulting table, internal relationships were small in size and inconsistent in direction, yielding low effect parameters (net effects of −2 and +3, respectively), indicating no independent impact on involvement.

We then devised an index of subjective attachment to the community,[14] on the possibility that it might be more important for local political involvement. The effects of both subjective attachment and objective stake were than compared by multivariate analysis, but both net effect parameters, while positive, were small (+4 and +3, respectively) and the result of internal inconsistencies. Again,

---

[13] Early findings of general relevance may be seen in Gresham Sykes, "The Differential Distribution of Community Knowledge," *Social Forces*, 29 (May, 1951), 376–382. The population was white, male wage-earners in Plainfield, New Jersey. The dependent variable was knowledge of local community affairs. Among the hypothesized independent variables having positive effect were home-ownership, geographic mobility, and length of residence. One of the earliest theoretical generalizations of such community-attachment findings to explicitly political behavior may be found in Chapter 30, "The Psychology of Voting," by Seymour M. Lipset *et al*, in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Company, 1954). And Bayes, *op. cit.*, more recently demonstrated that geographic mobility itself, regardless of length of residence, was the most destructive for social and political participation of all factors she surveyed. (In thinking about the far smaller impact of inter-state geographic mobility in our data than in Bayes', we note that two-thirds of our respondents had lived all their lives in Wisconsin whereas more than 60 per cent of the Los Angeles population had been born outside California, suggesting that the local political system may be able to absorb without much change small amounts of geographic mobility. Future research of a comparative sort thus might usefully focus on whether there is a threshold effect or a "critical mass" factor involved.)

[14] The index of subjective attachment was based on three items: "In general, this is a very good community to live in," "I can hardly imagine myself moving out of this community at any time in the future," and "I could be just about as satisfied with life in another community as I am here." Agreements to the first two questions and disagreement to the third were each scored 1, producing an index ranging from 0 to 3 (high subjective attachment). The items were originally devised by Martin A. Trow for study of communication flows in Bennington, Vermont, and were based upon the discussion of "locals" and "cosmopolitans" in Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957 edition).

TABLE 4. LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT, RELIGION AND ETHNICITY

Per cent high in local political involvement						
Religion		Catholic	Protestant			Total
		22% (656)	26% (852)			24% (1551)
Original Nationality:	Mediterr. Europe	Eastern Europe	Central Europe	Northwest Europe	Great Britain	Total
	21% (67)	30% (166)	22% (492)	22% (364)	33% (383)	25% (1512
Father's Birthplace:	Mediterr. Europe	Eastern Europe	Central Europe	Northwest Europe	Great Britain	Total
	20% (65)	35% (113)	20% (141)	25% (122)	45% (33)	26% (499)
Generation in United States:	First	Second	Third	Fourth		Total
	20% (123)	28% (457)	27% (543)	19% (369)		25% (1492)

Religion is based on "What is your religious preference or membership?"

Original Nationality is based on "What is the original nationality of your family on your father's side?" (If the answer was "American," this was probed—"What country did your family come from originally?")

Father's Birthplace is based on "Where was your father born?" (and this portion of the table excludes US-born fathers). For both original nationality and father's birthplace, "Mediterranean Europe" is defined by Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece; "Eastern Europe" includes Poland, Russia, and any other country east of Germany; "Central Europe" includes Germany, Austria, and Switzerland; "Northwest Europe" includes France, Belgium, Holland, and the Scandanavian countries; while "Great Britain" includes Ireland. Persons of mixed British and Northwest European background were classified as British. The few "other" countries of origin have been excluded from this table.

Generation in United States was determined by responses to questions about birthplace of the respondent, his parents, and all grandparents. "First generation" means all were foreign born, "second generation" that respondent was US-born but one or both parents foreign born, etc. Ninety persons were unclassifiable because they could not answer one or more questions.

by our test, neither variable demonstrated independent influence.

We conclude that—except for home ownership—neither subjective nor objective attachment to the community plays an important role in creating local political involvement. Whether this is a new historical development, to be expected in modern mass societies in which "attachment" as a social phenomenon has little general influence, is a question we cannot answer.

Religion and Ethnicity

Religion, nationality, and nativity are three aspects of the cultural origins of a population which may be related to local political involvement which have been little studied. Table 4 presents four basic associations in the context. Protestants are only slightly more likely to be involved than Catholics and the difference is not significant. Persons whose original nationality is British or whose father was born in Great Britain are slightly more likely to be highly involved than persons with other ethnic origins (with East Europeans an unexplainable exception). And the number of generations in the United States interestingly appears curvilinear, making no consistent difference in involvement.

Religion and original nationality were then examined in combination. In three of the four

TABLE 5. LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND POLITICAL PREDISPOSITIONS

Per cent high in local political involvement				
Local Political Efficacy:	Low	Medium	High	Total
	24% (514)	23% (664)	33% (295)	25% (1473)
Local Political Alienation:	High	Medium	Low	Total
	15% (114)	20% (597)	32% (781)	26% (1492)
Local Civic Duty:	Low	Medium	High	Total
	12% (224)	22% (672)	32% (649)	25% (1545)

Local Political Efficacy is based on three statements, "I don't think public officials in this city care much what people like me think," "I get as much satisfaction out of my political activity as I do from my other community activities," and "The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this city." Disagreement with the first statement and agreement with the second two were considered indicators of a high sense of local political efficacy, scored 1 each and summed. "Low" in this table is 0 or 1, "medium" is 2, and "high" is 3.

Local Political Alienation is based on two statements, "In most local elections there usually isn't enough information available for me to make an intelligent choice" and "To succeed in politics around here, a man has to be dishonest." Agreement with either was considered evidence of local political alienation and was scored 1. "High" in this table means 2, "medium" 1, and "low" 0 total score.

Local Civic Duty is based on two statements, "A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with" and "If a person doesn't care how a local election comes out, he shouldn't vote in it." Disagreement in both cases was considered evidence of high local civic duty, scored 1 each, and summed. "Low" here is 0, "medium" is 1, and "high" a score of 2.

nationality groups with enough cases for comparison, Protestants were slightly more likely than Catholics to be highly involved in local politics. Also, persons originally from Britain were slightly more highly involved than persons from Northwest, Central, and Mediterranean Europe, whether Catholic or Protestant. But the patterns were not completely consistent, and it was evident from Table 4 that neither ethnicity nor religion is as strongly related to local political involvement as other independent variables previously examined. Furthermore, whatever apparent effect ethno-religious groupings exhibit might well be the effect of social status differences. And this was then exammined, using education as the indicator. Education retains a relatively large influence (net effect +14) but original nationality exhibits no independent influence when controlled (net effect +1).

In short, while there may be a special affinity for politics among particular ethno-religious groupings, this factor is probably not strong enough to offset the major effects of social status and organizational activity. When education and organizational activity are taken into account, we have probably controlled for the major part of the variation in involvement which might initially appear due to ethno-religious origins.[15]

Political Predispositions

Political predispositions have repeatedly been found to be associated with voting turnout and other forms of psychological or behavioral involvement in politics; especially in national studies.[16] Here we present three different composite measures of a positive or negative predisposition to be involved in local politics: local political efficacy, civic duty, and political alienation. As indicated in Table 5 there is indeed a positive relationship between each indicator of political motivation and local political involvement, yet we note that the associations tend to be smaller than those of social status or organizational activity with involvement.

---

[15] See two M.A. theses based on the same data reported here for more detailed analyses of the religious bases of political behavior in the four Wisconsin cities: Patricia D. Cousens, "Religion and Class and Predictors of Political Involvement" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, 1964) and Luther B. Otto, "Catholic and Lutheran Political Cultures in Medium Sized Wisconsin Cities" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, 1963). The first study found that "with class controlled, there are no differences between Protestants and Catholics in levels of political involvement in the local community," although distinct religious differences remained in party identification and voting. The second study produced a similar finding for Lutherans and Catholics.

[16] See Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–107 for motivational factors involved in the 1956 presidential election. The original scales are presented in Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), pp. 187–199, which we have adapted with specifically local referents.

The three motivational measures were then combined, on the assumption that a stronger relationship might result if persons were scored on seven separate items (rather than only two or three) and that there might be something internally inconsistent about the items, in the context of local politics, which might account for the relatively weak relationship of these social-psychological attributes with local involvement. Such is not the case. Agreement on local political efficacy items has no independent effect (net effect +1) on local political involvement; local civic duty or political alienation retains almost exactly the same effect on involvement whether considered separately or simultaneously (that is, the gross and net effect parameters are both +12 and +11); and the explanatory power of all three together is clearly *not* substantially more than that of any one of the three separately.

We shall see later whether and how social status and home-ownership are related to the sense of local civic duty, selecting this measure of political predisposition for special analysis.

Political Environment

The concept of political environment or milieu has existed in the literature some forty years, dating from the Chicago social scientists' concerns with "urbanism as a way of life"; but political analysts have made less extensive use of the concept in their research than have social-area analysts.[17] In this section, we are concerned with a limited aspect of political environment (in terms of its effect on *amount* of political behavior, rather than more traditional concern with effect on *direction*). Thus we are asking whether individual political involvement in the local community is associated with residence in a ward with a high level of voting turnout, housing quality, and/or home-ownership? The basic associations of these environmental indicators with the dependent variable are presented in Table 6, showing that there is indeed a slight positive association between local and presidential voting turnout in the ward and between housing quality and level of home-ownership of the ward and the level of local political involvement. (But reversals occur with respect to both local turnout and home-ownership.)

The multivariate procedures previously described were than employed. The two aggre-

---

[17] The concept of political environment or milieu is essentially that of a subnational areal (e.g., "neighborhood") political culture persisting through time and social space. Five representative political studies making use of the concept are: (1) Harold F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), pp. 91–125, where the author used electoral and census data on Chicago subcommunities to determine types of voter-support for Franklin D. Roosevelt and also to compare 1928–1936 voting consistency; (2) a study similar to Gosnell's by Bartelmann, as reported in R. C. Tryon, *Identification of Social Areas by Cluster Analysis; A General Method with an Application to the San Francisco Bay Area*, vol. 8, No. 1 (University of California Publications in Psychology, 1955), pp. 1–100, in which the author compared the 1940 Roosevelt vote with the 1947 Congressional vote for Havenner (an FDR-Truman supporter), showing that the neighborhood distribution of the vote was practically the same in the two elections in San Francisco; (3) Walter C. Kaufman and Scott Greer, "Voting in a Metropolitan Community: An Application of Social Area Analysis," *Social Forces*, 38 (Mar., 1960), 196–204, comparing 1952 presidential vote with a 1954 local referendum (to establish a Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District) in terms of both direction of voting and level of turnout and by reference to census tracts classified by Shevky's indices of social rank, urbanization, and minority segregation; (4) Heinz Eulau, Betty H. Zisk, and Kenneth Prewitt, "Latent Partisanship in Non-partisan Elections: Effects of Political Milieu and Mobilication," in M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1966), pp. 208–237, in which the researchers classified the city-wide partisan milieu—predominantly Democratic, competitive, or predominantly Republican, as defined by party registration data—of formally nonpartisan California cities and then demonstrated milieu effects on individual behavior (characteristics, perceptions, campaign activities, career expectations, etc., of incumbent councilmen); and (5) Bayes, *op cit.*, chapter 8, in which Bayes arrayed Los Angeles County census tracts according to whether they were nationally-oriented in voting, state-local oriented, or mixed, and then demonstrated that the observable effect of political milieu was upon the behavior of the non-college educated respondents in her samples.

TABLE 6. LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND WARD CHARACTERISTICS

Per cent high in local political involvement					
	Low	Medium Low	Medium High	High	Total
Presidential Vote Turnout:	21%	23%	26%	27%	24%
	(337)	(352)	(435)	(471)	(1595)
Local Vote Turnout:	19%	23%	28%	26%	24%
	(340)	(381)	(413)	(461)	(1595)
Housing Quality:	13%	16%	25%	27%	24%
	(149)	(162)	(438)	(863)	(1592)
Home Ownership:	16%	24%	28%	24%	24%
	(204)	(478)	(473)	(437)	(1592)

Presidential Vote Turnout is based on the percentage of voters in the spring presidential primary of 1960. City election statistics were employed. Each of the 78 wards in the four cities was ranked, separately for each city, and then divided into four approximately equal groups. Cutting points thus differed for each city, because the overall turnout levels of the cities differed.

Local Vote Turnout is based on the aldermanic elections of 1961 or 1962 (and procedures similar to the above were used). Two successive years were necessary because of staggered elections in Wisconsin municipalities.

Housing Quality refers to the proportion of dilapidated housing units in each ward in 1960 and *Home Ownership* to the proportion of housing units owned by their residents in 1960, again by wards. Both of the latter measures were derived from the block data of the 1960 Census of Housing. For further details on construction and interrelationships of these measures of ward characteristics, see Robert R. Alford, in collaboration with Harry M. Scoble, *Bureaucracy and Mobilization in Urban Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, forthcoming), Chapters 8 and 9.

gate social characteristics of the wards were compared, but the net-effect parameters (of ownership +2 and of housing quality +4) indicated that neither had an independent effect on involvement when controlled for the other. The two political characteristics of the wards were then compared, with similar evidence of lack of impact (net effect +2 for both presidential and local voting turnout). From these two tests, it seemed entirely possible that the small, positive initial associations (in Table 6) were entirely the result of the status composition of the wards—that when *individual* characteristics of respondents were controlled the apparent contextual effects of wards would entirely disappear. Thus two further multivariate tests were conducted, to examine the mutual effects of social status—measured first by education alone and then by a combined index based on education, occupation, and income—and ward characteristics upon local political involvement. That is, in each test, a status characteristic of the respondent was combined with two ward characteristics—one social, one political—in order to produce two separate tests of the possible independence of ward influences upon involvement. The results of the first test were net-effect parameters as follows: ward home-ownership +3, ward local voting turnout +7, and combined social status +27. The results of the second (again net effects) were: ward presidential turnout +3, ward housing quality +4, and education +16. In short, *no* ward characteristic exhibited an independent effect (by our definition) on local political involvement; but social status (by both measures) retained a uniformly positive and high association with involvement, regardless of the political or social characteristic of the ward and regardless of which ward indicator was employed.

Contrary to earlier findings, the political environment—defined here in terms of the ward election district—does not exhibit independent influence upon political behavior. Whether a different (smaller or larger areal) definition of the political milieu might yield different (and positive) results is a question we cannot answer.

III. THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF VARIOUS FACTORS

Before summarizing findings and conclusions, we wish to examine the combined effects of various indicators, approaching this subject through the question (earlier deferred) of the joint or individual effects of education and organizational activity upon local political involvement. Does organizational activity account for the influence of education on involvement? There are at least three possibilities, two plausible and one implausible. First, if the path of recruitment to organizations is primarily through education (and organizational-belonging is class-related in this sense) and if local political involvement is primarily a function of social status, then organizational activity should prove an intervening variable which, when controlled, would eliminate the apparent influence of education on involvement (i.e., similarly active persons should be similarly involved in local politics, regardless of education). The contrary is implausible, that education is the primary determinant and organizational activity only incidental, for then college-educated persons should have the same level of local involvement whether belonging to four organizations or none. But, third, education and organizational activity may *both* independently influence involvement, not only because of the assumption that the local political system is accessible through various channels of participation but also because involvement (as defined) does not require that a person be active in organizations. The components of involvement do not depend upon membership or activity in associations of any kind; while such "unmediated" involvement may be of quite a different nature than that derived from organizational activity, it certainly need not be considered "lesser" in any sense. And home ownership may be another intervening variable, mediating both organizational activity and local involvement.

These possibilities were examined by multivariate analysis, first comparing education, individual home-ownership, and sense of local civic duty. The net effect parameters were: education +21, ownership +25, and civic duty +7. The independent influences of both education and home-ownership on involvement are clear and strong, regardless of each other or of civic duty. Civic duty, on the other hand, has small impact when controlled. Indeed, among renters, there was *no* relationship between high sense of civic duty and local involvement, among either highly or relatively less educated respondents. In this sense, a sense of civic duty simply does not "compensate" for not owning a home or not having a college education. Alternatively, home ownership may imply crossing a threshold of community attachment at which point local elections assume enough meaning that one's personal predispositions become engaged and influence one's involvement; but below that threshold, local politics apparently has little meaning and civic-duty questions may tap general ideological assumptions—but, whatever, these bear no relation to (low) local political involvement.

Therefore we turned to the three indicators of *different* independent variables which Tables 1–6 had indicated as having greatest impact on local political involvement: education, organizational activity, and home-ownership. In multivariate comparison, the respective net effect parameters of these three were: +17, +16, and +16. No one of these accounts for the "apparent" influence of the others; each retains a strong independent effect on involvement when simultaneously controlled for the other two.

What does it mean that home-ownership or organizational activity is a source of local political involvement independent of education? Home ownership apparently is a form of politically-relevant group membership, vesting the individual with tangible interests perceived as impinged upon by local politics quite apart from more conventional interests of high social status. So for organizational activity: persons become politically involved through channels other than that provided by elite social position. For membership and activity in a church, Rotary club, labor union, or recreational association brings one into contact with local affairs in ways exposing one to information, arousing interest, provoking attendance at meetings and voting in local elections whether or not one had the initial predisposition to repond to political stimuli implied by relatively high education.

Earlier, we referred to Coleman's "joint effect" parameter as a useful summary statistic by which one may readily judge whether, for example, the combined effects of three indicators of one independent variable are more or less than those of the indicators of another independent variable (or judge the relative importance of "mixed" indicators of two or more independent variables). Thus, in Table 7, we have summarized the major joint effects observed in the previous (unreproduced) multivariate tables. (We have ignored the indicators of community attachment—other than home-ownership—and of religion and ethnicity, for obvious reasons.) Another way to state the purpose of Table 7 is to say that it isolates categories of combinations exhibiting least-to-most probability of being associated with local political involvement.

Thus, personal predispositions to participate (senses of local political efficacy, civic duty, or lack of political alienation) had least combined influence on local political involvement, as defined here.

Political environmental indicators, even when "mixed" with social status indicators, had only intermediate effect.

Organizational activity and social status had approximately equal "maximum effects," when all three indicators of each were taken into account simultaneously in the extreme cells.

And when the joint effects of several different independent variables were taken into account, the degree of explanatory power of all indicators/variables was increased slightly. For example, 60 per cent of all persons of high education, owning their homes, and having high sense of civic duty were high in local political involvement, compared with only 8 per cent of those low in education, renters, and low in civic duty—leaving (as indicated in Table 7, sixth row) a net joint-effect of +52.

Table 8 shows even more graphically the structural sources of local political involvement, by classifying persons on the three most important indicators of different independent variables: home-ownership, organizational activity, and education. Table 8 presents three

TABLE 7. SUMMARY OF MAJOR JOINT EFFECTS OF INDICATORS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGH LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

	Joint Effect
Political Motivation Indicators:	
Local political efficacy, civic duty, political alienation	+23
Political Environment and Social Status Indicators (Mixed):	
Combined social status, ward home-ownership, ward local voting turnout	+28
Education, ward housing quality, ward presidential voting turnout	+36
Organizational Activity Indicators:	
Organizational memberships, organizational activity, local party membership	+39
Social Status Indicators:	
Education, occupation, income	+42
Joint Effects of Mixed Indicators:	
Education, individual home-ownership, sense of civic duty	+52
Education, organizational activity, individual home-ownership	+47

This table summarizes joint (maximum, extreme, or net) effect parameters for the *extreme* cells of the multivariate tables previously described in the text (but unreproduced). In each row of this table, the "joint effect" represents the maximum percentage-point difference between the two cells "highest" and "lowest" in each individual table with respect to their potential influence upon local political involvement. Thus, in row five of the table above, we summarize the fact that we found 55 per cent of those with some college education, a nonmanual occupation, and an income of more than $6,000 a year were highly involved in local politics, whereas only 13 per cent of those with less than college education, a manual occupation, and an income of less than $6,000 a year were highly involved. The difference between these two figures is +42, entered in row five in this table.

sets of related figures (from left to right): the proportion highly involved of each category (following "condition of involvement"), then the proportion each such category is of the total population, and finally the distribution of highly involved persons in each of the eight categories. For example, at one extreme, home owning, organizationally active, high-status persons constitute 22 per cent of the population; half are active, yet these constitute 44 per cent of all highly involved persons. At the other, 13 per cent rents, are inactive organizationally, low-status, and only 3 per cent are highly involved, constituting only 2 per cent of the total number of highly involved persons.

We divided the aggregate sample into four main groups, based on home ownership, organizational activity, education, and local political involvement. Of those high on the first three factors, half are involved—and probably from this group of stable middle-class activists is drawn most of the civic/political leadership of the communities. In the second (lower) category, the main group is that of organizationally-active home-owners with low education, constituting 29 per cent of the total population and 30 per cent of the "highly involved" population.

Finally, we may lump together as relatively uninvolved those persons lacking any two or more structual conditions for involvement—for these constitute a combined 39 per cent of the total population, but only roughly one-seventh of those highly involved in local politics.

In short, Table 8 isolates four different categories of persons defined by four main variables: home ownership, organizational activity, education, and local political involvement. (The first three are the key structural conditions leading to involvement itself.) The important fact is the high degree of correlation of these characteristics, illustrated by the fact that we have been able to classify fully 85 per cent of the total population. To state it differently, relatively few persons own a home, have high education, but are not also organizationally active; nor are there many who rent, are organizationally inactive, but also have high education. This shorthand summary of results is a verbal means of providing a quasi-demographic description of the "involvement composition" of the Wisconsin sample. But we must reserve to the future examination of variations in actual political roles played by persons with differing combinations of these attributes.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The above tables indicate that only some of the several factors presumably related to local political involvement are independently important and that some are much more important than others. Social status and organizational activity, not surprisingly, proved the most important personal characteristics associated with local political involvement. Local political predispositions—measured by indices of civic duty, political efficacy, and political alienation—are relatively less important. Local polit-

TABLE 8. STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF LOCAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

Condition of Involvement			Per cent Highly Involved		Proportion category is of total population	Proportion category is of all highly involved persons
Home Ownership	Organizational Activity	Education				
			%	(N)	%	%
	ALL THREE HIGH					
High	High	High	50%	(309)	22%	44%
	ANY TWO HIGH					
High	Low	High	31%	(51)	4	5
Low	High	High	28%	(85)	6 }39	7 }42
High	High	Low	26%	(406)	29	30
	ANY TWO LOW					
Low	High	Low	13%	(164)	11	6
High	Low	Low	11%	(184)	13 }26	6 }12
Low	Low	High	10%	(21)	2	—
	ALL THREE LOW					
Low	Low	Low	3%	(178)	13	2
	TOTAL		25%	(1378)	100% (1378)	100% (349)

The left-hand set of figures in this table simply rearranges those of tables previously reported (but unreproduced); the right-hand set takes these same figures and (1) presents the proportion each category (High, High, High, etc.) is of the total sample and (2) presents the proportion it is of the total of "highly involved" persons. (All measures here are based on dichotomies.) For example, in the first row above, 50 per cent of those 309 persons who owned homes, were organizationally active, and had high education were highly involved in local politics. These same 309 persons constituted 22 per cent of the total sample (aggregated across the four cities) but they also constituted 44 per cent of the 349 persons (in that total sample) who were scored as highly involved in local politics.

ical environment (as measured by the social status and voting turnout levels of the ward of residence) was even less important. Geographic mobility, length of residence, and subjective attachment to the community had no importance—but home-ownership was strongly related to local involvement. And evidence concerning religion, ethnicity, and nativity was inconclusive, at best.

What can one infer from such diverse findings? We feel both the positive and negative findings are important. The fact that neither mobility, residence, nor subjective attachment is significantly related to local involvement (whereas organizational activity and home-ownership are) suggests that "traditional" ties to the community have lost whatever significance they might once have had. Rather, only concrete memberships in local groups and specific interests at stake produce high local involvement. Similarly, the trivial role played by neighborhood socio-political environment indicates that people "carry around" with them their predispositions to participate, and are not significantly influenced by "immediate" socio-political milieu. "Local" influences such as ward social-status level or turnout level no longer—if ever—have strong influence on involvement, apart from personal characteristics of individuals living in the ward. Religion, ethnicity, nativity seem similar: characteristics people "carry around" and perhaps more stable than influences deriving from geography and location (e.g., ward, residence, and/or mobility)—but we do not have space to examine these factors further.

It is surprising that the predispositional factors—efficacy, civic duty, alienation—do not exhibit greater influence than they do, in light of the considerable social-psychological literature stressing individual decision and choice in political behavior. Since we are unprepared to argue that the four Wisconsin cities are different from other communities as data sources, we suggest that previous studies have not taken into account a wide enough range of structural conditions affecting voting and political involvement.

It is formally possible for any person to become involved (as defined); but the fact that high-status, home-owning, organizationally-active persons provide half of all highly involved persons suggests that politics in American cities is probably disproportionately influenced by the norms and values characteristic of that group—*if* it is a group with distinctive norms and values.

The advantage of restricting inquiry to relatively "hard" structural conditions (such as the three prime indicators here) is that one avoids the easy assumption that "anyone can become involved if he wants to," that politics is a matter of will-power—entirely up to the individual to acquire or not. This assumption—a myth of "equal political opportunity" as it were—is analogous to that in economics: that involvement is merely a matter of desire and that any one who wishes to, by dint of hard labor, can become a fully participating member of the economic system. The difficulties with this view are perhaps more apparent with respect to the economy than the polity, but it can reasonably be argued that structural barriers to involvement are similar in both spheres.

Those persons drawn into organizational activity, having a certain stability of residence in the community, and having high status provide the bulk of those actively involved in local government and politics. These conditions, in turn, may be highly correlated with a sense of political confidence or efficacy, but surely primarily as causes, not consequences. Individual voting acts in particular elections constitute true "decisions" in the sense usually meant, but involvement *rates* are more than aggregates of decisions, to the extent that they are systematically correlated with the social structuring of group memberships, attachments, and stratification. If political involvement is thus linked with social structure, involvement rates are undoubtedly linked to the political role-structure of the society. To be specific, when we find that better-educated persons vote more frequently than less-educated, we have not explained this by asserting that better-educated people are more likely to "decide" to vote than less well educated. The level of explanation or understanding more appropriate to the empirical finding is to look to the definitions of appropriate behavior for particular categories of persons in the society, i.e., the norms governing political participation and involvement.

Political involvement may be a characteristic of a political "stratum"[18] which, in a society like the United States, has much the same character as the social stratification system. High status (political *or* social) is formally accessible to all, but limited in fact—by background, training, and selection. Political involvement is an attribute of a politically-organized stratum which—like social class strata—need not be cohesive, but may be internally divided and represent only partially consistent interests and values.

Political involvement may thus be usefully conceived as a social role, with attached normative expectations for self and others, varying with group and community membership, containing the possibility of role conflict, role sets, and role change. Involvement thus is connected with social and political structures through processes of role definition and learning. (One asks, how do people come to see themselves as related to politics? How and when is political role fixed? How does it change? How is it related to other roles?) Viewing involvement thus, we attempt to avoid reifying a classification of individuals, something hard to do when analyzing survey data from one point in time. High level of involvement is not assumed to be a *permanent* characteristic of an individual, but only partial, segmentary, subject to pressures for change either for intensification or abandonment. When a political role becomes permanent and central, we normally refer to the "professional politician"—but this is not the central role for most persons and, therefore, the structural conditions under which political roles are played become important.

That there are several independent sources of local political involvement means that one can neither explain nor understand the course of controversial issues with reference to a single underlying dimension. Interest, information, meeting-attendance, voting turnout—these arise from a number of independently varying causes which cannot be reduced to a single origin.

---

[18] Our article cited in footnote 2 above treats the formal leadership of the four Wisconsin cities as such a political stratum.

MALAPPORTIONMENT PARTY COMPETITION, AND THE FUNCTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES*

ALLAN G. PULSIPHER
Southern Illinois University

JAMES L. WEATHERBY, JR.
University of Minnesota

I. INTRODUCTION

Most students of American politics traditionally have argued that it is desirable that legislative apportionment systems conform as closely as possible to an ideal of numerical equality,[1] and that it is desirable that major political parties actively compete for elective office.[2] Admittedly this argument has been in large part only implicit, but, since most theoretical argument in political science has been implicit,[3] this does not imply that apportionment or party competition have not been considered to be important by students of politics. Indeed several recent articles in professional journals have been published which seem to derive at least a portion of their appeal and *raison d'être* from a "demonstration" that students of politics have been guilty of the sin of credulity by holding these implicit beliefs.

The tone of much of this work is aptly expressed by the title of a popularizing article by David Brady and Douglas Edmonds, "One Man, One Vote—So What?"[4] Brady and Edmonds—after some extensive, but, unfornately not very discriminating statistical computations—concluded "that the whole Pandora's box of evil consequences which supposedly result from malapportionment—from right-to-work laws to not spending enough on school children—really has little to do with malapportionment."[5] Although somewhat more cautious in his approach, Thomas R. Dye reached the similar conclusion that "on the whole, the policy choices of malapportioned legislatures are not noticeably different from policy choices of well-apportioned legislatures."[6] And Richard I. Hofferbert also concluded a non-parametric analysis in the same sceptical vein by writing, "structural characteristics and, if one prefers to give partisan variables a separate berth, the nature of the party system and its operation do not seem to go very far toward explaining the kind of politics produced in the states."[7]

---

* Some of the research reported in this paper was done while both authors were staff members of the Community Service Seminar and Research Program at Texas A&M University, an activity jointly funded by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare under Title One of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and the Coordinating Board of the Texas College and University System. The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of this program in the preparation of their research. We would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Claude A. Bitner, Jr. of the University of Houston, Claude Davis of Texas A&M University, Neil Wallace of the University of Minnesota and a referee on earlier drafts of this paper.

[1] Numerical equality is, of course, merely one ideal, and it is certainly an ideal which is neither very confining nor demanding. It is in no way necessarily related to other characteristics which are normally considered to be desirable in a system of representation. Gerrymandering, for example, does not necessarily require deviations from numerical equality, and, given certain characteristics of the geographical distribution of the electorate, gerrymandering itself may be a force tending to produce numerical equality.

[2] We realize that competition between major political parties is not the only form of political competition which is important in the United States. Clearly in many states competition *within* one or the other of the major political parties is much more important than that between parties. A study with more ambitious objectives than ours would have to explore the influence of this and other types of political competition. Our investigation should be viewed as an attempt merely to explore the influence of strength of competition between the two major parties upon state and local expenditure patterns.

[3] For an excellent discussion of implicit theorizing in political science see Charles E. Lindblom's "In Praise of Political Science" *World Politics*, 24 (Jan., 1958).

[4] *Trans-action*, 4 (March, 1967), 41–46.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[6] "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States," *Journal of Politics*, 27 (August, 1965), 599.

[7] "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW, 60 (March, 1966), 82.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to furnish a grain of scholarly salt for assertions of this type. Rather than attempting to accomplish this objective by engaging in the necessarily tedious process of immanent criticism, we will present the results of a study which indicate that malapportionment and party competition are associated with policy choices in a statistically significant manner.

Specifically, this study has three principal objectives. They are:

1. To formulate some consistent, but only exploratory, hypotheses about the possible relationship between differences in the apportionment patterns and levels of major party competition among the American States and differences in per capita expenditure levels in these states for some selected governmental functions.
2. To organize these hypotheses in a manner which will allow multivariate statistical techniques to be used legitimately to test the explanatory usefulness of these hypotheses.
3. To statistically test these hypotheses and discuss some of the implications and limitations of these tests and their results.

II. THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE HYPOTHESES

The formulation of the Hypotheses. The hypotheses concerning the influence of malapportionment and party competition are formulated in the following manner.

Hypothesis I.—The greater the degree of apportionment in a state, the *lower* the level of per capita expenditure will tend to be *for the governmental function in question.*

We interpret this hypothesis to be consistent with the following two premises:

Premise I.1.—The greater the degree of malapportionment in a state, the greater will tend to be the divergence between the actual results of the political decision-making process and the "true" preferences of the electorate for the category of governmental expenditures in question.

Premise I.2.—The "true" preferences of the electorate call for a higher level of expenditure on the function in question than the actual level produced by the political decision-making process.

We wish to postulate these two premises for two reasons. The first is that they make explicit how we will interpret an empirical affirmation of the validity of Hypothesis I. The second is that these premises will be used in our analysis of the second major hypothesis to insure consistency in our testing procedure.

The second hypothesis we wish to test concerns the influence of competition between the two major political parties within a state and expenditure levels within that state for the governmental functions which we have selected for study. This hypothesis is formulated in the following manner.

Hypothesis II.—The greater the degree of party competition in a state, the *higher* the level of per capita expenditures will tend to be *for the governmental function in question.*

We interpret this hypothesis to be consistent with the following two premises.

Premise II.1—The greater the degree of party competition in a state, the greater will be the degree of conformity between the actual results of the political decision-making process and the "true" preferences of the electorate for the governmental expenditure classification in question.

Premise II.2.—The "true" preferences of the electorate call for a higher level of expenditure on the function in question than the actual level produced by the political decision-making process.

The Procedure for Testing the Hypotheses. The procedure which we have used to test these two hypotheses can be outlined as follows. For each of the selected expenditure categories:

1. We test Hypothesis I using standard statistical techniques.
2. If the criteria of these tests allow us to accept Hypothesis I, then we proceed to test Hypothesis II using the same techniques.
3. If Hypothesis II satisfies the criteria of the test it is accepted, if it does not it is rejected.
4. However, if the criteria of the tests used do not allow us to accept Hypothesis I we make no attempt to test Hypothesis II.

Although somewhat complex, this procedure is necessary if we wish to assign internally consistent and unambiguous meaning to the results of the statistical tests of our two hypotheses. Premises I.1 and I.2 make explicit how we wish to interpret Hypothesis I, and, likewise, Premises II.1 and II.2 indicate our interpretation of Hypothesis II; but, clearly, there are also many other sets of premises which are also consistent with these two hypotheses. We cannot directly test the validity of these premises by statistical methods, but, to us, the premises seem reasonable. We can, however, insure that our interpretation of our statistical tests is consistent with our premises. This is what our testing procedure is designed to do.

The design of our testing procedure incorporates the test of Hypothesis I as a *necessary condition* (to use mathematical terms) for the testing of Hypothesis II. There are two reasons we designed the procedure in this way. One is basically a value judgement that we have made and the other concerns the statistical relationships inherent in the data available to test the hypotheses. The value judgement is that, to us, the first hypothesis seems to be the simpler and more widely accepted of the two hypotheses. It should be emphasized, however, that this "judgement" is largely an intuitive affirmation, on our part, since, frankly, we do not feel that the *a priori* theoretical analysis devoted to either hypothesis has been adequate to warrant much confidence. The statistical reason for using Hypothesis I as a necessary condition in our procedure is that the measure we have used to quantitatively approximate the concept of malapportionment is much less highly correlated with the other independent variables in our regression equations than is our measure of inter-party competition. As will be explained later, when independent variables are highly correlated with one another a statistical problem called multicollinearity is created which causes some difficulty in interpreting results. In other words, we are slightly more confident about our measurement of the relationship between malapportionment and expenditure levels than we are about our measurement of the relationship between inter-party competition and expenditure levels.

Operationally, our use of the test of Hypothesis I as a necessary condition for accepting or rejecting Hypothesis II involves the following. If we reject Hypothesis I our testing procedure stops. We make no attempt to interpret the test of Hypothesis II for that expenditure category. We feel that if we attempted to do so we would introduce ambiguity into our analysis. The premises which we have assigned, *a priori*, to the two hypotheses indicates our interpretation of them. We feel more confident that our test of Hypothesis I is adequate, therefore, if we reject Hypothesis I we are, in effect, saying that for that expenditure category Premise I.2 is subject to question. We are less confident that our test of Hypothesis II is adequate, and since Premise II.2 is identical to Premise I.2, we feel that it would be inconsistent to accept Hypothesis II if we have rejected Hypothesis I. If Hypothesis I is accepted, however, our procedure does allow us to either accept or reject Hypothesis II as indicated by the results of our statistical tests.

The objective of our testing procedure is not to attempt to verify the hypotheses we have postulated for all or even most of the functional expenditure categories of state and local governments. They are not statements that we *a priori* expect to be universally descriptive of political processes.[8] It would be naive to interpret our statistical tests as in any sense a rigorous test of the hypotheses which we have formulated or the familiar political concepts upon which these hypotheses rest. The procedure was designed merely to find those expenditure functions which are consistent with these hypotheses as we have interpreted them.

For those expenditure categories which are not empirically compatible with the hypotheses our method is inconclusive. In other words, our procedure will not divide the functions which we have selected for study into two mutually exclusive sets, one set composed of those functions which are compatible with the hypotheses and the other set composed of those which are not compatible with the hypotheses. The procedure only demonstrates that some functions are compatible. It is not powerful enough to demonstrate that (1) these are the *only* functions which are compatible or (2) that all the other functions are not compatible; i.e., the procedure only locates *some* members of the "compatible set," and *some* members of the "not compatible set."

III. VARIABLES SELECTED TO TEST THE HYPOTHESES

Dependent and Independent Variables. We have selected two groups of variables in order to explore the explanatory usefulness of our hypotheses. The first group are assumed to be the dependent variables, i.e., variables which react passively to changes in other variables. The dependent variables which we have chosen were selected from the categories of state and local expenditures as given in the *1962 Census of Governments*.[9] The full variable names and the reference abbreviations of the dependent variables selected are given in Table 1.

In order to explore the relationship between differences in per capita expenditures on the functions listed in Table 1 and differences in apportionment patterns and the degree of interparty competition, we will use two single equation regression models. The first model is:

---

[8] We do, of course, have *a priori* reasons for believing apportionment patterns and party competitiveness might influence the pattern of expenditures or we would not have undertaken this study. Two examples of the type of *a priori* argument which led us to believe that this is so are Anthony Downs' *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), especially pp. 21–74 and 114–141, and William Riker's, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

[9] U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments: 1962, Vol. IV, No. 4, Compendium of Government Finances* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 57–58.

TABLE 1. FULL VARIABLE NAME AND REFERENCE ABBREVIATION FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLES[a]

Full Variable Name	Reference Abbreviation
1. Total General Expenditure of State and Local Governmental Units	1. Total Expenditure
2. Total Expenditure for Education	2. Total Education
2a. Expenditure for Institutions of Higher Education	2a. Higher Education
2b. Expenditure for Local Schools	2b. Elementary and Secondary
3. Total Expenditure for Public Welfare	3. Total Public Welfare
3a. Public Welfare Expenditure for Categorical Programs[b]	3a. Categorical Programs
3b. Public Welfare Expenditure for Other Cash Assistance Programs[c]	3b. Cash Assistance
3c. Other Public Welfare Expenditure[d]	3c. Other Public Welfare
4. Expenditure for Hospitals and Health[e]	4. Hospitals and Health
5. Expenditure for Highway Construction and Maintenance	5. Highways
6. Expenditure for Police and Local Fire Protection[e]	6. Police and Fire
7. Expenditure for Sewage and Other Sanitation[e]	7. Sanitation
8. Expenditure for Local Parks, Recreation and Natural Resources[e]	8. Recreation and Resources
9. Expenditure for Housing and Urban Renewal	9. Housing and Urban

[a] All dependent variables are measured in per capita terms.

[b] Includes total expenditure for the programs of Old Age Assistance, (OAA); Aid to the Blind, (AB); Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, (APTD); and Aid to Families with Dependent Children, (AFDC). Although these are jointly financial programs of the Federal, State, and Local Governments, the total per capita amount spent is the figure used in this study.

[c] Cash assistance includes general relief payments made to those not qualifying for categorical programs and are wholly financed by state and local governmental units.

[d] The category, "Other Public Welfare," is composed of expenditures for vendor payments, institutional care of the needy and welfare administration.

[e] Items consolidated from categories reported separately in the *Census of Governments.*

$$\frac{E}{P} = b_0 + b_1\frac{Y}{P} + \epsilon,$$

where E stands for the expenditure category under consideration, P for total population, Y for total personal income received in the state, b_0 and b_1 are constants to be statistically estimated, and ϵ is the error term. The model posits a relationship between per capita personal income in a state and that state's per capita expenditure for the function in question. There are two reasons why one would expect that this posited relationship exists. In his pioneering work on inter-state variation in the functional distribution of expenditures Solomon Fabricant concluded that differences in per capita personal income was the most important factor "causing" differences in expenditure levels.[10] Later writers have affirmed Fabricant's conclusion.[11] This is certainly not surprising. Casual

---

[10] Solomon Fabricant, *The Trend of Government Activity in the United States Since 1900,* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1952), Chapter 6.

[11] See, Glenn W. Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State and Local Government," *National Tax Journal,* 17 (March, 1964), 55–74; Seymour Sacks and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditure and Inter-Governmental Flow of Funds," *National Tax Journal,* 17 (March, 1964), 75–85; Ray W. Bahl, Jr., and Robert J. Saunders, "Determinants of Change in State and Local Government Ex-

TABLE 2. SOCIAL VARIABLES INCLUDED IN REGRESSION EQUATION FOR EACH OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES[12]

Dependent Variable	Social Variables			
	Population Density	Per Cent Population in Urban Areas	Per Cent Population Over 65	Per Cent Population Less Than 17
1. Total Expenditure	Included	—	—	—
2. Total Education	Included	—	—	—
2a. Higher Education	Included	—	—	—
2b. Elementary and Secondary	Included	—	—	Included
3. Total Public Welfare	Included	—	Included	Included
3a. Categorical Programs	Included	—	Included	Included
3b. Cash Assistance	Included	—	Included	Included
3c. Other Public Welfare	Included	—	Included	Included
4. Hospitals and Health	Included	Included	—	—
5. Highways	Included	Included	—	—
6. Police and Fire	Included	Included	—	—
7. Sanitation	Included	Included	—	—
8. Recreation and Resources	Included	—	—	—
9. Housing and Urban	Included	Included	—	—

inspection of Table 1 leads one to the common-sense conclusion that most of the expenditure categories listed are closely related to general consumption activity. And hence, just as differences in income levels is the major factor which influences general consumption activity, one would expect that these differences also would be a major factor influencing inter-state variation in expenditures in the categories in question.

This first model serves as a reference point. We use it to ascertain how much of the variation which we observe in inter-state patterns of expenditure is due merely to differences in income levels alone. We will then compare the results obtained from fitting this model to the data with the results obtained with the second model which we postulate. This second model incorporates additional "social variables" which we would also expect to influence expenditure levels plus "political variables" which attempt to quantitatively approximate the concepts of apportionment and party competition contained in our hypotheses.

Formally, this second model is:

$$\frac{E}{P} = a_0 + a_1 \frac{Y}{P} + a_2 Z + \epsilon^*,$$

where E, P, and Y are defined as in the first model, and a_0 and a_1 are constants to be statistically estimated, Z is the transpose of a 1-by-m vector of social and political variables, a_2 is a 1-by-m vector of constants to be estimated and ϵ^* is the error term.

Verbally, this second regression model is simply the first model plus some social variables, which we also expect to be related to various expenditure categories, and the political variables whose influence, if any, we are seeking to ascertain. This model may be thought of as an attempt to "hold constant" income levels and some other social factors which might reasonably be expected to influence expenditure levels in order to explore the influence the political variables have upon expenditure levels. In other words, our method allows us to attempt to verify the hypotheses stated in section one while accounting for the influence of other fac-

---

penditures," *National Tax Journal*, 18 (March, 1965), 50–57; and Elliot R. Morse, "Some Thoughts on the Determinants of State and Local Expenditures," *National Tax Journal*, 19 (March, 1966), 95–103. Morse's article includes an excellent discussion of the problems involved in the selection of independent variables to "explain" interstate variations in expenditure levels.

[12] The social variables, as well as the per capita personal income figure, are taken from U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1964* (85th edition; Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 11 and p. 329. Alaska and Hawaii are omitted from the analysis because data upon which the political variables are based are not available.

tors which could also reasonably be expected to influence expenditure levels. If these other influences are not accounted for, one would, in effect be arguing that differences in political structure and process *dominate* all other factors which influence governmental expenditure levels. This is an argument which we would not like to make.

The Selection of Social Variables. The term "social variable" is used here to refer to a group of demographic measures which are used as independent variables in the second model postulated. The social variables which were incorporated into the second model for each of the selected expenditure categories are summarized in Table 2.

The selection of the particular set of social variables for each of the expenditure categories was the result of a compromise between two desires. The first was the desire to include in the analysis measures which would be capable of distinguishing different types of population structures and distributions among the states. The second was the desire to avoid statistical difficulties arising from the nature of the available data that would make the results of even a tentative and exploratory analysis, such as ours, difficult to interpret.

It is desirable to include in the analysis measures which would reflect differences in the structure of the population and its geographical distribution, because one would expect that such differences would be associated with differences in the "true" preference patterns of the corresponding electorate. To give an obvious example, the larger the proportion of the population of school-age children, the higher the level of per capita expenditures on education which the electorate could be expected to desire. To the extent that such factors are not accounted for by our statistical techniques, the tests of the hypotheses become weaker.

If, however, we attempted to strengthen the tests by including a larger and larger number of social variables into the regression model, we would encounter diminishing and, in fact, negative returns quite abruptly. The principal reason that this is so is that multicollinearity between the independent variables becomes more probable as the number of variables increases.

Multicollinearity is created when the independent variables in a regression equation are highly correlated with each other. When such a situation exists, it is difficult to ascertain the relationship which may exist between the dependent variable and the individual independent variables. If one is interested only in the relationship between the dependent variable and a combined set of independent variables, then multicollinearity causes no difficulties in interpretation. However, to test the hypotheses we have formulated meaningfully, we must be able to ascertain if statistically significant relationships exist between the dependent variables and our measures of political structure. Unfortunately, many of the available demographic measures are highly correlated with both per capita personal income and the political measures which we wish to use. Hence, we have deliberately limited the number of social variables, and tried to use only those social variables which are not highly correlated with other independent variables.[13]

The Choice of Political Variables. To test the hypotheses described in the first section of this paper, it was necessary to obtain quantitative approximations of the qualitative concepts of apportionment and political competition.

The quantitative measure of apportionment

---

[13] We do not intend to imply that our analysis is completely free from multicollinearity difficulties. As can be seen below we still have a few independent variables which are correlated with one another in the same regression equation. These simple correlations are

Independent Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Income per capita	—					
2. Per cent Urban	.68	—				
3. Population Density	.45	.58	—			
4. Per cent of Population Greater than 65	.12	−.03	.13	—		
5. Per cent of Population Less than 18	−.58	−.54	−.54	−.59	—	
6. Party Competition	.75	.47	.30	.19	−.29	—
7. Apportionment Score	.11	−.01	.13	.18	−.12	.23

As we have previously indicated, the simple correlation which gives us the longest pause for thought is the .75 correlation between personal income per capita and our index of party competition. We do not feel that this level causes serious problems of interpretation although undoubtedly it does dim the clarity of our results. We do not feel that any of the other correlations are of sufficient magnitude to introduce serious multicollinearity problems in our analysis.

chosen was the "apportionment score" constructed by Glendon Schubert and Charles Press.[14] This measure was chosen for the following reasons: (1) It is constructed from standard statistical measures whose characteristics are well known; (2) the political assumptions of the measure were made explicit and seem reasonable; and (3) The data used to construct the index were gathered prior to the decision in *Baker* v. *Carr*; hence, the "score" does not reflect the chaos of the aftermath of that decision.

The principal weakness[15] of the measure for our purposes is that it is based upon a single set of cross-section data, i.e., the measure reflects apportionment patterns as they existed at a single point in time. A measure which was influenced by apportionment patterns as they existed in previous periods would be more suitable for our methods and objectives, but, unfortunately, is not yet available.

In an attempt to quantitatively approximate the concept of political competition, a numerical index was constructed from data and measures which Richard Hofferbert had used to construct an ordinal index inter-party competition.[16] To construct his index Hofferbert used the votes cast for each of the two major political party candidates in the presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections during the period 1932 through 1964. Because we were interested only in state and local expenditures we based our index solely upon the gubernatorial elections.[17] Hofferbert used three different measures, based on this data, to construct his index. They were: (1) The "over-all score," (OV), which is simply the percentage of elections won by the party winning the majority of elections during the period; (2) the "cyclical score," (CY), which is simply the percentage of elections in which the party that was in power was defeated by its opposition; and, (3) the "mean percentage of the losing party vote," ($\overline{\text{V}}$), which is self-explanatory.

Using the gubernatorial data, we combined these measures into a cardinal index of party competition (IPC) of the following form:

$$\text{IPC} = 1/3\Biggl[\biggl(\frac{100\text{-OV}}{\text{OV}}\biggr) + \biggl(\frac{\text{CY}}{50}\biggr)\biggl(+ \biggr)\frac{\overline{\text{V}}}{50}\biggr)\Biggr]$$

In this form the components of the index receive equal weight as each varies between zero and an upper limit of one, as does the index itself. The index assumes that the smaller OV (that is, the more closely it approaches its definitional minimum of 50%) and the larger that CY and $\overline{\text{V}}$ become (that is the more closely they approach their definitional maximums of 50%) the greater the degree of political competition in the state.

No profound assumptions as to the relationship which may exist between these measures and the operational characteristics of public decision-making bodies form the basis for this index. Its construction is essentially arbitrary. A considerable amount of empirical effort has been expended in attempting to measure political competition, but the theoretical analysis upon which such work must rest is so embryonic as to create a preference, at least in our minds, for naked simplicity.[18]

---

[14] The concepts upon which this score is based are presented in Glendon Schubert and Charles Press' article, "Measuring Malapportionment," this Review, 57 (June, 1964), 302–327, but the actual score used in this article is taken from a corrected version of their numerical results in "Malapportionment Remeasured," this Review, 57 (December, 1964), 578–580.

[15] The measure only relates to the "ideal" of numerical equality, and as we have indicated in note 1, this "ideal" has limited theoretical appeal. We have explored the possibility of constructing a measure of "representativeness" which incorporated measurements of gerrymandering as well as deviations from numerical equality. We have, so far, been thwarted in our attempt to construct such a measure, not by difficulties in empirical measurement, but by inadequate specification by political theorists of what gerrymandering "really is." The statistical problems in measuring gerrymandering do not seem to be too serious, but it is impossible to "measure" something which has not been adequately described.

[16] Richard I. Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (August, 1964), 562–563.

[17] Certainly party competition in Presidential and Senatorial campaigns reflects competitiveness, but, we felt that perhaps these elections are more subject to the influence of issues unrelated to state and local spending decisions than was the gubernatorial election. Ideally we would like to use a measure which is influenced by a much wider range of elections at the state level (particularly state legislator elections) and also competition at the local level. The construction of such a measure, however, would be a major task in itself, and one much too heroic to be attempted in a paper with objectives as modest as the present ones.

[18] The best description and criticism of this work is David G. Pfeiffer's article "The Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systematic Stability," this Review, 61 (June, 1967), 457–467. Our simple index was fabricated and the cal-

TABLE 3. COEFFICIENTS OF DETERMINATION OF CENSUS CLASSES OF STATE AND LOCAL PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE REGRESSED ON PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME AND SELECTED SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLES

Class of Expenditure Per Capita	Regressed on: (1) Personal Income Per Capita	(2) Personal Income Per Capita and Social and Political Variables
1. Total Expenditure	0.4148**	0.5815**
2. Total Education	0.2694**	0.6230**
2a. Higher Education	0.0075	0.4938**
2b. Elementary and Secondary	0.4690**	0.7318**
3. Total Public Welfare	0.0007	0.2579
3a. Categorical Programs	0.0896*	0.3618**
3b. Cash Assistance	0.2838**	0.4302**
3c. Other Public Welfare	0.2026**	0.3569**
4. Hospitals and Health	0.2355**	0.3109**
5. Highways	0.0059	0.4131**
6. Police and Fire	0.6480**	0.8335**
7. Sanitation	0.3314**	0.4496**
8. Recreation and Resources	0.0593*	0.3379**
9. Housing and Urban	0.2958**	0.6377**

* Significant at the 90% level.
** Significant at the 99% level.

IV. THE STATISTICAL TESTS

The statistical analysis presented in this paper should be viewed as rudimentary and exploratory only. It is not intended to be, nor is it, definitive in any sense of the word. Its purpose is to see if statistically significant associations exist between the measures of malapportionment and party competition which we have described and the expenditure categories which we selected. The results of these tests suggest that some associations do exist.

The Regression Models. The technique which we have used is multiple regression analysis. Our analysis consisted of two basic steps. The first was to calculate a set of simple regression equations using the first model which we described above in which each of the selected expenditure categories is assumed to be the dependent variable. The results of this analysis are summarized in Column One of Table 3, which reports the significance level and coefficient of determination of this simple regression equation for each of the selected expenditure categories. Eleven of the fourteen regression equations calculated were significant at the 90 per cent level or greater and nine were significant at the 99 per cent level.

Column Two of Table 3 records the second

TABLE 4. TESTS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ADDITION OF SELECTED SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLES TO THE REGRESSION EQUATION FOR CENSUS CLASSES OF STATE AND LOCAL PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES[a]

Class of Expenditure Per Capita	(1) Variance Ratio	(2) Significance Level
1. Total Expenditure	5.70 (3, 43)	99 per cent
2. Total Education	13.44 (3, 43)	99 per cent
2a. Higher Education	14.02 (3, 43)	99 per cent
2b. Elementary and Secondary	10.28 (4, 42)	99 per cent
3. Total Public Welfare	2.84 (5, 41)	95 per cent
3a. Categorical Programs	3.49 (5, 41)	95 per cent
3b. Cash Assistance	2.10 (5, 41)	90 per cent
3c. Other Public Welfare	1.96 (5, 41)	b
4. Hospitals and Health	1.15 (4, 42)	b
5. Highways	7.28 (4, 42)	99 per cent
6. Police and Fire	11.69 (4, 42)	99 per cent
7. Sanitation	2.25 (4, 42)	90 per cent
8. Recreation and Resources	6.03 (3, 43)	99 per cent
9. Housing and Urban	9.90 (4, 42)	99 per cent

[a] Figures in parentheses under the variance ratios are the degrees of freedom for the numerator and denominator respectively.
[b] Less than 90 per cent.

---

culations for the paper performed, unfortunately, prior to the appearance of Pfeiffer's article. Our measure does meet some of his objections to previous measures; but, more importantly—Pfeiffer's excellent analysis included—we think our assertion still stands. A *theory* of political or even party competition is yet to appear, and, until it does, most attempts at measurement are doomed to produce the sort of "*ad hoc*" results which existing measures do.

step of the analysis. This was to calculate another regression equation using the second model which again uses the expenditure categories as the dependent variables but adds the social variables outlined in Table 2 and the two political measures to form, with personal income, the set of independent variables. The regression equations so calculated were significant at the ninety per cent or higher level for all fourteen of the expenditure categories.

This result in column two is, however, misleading. As is shown in Table 4, if one tests the significance of the addition of the set social and political variables to personal income, for two of the categories, "Other Public Welfare" and "Hospitals and Health," this addition is not statistically significant. The first (expenditure category-personal income) regression model *was* statistically significant for both of these expenditure categories, and when the vector of social and political variables was added to this simple regression model the coefficient of multiple determination (R^2) term *did* increase. However, this is always the result when additional independent variables are added to a regression equation—the R^2 term always increases. Therefore, if one wishes to make any statements about the relationship between the independent variables added to the regression equation and the dependent variable, then one must ascertain whether or not these *added* variables are significantly related to the dependent variable, i.e., whether or not the increase in the R^2 term is due merely to chance. Because the addition of these social and political variables was not significant for the two expenditure categories are excluded from further analysis.

The complete regression equations for each of the remaining expenditure categories with which our analysis will be concerned (those expenditure categories for which the addition of the vector of political and social variables was found to be significant) are shown in Table 5.

Significance Levels. Table 6 records the significance levels of each of the individual regression coefficients appearing in the equation in Table 5. Each regression coefficient measures the relationship between the individual independent variable and the dependent variable. The significance level of a regression coefficient can be thought of as the level of probability with which one can stipulate that the relationship which the regression coefficient attempts to measure is not due to chance. In other words, the probability that the true regression coefficient is not equal to zero. To ascertain this probability we, formally, postulate two mutually exclusive statements concerning the regression coefficient. One of these statements postulates that the regression coefficient is not equal to zero and is called the null hypothesis. The other postulates that the regression coefficient is equal to zero and is called the alternative hypothesis.

If the null hypothesis were accepted when in fact the alternative hypothesis is true, this is described as the commission of a "type one error." The significance level is equal to one minus the probability of a type one error.

An important difference in the types of significance levels which are recorded in Table 6 should be noted. For all of the independent variables except the political variables we are merely interested in the probability that the relationship estimated by the regression coefficient exists, i.e., the probability that the coefficient is not equal to zero. However, in formulating the two hypotheses we stipulate not only that a relationship between the dependent variable and respective independent political variables exists, but, also, that this relationship is of a specified type. The hypotheses postulate that the relationship between malapportionment and the dependent variable will be inverse (this means that the coefficient will be less than zero) and that the relationship between party competition and the dependent variable will be direct (this means that the coefficient will be greater than zero).

This stipulation means that the relevant probabilities for testing the hypotheses are: (1) the probability that the coefficient of malapportionment variable exists and is less than zero, and (2) the probability that the coefficient of the party competition variable exists and is greater than zero. Therefore the significance level for these two variables is equal to one minus the probability that we have accepted the null hypotheses that the coefficients of the political variables are either positive or negative when in fact they are not.

In statistical terms this merely means that a "one-tailed" "t" test is appropriate for calculating the significance levels for the two political variables and a "two-tailed" "t" test is the appropriate one for the remaining variables.

Testing Procedure. The statistical criteria we have used in our testing procedure is that the significance of the relevant political variable equal or exceed a predetermined level. The significance level which one wishes to use depends upon the objectives of his study and the probable repercussions of erroneously accepting the hypothesis which he is testing. Since our study is admittedly exploratory and intended to be suggestive rather than definitive, we have used two different significance levels in reporting the results of our testing procedure.

TABLE 5. REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR FOURTEEN CLASSES OF PER CAPITA STATE AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES

Class of Expenditure Per Capita	Constant	Personal Income Per Capita	Social Variables				Political Variables		R²
			Per cent Urban	Population Density	Per cent of Population Greater than Sixty-five	Per cent of Population Less than Seventeen	Malapportionment	Party Competition	
1. Total Expenditure	119.884	91.028	ni	−0.123	ni	ni	−0.321	0.614	0.582
	(39.760)	(22.594)		(0.035)			(0.261)	(0.398)	
2. Total Education	60.488	21.797	ni	−0.068	ni	ni	−0.148	0.552	0.623
	(15.847)	(9.006)		(0.014)			(0.104)	(0.159)	
2a. Higher Education	21.649	−0.070	ni	−0.033	ni	ni	−0.076	0.221	0.498
	(7.067)	(4.016)		(0.006)			(0.046)	(0.071)	
2b. Elementary and Secondary	−60.831	30.778	ni	−0.025	ni	2.218	−0.052	0.260	0.732
	(36.511)	(6.294)		(0.009)		(0.784)	(0.063)	(0.100)	
3. Total Public Welfare	160.724	−15.646	ni	−0.010	−0.717	−2.644	−0.102	0.220	0.258
	(53.698)	(6.371)		(0.008)	(1.182)	(1.004)	(0.055)	(0.097)	
3a. Categorical Programs	156.822	−16.741	ni	−0.011	−1.271	−2.486	−0.106	0.152	0.362
	(41.603)	(4.936)		(0.006)	(0.916)	(0.788)	(0.043)	(0.075)	
3k. Cash Assistance	0.390	0.434	ni	0.001	0.017	−0.043	0.011	0.012	0.430
	(5.184)	(0.615)		(0.001)	(0.114)	(0.097)	(0.005)	(0.009)	
3c. Other Public Welfare	0.143	3.553	ni	ni	ni	ni	ni	ni	0.203
	(2.351)	(1.039)							
4. Hospitals and Health	5.165	7.038	ni	ni	ni	ni	ni	ni	0.236
	(4.229)	(1.870)							
5. Highways	64.308	26.016	−0.976	−0.034	ni	ni	−0.014	0.179	0.413
	(18.620)	(11.372)	(0.278)	(0.017)			(0.118)	(0.177)	
6. Police and Fire	−10.095	6.832	0.168	0.005	ni	ni	0.011	−0.039	0.834
	(2.404)	(1.468)	(0.036)	(0.002)			(0.015)	(0.023)	
7. Sanitation	−1.149	0.939	0.110	−0.002	ni	ni	−0.006	0.040	0.450
	(2.820)	(1.722)	(0.042)	(0.003)			(0.018)	(0.027)	
8. Recreation and Resources	3.570	4.123	ni	−0.016	ni	ni	−0.021	0.061	0.338
	(4.750)	(2.703)		(0.004)			(0.031)	(0.048)	
9. Housing and Urban	−5.353	4.271	0.029	0.011	ni	ni	−0.023	−0.050	0.638
	(2.616)	(1.589)	(0.039)	(0.002)			(0.017)	(0.025)	

Notes: ni: not included

The standard errors of the individual coefficients appear in parentheses below the regression coefficient.

TABLE 6. SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS OF THE INDIVIDUAL-COEFFICIENTS OF THE REGRESSION EQUATIONS IN TABLE 5.

			Social Variables*				Political Variables**	
Class of Expenditure Per Capita	Constant*	Personal Income Per Capita*	Per cent Urban	Population Density	Per cent of Population Greater than Sixty-five	Per cent of Population Less than Seventeen	Malapportionment	Party Competition
1. Total General	99	99	ni	99	ni	ni	85	90
2. Total Educational	99	95	ni	99	ni	ni	90	99.5
2a. Higher Education	99	a	ni	99	ni	ni	90	99.5
2b. Elementary and Secondary	90	99	ni	99	ni	99	75	99
3. Total Public Welfare	99	98	ni	70	a	99	95	97.5
3a. Categorical Programs	99	99	ni	80	80	99	99	95
3b. Cash Assistance	a	a	ni	a	a	a	a	85
3c. Other Public Welfare	a	99	ni	ni	ni	ni	ni	ni
4. Hospitals and Health	70	99	ni	ni	ni	ni	ni	ni
5. Highways	99	95	99	90	ni	ni	a	80
6. Police and Fire	99	99	99	95	ni	ni	a	a
7. Sewage and Sanitation	a	a	99	a	ni	ni	a	90
8. Recreation and Resources	a	80	ni	99	ni	ni	70	85
9. Housing and Urban Renewal	95	99	a	99	ni	ni	90	a

[a] Less than 70 per cent

* Calculated using a "two-tailed" "t" test.

** Calculated using a "one-tailed" "t" test.

[ni] not included.

Table 7 summarizes the steps in our testing procedure and the results of these tests if a significance level of 80 per cent is used. In Table 8 the same procedure is summarized, but a significance level of 90 per cent is used. Although both of these tables are intended to be self-explanatory, it might be useful to trace some expenditure categories through the tables in order to summarize explicitly the assumptions and criteria of our testing procedure.

Consider expenditure category number one, "Total Expenditure," in Table 7. The second column of this table is taken from Table 4. It records whether of not the addition of the vector of social and political variables to the first simple regression model, (expenditure category—personal income), was significant at a level equal to or greater than 90 per cent. For "Total Expenditure" the addition of this vector was significant. If it had not been, we would not proceed with the testing procedure for this expenditure category because the vector of social and political variables did not increase the explanatory value of the regression model in a statistically significant manner. Column three is the next step in the testing procedure. It is taken from Table 5. It records whether or not the regression coefficient of the malapportionment variable is negative; if it is not the hypothesis is rejected. For "Total Expenditure" this was not the case; hence the analysis proceeds to column four. Column four is taken from Table 6 and records whether or not the significance level of the malapportionment term equals or exceeds 80 per cent. To reiterate, this means that the probability that we have *not* accepted the statement that the regression coefficient in question is less than zero, when in fact it is equal to or greater than zero equals or exceeds 80 per cent.

Because "Total Expenditure" satisfies each of the criteria described in columns two through four, we "accept" Hypothesis I for this particular expenditure category.

It should be recalled that in our testing procedure we use the test of Hypothesis I as a necessary condition which must be satisfied in order to proceed with the testing of Hypothesis II. Because we accept Hypothesis I for this expenditure category, we are able to continue with our testing procedure for either accepting or rejecting Hypothesis II. If our testing procedure had not permitted us to accept Hypothesis I we would not test Hypothesis II because we would not feel confident in assigning meaning to the empirical tests, for the reasons we have previously outlined.

Moving to columns six and seven in Table 7 we find that for "Total Expenditure" the sign of the inter-party competition coefficient is in the direction postulated by the hypothesis, and that the significance level of the coefficient exceeds 80 per cent. Hence, we also accept the Hypothesis II for this expenditure category.

TABLE 7. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURE AND RESULTS OF TESTING HYPOTHESES AT SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL OF 80%

(1) Expenditure Categories	(2) Addition of Political and Social Variables Significant (From Table IV)	(3) Negative Sign for Malapportionment Variable (From Table V)	(4) Significance Level for Malapportionment Variable Equal to or Greater than 80% (From Table VI)	(5) Accept or Reject Hypothesis One, (Columns 2–4)	(6) Positive Sign for Party Competition Variable (From Table V)	(7) Significance Level for Party Competition Variable Equal to or Greater than 80% (From Table VI)	(8) Accept or Reject Hypothesis Two, (Columns 5–7)
1. Total Expenditure	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept
2. Total Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept
2a. Higher Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept
2b. Elementary and Secondary	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
3. Total Public Welfare	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept
3a. Categorical Programs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept
3b. Cash Assistance	Yes	No	N.A.	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
3c. Other Public Welfare	No	N.A.	N.A.	No Test	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
4. Hospitals and Health	No	N.A.	N.A.	No Test	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
5. Highways	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
6. Police and Fire	Yes	No	N.A.	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
7. Sanitation	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
8. Recreation and Resources	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
9. Housing and Urban	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	No	N.A.	Reject

To trace, briefly, an expenditure category for which different conclusions are required, consider the last expenditure category, "Housing and Urban." For this category the criteria described in columns two, three, and four are satisfied and we accept Hypothesis I. Making the same assumptions as before we then proceed to investigate Hypothesis II. In the case of "Housing and Urban," however, the sign of the coefficient for the inter-party competition term is negative. This is sufficient information to reject Hypothesis II without reference to the significance level of the coefficient.

We feel that we are able to *reject* this hypothesis for "Housing and Urban" because we had previously accepted Hypothesis I which we have interpreted as being consistent with the statement that the "true" preferences of the electorate indicate a higher level of per capita expenditure for "Housing and Urban" than the level actually produced. For those expenditure categories for which Hypothesis I is rejected, as in the case of "Highways" we cannot accept this proposition. As a result, we are unable to test Hypothesis II within the constraints which we have imposed upon our procedure. But it must be emphasized that in such cases where we are unable to test an hypothesis, there is no inference made about whether or not the hypothesis would have been accepted or rejected if we had been able to test it.

The narrative need not be extended by discussing the results of our tests for each expenditure category separately. At the eighty per cent significance level we accepted Hypothesis I for for six of the fourteen categories. We rejected the hypothesis in six cases and were unable to test the hypothesis for the remaining two expenditure categories. We were able to test Hypothesis II only for the six categories for which we had accepted Hypothesis I. For five of these six categories we were also able to accept Hypothesis II, and for the sixth the hypothesis was rejected. It is interesting to note that the categories for which both hypotheses were accepted comprise some of the more important categories of state and local expenditure, and the acceptance of the hypotheses would seem to suggest that apportionment patterns and levels of political competition are more potent influences

TABLE 8. SUMMARY OF PROCEDURE AND RESULTS OF TESTING HYPOTHESES AT SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL OF 90%

(1) Expenditure Categories	(2) Addition of Political and Social Variables Significant (From Table IV)	(3) Negative Sign for Malapportionment Variable (From Table V)	(4) Significance Level for Malapportionment Variable Equal to or Greater than 90% (From Table VI)	(5) Accept or Reject Hypothesis One, (Columns 2–4)	(6) Positive Sign for Party Competition Variable (From Table V)	(7) Significance Level for Party Competition Variable Equal to or Greater than 90% (From Table VI)	(8) Accept or Reject Hypothesis Two, (Columns 5–7)
1. Total Expenditure	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
2. Total Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept
2a. Higher Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept
2b. Elementary and Secondary	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
3. Total Public Welfare	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	No	Reject
3a. Categorical Programs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	Yes	Yes	Accept
3b. Cash Assistance	Yes	No	N.A.	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
3c. Other Public Welfare	No	N.A.	N.A.	No Test	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
4. Hospitals and Health	No	N.A.	N.A.	No Test	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
5. Highways	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
6. Police and Fire	Yes	No	N.A.	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
7. Sanitation	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
8. Recreation and Resources	Yes	Yes	No	Reject	N.A.	N.A.	No Test
9. Housing and Urban	Yes	Yes	Yes	Accept	No	N.A.	Reject

than some of the recent literature referred to above would lead one to believe.

In Table 8, where the significance level is increased to the ninety per cent level, Hypothesis I is accepted for five of the expenditure categories and rejected for the other seven categories. Of the five for which the hypothesis was accepted, Hypothesis II also was accepted in three cases and rejected in the remaining two.

V. CONCLUSION

This paper has explored the relationship between malapportionment, party competition and some selected functional categories of governmental expenditures. A logical and statistical methodological procedure has been used to explore this relationship which was designed to be confining. The reasons for using a confining methodological procedure are to make the theoretical and statistical assumption of the analysis as clear and explicit as possible, to emphasize exactly what was and was not done, and to attempt to encourage further investigation by providing some exploratory, but carefully defined, results. It has been shown that within this confining methodological procedure it is possible to accept the hypotheses that malapportionment tends to depress and party competition tends to elevate some of the more important categories of state and local governmental expenditure.

We have tried to emphasize the tentative and exploratory nature of our study. Perhaps we have unduly belabored the point. But we do feel strongly that a study much more ambitious than ours, or than those which have reached conclusions dissimilar to ours, is required before definitive answers to questions such as those we have explored ought to be offered. In our view the principal obstacles which such a study would have to surmount are not statistical but theoretical and conceptual. More complete and disaggregative data would have to be assembled, but, at worst, this is merely an expensive and dull task. Both the data and the techniques of measurement and inference exist, but to be used intelligently the relevant relationships to measure must be stipulated.

AGENCY REQUESTS, GUBERNATORIAL SUPPORT AND BUDGET SUCCESS IN STATE LEGISLATURES*

IRA SHARKANSKY
University of Wisconsin

This is a study of the budget success of state administrative agencies. Although a number of recent studies provide valuable information about environmental influences on state and local government expenditures, relatively little is known about the factors that affect the budgets of individual administrative units.[1] Existing studies typically focus on the state as the unit of analysis, and report findings about the correlates of state (or state plus local) government expenditures in total and by the major fields of education, highways, public welfare, health, hospitals *et al.* The United States Bureau of the Census provides an invaluable service for this scholarship by collecting state and local government data and ordering it into categories that permit state-to-state comparisons. When political scientists and economists rely exclusively on Census Bureau publications, however, they preclude an attack on certain aspects of the expenditure process. In order to report data by the comparable fields of education, highways, public welfare etc., the Bureau of the Census rearranges the expenditures made by individual state agencies.[2] As a result we know little about the factors that affect the budgets of individual agencies. And because it is the agency's budget that is the focus of budget-making, we have no systematic information about many of the influences that might affect government expenditures. Chief among the unknowns are the influence of each agency's budget request in the expenditure process, and the support given to the agencies by the governor.

Much of the existing literature on government budgeting suggests the importance of incremental decision rules. Officials who review agency requests in the executive and legislative branches are said to have too few resources for a comprehensive examination of each agency's program. Studies of federal budgeting reveal that appropriations committees generally accept each agency's "base" of previous expenditure, and focus their attention on the requests for new funds.[3] Congress holds down the growth rate of most agency budgets, typically to within 10 percent of their existing budget.[4] The common explanation for incremental budgeting cites the difficulties associated with a comprehensive review of each agancy. Legislatures have much else to do beside reviewing past and present expenditures. To reopen past budget decisions each year would broaden the scope of political controversy. Decision-makers can limit their task by accepting their own past evaluations about each existing program, and by focusing their current inquiries on those items that an agency seeks for the first time, or those which the agency hopes to increase well beyond the limit of past funding.[5]

---

* The author wishes to thank the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Governmental and Legal Processes, and the University of Georgia's Office of General Research for their financial assistance; and Patricia Owens for her help in gathering the data.

[1] See, for example, Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Glenn W. Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State and Local Government Expenditures," *National Tax Journal*, 17 (March, 1964), 57–64; Seymour Sachs and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds," *National Tax Journal*, 17 (March, 1964), 75–85; Elliott R. Morss, J. Eric Fredland and Saul H. Hymans, "Fluctuations in State Expenditures: An Econometric Analysis," *Southern Economic Journal* (April, 1967); Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Politics in the American States," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May, 1963), 265–289; and Ira Sharkansky, "Economic and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant Cases," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 11 (May, 1967), 173–192.

[2] Most state governments have several administrative units with educational responsibilities, for example, and their titles and program responsibilities vary considerably from one state to another.

[3] Otto A. Davis, M.A.H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," this REVIEW, 60 (September, 1968), 529–547.

[4] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), Chapters 8 and 11.

[5] Charles E. Lindblom "Decision-Making in Taxation and Expenditure," in *Public Finances:*

A principal task of this study is to identify and measure some likely mechanisms of incremental budgeting in state governments. By looking at the *requests* of 592 agencies in 19 states, the *response of the governor* to agency requests, and the *action of the legislature*, it will assess the importance of incremental routines in each of these states. Then it identifies certain characteristics of each state that influence the nature of its budget procedures. The study proceeds at two levels of analysis. It first reports the results of 19 separate within-state analyses that show relationships between measures of agency success in the legislature and measures of budget size, agency acquisitiveness and gubernatorial support. Secondly, it uses these 19 states as the units of analysis, and defines the importance of certain environmental conditions for these relationships among agencies, the governor and the state legislature.

I. TECHNIQUES AND EXPECTATIONS

The complexity and individuality of state government budgets represent formidable barriers to comparative analysis. Because state budgeting proceeds with a variety of separate funds whose labels and components vary from state to state, and because the official documents vary widely in the quality of information they contain, it is necessary to eliminate over half of the state governments from this analysis. The budget documents and financial reports of 19 state governments meet the essential criteria of providing an agency-by-agency record of current expenditures; the agencies' initial requests for the coming budget period;[6] the amount recommended by the governor for each agency;[7] and the sum appropriated by the legislature. The 19 states come from each major section of the country and range in population size from Texas and Illinois to Vermont and Wyoming. They range in economic well-being (measured in per capita personal income) from Illinois and Indiana to West Virginia and South Carolina. For each major agency in these states two measures of budget success are defined. These are the dependent variables for the within-state analysis of agency budgets:[8]

Needs, Sources and Utilization (Princeton: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1961), pp. 295–333.

[6] The states included in this study—and the nature of the findings—may be affected by the requirement of separate indications for the agency's budget request and the governor's recommendation. One tenet of certain administrative reformers prescribes that public agencies *not* submit their own budget requests to the legislature. Instead, they should submit their requests to the chief executive, who should then review each agency's budget in the light of his whole program, and submit his own recommendations for each agency to the legislature. Presumably the legislature will consider only these budget recommendations of the executive, and thereby force each agency to operate within the budget limits set by the leader of the "administration team." A number of states have adopted these budget procedures, and their budgets show only the governor's recommendation for each agency. Our sample, in contrast, may be overly representative of states with "unreformed" budget procedures.

The "budget period" employed is the fiscal year or the biennium, depending upon the usage prevailing within each state. Although the use of a single year or a biennium varies from one state to another, this should not have a material effect on the findings insofar as the principal findings grow out of correlation coefficients that are calculated separately for each state. The particular years employed in the analysis of each state are indicated with the name of each state in Table 1. In each case, the most recent budget period was employed for which complete data was available. A small number of additional states publish budgetary information that would qualify them for this type of analysis. They are not included here, however, because the appropriate documents were not available.

[7] In some cases it is a budget review board, rather than the governor *per se*, that is directly responsible for the recommendation to the legislature. In each case, however, it is reported by observers native to the state that the governor's role is critical in the recommendations.

[8] All of the findings reported below for the within-state analysis of agency budgets reflects data about the "general fund" for those states that segregate the "general" fund from the "total" fund. For most states, the designation of "general" fund pertains to those moneys subject to state legislative appropriation. For those states showing both general and total fund accounts, the correlation analyses were performed twice: once with each account. However, the findings from the two analyses were not so different as to warrant separate reporting here. For each state, agencies requesting at least $500,000 were included. These are considered the "major" agencies. Supplementary appropriations are excluded from the legislature's appropriation due to lack of data. In the case of one state for which supplementary appropriations were available, the within-state analysis of agencies was run with and without the supplementals; the differences in findings appear inconsequential.

Y_1: the percentage of the agency's request for the coming budget period appropriated by the legislature (short-term success)

Y_2: the percentage of current expenditures appropriated by the legislature for the coming budget period (success in budget expansion)

The first dependent variable is labelled short-term success because of its concern with one budget period. It simply measures the success of each agency in getting from the legislature what it announces as its goals. The second dependent variable measures the willingness of the legislature to provide each agency with an increase over its current budget. Thus, it measures the increment of growth enjoyed by each unit. In most of the states there is not a significant coefficient of simple correlation between the two measures of success, indicating that they are distinct aspects of the budgetary process.

The independent variables for the within-state analysis of agency budgets are:

X_1: agency request for the coming budget period (budget size)

X_2: agency request for the coming budget period as a percentage of current expenditures (agency acquisitiveness)

X_3: the governor's recommendation for each agency as a percentage of its request (short-term support)

X_4: the governor's recommendation for each agency as a percentage of its current expenditures (support for budget expansion)

Due to the alleged conservatism of governors and legislators who review agency budgets,[9] it is expected that measures of budget size and acquisitiveness will show negative relationships with the measures of short-term support and legislative success; incremental budget reviewers should cut budgets that threaten to grow. But because an expansionist request is probably a requirement for an increase in appropriations, there are likely to be positive relationships between the measure of acquisitiveness and gubernatorial support and legislative success in budget expansion; it is probably the agencies that ask for the largest increases that receive the largest increases, even though their final appropriation is reduced substantially below their request. Because state legislators have limited investigatory resources and are poorly prepared by training or background for budget reviews,[10] it is expected that the governor's recommendation will serve as an important cue for their decisions. The measures of gubernatorial support should therefore relate closely to the measures of legislative appropriations.

Coefficients of simple correlation are computed separately for each of the nineteen states, and provide measures of association between the dependent and independent variables.[11] With these correlations, we shall also perform a causal analysis to test for the relative importance of the agencies' requests and the governor's recommendations in the decisions of the legislature.

Once we have correlation coefficients that express the prevailing relationships between agency acquisitiveness, gubernatorial support and budget success for each state, we shall employ these coefficients as dependent variables in another inquiry that focuses on the state as the unit of analysis. There we shall consider several aspects of governmental structure, political characteristics and economic resources as potential influences on relationships between agencies, the governor and the legislature. The independent variables for the state-by-state analysis are:[12]

S_1: Schlesinger's index of the Governor's potential for tenure in office[13]

---

[9] Cf. Thomas J. Anton, *The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), Chapters 5, 6.

[10] Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, *The Legislative Process in the United States* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 251 ff.

[11] The data used in this study meet two of the primary assumptions of correlation analysis: the distribution of each variable approximates normality; and all two-variable relationships are linear.

[12] Several other variables were considered, but excluded in this report because of their failure to add anything of importance to the findings reported below. Those excluded are:

a. Schlesinger's index of the Governor's formal budget powers
b. Schlesinger's index of the Governor's formal powers of appointment
c. Schlesinger's aggregate index of the Governor's formal powers
d. Ranney's measure of Democratic party strength
e. biennial compensation paid to members of the state Legislature
f. state expenditures per capita for personal services
g. total population of the state
h. number of state government departments with elected heads.

[13] Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 229.

TABLE 1. ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES BY STAGES IN THE BUDGET PROCESS OF MAJOR AGENCIES, BY STATE

State, showing years of budget analyzed and number of agencies	Agency request as per cent of current expenditure	Governor's recommendation as a per cent of agency request	Legislature's appropriation as a per cent of Gov's request	Legislature's appropriation as per cent of agency's current expenditure	Legislature's appropriation as a per cent of agency request
Florida 1965–67, $n=39$	120	90	93	109	84
Georgia 1965–67, $n=26$	153	86	100	139	87
Idaho 1967–69, $n=23$	119	93	92	109	86
Illinois 1963–65* $n=37$	118	83	102	108	85
Indiana 1965–67, $n=47$	123	83	103	112	86
Kentucky 1966–68, $n=28$	120	90	93	109	84
Louisiana 1966–67, $n=32$	121	90	101	110	91
Maine 1965–67, $n=17$	114	85	108	109	92
Nebraska 1965–67, $n=10$	122	87	119	124	104
North Carolina 1965–67, $n=61$	120	84	105	112	87
North Dakota 1965–67, $n=21$	124	74	111	111	82
South Carolina 1966–67, $n=29$	117	96	104	116	99
South Dakota 1967–68, $n=25$	136	82	98	109	80
Texas 1965–67, $n=41$	128	82	104	117	86
Vermont 1965–67, $n=17$	121	87	106	115	91
Virginia 1966–68, $n=57$	120	92	100	114	91
West Virginia 1966–67, $n=43$	125	88	92	101	81
Wisconsin 1965–67, $n=26$	115	96	98	111	94
Wyoming 1967–69, $n=13$	133	69	109	112	75

* The Illinois data comes from the Appendix of Thomas J. Anton's *The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966). All other data come from the official budgets and financial reports of the states.

S_2: Schlesinger's index of the Governor's veto power[14]
S_3: Ranney's measure of two-party competition[15]
S_4: number of elected state executive officials
S_5: percentage of voting-age population casting ballots in a recent state-wide election[16]
S_6: total state government expenditures per capita[17]
S_7: total state government debt per capita
S_8: per capita personal income of state residents

It is expected that a governor with long tenure potential and extensive veto powers will have a relatively strong position *vis a vis* the agencies and the legislature. Such governors may take a hard line in cutting agency budgets, and succeed in providing the legislature with its major budget cues. Intense party competition and high voter turnout often work in favor of high expenditures.[18] Under conditions of high turnout and competition, therefore, acquisitive agencies should be able to elicit the most support from the governor and the legislature. Where there is a large number of separately elected executive officials, it is expected that acquisitive agencies will use them as allies and have a better chance of getting the governor and legislature to approve their budgets. And because independent executives may compete with the governor in supporting agency budgets, the states with numerous elected officials may be those where the governor's recommendations are least potent in the legislature. Where state resources are as-yet uncommited, agencies may draw on the "slack" for their budgets.[19] Therefore, the states with low per capita expenditures and debt, but high per capita personal income should offer the most hospitable environments for acquisitive agencies.

Recall that the dependent variables of the state-by-state analysis will be correlation coefficients determined by the within-state analysis of agency budgets. After describing the re-

---

[14] *Loc. cit.*

[15] Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, p. 65. The measure of competition used here equals the difference between each state's score on Ranney's index of Democratic Party strength and .5000, with the result inverted so that high scores indicate high interparty competition.

[16] The data pertain to the 1964 election for U.S. Representative.

[17] The figure used is total general state government expenditures per capita in 1966.

[18] See the works of Dye and Dawson and Robinson, cited in note 1.

[19] The concept of "slack" is explained in Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 36 ff.

TABLE 2. COEFFICIENTS OF SIMPLE CORRELATION BETWEEN MEASURES OF BUDGET-SUCCESS IN THE STATE LEGISLATURE AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, BY STATE

	Correlations between short-term success and:			Correlations between budget expansion and:		
	Budget size	Agency acquisitiveness	Governor's short-term support	Budget size	Agency acquisitiveness	Governor's support for expansion
Florida	.03	−.63*	.77*	−.04	.50	.71*
Georgia	.02	−.82*	.93*	−.12	−.09	.92*
Idaho	.04	−.80*	.72*	−.14	.74*	.79*
Illinois	.03	−.51*	.79*	−.04	.81*	.81*
Indiana	.04	−.27	.86*	−.04	.99*	.99*
Kentucky	.06	−.77*	.80*	−.14	.07	.19
Louisiana	.00	−.48*	.72*	−.09	.04	.54*
Maine	.24	.18	.75*	.25	.64*	.74*
Nebraska	−.09	.51	−.54	−.06	.79*	.43
North Carolina	−.04	−.20	.99*	−.05	.93*	.99*
North Dakota	.17	−.80*	.94*	−.16	.42	.87*
South Carolina	.00	−.17	.36	−.05	.81*	.75*
South Dakota	.00	−.70*	.63*	−.15	.58*	.48*
Texas	−.25	−.06	.52*	−.10	.95*	.89*
Vermont	−.12	−.61*	.58*	.24	.37	.46
Virginia	.07	−.27*	.19	−.02	.81*	.60*
West Virginia	.01	−.65*	.61*	−.09	.22	.26
Wisconsin	−.08	−.28	.67*	−.06	−.10	.16
Wyoming	−.18	−.70*	.94*	−.13	.18	.92*

* Significant at the .05 level (see note #20).

sults of the within-state analysis, we shall specify the dependent variables for the second inquiry.

II. FINDINGS: THE CORRELATES OF AGENCY BUDGET SUCCESS

Administrative agencies and the governor play more consistent roles than the legislature in the state budget process. In each of the 19 states the major agencies requested a sizable increase (15–53 per cent) over their current appropriations for the coming year, and the governor pared down the increase in his recommendations (by 4–31 per cent). Table 1 shows the percentage changes occurring at each major stage of the budget process by states; it indicates that major agencies requested an average 24 per cent increase over their current budgets, and that the governor's recommendation trimmed an average 14 per cent from their requests. The legislature's final appropriation for these agencies typically remained close to the governor's recommendation, but varied from a cut of 8 per cent below his recommendation to an increase of 19 per cent above his recommendation. Six of the legislatures cut agency budgets below the governor's figure, and 11 appropriated more than the governor asked. In only one case, however, did a legislature (in Nebraska) give more money to the agencies than they had requested themselves. The average legislative grant for the coming period was 13 per cent below the agencies' request, but 13 per cent above the agencies' current budget.

The governor's support appears to be a critical ingredient in the success enjoyed by individual agencies in the Legislature. In 16 states there is a significant positive correlation (shown in Table 2) between the governor's support and short term success,[20] and in 14 of the states there is a similar relationship between the governor's support and success in budget expansion. A contrary finding appears only in the case of Nebraska, where a negative coefficient of .54 links the governor's recommendation with the legislature's appropriation. In 1965, the Nebraska Legislature was unique in acting consistently in opposition to the recommendations of Governor Frank B. Morrison. A reading of Nebraska newspapers during that period suggests that gubernatorial-legislative antagonism over the budget was part of a larger dispute that grew out of a tax conflict. The conservative Democratic Governor opposed any new taxes, while the Republican leadership of the Legislature sought the establishment of a state income or sales tax. Perhaps in an effort to force the Governor's acceptance of a new tax, the legislators voted more funds than the governor recommended for the major agencies. (see Table 1). The legislature was especially generous with those agencies which had suffered a budget-cut in the Governor's office (see Table 2).

---

[20] A test for significance is not, strictly speaking, applicable because the units of analysis are not chosen at random to represent a larger population. Nevertheless, the tests for significance provide a convenient device to denote relationships that are "sizeable."

The acquisitiveness of agency requests plays an important role in the budget process. There is a significant negative relationship between acquisitiveness and short-term success in 12 states and a significant positive relationship between acquisitiveness and success in budget expansion in 11 states. The legislature is most likely to trim the budgets of agencies that ask for large increases, but it is only these acquisitive agencies that can hope for a large increase to remain after the legislature has acted. The acquisitiveness of the agencies is also a factor in the governor's recommendation. Table 3 shows significant negative relationships between acquisitiveness and the governor's short-term recommendation in 14 states, and significant positive relationships between acquisitiveness and the governor's recommendation for budget expansion in 14 states. Both the governor and the legislature may be using similar decision rules: do not cut the agencies that ask for little or no increase; but do not recommend a budget expansion for those agencies that ask for little or no increase. Short term cuts are made in the budgets of acquisitive agencies, but the acquisitive agencies stand the best chance of enjoying a substantial budget increase.

TABLE 3. COEFFICIENTS OF SIMPLE CORRELATION BETWEEN MEASURES OF GUBERNATORIAL SUPPORT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, BY STATE

	Between short-term support and correlations		Between support for expansion and correlations	
	Budget size	Agency acquisitiveness	Budget size	Agency acquisitiveness
Florida	.04	−.80*	−.03	.22
Georgia	.08	−.86*	−.05	−.11
Idaho	.45*	−.70*	−.03	.99*
Illinois	.07	−.52	.00	.85*
Indiana	.10	.13	−.04	.99*
Kentucky	.18	−.94*	.02	.04
Louisiana	.12	−.82*	−.05	.37*
Maine	.08	.22	.09	.75*
Nebraska	−.23	−.59	−.27	.76*
North Carolina	−.05	−.20	−.06	.94*
North Dakota	−.01	−.84*	−.34	.39
South Carolina	.06	−.30	−.02	.77*
South Dakota	.02	−.75*	−.11	.71*
Texas	−.10	−.63*	−.04	.93*
Vermont	−.16	−.67*	.36	.85*
Virginia	.12	−.56*	−.05	.71*
West Virginia	.16	−.57*	.03	.57*
Wisconsin	−.03	−.61*	.07	.88*
Wyoming	−.15	−.82*	−.09	.28

* Significant at the .05 level (see note #20).

The absolute size of agency budget requests does not appear to influence the decisions made by the governor or legislature. Tables 2 and 3 show generally weak or inconsistent correlations between budget size and the governor's recommendations or the legislature's appropriations. Budget reviewers in the governor's office and the legislature are using procedures that serve to minimize the increments of budget growth; they are more likely to respond to the increment of change that is requested (i.e., agency acquisitiveness) than to the sheer-size of the request.

Because agency acquisitiveness shows similar relationships with both the governor's recommendation and the legislature's appropriation, one is tempted to ask if the legislature responds directly to the agencies' acquisitiveness, or merely to the governor's recommendations. The alternate explanations are conveniently depicted and analyzed with the techniques of causal inference.[21] The alternate linkages and the computations associated with them are reported in Figure 1 and Table 4. The results support the inference that the legislature responds more often to the governor's recommendations than directly to agency acquisitiveness. In the case of short-term success, the data support this for Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South

---

[21] The techniques are explained in Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), pp. 64 ff.; and demonstrated in Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," this REVIEW, 61 (March, 1967), 72–79. In this causal analysis, the author is following the convention of inferring a linkage to be absent if the difference between expected and actual findings are less than the difference for the alternative model, and if the difference between expected and actual findings is less than .10.

FIG. 1. Alternative causal models for relationships among administrative agencies, the governor and the legislature.

Model 1: *No direct link between agency acquisitiveness and Legislature.*


Agency acquisitiveness (A)
Governor's recommendation (G)
Legislative appropriation (L)

Model 2: *No direct link between Governor's recommendation and Legislature*


Agency acquisitiveness (A)
Governor's recommendation (G)
Legislative appropriation (L)

Model 3: *Links from both agency acquisitiveness and Governor's recommendation to the Legislature*


Agency acquisitiveness (A)
Governor's recommendation (G)
Legislative appropriation (L)

Carolina and Wyoming. Only in the cases of South Dakota, and Virginia does the legislature seem to respond primarily to agency acquisitiveness. In the remaining states the findings suggest that the legislature is responding to a combination of gubernatorial recommendations and agency acquisitiveness. Similar findings appear in the causal analysis of budget expansion. Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, North Carolina, North Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia and Wyoming show legislative reliance primarily on the governor's recommendation, while only South Dakota, Texas and Virginia show legislative response primarily to agency acquisitiveness.

For most of the 19 states, it is a combination of incrementalism and legislative dependence on the governor's recommendation that shapes the budgets of major agencies. Both the governor and the legislature respond to the agencies request for increments above their present expenditures, and their response serves to minimize budget growth. Also, most legislatures weigh the governor's recommendations heavily in their own decisions. Without a favorable recommendation from the governor, an agency is unlikely to enjoy any substantial increase in its appropriation.

III. THE CORRELATES OF AGENCY-GOVERNOR-LEGISLATURE RELATIONSHIPS

An examination of the correlation coefficients in Tables 2 and 3 indicates that states vary in the nature of budget relations among agencies, the governor and the legislature. Although agency acquisitiveness and the governor's recommendations generally show certain correlations with the legislature's appropriation, the strength (and occasionally the direction) of these relationships vary from state to state. By examining these variations it is possible to define the conditions under which the governor is severe or supportive in his review of agency budgets, and the conditions under which the

TABLE 4. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RELATIONSHIPS EXPECTED ON THE BASIS OF CAUSAL INFERENCES AND ACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS

	Short-term success				Program expansion			
	Expected	Actual	Difference	Model inferred	Expected	Actual	Difference	Model inferred
Florida								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG} r_{GL}$	−.62	−.63	.01	#1	.16	.50	.34	#3
$r_{GL} = r_{AG} r_{AL}$	.50	.77	.27		.11	.71	.60	
Georgia								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG} r_{GL}$	−.80	−.82	.02	#1	−.10	−.09	.01	#1
$r_{GL} = r_{AG} r_{AL}$	.71	.93	.22		.01	.92	.91	
Idaho								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG} r_{GL}$	−.50	−.80	.30	#3	.78	.74	.04	#1
$r_{GL} = r_{AG} r_{AL}$	.56	.72	.16		.73	.79	.06	
Illinois								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG} r_{GL}$	−.41	−.51	.10	#1	.69	.81	.12	#3
$r_{GL} = r_{AG} r_{AL}$	.41	.79	.38		.69	.81	.12	
Indiana								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG} r_{GL}$	−.11	−.27	.16	#3	.99	.99	.00	indeterminate
$r_{GL} = r_{AG} r_{AL}$	.04	.86	.82		.99	.99	.00	
Kentucky								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG} r_{GL}$	−.75	−.77	.02	#1	.01	.07	.06	#1
$r_{GL} = r_{AG} r_{AL}$	.72	.80	.08		.00	.19	.19	
Louisiana								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG} r_{GL}$	−.59	−.48	.11	#3	.20	.04	.16	#3
$r_{GL} = r_{AG} r_{AL}$	.39	.72	.33		.01	.54	.53	
Maine								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG} r_{GL}$	.17	.18	.01	#1	.56	.64	.08	#1
$r_{GL} = r_{AG} r_{AL}$	.04	.75	.71		.48	.74	.26	
Nebraska								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG} r_{GL}$	.32	.51	.19	#3	.33	.79	.46	#3
$r_{GL} = r_{AG} r_{AL}$	−.30	−.50	.20		.60	.43	.17	
North Carolina								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG} r_{GL}$	−.20	−.20	.00	#1	.93	.93	.00	#1
$r_{GL} = r_{AG} r_{AL}$	.04	.99	.95		.87	.79	.12	
North Dakota								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG} r_{GL}$	−.79	−.80	.01	#1	.34	.42	.08	#1
$r_{GL} = r_{AG} r_{AL}$	.67	.94	.27		.16	.87	.71	
South Carolina								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG} r_{GL}$	−.11	−.17	.06	#1	.58	.81	.23	#3
$r_{GL} = r_{AG} r_{AL}$	.05	.36	.31		.62	.75	.13	
South Dakota								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG} r_{GL}$	−.47	−.70	.23	#2	.34	.58	.24	#2
$r_{GL} = r_{AG} r_{AL}$	.53	.63	.10		.41	.48	.07	

TABLE 4—(*Continued*)

	Short-term success				Program expansion			
	Expected	Actual	Difference	Model inferred	Expected	Actual	Difference	Model inferred
Texas								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	−.33	−.06	.26	#3	.83	.95	.12	#2
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$	.04	.52	.48		.88	.89	.01	
Vermont								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	−.39	−.61	.22	#3	.39	.37	.02	#1
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$	.41	.58	.17		.31	.46	.15	
Virginia								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	−.11	−.27	.16	#2	.43	.81	.38	#2
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$	.15	.19	.04		.58	.60	.02	
West Virginia								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	−.35	−.65	.30	#3	.15	.22	.07	#1
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$	.37	.61	.24		.13	.26	.13	
Wisconsin								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	−.41	−.28	.13	#3	−.09	.16	.25	#3
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$	.17	.67	.50		.14	−.10	.24	
Wyoming								
$r_{AL} = r_{AG}r_{GL}$	−.77	−.70	.07	#1	.26	.18	.08	#1
$r_{GL} = r_{AG}r_{AL}$	.57	.94	.37		.05	.92	.87	

legislature is particularly responsive to agency acquisitiveness and the governor's recommendations. The dependent variables of this inquiry are certain correlation coefficients from Tables 2 and 3:

$r_{X_2X_3}$: the stronger the *negative* correlation between agency acquisitiveness and the governor's short-term support, the more the governor appears to be restraining the agencies' budget development

$r_{X_2X_4}$: the stronger the *positive* correlation between agency acquisitiveness and the governor's support for budget expansion, the more the governor appears to accept agency-initiated budget expansions

$r_{X_2Y_1}$: the stronger the *negative* correlation between agency acquisitiveness and short-term success in the legislature, the more the legislature appears to be restraining agency budget development

$r_{X_2Y_2}$: the stronger the *positive* correlation between agency acquisitiveness and budget-expansion in the legislature, the more the legislature appears to accept agency-initiated budget expansions

$r_{X_3Y_1}$: the stronger the *positive* correlation between the governor's short-term recommendation and the legislature's short-term appropriation, the greater the gubernatorial-legislative rapport in short-term budget making

$r_{X_4Y_2}$: the stronger the positive correlation between the governor's budget-expansion recommendation and the legislature's budget-expansion appropriation, the greater the gubernatorial-legislative rapport in budget-expansion

The independent variables for this analysis are introduced above. By examining correlation coefficients between the measures of agency-governor-legislature relationships and the measures of government structure, political characteristics and economic resources, it is possible to define certain state characteristics that support these behaviors.

Findings: *The Environment of Agency-Governor-Legislature Budget Relations.* The impact of the environment on agency-governor-legislature budget relations does not appear to be strong. Only a few of the correlation coefficients reported in Table 5 are strong enough to pass a test for statistical significance. However, by combining these significant relationships with

TABLE 5. COEFFICIENTS OF SIMPLE CORRELATION BETWEEN MEASURES OF AGENCY-GOVERNOR-LEGISLATURE RELATIONSHIPS AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	S_1: Governor tenure	S_2: Governor veto	S_3: party comp	S_4: elected execs.	S_5: voter turnout	S_6: expend/capita	S_7: debt/capita	S_8: personal income/capita
rX_2X_3: agency acquisitiveness and Gov short-term support	.15	−.52*	.16	−.08	.16	−.34	−.05	.14
rX_2X_4: agency acquisitiveness and Gov support for expansion	−.04	−.20	.34	.07	.40	−.22	−.45	.33
rX_2Y_1: acquisitiveness and Legis short-term appropriation	−.17	−.21	.07	.34	−.09	−.45	−.21	.15
rX_2Y_2: acquisitiveness and Legis expansion appropriation	.09	−.27	.14	.20	.10	−.51*	−.50*	.24
rX_3Y_1: Gov support and Legis short-term appropriation	.32	−.05	−.11	−.31	.08	.34	.21	−.06
rX_4Y_2: Gov support and Legis expansion appropriation	.38	−.01	−.17	.18	−.11	−.07	−.45	.14

* Significant at .05 level (see note #20).

those showing a magnitude of at least .30, it is possible to speculate about certain conditions that give some support to certain budget behaviors.

Two environmental characteristics associated with the governor's restraint of agency budget development are substantial veto powers and high state government expenditures.[22] Perhaps the threat of veto permits the governor to impose a severe review on the agencies when they submit requests to him. And the already-high expenditures may incline the governor against further large increases in state spending. Where the governor accepts agency requests for budget expansion, there tends to be a low state debt, high personal income, relatively intense party competition and high voter turnout.[23] Perhaps low debt and high personal income permit the governor to support agency plans for expansion. And in a high participation-competitive party situation he may be inclined to seek electoral and legislative rewards by supporting innovative agencies.

Where the legislature restrains agency budget development there is relatively high state government expenditure and a low incidence of separately elected officials.[24] Like the governor, the legislature appears to resist an acquisitive agency in the face of already high expenditures. And with a scarcity of separately elected executives, agency heads may lack for politically independent allies who can promote their budget through the legislature. Where the legislature accepts agency-initiated budget expansions there tend to be low total state expenditures and state debt.[25] Thus, the condition of still-flexible resources seems to permit the legislature (like the governor) to give some support to acquisitive agencies.

Gubernatorial-legislative rapport on short-term success is high where the governor has considerable tenure potential, where there is a scarcity of separately elected executive officials, and where total expenditures are relatively high.[26] With high tenure potential the governor may be able to elicit legislative cooperation on the expectation that he will remain in office for some time to come. The scarcity of separately elected executives may reduce the governor's competition with other power-holders for the legislature's attention. And the already-high expenditures may encourage the legislators to accept the governor's cues on the agencies' budgets. Where the governor and legislature show rapport in budget-expansion there is a similar high tenure potential and there tends to be a low state debt.[27] Perhaps the low debt constraint permits the governor and legislature to cooperate in the support of agencies that seek to expand their budgets.[28]

---

[22] The correlations indicate that high scores on veto power and expenditures correspond with high *negative* relationships between agency acquisitiveness and the governor's short-term support.

[23] The correlations indicate that low scores on debt, but high scores on party competition, voter turnout, and per capita personal income correspond with high *positive* relationships between agency acquisitiveness and the governor's support for budget expansion.

[24] The correlations indicate that high state expenditures and a low number of elected officials correspond with high *negative* relationships between agency acquisitiveness and short-term success in the legislature.

[25] The correlations indicate that low expenditures and debt correspond with high *positive* relationships between agency acquisitiveness and budget-expansion success in the legislature.

[26] The correlations indicate that high tenure potential and expenditures, but a low number of elected officials correspond with high *positive* relationships between the governor's short-term recommendation and the legislature's short-term appropriation.

IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

By means of separate correlation analyses within each of 19 states this article has defined certain relationships between administrative agencies, the governor and the legislature in state government budgeting. A favorable recommendation from the governor seems essential for agency budget success in the legislature. The agency may influence both the governor's recommendation and the legislature's appropriation by the nature of its request. Acquisitive requests generally receive severe short-run treatment from the governor and the legislature, but an acquisitive strategy appears to be essential for a significant budget expansion. On the basis of separate causal analyses for each of the 19 states, it appears that the governor's recommendation is more directly important for the legislature of more states than is the acquisitiveness of agency requests.

The findings about the interaction of agency, gubernatorial and legislative behavior help to substantiate several observations that have been made previously about executive-legislative relations and the budgetary process in American governments.[29] The reluctance of governors and legislators to support an acquisi-

---

[27] The correlations indicate that high tenure potential and low debt correspond with high *positive* relationships between the governor's recommendation and the legislature's appropriation for budget expansion.

[28] An examination of simple correlation coefficients among variables S_1—S_8 suggests that the relationships which appear most strongly in Table 5 are independent. Except for the expected relationships among turnout, competition and personal income, few of the variables show strong relationships with each other. Thus, the relationships in Table 5 involving the governor's veto, and tenure potential, and total per capita state expenditures and debt are not the product of any of the other independent variables considered in this study. The coefficients of simple correlation among the independent variables are reported here:

	S_1	S_2	S_3	S_4	S_5	S_6	S_7	S_8
S_1 governor's tenure	1.00	.06	−.34	−.32	.13	.19	.08	.30
S_2 governor's veto		1.00	.20	.22	−.24	.20	−.28	.13
S_3 party competition			1.00	.53*	−.87*	−.20	.15	−.65*
S_4 # elected executives				1.00	−.45	−.32	−.10	−.23
S_5 voter turnout					1.00	.35	−.19	.50*
S_6 expenditures/capita						1.00	.08	−.09
S_7 debt/capita							1.00	−.27
S_8 personal income/capita								1.00

* Significant at the .05 level (see note #20).

A test with regression analysis lends support to the importance of many elected officials for the legislature's short-term support of acquisitive agencies and the importance of few elected officials for governor-legislative rapport on short-term appropriations; this independent variable (S_4) shows a regression coefficient of at least 1.5 times the standard error with the appropriate dependent variables, in the presence of all other independent variables.

[29] See, for example, Arthur MacMahon, "Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse," *Political Science Quarterly*, 58 (June and September, 1943), 161–190; and 380–414; Warner Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Schilling *et al*, *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 1–266; Elias Huzar, *The Purse and the Sword* (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1950); Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964); Rufus Browning, "Innovative and Non-Innovative Decision Processes in Government Budgeting," a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September, 1963; Richard Fenno, *The Power of the Purse op. cit.*; John P. Crecine, "A Computer Simulation Model of Municipal Resource Allocation," a paper presented at the 1966 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting.

tive agency in the short term reveals the conservative bias that is built into incremental budgeting. Agencies that request little or no increase over their current budget are generally treated well by the governor and the legislature, while those seeking large increases suffer the greatest reductions in their requests. Yet an acquisitive strategy appears to be a prerequisite for a substantial budget increase. It is a rare occurrence for the governor or legislature to provide an agency with a sum larger than that it had requested. In part, this is a function of incremental budgeting. Executive and legislative budget-makers concentrate on the inspection and reduction of increments; they leave the development of increments to the agencies. At its heart, the reluctance of governors and legislators to innovate may reveal the difficult position of the generalists in their relations with agency specialists. The highly trained professional personnel in the agencies are most intimately aware of current programs and the new services that an expanded budget might produce. Chief executives and legislators have surrendered much of their innovative potential for a more limited role as reviewers of administrators' requests. And state legislators seem to have accepted a more limited supervisory role than the governors. The findings of greater importance for the governor's recommendation (rather than the agency's request) in the legislature's decisions indicates the legislature's dependence on the governor's budget cues. Perhaps this reflects the greater staff resources of the governor and the typically amateurish character of state legislatures. When they are compared to the professional analysts in the governor's office, legislators appear to have little experience in public budgeting, no professional training in a relevant discipline, an impossibly brief time to consider agency budgets and inadequate staff and clerical assistance.[30] State legislators have a desperate need for cues that will guide their budget performance and the governor's recommendation is usually the best cue available.

When the 19 states are examined for the characteristics that support various styles of relationships between agencies, the governor and the legislature, the findings shed some new light on the influence of governmental and political characteristics of the states.[31] The veto and tenure powers of the governor help to strengthen his position with both the agencies and the legislature. Because of formal prerogatives, the governor appears to be in a more secure position when he reduces agency requests and makes recommendations to the legislature; the governors that have these powers are more likely to be severe in cutting agency requests and they are more likely to be successful in their recommendations to the legislature. In contrast, the presence of numerous separately elected executives appears to benefit agencies at the governor's expense. In the states where there are many elected officials, agencies are more likely to get their acquisitive requests approved by the legislature, and the governor's recommendation is most likely to be altered in the legislature. Party competition and voter turnout also seem to strengthen the agencies' position. In states with heavy turnout and intense competition the governor is most likely to support the agencies' acquisitive requests, perhaps in an effort to assert his own identity as a program innovator. High levels of state government expenditure and debt work in opposition to agency budget aspirations. Where spending and debt is already high, both the governor and the legislature are severe in reviewing agency requests. This may be an outgrowth of incremental budgeting. The principal reviewers are conservative in their attitudes toward increases in expenditures, and they may be particularly wary of acquisitive agencies when existing state resources are already heavily committed.

---

[30] See Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, *op. cit.*, p. 251 ff.

[31] See the works by Dye, Dawson and Robinson and Sharkansky cited in note 1; plus Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW, 60 (March, 1966), 73–82.

THE SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE: AN ELITE ANALYSIS

MICHAEL P. GEHLEN AND MICHAEL McBRIDE
Purdue University

This paper is a study of the backgrounds of the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The purpose of its first part is to present and interpret certain quantitative material concerning the background characteristics of the members of the Central Committee. The conclusion elaborates premises regarding the function of co-optation in the higher Party organs and suggests possible relationships of this function to the education and career experiences of the Central Committee membership as discussed in the first part. To pursue an ideal study of this type, we recognize that extensive interviews and depth exploration of the sociological histories of the members would be desirable. In the case of the Soviet political elite such a course is obviously not possible at the present time. Nevertheless, sufficient data exist to make a modest beginning toward what we hope will help to lay a foundation for more extensive analysis of elites in the Soviet system in the future.

Two basic assumptions underlie our interest in the backgrounds of the Soviet political elite. First, and more important for this paper, is the premise that persons are co-opted into the Central Committee primarily, though not exclusively, as a result of the group associations they have made during the courses of their careers. These associations are largely career associations, and most of the members become part of the elite of important functional groups before they become members of the Party elite. Educational backgrounds, age, Party status, role associations, occupation, and other factors all converge to influence the development of the careers of the members. Our concern is with the general patterns of these and related variables among the total membership of the Central Committee.

A second and corollary premise is that the attitudes and value orientations of individual members are shaped in significant part by these background factors, especially by education, occupation, and role associations. This assumption, of course, opens the Pandora's box of how to determine ideological influence. More to the point here, however, the premise is intended to underscore the belief that many members are co-opted precisely because of their different backgrounds and career associations in order to bring people of varying experience, perceptions, and abilities toward the center of the decisional processes. This premise is predicated on the view that the Central Committee of the CPSU has become a composite of the representatives of key functional groups and is the principal medium, either through individual members or as a collective, through which the members of the Politburo regularly exchange information with the elites of the major interests in the system. Co-optation is viewed here as a rationl process of attaining group representation in order to facilitate the communications flow between the principal decision-makers and the functional groups of Soviet society and to integrate group elites into the Party-dominated system. Co-optation, therefore, is interpreted as having both representative and regulatory functions. In short, we see the membership selection and function of the Central Committee as an institutionalization of a high level communications network.

I. FINDINGS ON BIOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS

The empirical portion of this study consists of the examination of background factors of members of the Central Committee elected at the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in 1966. The data were collected from written sources, primarily from *Who's Who in the USSR,* other information made available by the institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, and official Soviet sources.[1] Of the 195 full members sufficient information was obtained on 184. Of the 165 candidate members, similar information was available on 125. The basic total population of the sample therefore is 309, although in some categories information was available on a larger number of candidates.

---

[1] The most accessible source of biographical data is the *Who's Who in the USSR, 1965–1966,* compiled by the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Germany, and published by the Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1966. Additional information is available in the files of the Institute. Short but current biographical sketches are published in the *Ezhegodnik* of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia.* More extensive biographies, though sometimes less up-to-date, are found in *Biograficheskii slovar',* produced at different times by different professional groups (scientists, engineers, *etc.*) in the USSR.

The data collected on the 309 members were classified into twenty-eight variables. Among the more important were date of birth, level of education, source of education, the learned occupation, the practiced occupation, date of admission to the CPSU, date of admission to the Central Committee, record of Party work, occupational status before and after 1953, and regon of residency. Insufficient data made some variables impossible to use. These were population of place of birth, region of birth, social class of parents and recent technological education or re-tooling. Others, which will be considered later, proved of only limited value. After the data were assembled, frequency distributions were made of all variables and their subdivisions. Then, a correlation matrix was employed in order to ascertain patterns of inter-relationships between pairs of variables.

Age and Sex. Examination of age and sex of the members of the Central Committee (CC) reveals what one might expect. The full members were slightly older than the candidates, but the average age of both groups fell into the 54–60 age category. Thirty-eight and six-tenths per cent of the full members and 22.6% of the candidates were born in the decade 1900–1909, while 45.7% of the former and 52.4% of the latter were born between 1910 and 1919. Only one person in each group was born after 1930, and only 11 of the full members and 7 of the candidates were born before 1900. In 1967, the average age of the full member was 57 and that of the candidate was slightly under 55. These figures indicate that the newly elected members kept the average age at about the same level as it had been for the CC elected in 1961.[2] (At that time 58.5% of the total membership had been born in the decade of 1900-1909.) The overwhelming number of both types of members were male. Only five full members and five candidates were women (two of the candidates for whom biographical data were unavailable were also women).

Education. The level of education of the CC membership continued to show a gradual increase as did the tendency to co-opt persons who had basically a specialized higher education. Table 1 indicates the level of education attained by the members. These figures may be compared with those representing the source of the highest degree attained by the member (Table 2). These two tables indicate a slight decline in the number of persons educated at universities and military academies from the CC elected in 1961. There was a simultaneous increase in the number that had Party schools as their only source of higher education. In regard to the technically trained, there was an increase both in number and percentage in the ranks of the full members—from 58% to 61%. However, there was a substantial decrease in technical education among the candidates. This number dropped from 83 to 64, while the size of the candidate ranks was being increased. The percentage of those so classified declined from 53.4% to 38.8%. The reasons for this shift among the candidate membership toward more exclusive education in party schools and less technical education was probably to provide compensation to the so-called "reds" or more ideologically oriented members, while the "experts" were being rewarded with full membership.

Occupation. An important aspect of educa-

TABLE 1. LEVEL AND TYPES OF EDUCATION

	Full Members		Candidate Members	
University	17	9.3%	11	8.8%
Party School only	8	4.4	15	12.0
Military Academy	15	8.1	10	8.0
Technical*	120	65.2	64	51.2
Secondary	4	2.2	2	1.6
Other	1	.5	0	0.0
No data/or none reported	19	10.3	23	18.4
	184	100%	125	100%

* Technical includes institutes, polytechnical schools, and specialized academies other than military ones.

TABLE 2. SOURCE OF HIGHEST DEGREE

	Full Members		Candidate Members	
University	14	7.6	9	7.2
Party Schools	32	17.4	28	22.4
Military Academy	16	8.7	10	8.0
Technical	100	54.4	49	39.2
Secondary	4	2.2	2	1.6
No data/none received	18	9.7	27	21.6
	184	100%	125	100%

---

[2] References to the background characteristics of the Central Committee membership between 1961 and 1966 are based on Michael P. Gehlen, "The Educational Backgrounds and Career Orientations of the Members of the Central Committee of the CPSU," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 9 (April, 1966), 11–14.

TABLE 3. LEARNED OCCUPATION

	Full Members	Candidates	Total
Engineering	42.1%	30.3%	37.5%
Science & Mathematics	5.6	3.0	4.7
Agronomy	18.5	16.2	17.5
Military	8.3	14.1	10.6
Arts & Letters	12.7	16.2	14.0
Other (mostly Party training)	12.8	20.2	15.7
	100%	100%	100%

tion is the learned occupation. The frequency of this variable was also tabulated with the related factor of the occupation practiced by the CC members during the early parts of their careers. Table 3 lists the percentages of the membership in the principal categories of learned occupations. The information in this table corresponds fairly closely with the occupations practiced by the members of the CC in the early parts of their careers. Table 4 provides the latter information, indicating the slightly higher percentage of people drawn immediately into Party work than were specifically educated for that purpose. This practice was quite probably the result of the need to fill Party posts that were associated with some productive function (*eg.* factory or kolkhoz management) that demanded technical competence.

It is suggestive from the principal occupational lines followed during the bulk of their careers that the "learned" occupations of the CC members were only selectively significant. Scientists had obviously been trained as scientists, for example, but Party workers came from a variety of educational backgrounds. In order to ascertain the career orientations pursued by individuals over a longer term period than was indicated in Table 4, occupational status was examined in two parts: first, the career orientation of each member before 1953 and, second, the career orientation after 1953. The year 1953 was chosen as the dividing line between Stalinist and post-Stalinist Russia so that any significant variation in career patterns and in means of mobility might be more accurately assessed. Career orientation was determined by the number of years a CC member had spent in a particular type of occupation. Table 5 presents the data collected on occupational status before 1953 while Table 6 presents the corresponding information for the years 1953–1966.

TABLE 4. PRACTICED OCCUPATION

	Full Members	Candidates	Total
Engineering	38.0%	26.7%	33.6%
Science & Mathematics	4.9	2.8	4.2
Agronomy	16.6	19.4	17.5
Military	9.2	13.2	10.8
Arts & Letters	15.3	16.1	15.6
Other (mostly Party work)	16.0	21.8	18.3
	100%	100%	100%

The most striking difference between the occupational associations of the full members before and after 1953 is the sharp increase in apparatus assignments from 40.0% to 54.9%. This very strongly suggests the importance of ties with the apparatus for upward mobility in the higher levels of the Party. Since most of those moving into apparatus posts had devoted most of their careers to economic or cultural activities, the increase also underscores the emphasis placed on experience in a relatively broad range of economic and cultural areas as

TABLE 5. OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF FULL MEMBERS

Occupation	Occupational Status		Occupational Status	
		Before 1953		After 1953
Party apparatchiki	74	40.0%	101	54.9%
High level bureaucrats				
(heavy industry)	25	13.6	23	12.5
(light industry)	1	.5	1	.5
(agriculture)	5	2.7	10	5.4
Low level bureaucrats				
(heavy industry)	15	8.2	0	0.0
(light industry)	1	.5	0	0.0
(agriculture)	11	6.0	0	0.0
Other bureaucrats[1]	5	2.7	12	6.5
Indeterminate[2]	3	1.6	5	2.7
Military Officers	15	8.2	14	7.6
Scientists	4	2.2	4	2.2
Writers	3	1.6	3	1.6
Journalists	1	.5	1	.5
Trade Union Officers	4	2.2	6	3.3
Workers	3	1.6	2	1.1
Others	2	1.1	2	1.1
No data	12	6.5		
	184	100.0%	184	100.0%

[1] Other bureaucrats include those in the cultural, welfare, planning, and security ministries of the government.

[2] Indeterminate includes those who spent such equal portions of their careers in both party and state work as to make it impossible to place them in either category.

one condition for the co-optation of non-professional apparatchiki into important apparatus positions. The data indicate that about one-third of the members of the Party apparatus in the 1966 Central Committee had built their earlier careers in the economic or cultural bureaucracy or some related unit of Soviet society. In addition, many of those who had been professional apparatchiki from near the outset of their careers had been intensively trained in economic and technological matters in Party schools. As a consequence of these factors, a substantial proportion of the apparatchiki themselves had acquired some measure of expertise or specialization in one or more areas outside of Party administration. The co-optation of such experienced persons into the apparatus suggests an effort on the part of the apparatchiki to enrich their own numbers with highly competent individuals who have succeeded in careers outside the apparatus and to help assure the loyalty of such experienced persons to the role of the apparatus in the system.

The priority given to continuation of the influence of the Party apparatus and to the development of heavy industry is attested to by the paucity of formal representation accorded persons in light industry and in intermediate and lower level bureaucratic positions. The fact that only one full member was associated with light industry both before and after 1953 indicates that careers in that sector of the economy have afforded little opportunity for upward mobility. On the other hand, it should be noted that a small number of the apparatchiki and of those now in the Council of Ministers have developed special competence in the light industry sector.

TABLE 6. OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF CANDIDATE MEMBERS

Occupation	Occupational Status		Occupational Status	
		Before 1953		After 1953
Party apparatchiki	50	40.0%	63	50.4%
High level bureaucrats				
(heavy industry)	9	7.2	14	11.2
(light industry)	4	3.2	5	4.0
(agriculture)	4	3.2	5	4.0
Low level bureaucrats				
(heavy industry)	4	3.2	0	0.0
(light industry)	0	0.0	0	0.0
(agriculture)	4	3.2	1	.8
Other bureaucrats[1]	3	2.4	7	5.6
Indeterminate[2]	3	2.4	4	3.2
Military Officers	11	7.2	11	8.8
Scientists	3	2.4	3	2.4
Writers	4	3.2	4	3.2
Journalists	3	2.4	2	1.6
Trade Union Officers	1	.8	4	3.2
Workers	2	1.6	2	1.6
Others	0	0.0	0	0.0
No data	20	16.0		
	125	100.0%	125	100.0%

[1] Other bureaucrats include those in the cultural, welfare, planning, and security ministries of the government.

[2] Indeterminate includes those who spent such equal portions of their careers in both party and state work as to make it impossible to place them in either category.

The same general pattern exists for the candidate membership as for the full members.

Prior Positions. A related point of particular importance is the relationship between the position occupied by an individual and his co-optation into the Central Committee. Examination of the compositions of the Central Committees elected in 1952, 1956, 1961, and 1966 reveals that at least eighty and possibly one hundred of the full members are chosen as a result of their holding particular positions.[3] The figure cannot be more precise, for the size of the Central Committee has tended to increase with each election, thereby making it difficult to ascertain whether the holders of some posts will continue to serve in the CC regardless of their personal identities. In addition to the members of the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat, who are always members of the Central Committee, there are sixty-five or more posts that carry CC membership with them. These include all the first secretaries of the Union Republic Parties, thirty-five or more first secretaries of important provincial Party organizations (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Stalingrad-Volgograd, *etc.*), and the first secretaries of the Moscow and Leningrad city Party organizations. From the government, the Chairman of the All-Union Council of Ministers, also a member of the Politburo, and at least two first deputy chairmen of the Council are members, along with the Ministers and First Deputy Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs. Besides these, the chairmen of the Republic Councils of Ministers of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and probably Georgia and Uzbekistan are Central Committee members. From the mass organizations, the first secretary of the Komsomols and the chairman of the Trade Union Council are members. Although supporting data come from a rather limited time span, it can be stated that the editor of *Pravda*, the president of the Academy of Sciences, and at least one deputy chairman of the Trade Union Council have probably become positions bringing automatic membership in the Central Committee. There have also regularly been other members of the Council of Ministers represented on the Central Committee but they have not been associated with any particular ministry.

---

[3] Compilations of the members and their positions at the time of election to the Central Committee are available in *Current Soviet Policies*, Volumes I-IV, published by Columbia University Press and by Frederick A. Praeger.

As yet, candidate membership appears to have no such strong associations with particular positions, although there are some indications of change in this regard. Perhaps as many as twenty-five provincial Party first secretarial posts have reached the point where they carry with them candidate membership. Some particular types of specialists may consistently be given candidate status but thus far there is no indication that they are chosen as a result of positions already held. In general, the Party leaders may be expected to have more flexibility in the selection of candidates.

The remaining members and candidate members of the Central Committee are not commonly associated with any special positions although the great majority of them also seem to be selected as a result of a combination of their reputations and positions. The co-optation of certain military officers, scientists, literary figures, journalists, economic planners and managers of sovnarkhozy and industrial and agricultural enterprises round out the representative significance of the institution. Some of these may achieve permanent membership. This is a distinct possibility for marshals in command of crucially stationed troops or the admirals of key fleets. It is certainly less likely for less highly institutionalized professional groups, such as writers and scientists.

The association of some positions with CC membership is undoubtedly a major reason for the relative stability of membership in recent years. Whereas there were at least two fairly sharp turnovers on the CC during the 1950's, the membership has been relatively stable since the election of the CC of 1961. In 1966, 79.4% of the 175 full members from the preceding Central Committee were re-elected, although the size was increased to 195 to allow for the cooptation of additional persons. Only 26 living members of the previous Central Committee were not returned. Seventy percent of the full members had never served as candidates, having been drawn directly into voting status. Twenty-two (12%) had served as candidates in the preceding committee. Seventy-eight per cent were elected in 1956 or later, over one-half of these in 1961.

The candidate membership experienced greater changes in 1966 than the full membership. Here it should be remembered that data were not available on 40 of the 165 candidates. The vast majority of these were new admissions. However, the data referred to in this paragraph consist of references only to 129 candidates for whom information could be collected on those variables dealing with candidate status. Of these, 51 were elected in 1966, 54 in 1961, and 6 in 1956. In short, over 84% of the 129 reached the Central Committee at or after the 20th Party Congress of 1956.

A related matter worthy of attention is that the proportion of apparatchiki and bureaucrats among the full members of the CC of 1966 did not differ significantly from that found in the CC selected in the 22nd Party Congress of 1961. On the other hand, the number of bureaucrats in the candidate membership decreased from 29.0% to 25.6%, while the proportion of apparatchiki increased over 3%. Both the apparatchiki and bureaucrats who were full members immediately prior to the 23rd Party Congress were sufficiently entrenched to discourage a serious turnover. The pressure from the conservatives, who apparently were still anxious to prevent a resurgence of Khrushchev-type reformism, was felt more keenly in the candidate membership, where the percentage of bureaucrats and technocrats declined due to an increase in apparatchiki.

Occupational Changes. Of particular interest is the question of who changed occupational classifications after 1953. A total of 54 full members, 41 with technical education, changed job classifications in the post-Stalin years. These figures include 12 for whom there were no data for the years before 1953. Of these 12 nine had assumed career associations with the party apparatus after 1953. Sixteen of the others moved from positions in the lower and intermediary levels of the agricultural and industrial bureaucracies into the ranks of the apparatchiki. All but one of these had records of technical education. Six achieved upward mobility in their initial career areas, moving from low level to high level bureaucratic positions. No pattern existed among the remaining 20 full members who changed from one job classification to another.

Of the candidate members, 20 changed kinds of positions and another 20 moved from the unclassified (no data) category before 1953 to identifiable posts after that date. Twelve of the unclassified occupied positions in the apparatchiki after 1953. Nine others moved from the low or middle level bureaucracy into the party apparatus, eight of these having had technical education. Eleven others changed kinds of positions without a pattern. Of the 40 candidates, there was no information on the educational backgrounds of 19, while 19 others had technical training and two had non-technical higher education.

Of those whose occupational associations changed after 1953, there was a primary movement from specialized bureaucratic positions to the party apparatus and a secondary movement from low level to high level positions in the same general occupational category. The primary movement indicates a tendency of the party to recruit and promote at least partly on the basis of specialized education and experience. The secondary movement of promotion within the ranks of a particular organization is probably typical of non-party institutional processes. The primary movement is undoubtedly more important as a means of providing the apparatus with the intelligence necessary to exert effective control over non-party institutions by giving the apparatus groups of experts with previous or continuing association with those institutions.

Place of Residence. Although the place-of-residence factor did not have a significant correlation with the other variables considered, it does indicate the shifting living habits of the Soviet elite. Seventy-eight per cent of the full members and 63% of the candidates listed their current residences in cities of 500,000 or more. Of the total membership 91% lived in cities of 100,000 or above. Moscow was by far the most widely claimed residence, despite the fact that many who lived there were formally associated with republic Party organizations. Of the full membership, 46% had residencies in Moscow, while 44% of the candidates had the same. Also, 65% of the full members and 62% of the candidates resided in the RSFSR, with the Ukraine and the Central Asian republics following as the next most widely claimed places of residence.

Party Status. The status of each member in the CPSU is another major area of consideration. Factors examined here are date of admission to the CPSU, the tenure of each member in the Central Committee, and the record of service in the central, republic, and regional Party organs. Then attention will be focused on the backgrounds of the members who were newly elected at the 23rd Party Congress.

The record of the dates of admission to Party membership is found in Table 7. The large percentage of candidates for whom there is no information suggests that those individuals were admitted fairly recently (at least, post-war) and that they are probably younger than the members for whom there is information. Assuming this to be the case, well over one-half the candidates were admitted after the great purges of the 1930's. In contrast, about 45% of the full members attained membership prior to or during the great purges. Nevertheless, the old Bolsheviks have almost entirely vanished, only five members of the CC having joined the Party prior to the revolution.

TABLE 7. DATE OF ADMISSION TO THE CPSU

	Full Members		Candidates	
Pre-1917	5	3.7%	0	0.0%
1918–1937	76	41.3	34	27.2
1938–1945	88	47.8	62	49.6
1946–1952	4	2.2	6	4.8
1953 or after	4	2.2	1	.8
No data	7	3.8	22	17.6
	184	100%	125	100%

Another aspect of Party status concerns the records of those who had worked as apparatchiki in the Party before being co-opted into the Central Committee. Tables 8 and 9 indicate the Party status of the CC members before and after 1953. Party status here refers to the level of official positions held in the organs of the CPSU. Well over one-half of both the full members and candidates had no record of regular service in Party organs before 1953. In the post-Stalin period this situation was reversed with the reversal being most sharp among the candidates. This information suggests two important possibilities that tend to enforce the findings on occupational backgrounds presented in Tables 5 and 6. First, many members made themselves accessible to co-optation into the apparatchiki as a means of increasing their upward mobility after having already established themselves in other occupational endeavors. This means that a significant portion of the CC who would now be classified as apparatchiki would not have been so classified during most of their careers. For the most part, they appear to be specialists who demonstrated their abilities as engineers or administrators and were only later drawn into

TABLE 8. PARTY OFFICES HELD BY FULL MEMBERS

	Before 1953		*After 1953*	
Central apparatus	6	3.4%	8	4.4%
Central & Republic apparati	1	.5	17	9.2
Republic apparati	13	7.1	16	8.7
Republic & Regional apparati	17	9.2	31	16.8
Regional apparati	42	22.8	43	23.4
All three levels	3	1.6	13	7.1
None	102	55.4	56	30.4
	184	100%	184	100%

TABLE 9. PARTY OFFICES HELD BY CANDIDATE MEMBERS

	Before 1953		After 1953	
Central apparatus	5	4.0%	11	8.8%
Central & Republic apparati	0	0.0	6	4.8
Republic apparati	4	3.2	21	16.8
Republic & Regional apparati	6	4.8	17	13.6
Regional apparati	34	27.2	36	28.8
All three levels	0	0.0	3	2.4
None	76	60.8	31	24.8
	125	100%	125	100%

TABLE 10. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF NEW MEMBERS

	Full Members	Candidate Members
Engineering	10	9
Agronomy	7	4
Science	3	2
Military	2	4
Arts & Letters	2	7
Party schools only	3	4
No data	11	21
	38	51

TABLE 11. OCCUPATIONS OF NEW MEMBERS

	Full Members		Candidate Members	
	Before 1953	After 1953	Before 1953	After 1953
Apparatchiki	17	23	16	27
High level bureaucrats	6	8	2	10
Low level bureaucrats	5	0	1	1
Military Officers	2	2	3	5
Writer	0	0	1	1
Journalist	0	0	2	1
Scientists	3	3	2	2
Trade Union Officers	0	0	1	4
Indeterminate	0	1	0	0
No data	4	0	23	0
	37	37	51	51

full-time Party work. Second, the turnover in candidate membership in 1966 suggests that some individuals who had been members primarily as a result of their specialization and who had not become apparatchiki were removed from candidacy in favor of those who had given more regular administrative service to Party organs in the past.

New Members. Examination of the backgrounds of the newly elected members can be expected to shed further light on patterns of continuity or change in the membership of the Central Committee. Consequently, the educational backgrounds and careers of the 38 new full members and the 51 new candidates are highlighted in Tables 10 and 11. Of the 89 new members and candidates considered, 50 (56%) had been regularly associated with the Party apparatus after 1953. All but 18 (20%) had had at least periodic occupational association with the apparatus. This suggests a possible effort on the part of the ruling coalition of the Party to check the influence of the technocrats and to stabilize, if not accelerate, the influence of the apparatchiki in the heirarchy of the CPSU. At the same time it should be emphasized that this effort had more effect on the candidate membership than on the full membership.

II. CORRELATIONS

Age. Although there were only about three years separating the average ages of the full and candidate members of the Central Committee, age proved to have statistical importance as a factor influencing other variables and demarking differences between the two classes of membership. Date of birth was related both to the level and to the source of education. Despite the small difference in age, the candidates had had greater access to higher forms of education. The higher correlations for the candidates lead one to assume that a larger number of them were co-opted into the Central Committee on the basis of their specialized training than was the case with the full members, who were often selected on the basis of their positions. In related areas, date of birth had an expectedly high correlation with date of admission to the CPSU, .5608 for the full members and .4682 for the candidates. The lower correlation for the candidates indicates a wider distribution of age of admission, thereby reducing, to a modest extent, the importance of age as a significant determinant to admission.

	Level of Education	Source of Degree	Learned Occupation
Age of Full Members	.3149	.3024	.2932
Age of Candidates	.5279	.4742	.3428

Sex. Sex is an obvious influence on the selection of members when one considers that only five of the 184 full members and five of the 125 candidates for whom information was available were women. Elite status in the CPSU is clearly reserved largely for males. What, then, are the factors that help to create the exceptions? For the full members no definite pattern was observed. However, two factors stood out in regard to the women candidates. All five of the latter had records as active members of the Komsomols, working in the apparatus of that organization, and four of the five had careers as apparatchiki. Two of the full members had the same backgrounds. The single exception among the candidates was the Minister of Social Security, who was associated with the state bureaucracy. Only one of the five was newly elected to the Central Committee. The foregoing factors indicate that those women who were able to overcome the political obstacle created by their sex have done so largely through their records as political activists in youth organizations and their willingness to seek careers in the Party apparatus rather than through specialization in technical areas. Moreover, it should be noted that the women tended to be younger than the male members, for the eldest was 56 and two of the ten were in their thirties.

Education. Level and source of education proved to be of greater significance for candidates than for full members, although it was important for both. Not only did these two factors have a greater bearing on the learned and practiced occupations of the candidates than of the full members, but the source of the highest degree earned by the candidates had a significance of .3540 with Party office held before 1953. The correlation of the same variables pertaining to full members was only .2820. In addition, a similar positive correlation (.3896) existed between the Party office held by candidates after 1953 and occupational status after 1953. Those patterns suggest rather strongly that the candidates were co-opted more for their degree of specialization than the full members. If such is the case, it can be hypothesized that candidate members in the Central Committee elected at the 23rd Party Congress were selected because they were thought to provide a communications in-put into the higher decision-making centers of the CPSU. It appears that the full members, as distinct from the candidates, became less directly associated with the occupational specialty for which they were educated as they moved to higher positions in the political structure.

FULL MEMBERS

	Learned Occupation	Practiced Occupation
Level of Education	.3189	.2101
Source of Highest Degree	.3244	.1897

CANDIDATE MEMBERS

	Learned Occupation	Practiced Occupation
Level of Education	.6243	.5848
Source of Highest Degree	.5403	.5370

Regional Factors. There was a correlation of .3956 between candidate status in the Central Committee and the region of birth. This indicates that candidacy is used more to give recognition to the geographic divisions and ethnic groups of the USSR than full membership, for which the correlation was only .2053. Related to this is the relationship of experience in a large city Party organization to the levels of the Party apparatus in which members of the CC who had such experience worked. These levels were identified by the Party offices that were held in the central, republic, and regional Party organizations. The correlations suggest that work in a city Party organization was more important for the full members than for the candidates in terms of their movement upward in the Party apparatus. It also suggests that the younger full members and most of the candidates had found other means of attaining upward mobility in the system. The days of intense rivalry between the Moscow and Leningrad Party organizations are probably about over, and the importance of association with one or the other has apparently declined despite the increasing tendency to move to the larger cities. This indicator, especially when considered in combination with the background of the members in the Party apparatus, bears out the basic contention that factors other than professional association with the apparatus are of considerable significance in determining the co-optation of persons into the Central Committee, even during a period of conservative re-

PARTY OFFICE HELD

	Full Members		Candidate Members	
	Before 1953	After 1953	Before 1953	After 1953
City Party Work	.4937	.3548	.3018	.3005

action to the reformism of the Khrushchev years and even though many of them may be assigned positions in the apparatus after becoming CC members or candidates.

Foreign Travel. Among the other relationships examined only two merit attention, and these may be only of passing interest. There was no apparent difference between the number of awards and decorations bestowed upon the two classes of CC members. What difference existed can probably be accounted for by the slight age difference. On the other hand, one curious differential may be construed as indicating the greater status of the full members in comparison with the candidates. This factor is foreign travel. There is a positive correlation of .3544 between full membership and foreign travel and a slight inverse correlation between candidate membership and foreign travel. This may be interpreted as a distinction in status, although it should be pointed out that the number of full members who had had diplomatic experience may have accounted for part of the difference in correlation.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The evidence presented indicates the importance of education to members of the Soviet political elite both in terms of influencing how they launched their careers and of influencing their status in the CPSU. Most of this educational preparation was specialized rather than general, with the four largest categories being engineering, agronomy, Party, and military in that order. Of our sample, 65% (120) of the full members and 51% (64) of the candidates had a technical education (excluding military officers and scientists). The career patterns of the members included 55% (101) of the full members and 50% (63) of the candidates who had primary associations in the Party apparatus after 1953. In addition, 25% (46) of the full members and 26% (32) of the candidates had primary associations with the state bureaucracy (excluding the military). Of those in the bureaucratic category members attached to the heavy industry segment of the state machinery were clearly predominant, with modest representation being given to agricultural administrators and specialists and only token recognition to those associated with light industry.

Despite the fact of considerable experience in the Party apparatus after 1953, a clear majority of both full and candidate members held no Party posts on the central, republic, or regional levels of the apparatus prior to 1953. This was true of 55% (102) of the full members and 60% (64) of the candidates. It was only after 1953—that is, the period during which increasing emphasis was given to co-opting persons into Party leadership positions who had specialized training and experience in some functional service (economics, agronomy, military technology, etc.)—that many of the members were assigned positions, temporarily or otherwise, in various levels of the Party apparatus. During this period all but 30% (56) of the full members and 24% (30) of the candidates held official posts in Party organs.

The correlation study demonstrated a modest though meaningful relationship between degree earned and Party office and between the Party office held by candidates and their occupational status after 1953. These correlations, especially when considered in the light of the data concerning backgrounds in Party posts, and a general survey of the 1956 and 1961 Central Committees, support the contention that co-optation is developing largely into a rational process and not merely into a device with which to play games of musical chairs. In short, at least a large percentage, though undoubtedly not all, are drawn into the Central Committee as a result of their knowledge, demonstrated abilities, and occupational role associations. Their presence helps to assure an inflow of information from others with whom the members have occupational associations. It is in the sense of accessibility that the members of the Central Committee may be considered representatives, though certainly at this stage of development they are not equal voting deputies.

The role functions of the persons in the Central Committee, especially their representative role, are closely associated with *who* they are and *why* they were co-opted. The question of who they are is partially answered by the foregoing empirical study. They are persons with key occupational assignments, most of whom had acquired reputations as successes in their respective career specializations. Most are also associated with an important functional group in the Soviet system. To be sure, the evidence presented here does not deal with the difficult and important question of the degree of group solidarity and the extent to which the persons in the same group share or contest particular values. The situation of the apparatchiki, who constitute such a significant percentage of the membership, is a case in point. The very fact that some of them have joined the apparatus rather late in their careers, that some are in Party posts that require technical training and special skills as well as administrative ability, and that still others have spent their adult lives in Party administration or in propaganda and security organs indicates the range of experiences and attitudes that they may carry into the Central Committee. The point here is simply that most have been associated with particular functional groups that have particular interests. From these associations and interests they can be expected to have acquired specialized knowledge and abilities that influence their perceptions of systemic goals as well as of their own roles in the system.

The question of why they were co-opted relates to the practice of co-optation and the kind of representation they are able to perform. Philip Selznick has argued that organizations adopt two principal mechanisms of defense as means of enhancing the security of the organization in its relation to the social forces around it.[4] These mechanisms are ideology and co-optation. The use of ideology as a device of political socialization in the Soviet system is widely recognized by Western observers. The rational use of co-optation in the system has been noted but not deeply explored. Selznick suggests that there are two types of co-optation: formal and informal. Informal co-optation involves the actual sharing of power by the old elite with the co-opted persons. While this has occurred in the case of the Central Committee in leadership disputes (e.g., the anti-party crisis of 1957), the actual sharing of power is undoubtedly the exception rather than the rule. On the other hand, the concept of formal co-optation appears to have more meaningful application in analyzing why persons are co-opted into the Central Committee. This mechanism is used to maintain or increase general acceptance of the legitimacy of the Party elite as the highest decision-making authority in the system by establishing definite means of accessibility to key individuals and especially to key groups. This is accomplished by the selection of persons who are part of group elites. Such use of co-optation also consists of selecting persons who are dependable sources of information. The in-flow of knowledge that they bring helps the elite to make more effective operational decisions than they otherwise might make. By co-opting persons on the basis of these two factors—accessibility and communications—the ruling elite may have the advantage of increased stability and information without a complementary loss of power.

The sharing of the symbols of authority, however, opens the door to pressure for a transfer of real power to the co-opted parties. The prevention of this development requires some form of control (Selznick contends informal control) over the co-opted elements. These forces—the sharing of symbols of authority and the placement of controls over those with whom authority is seemingly shared—create tension between representation and participation on the one hand and integration and regulation on the other. Such tension is suggested by the addition of apparatus-associated persons to the Central Committee in 1966 (especially among the candidates) and the corresponding decrease in the more diffuse technocratic contingent. The relative stability of the full membership, however, indicates that certain groups and individuals had acquired representation by right and that only a major conflict would overturn the general balance of forces. Candidacy may be a means of giving ostensible authority and recognition to those less firmly entrenched but ambitious to secure recognition to themselves and those with whom they are professionally associated.

These interpretations must, for the present, be tentative, although they are definitely suggested by the history of the Central Committee since 1956 and by the examination of the backgrounds of the members. The paucity of reliable information on informal channels of communications makes the problem of a more comprehensive empirical study virually insurmountable for the time being. However, it is our hope that the methods used and the hypotheses set forth in this study will be suggestive to others of related and more comprehensive projects that might be developed in the future.

---

[4] See Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grassroots*, University of California Publications in Culture and Society, Vol. III, pp. 259–261. For other works involving either elite or group analysis see: Bernard M. Bass, *Leadership, Psychology, and Organizational Behavior* (New York: Harper, 1960); Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, *Group Dynamics, Research and Theory* (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1960); Lewis J. Edinger, *Political Leadership of Industrial Societies* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967); Thomas Gordon, *Group-Centered Leadership* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1955); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960; Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: Viking Press, 1948); Dwaine Marvick, *Political Decision-Makers* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961); Robert Tannenbaum, *Leadership and Organization: a Behavioral Science Approach* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961). For one of the few indepth analyses of an important segment of the Soviet elite, see John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York: Praeger, 1959).

THE RECRUITMENT OF CANDIDATES FOR THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS

ALLAN KORNBERG
Duke University
AND
HAL H. WINSBOROUGH
University of Wisconsin

Systematic empirical research into the process of political leadership recruitment has made substantial progress since World War II with emphasis given to those who occupy formal positions of authority within the political system, specifically, legislators and party activists.[1] Generally such studies have been concerned with delineating (a) who the leaders are,[2] (b) how and why they are where they are,[3] and (c) the variables affecting (a) and (b).[4]

The most ambitious recent studies, in the sense that they try to deal systematically with all three aspects of recruitment, are those by Samuel J. Eldersveld,[5] Austin Ranney,[6] and Henry Valen.[7] Their research, and the examples cited of other scholarship, have yielded a substantial number of propositions. Three which lend themselves to testing with data we have gathered on the recruitment of candidates for the Canadian House of Commons, 1945–65, are:

1) The status of individuals recruited by a party in part is a function of the party's competitive positions. (Key, Snowiss).[8]

---

[1] See Dwaine Marvick's essay, "Political Decision-Makers in Contrasting Milieus," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), *Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 13–27.

[2] See, for example, Donald R. Matthews, *U. S. Senators and Their World* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 11–67; Mattei Dogan, "Political Ascent in a Class Society: French Deputies 1870–1958," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 57–90; and Peter G. Richards, *Honourable Members* (London: Faber & Faber, 1959). A recent study of a non-western elite is Frederick Frey's *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965). See, also, comparative studies such as Harold D. Lasswell, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952) and Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954).

[3] See, for example, Heinz Eulau, "The Legislative Career," in John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and Leroy Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), pp. 69–121; Dwaine Marvick and Charles R. Nixon, "Recruitment Contrasts in Rival Campaign Groups," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 193–217; James D. Barber, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); William E. Wright, "Local Party Leadership in West Berlin: SPD and CDU," (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1966); and Lewis Bowman and G. R. Boynton, "Recruitment Patterns Among Local Party Officials: A Model and Some Preliminary Findings in Selected Locales," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), 667–676.

[4] See, for example, V. O. Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Vintage Books Ed.), pp. 386–442, and *American State Politics* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1956), pp. 133–196; Peter H. Rossi and Phillips Cutright, "The Impact of Party Organization in an Industrial Setting," in Morris Janowitz (ed.), *Community Political Systems* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 81–116; Lester Seligman, "Political Recruitment and Party Structure," this REVIEW, 55 (1961), 77–86; Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "The Mobilization of the Periphery: Data on Turnout, Party Membership and Candidate Recruitment in Norway," *Acta Sociologica*, 6 (1962), 115–158; and Leo M. Snowiss, "Congressional Recruitment and Representation," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), 627–639,

[5] Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).

[6] Austin Ranney, *Pathways to Parliament* (Madison; University of Wisconsin Press, 1965).

[7] Henry Valen, "The Recruitment of Parliamentary Nominees in Norway," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 1 (1966), 121–166.

[8] V. O. Key, for example, in his study of Southern state parties, found that the favored Democratic parties or (in some instances) factions were able to recruit candidates and workers of relatively high status. The less favored Republicans, however, had great difficulty recruiting "respect-

2) The status of individuals recruited by a party varies with the party's position on an ideological continuum[9] (Eldersveld, Ranney, Marvick and Nixon, Valen).
3) Relative urbanism and the degree of industrialization of communities affect recruitment patterns (Rokkan and Valen, Valen, Snowiss).[10] In the present instance there should be a positive relationship between urbanism and the mean status of candidates.

In testing these propositions we will compare, whenever such comparisons appear appropriate, the data for Canadian parliamentary candidates with findings from some of the previously cited studies and also indicate how, in Canada, multi-partyism is related to the status of recruited candidates. Then we will employ a multiple regression analysis to suggest how in two pairs of elections the socio-economic status of candidates, the number of candidates in an electoral contest, the relative urbanism, and the competitiveness of constituencies, influence the process of candidate recruitment. The right-left positions of party candidates are not used because we feel this variable does not lend itself to regression analysis when the units sampled and measured are constituencies.

I. PROCEDURES AND DATA SOURCES

The chief data sources are the *Report of the Chief Electoral Officer*[11] for eight Canadian national elections from 1945–1965 and the *Population of Electoral Districts*[12] for 1951, 1956, and 1961. The former give the occupations at the time of nomination and votes received by the candidates of the four national parties in the elections of 1945, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1962, 1963, and 1965. The latter provide a list of all enclaves of population of 5000 or more in each federal constituency.

In this analysis we employed a random sample of 165 of Canada's then 263 federal constituencies. The data for the 1945 election should be viewed with caution. This was a wartime election and a considerable number of candidates were still members of Canada's Armed Forces. This occupation receives a low score in the rating system we employed, so that the socio-economic status of 1945 candidates is somewhat artificially depressed. Further, since there were only 242 constituencies at the time, there are no data for 22 of the sample constituencies.

MEASURES

Urbanism. Our measure of urbanism is based upon the definition of urban employed by the Canadian Census Bureau, that of incorporated

---

able" people. Leo M. Snowiss claimed that the characteristics of Congressional candidates in the Chicago area varied with inter-party competition. Thus, in non-competitive districts in which they were certain to win, the Democrats recruited "old-pro" types who were longtime activists in the party organization. In non-competitive districts in which the Republicans were certain to win, however, the Democrats tended to recruit younger and, presumably, better-educated men who most often were lawyers. In marginal districts they frequently recruited candidates with only tenuous links to the party organization rather than the old-line politicians sent to Congress from their inner-city stronghold.

[9] Eldersveld, and Marvick and Nixon, in their respective studies of party activists in Detroit and Los Angeles, found that the Republican subjects enjoyed more prestigious occupations than their Democratic counterparts. Both Austin Ranney and Henry Valen found that the socio-economic status of candidates for Parliament in Britain and Norway, respectively, varied with the right-left positions of the parties.

[10] Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen demonstrated that the proportion of Norwegian women recruited as party workers increased markedly in urban areas. Valen subsequently found that the proportion of women candidates for the Norwegian Parliament in part was a function of the relative urbanism of constituencies. Leo Snowiss claimed that differences in the backgrounds, the skills, and even the political "styles" of Congressional candidates were associated with relative urbanism (i.e., whether they were seeking office in the core city, the outer city, or the suburban townships of Chicago).

[11] (Ottawa: Queen's Printer). This is the most convenient and reliable source for the occupations of both incumbent and non-incumbent candidates. The *Parliamentary Guide* has considerable bibliographic information but only for incumbents. In seven instances, when a *Report* listed the occupation of a candidate as "gentleman" or "retired" we also used the *Parliamentary Guide, Who's Who in Canada,* and the *National Reference Book* to ascertain occupations. Although there were not enough cases to significantly affect the analysis, it is still possible that some of the published and "real" occupations of candidates differed.

[12] (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics). The data for 1946 are available only for Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta and hence, have not been employed in the analysis.

	Party 1 (40% of 4 party vote)	Party 2 (30% of 4 party vote)	Party 3 (20% of 4 party vote)	Party 4 (10% of 4 party vote)
Party 1	—	10	20	30
Party 2		—	10	20
Party 3			—	10
Party 4				—

Sum of differences = 100, Number of differences = 6, Competition = −16.6

FIG. 1. An inter-party competition measure.

cities or towns of 5000 or more.[13] It is a ratio (expressed in per cent) of all such urban units in a constituency over the total population of the constituency. Scores range from 00 (completely rural) to 99 (constituencies falling wholly within a metropolitan region, such as Toronto or Vancouver).

Inter-Party Competition. Although there are numerous measures of political competition, they are difficult to construct and, therefore, do not please all political scientists all of the time.[14] Despite the fact that during the period Canada had single-member constituencies[15] and plurality voting, an added difficulty in satisfactorily measuring inter-party competition was the presence of four rather than two national parties.[16] Further, all parties did not always contest every constituency and the constituencies which they did contest may have varied from election to election. Since, for the multivariate portion of this analysis, we wish to treat inter-party competition as a linear and continuous variable, we have computed the proportion of the total vote (in per cent) obtained by the candidates of the Social Credit, Progressive Conservative, Liberal, and New Democratic parties for every election in each of the 165 sample constituencies. Votes obtained by Independents or by candidates of splinter parties such as the Labor Progressive (Communist) have been disregarded. Our measure is based upon differences in the proportions of votes cast for the competing candidates of any of the above four parties and increases in magnitude as competition among the parties decreases.[17]

Socio-Economic Status. Political scientists are aware that occupation is a discriminating variable that frequently is correlated with sharp differences in behavior. Although, for analytic purposes, occupations are frequently arranged in an ordinal fashion, such data (since they are not interval or ratio) ordinarily do not lend themselves to use in multivariate statistical analysis. Happily, Otis D. Duncan has been able to estimate numerical socio-economic status scores for all detailed occupations in the 1960 U. S. Census of Population.[18] Briefly, his score is a composite of information on levels of educational attainment and income of the labor force engaged in the several occupations (as reported in the 1950 Census of Population). The score is so derived as to have a high correlation with the prestige rating of occupations ranked in a 1947 survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center. The result is an SES score which is a two digit number ranging from 00 to 96. It may be treated as a continuous variable in a statistical analysis in which a single figure representing occupational socio-economic status is desired. The measure is especially appropriate for the present analysis since the assumption underlying much of the literature on "respectable" candidate recruitment is that their desirability is a function of the prestige ascribed to them by the public. Further, Canadian society is sufficiently similar to the American in the education required, the income derived, and the prestige ascribed to the several occupations, that the use of these scores is valid for the study of 4168 Canadian candidates for Parliament.[19] We have two measures of status: "mean status" ($\bar{X}$ SES) which is the cumulated mean scores of candidates over their "N", and "status difference" (Δ SES).[20]

---

[13] *Revised Statutes of Canada,* 1952, Chapter 23 (2:38).

[14] See the discussion in Kenneth Janda, *Data Processing* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), pp. 174–183.

[15] Except for a two-member constituency in Halifax, Nova Scotia and Queens, Prince Edward Island. The two-member districts were abolished and the number of constituencies was increased to 264 after the 1966 redistribution of seats.

[16] Mark Kesselman has employed an "index of multipartyism" to measure competition in French national and local elections. According to Kesselman, the index does not measure competition but rather the convergence of votes among competing parties. See his "French Local Politics: A Statistical Examination of Grass Roots Consensus," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), 963–973.

[17] We cumulated the absolute value of *all* possible differences among parties and divided this sum by the total number of differences. Since the resultant measure increases with disparity among candidates, we have signed it negatively in order that a larger number represent greater competition. Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a situation in which all four parties contest a constituency. The resultant measure is Gini's mean difference. For bibliography concerning this measure see Gerald J. Glasser, "Variance Formulas for the Mean Difference and Coefficient of Concentration," *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* 59 (1962), 648–654.

[18] The rationale and method for computing these scores are described in Albert J. Reiss *et al.*, *Occupation and Social Change* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961).

	A	B	C	D
(scores)	(93)	(90)	(64)	(42)
A	—	3	29	51
B		—	26	48
C			—	22
D				—

Sum of differences = 179; Δ SES = $\frac{179}{6}$ = 29.8

FIG. 2. A measure of status difference.

A number of assumptions underlie the analysis. Three deserve particular comment here. First, in the complex process by which individuals come to assume active political roles, it is essentially the local party organizations that initiate action and proselytize recruits.[21] Second, it is assumed the parties generally can recruit candidates from population pools in which the several social classes are present, although, in different proportions, irrespective of whether they avail themselves of these resources. Third, despite the disagreement on the subject,[22] we

---

[19] We did not employ the Canadian occupational class scale developed by Bernard Blishen because, in our view, the Duncan scale was more detailed. However, Blishen in describing his scale said that rank correlations were computed between the ratings of occupational prestige in each of several countries previously studied by Alex Inkeles and Peter Rossi (i.e., U.S.A., Great Britain, New Zealand, Japan, the U.S.S.R., and West Germany). According to Blishen, "The highest ranked correlation, .94, was found between Canada and the U.S." See Bernard Blishen, "The Construction and Use of an Occupational Class Scale," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 24 (1958), 523. It should be noted that Inkeles and Rossi had found that in any population there was very little variation in the evaluations of occupations by sub-groups. Thus, Inkeles later observed, "Whether a worker or a professor does the rating, both place the doctor, lawyer, and engineer very near the top of the list, the ordinary worker about two-thirds of the way down, the shoe-shine boy or garbage man at the bottom." See Alex Inkeles, "Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception and Value," *American Sociological Review*, 66 (1960), 8. The earlier study referred to by Blishen is Alex Inkeles and Peter Rossi, "National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige," *American Journal of Sociology*, 61 (1956), 329–339.

[20] Like the measure of inter-party competition, status difference is the sum of all absolute value differences in SES scores for the candidates in every constituency over the total number of possible differences. Since we shall call this measure "status difference" it has been signed positively. Figure 2 represents a status difference score for four candidates.

[21] Samuel J. Eldersveld's finding that a considerable proportion of the party activists he studied claimed they generated their own political careers suggests that the relationship between recruiter and recruitee is not a neat asymmetrical one. See Eldersveld, *op. cit.*, p. 128. However, the assumption that candidate recruitment, even in a parliamentary system with disciplined parties, is left largely to the local party organizations is based upon a study of legislative behavior in a Canadian House of Commons. See Allan Kornberg, *Canadian Legislative Behavior: A Study of the 25th Parliament* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), pp. 63–66. See, also, R.M. Dawson and Norman Ward, *The Government of Canada*, 4th ed., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), pp. 480–486. Ranney's investigations in Great Britain and Valen's research in Norway also point to the important role local party organizations play in the process of candidate recruitment.

[22] Both our willingness to accept this ideological continuum and the less-than-complete consensus among observers can be understood by considering the observations of various experts. Some of these follow:

Parliamentary scholar R.M. Dawson has written that historically there have always been differences between Conservatives and Liberals (e.g., "The Conservatives have been the party of are willing to assume the four Canadian parties currently can be arrayed along a right-left ideological continuum ranging from the Social Credit, through the Conservative and Liberal parties, to the NDP (formerly, the CCF).

---

free enterprise while the Liberals have taken the lead in public ownership and social legislation"). See R.M. Dawson, *The Government of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948), p. 506. Data from an empirical study of the 25th Parliament tend to support this point of view. See Allan Kornberg, "Caucus and Cohesion in Canadian Parliamentary Parties," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), 83–92. Also, Robert Alford has described the New Democratic party as a "Social-Democratic-Left" party; the Liberals as a "Center-Left" party; the Conservatives as a "Conservative-Right" party; and the Social Credit party as a "Reactionary-Right" party. See Robert Alford, *Party and Society* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 13. Somewhat differently, Gad Horowitz sees the Conservatives as the party of the right, the NDP as the left, and the Liberals as the "classless" center party. Further, the electoral success of the Liberals, their "refusal to appear as a class party forces both right and left to mitigate their class appeals and to become themselves, in a sense, centre parties." See Gad Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation," in Hugh G. Thorburn (ed.), *Party Politics in Canada*, 2nd ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1967), pp. 55–74.

On the other hand (and despite the fact that a series of Liberal Administrations have passed most of the social welfare legislation Canadians enjoy) sociologist John Porter has argued there are few, if any, basic differences between the Liberals and Conservatives: both espouse the same conservative values; both parties are oriented toward business; and both perform essentially brokerage functions. See John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 373–379.

As for the two minor parties, the Social Credit and the CCF, both grew out of the short-lived Progressive party. See William L. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950). The Social Credit party began as a radical, rural, fundamentalist movement that was pledged to implement extremely unorthodox financial policies. See John Irving, *The Social Credit Movement in Alberta* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959). Over time, electoral success at the provincial level and the quest for respectability seemingly have caused the Western wing of the party to abandon the financial panaceas and radical ideology advocated during the 30's. The Alberta and British Columbia contingent appears to have moved from a populist, almost neo-fascist party, to a solidly conservative one. In fact, both former national leader Robert Thompson and Mr. Ernest Manning, long-time Premier of Alberta, a number of times have called upon Conservative party supporters to join with their party in a truly conservative coalition against socialist (i.e., Liberal and NDP) forces in Canada. See Mr. Manning's recent book *Political Realignment: A Challenge to Thoughtful Canadians* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1967). Mr. Thompson, perhaps because few Conservatives were joining him in the Social Credit party, recently left Social Credit, joined the Conservatives, and won the Conservative nomination for Red Deer, Alberta, in the June, 1968, national election. Spectacular defections such as those by Messrs. Thompson and Olson have seriously undermined Social Credit's claim to be a national party. Certainly, the nomination of candidates in less than a hundred constituencies in the 1968 election suggests that such defections have a deletorious effect on candidate recruitment.

The initial intention of the CCF was to eradicate capitalism in Canada and to replace it with a socialist society. In 1961, the party's close ties with organized labor were formalized in a union from which emerged the New Democratic Party. The CCF-NDP also appears to have lost some of its ideological militancy. The desire for electoral success and, relatedly, the necessity of broadening the base of its middle class support, seemingly, have turned the CCF-NDP from a party advocating a full-blown socialist ideology to a leftist party of moderate reform. See Leo Zakuta, *A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964).

A kind of ideolological convergence seemingly has taken place on the Canadian left. The Liberals, supposedly, under pressure from the CCF-NDP, have moved left while the CCF-NDP, in turn, appears to have moved somewhat to the right. That the Liberal party's drift to the left has not been unopposed, however, is suggested by the recent struggle in the Liberal Cabinet and caucus between the supporters of Messrs. Sharp (the right) and Gordon (the left). In our view, however, the NDP still must be regarded as the party of the left, while the Liberals may be best described as a left-center party.

On the other half of the continuum at least the Western wing of Social Credit has moved from a radical conservative to a traditional conservative position. Still, they are certainly to the right of the Conservatives since the latter party moved somewhat to the left (e.g., they passed legislation

TABLE 1. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OCCUPATIONAL STATUS[a] AND RIGHT-LEFT PARTY AFFILIATION FOR PARTY ACTIVISTS IN LOS ANGELES AND DETROIT AND CANDIDATES FOR THE BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS AND THE NORWEGIAN STORTING

For	Occupational Status × Right-Left Party Affiliation	For	Occupational Status × Right-Left Party Affiliation
L. A. Party Activists	Gamma[b] = .47	British Candidates for Parliament	Gamma = .62
Detroit Party Activists	Gamma = .53	Norwegian Candidates for Storting	Gamma = .64

[a] The data are derived from: Marvick and Nixon, *op. cit.*, p. 205, Table 8, "Men Only"; Eldersveld, *op. cit.*, p. 52, Table 3.1; Ranney, *op. cit.*, p. 204, Table 7.7 and Valen, p. 141, Table 9. For the American and British studies, we dichotomized occupations into "high" and "low" status. The former include business proprietors, corporate executives and professionals such as lawyers. All others are classified as low status. The data on Norwegian occupations are trichotomized into "high" (i.e., business proprietors, professionals), "medium," (i.e., salaried employees, public and private, farmers and fishermen) and "low" (i.e., manual workers). The candidates of the Christian and Center parties are not included since, in our view, these appeared to be more pressure groups than parties.

[b] This is a non-parametric statistic proposed by Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross-Classification," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 49 (1954), 732–764.

II. FINDINGS

An overview. As has been indicated, a particularly intriguing aspect of the Eldersveld, Marvick and Nixon, Ranney, and Valen studies is that in all four, the average occupational status levels of parties' recruits vary with party position on an ideological continuum. Thus, all four studies show a rather impressive relationship between occupational status and right-left party postion. (See Table 1).

Our data, however, indicate that over a twenty year period, the Liberals, the party of the left-center, have presented the Canadian public with the most prestigious (as measured by their SES scores) candidates for the House of Commons. They also indicate that over time all parties have managed to recruit candidates of increasingly higher status. Interestingly the SES scores of Social Creditors rose fairly sharply in 1958, the election year in which, because of the unprecedented Conservative victory, they failed to elect a single candidate. An even sharper increase in the SES scores of CCF-NDP candidates occured in 1962, the year after the CCF formally joined with organized labor to become the New Democratic Party. (See Table 2).

In order to make a more direct comparison with Ranney's data, which included only non-incumbent candidates from 1951–64, for the two major Canadian parties, we isolated losing from winning candidates for the period 1949–64. The occupations of Ranney's subjects were then scored by using the Duncan system. Analysis indicated that: unsuccessful Canadian Conservative party candidates had higher status scores than Liberal losers;[23] unsuccessful candidates of the two major Canadian parties on the whole, enjoyed more prestigious occupations than their counterparts in Great Britain. (See Table 3).

In part, this difference in the prestige scores of the candidates for the British and Canadian House of Commons can be explained by the larger proportion of lawyer-candidates in Canada[24] and the fact that lawyers receive a very

---

which increased farm subsidies and extended benefits paid to old-age pensioners) during the tenure of their recently deposed leader, Mr. John Diefenbaker. Thus, the Social Credit still can be regarded as the Canadian party of the right while the Conservatives can be best described as a center-right party.

[23] However, the status of Canadian candidates *still* did not vary with their right-left ideological positions since the losing right-wing Social Creditors had mean status scores which were considerably lower than both the unsuccessful Conservatives and Liberals.

[24] For the period 1945–65, 28.5% of the candidates of the two major Canadian parties were lawyers. In comparison, Ranney found that 15% of the candidates of the Labor and Conservative parties were lawyers (i.e., barristers and solici-

TABLE 2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF CANDIDATES FOR THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS 1945–65, BY RIGHT-LEFT PARTY AFFILIATION

Election Year	Parties							
	Social Credit*		Conservative		Liberal		CCF-NDP	
	$\bar{X}$ SES	$N=$	$\bar{X}$ SES	$N=$	$\bar{X}$ SES	$N=$	$\bar{X}$ SES	$N=$
1945	46.0	57	52.2	115	61.5	142	47.1	113
1949	46.1	48	65.6	146	68.4	154	47.1	104
1953	48.5	42	63.9	156	67.0	165	47.1	103
1957	49.4	76	66.3	163	70.1	165	49.8	99
1958	55.4	55	68.5	165	67.7	165	45.0	103
1962	54.3	152	67.4	165	68.0	164	57.5	133
1963	56.2	143	62.8	165	69.4	165	55.9	144
1965	54.0	112	68.6	165	73.8	165	56.9	159
$\bar{X}$ SES 1945–65	52.6	685	64.9	1240	68.3	1285	51.6	958

* Social Credit includes individuals who ran as Ralliement des Creditistes in 1965.

high ranking (93) on the Duncan scale. The high incidence of lawyers in the legislatures of most Western countries usually has been explained in terms of the congruence between politics and law. In Canada, lawyers also would seem to be attractive candidates since the proportion of a party's winners who are lawyers normally exceeds the proportion of its lawyer-candidates.[25] However, one Canadian scholar has gone beyond the congruence-attractiveness thesis and claimed that lawyers serve as a kind of Canadian surrogate for a ruling class.[26]

However, in his intensive analysis of the distribution of power in Canadian society, John Porter

TABLE 3. A COMPARISON OF THE SES SCORES OF NON-INCUMBENT BRITISH CANDIDATES, 1951–64, WITH UNSUCCESSFUL CANADIAN CANDIDATES, 1949–64 (MAJOR PARTIES ONLY).

Period	Great Britain		Period	Canada	
	Conservative $\bar{X}$ SES	Labor $\bar{X}$ SES		Conservative $\bar{X}$ SES	Liberal $\bar{X}$ SES
1951–64	63.9 ($N=1311$)	55.3 ($N=1431$)	1949–64	66.6 ($N=596$)	63.5 ($N=499$)

---

tors). Ranney's data support the findings of an earlier study of incumbent British MP's by Barrington and Finer. See H.E. Barrington and S. E. Finer, "The British House of Commons," in Jean Meynaud (ed.), "The Parliamentary Profession," *International Social Science Journal*, 13 (1961), 601–605.

[25] See Kornberg, *op. cit.*, p. 44. Dawson and Ward have estimated that approximately a third of the members of the several Canadian Parliaments have been lawyers. See R. M. Dawson and N. Ward, *The Government of Canada*, 4th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 346. Their estimate is supported by data generated by Roman R. March in his longitudinal study of the characteristics of Canadian Parliamentarians. See Roman R. March, "An Empirical Test of M. Ostrogorski's Theory of Political Evolution in a British Parliamentary System," (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, 1967).

[26] Alexander Brady, "Canada and the Model of Westminister," in William B. Hamilton (ed.), *The Transfer of Institutions* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1964), pp. 59–80. Brady argues, "In the absence of anything like the modern British governing class, the legal profession in both the French and English sections of the country is a partial substitute. From the birth of the federation the role of lawyers in the national Parliament has been conspicuously more important than at Westminister." (p. 74)

TABLE 4. A COMPARISON OF THE SES SCORES OF FRENCH AND CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR THE PERIOD 1945–58.

French Deputies, 1945–58[a]

Far Right	Right	Left-Center	Left	Far Left
Poujadist Unclassified	Moderate, Independent Gaullist	MRP & Radical	Socialist	Communist
$\bar{X}$ SES	$\bar{X}$ SES	$\bar{X}$ SES	$\bar{X}$ SES	$\bar{X}$ SES
62.8 ($N=85$)	61.2 ($N=243$)	63.0 ($N=340$)	62.6 ($N=198$)	38.3 ($N=246$)

Canadian MP's, 1945–58

Far Right	Right	Left-Center	Left	Far Left
Social Credit	Conservative	Liberal	NDP	—
$\bar{X}$ SES	$\bar{X}$ SES	$\bar{X}$ SES	$\bar{X}$ SES	
46.4 ($N=29$)	66.3 ($N=282$)	72.1 ($N=415$)	45.6 ($N=69$)	

[a] Data are derived from Mattei Dogan, "French Deputies 1870–1958," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), *Political Decision-Makers: Recruitment and Performance* (Glencoe: The Fress Press, 1961), p. 67, Table 3.

Another interesting comparison we were able to make with the use of the Duncan scores was between members of the French Chamber of Deputies, 1945–58, and Canadian Members of Parliament for the same period. One is struck by the remarkably similar status, except for the Communist Deputies,[27] of all French parliamentarians, regardless of party. A second interesting finding is the very substantial difference between the status of French Socialist and Canadian New Democratic MP's. At the other end of the political continuum, the "far right" in France apparently has been able to recruit and to elect candidates of a higher occupational status than has the Canadian Social Credit party.[28] On the other hand, the Canadian "center" parties, particularly, the Liberal, compare very favorably with their French counterparts (See Table 4).

It would appear, then, that in a gross sense, the occupational status of Canadian MP's does not vary with the ideological position of their parties but, rather, with how successful the parties have been in national elections. Thus, the Liberal party, which over a twenty-year period has managed to capture 48% of the seats in the House of Commons, also has recruited

---

claims there is an effective Canadian ruling class—the members of the Canadian corporate elite. They have not (generally) bothered to make their way in national politics but have preferred to govern through the political elite. Most frequently the lawyers in the corporate elite have provided the link between the corporate and political worlds. They are the most likely to have overt political affiliations, to hold elected or appointed public office, and to hold top offices in the national and provincial party organizations. See Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. 296–298.

[27] Although, as has been indicated, Valen found that the occupational status of candidates for Parliament varied with the right-left positions of Norwegian parties, he also found by far the largest proportion of low status blue collar workers among Communist candidates.

[28] It could be argued that a comparison between the French "far right" and the Social Credit party is not a particularly appropriate one. It should be noted, however, that the Poujadist element of the French far right and the Quebec Creditistes were both "protest" movements and drew support from relatively similar social groups within their respective electorates.

TABLE 5. CANDIDATES' MEAN SES SCORES BY ORDER OF FINISH IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 1945–65[a]

Election Years	Position of Candidates in Electoral Contests							
	First Place		Second Place		Third Place		Fourth Place	
	$\bar{X}$ SES	$N=$	$\bar{X}$ SES	$N=$	$\bar{X}$ SES	$N=$	$\bar{X}$ SES	$N=$
1945–49	65.6	(300)	56.4	(293)	48.3	(241)	47.1	(45)
1953–57–58	67.6	(495)	64.7	(493)	50.9	(329)	50.6	(140)
1962–63–65	66.8	(495)	65.8	(495)	61.1	(486)	54.3	(356)
All, 1945–65	66.8	(1290)	63.2	(1281)	55.0	(1056)	52.8	(541)

[a] In their present form, these data, from which inferences are drawn as to the relationship between party, candidate status, and order of finish are subject, of course, to the now familiar effects generated by "ecological" correlation.

candidates with the highest SES scores. The Conservative candidates have ranked second to the Liberals, both in status and in terms of the proportion of seats (37%) they have won during that time. Finally, the candidates of the two minor parties, who together over the twenty years have been able to capture only 13% of the House seats, also trailed major party candidates in occupational status by approximately 15 SES points. The best way of illustrating the apparent relationship between the status of a party's recruits and its competitive position would be to show the mean status of all its winning, second, third, and fourth place candidates. Unfortunately, we do not have these data and are confined to merely suggesting the relationship through the table below. Over the years, the two minor parties generally have finished in third or fourth place and the data show that mean status scores vary directly with the order of candidate finish. The dramatic increase in the number of third and fourth place candidates also implies that the electoral activity of the minor parties has grown appreciably in the post-war period (See Table 5).

Urbanism, Candidate Numbers and Candidate Status. A cross-tabulation of the relative urbanism of constituencies by the SES of candidates running for office in them indicates that over a twenty-year period the status of candidates has varied directly with the urban nature of the districts they hope to represent (See Table 6).

Table 6 can be interpreted in two ways. First, the data, in part, may reflect the fact that the Canadian population has become more homogeneous over the years. That is, essentially rural areas have become more urban as people leave farming, move into towns and cities, and take up non-farming occupations. Thus, the largest differences in the status of candidates occurred in the 34–66% urban category, wherein we would expect such a transition to have occurred most rapidly. A second and related interpretation of these data is that urban-industrialized communities are likely to contain larger proportions of individuals with high

TABLE 6. CANDIDATES' SES SCORES BY THE RELATIVE URBANISM OF CONSTITUENCIES

Election Years	Relative Urbanism (in %)					
	0–33		34–66		67–99	
	$\bar{X}$ SES	$N=$	$\bar{X}$ SES	$N=$	$\bar{X}$ SES	$N=$
1945[a]–49	51.1	(405)	53.5	(171)	66.3	(303)
1952–57–58	54.4	(630)	61.1	(285)	67.6	(542)
1962–63–65	55.5	(716)	64.7	(380)	68.4	(736)
1945–65	54.1	(1751)	62.2	(836)	67.7	(1581)

[a] It should be noted that the urban measure for the 1945 election is based on 1951 census data.

TABLE 7. MEAN SES OF CANDIDATES BY NUMBER OF CANDIDATES IN A CONTEST

Election Years	2 Candidate Races			3 Candidate Races				4 Candidate Races				
	$\bar{X}$ SES 1	$\bar{X}$ SES 2	$N=$	$\bar{X}$ SES 1	$\bar{X}$ SES 2	$\bar{X}$ SES 3	$N=$	$\bar{X}$ SES 1	$\bar{X}$ SES 2	$\bar{X}$ SES 3	$\bar{X}$ SES 4	$N=$
1945	73.7	45.5	(24)	60.2	52.2	48.1	(85)	56.7	47.4	38.6	51.4	(30)
1949	68.2	56.0	(28)	70.0	63.2	51.6	(111)	54.5	60.7	44.2	38.5	(15)
1953	76.6	63.3	(59)	66.8	61.1	48.5	(73)	56.1	52.6	50.3	50.6	(32)
1957	76.0	71.5	(55)	65.8	66.4	50.1	(44)	59.4	63.2	55.5	50.0	(65)
1958	71.5	66.2	(50)	66.9	69.5	48.9	(72)	65.0	63.6	52.7	51.6	(43)
1962	only 9-2			62.0	67.9	67.3	(40)	65.4	66.0	60.9	52.2	(122)
1963	candidate races			64.7	59.9	56.1	(33)	65.9	64.6	59.6	55.7	(127)
1965	during these years			73.6	68.3	62.5	(57)	67.7	65.9	61.6	55.1	(107)
1945–65	73.9	63.5	(225)	66.6	63.1	52.9	(515)	63.9	63.2	57.1	52.8	(541)

status occupations than are found in rural areas. Since there is a larger pool of high status people from which the parties may draw, we find a positive relationship between relative urbanism and mean candidate status.

Given this relationship, we would expect that candidates for the House of Commons from Ontario constituencies would be a more prestigious group than candidates from other provinces, because Ontario always has been the most urbanized and industrialized province in Canada. This is not the case, however. The data show that Quebec rather than Ontario candidates have the highest average prestige scores. This was true for both winning (75.2 vs. 69.4) and non-winning candidates (63.8 vs. 58.1). We interpret these data as supporting the claim by John Porter regarding the elitist character of Quebec society; a rigid system of social stratification reinforced by an archaic "classical" educational system has had the effect of limiting the political participation of non-elite groups largely to voting. High public and party office positions have been virtually monopolized by a small socio-economic elite who periodically have employed the supposed threat to existing cultural arrangements both to justify and to maintain their dominant position in Quebec society.[29]

A more difficult relationship to explain, in the sense that it is not as consistent as that between urbanism and candidate status, is the association between the number of candidates contesting a district and their mean occupational status. Table 7 shows that at certain time periods an increase in the number of candidates contesting a seat was associated with lower SES scores, not only for the third and fourth finishers, but also, for the first and second. An immediate interpretation that is suggested is high status candidates are reluctant to contest districts in which, because there are likely to be more than two candidates in the race, the outcome may be less certain. The problem with such an interpretation is that in the elections of the sixties, the relationship between status and candidate numbers, generally, is attenuated or reversed. We have suggested another interpretation in the multivariate portion of the analysis.

To recapitulate, we scored the occupations of over 4000 candidates for the Canadian House of Commons during a twenty year period. The scores take into account the income, education and prestige ascribed to the occupations of individuals and provide a single convenient measure of their occupational socio-economic status. By similarly scoring the occupations of non-incumbent candidates for the British House of Commons, 1951–64, and members of the French Chamber of Deputies, 1945–58, we found that the SES scores of candidates recruited by the two major Canadian parties were even higher than the scores of the candidates of British and French parties with whom they were compared. With respect to the hypotheses we were testing, examination of the relevant data indicated that the mean status of candidates recruited by the four Canadian parties seemingly did not vary with party position on a right-left ideological continuum. One can speculate that this finding simply reflects a lack of class-based politics in Canada. Both Robert Alford and John Porter have noted the ability of Canadian parties to transform economic and class cleavages into ethnic-religious ones. The result, according to Alford, is that there is less class voting in Canada than in Britain, Australia, or even the U.S.[30] This situation may be changing, however.[31]

---

[29] See Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. 91–96. See, also, J.A.A. Lovink, "The Politics of Quebec: Provincial Political Parties, 1897–1936," (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1967). The Creditiste successes in Quebec, particularly in 1962, have been interpreted as a protest against the traditional elite domination of both the Liberal and Conservative parties. See, for example, Hubert Guindon, "Social Unrest, Social Class and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution," *Queen's Quarterly*, 71 (1964), 150–162.

There was a relationship between the status of a party's candidates and its competitive position *vis a vis* the other parties. In a gross sense this was illustrated by the fact that over the years the most successful Canadian party, the Liberal, has managed to recruit the most prestigious candidates for Parliament. The candidates of the second major party, the Conservative, have ranked somewhat behind the Liberals in terms of status, but still have been drawn from higher strata than have the candidates of the two minor parties, the Social Credit and the New Democratic. Over the years, the latter two parties have enjoyed approximately the same amount of electoral support and have recruited candidates with virtually the same status.

Finally, the data also have shown that the relative urbanism of the several constituencies and, to a lesser extent, the number of candidates in a particular contest, were associated with differences in the mean SES scores of candidates.

III. AN INTER-ELECTION MODEL

Our next task is to suggest how these variables (other than the right-left ideological positions of the parties) are associated in the recruitment process. To accomplish this we focus on inter-election relationships in a pair of elections in which one election directly follows another. Within the pair of elections we conceive of a rough causal ordering of variables. At the beginning of the recruitment process for the second election, we assume the values of the variables for the first election are known and uninfluenced by subsequent events. Further, we assume the urbanism of a constituency is established by forces outside of or too ponderous to be influenced by the election-to-election recruitment process. We further assume that the outcome of the recruitment process for the second election is represented by three variables: the mean status of candidates in a district; the status difference of candidates in a district; and the number of candidates standing in a district. Because decisions and successes in the recruitment process are thought to be dependent on prior decisions and successes, we assume the value of these outcome variables are, in part, a function of variables pertaining to the prior election. Finally, we assume that the degree of inter-party competition in the second election is that which the recruitment process aims to affect. Consequently, we hold this variable to be subsequent to both the events of the first election and to the recruitment process for the second. Within a pair of elections, then, we assume a causal ordering as in Figure 3.

To begin the construction of such a model, we assume each of the outcome variables may be predicted from a linear function of the initial variable. The parameter of such a linear function may be estimated by the usual least squares technique. We then assume the competitiveness of the outcome of the second election is a linear function of both the initial variables and the outcome variables from the recruitment process.

Although candidate recruitment in each of the several constituencies is intended to influence the outcome of a particular electoral contest, the process also may be affected by the total environment in which the election takes place; local affairs are rarely insulated from national affairs. For example, in an election in which the national outcome is considered certain, candidate recruitment in some constituencies may take on an aspect of experimentation or of providing campaign experience for highly regarded prospects. In such an election, the aim of recruitment may be less that of immediate success and more one of long-run party maintenance. Conversely, in a tense election with a doubtful national outcome, the possibility of immediate electoral success may lead the parties to be cautious and conservative in their recruitment practices. Because of the potential

---

[30] See Robert R. Alford, *op. cit.*, pp. 250–286.

[31] A 1965 survey of four metropolitan areas showed that people voting Conservative tend to follow religious lines, whereas NDP voters follow class lines. Liberal voters appear to be cross-pressured, with some following class and others religious lines. Further, religious affiliation would seem to be a more important determinant of voting preference among working class than among middle class voters. See Wallace Gagne and Peter Regenstreif, "Some Aspects of New Democratic Party Urban Support in 1965," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 23 (1967), 529–550.



FIG. 3. CAUSAL ORDERING OF VARIABLES IN AN INTER-ELECTION MODEL.

sensitiveness of the recruitment process at the local level to the national political milieu, we have chosen to investigate our model in two pairs of elections; one a safe sustaining pair, the other, two see-saw contests.

The Elections of 1949-53 and 1962-63. In 1949 the Liberal party won a smashing victory at the polls. Although it captured only 49% of the popular vote, it obtained 74% of the seats in the House of Commons, to maintain what, apparently, was an endless hegemony. In 1953, the distribution of the vote was such that, although the Liberal party again captured 49% of the vote, its proportion of seats declined to 64%. The latter election still may be seen as one which comfortably sustained a dominant party in office.

The environment in which the 1962–63 elections took place was drastically different. The Social Credit party, which had lost every member of its parliamentary group on the Conservative landslide of 1958, won thirty seats in 1962 and promised to do even better in 1963. A resurgent New Democratic Party, which by 1962 had come under the dynamic leadership of Mr. T.C. Douglas, posed a threat not only to the Liberals in the urban areas which had long sustained that party, but also to the Conservatives in the rural constituencies of the West. Although most "responsible" public opinion leaders, including some in his own party, were deeply disturbed by Conservative party leader John Diefenbaker's thinly veiled anti-Americanism, it was apparent from public response to his efforts that he had seized upon an emotional issue which well might return him to office. The Liberals, on the other hand, were hopeful that the continued internecine warfare in the Conservative party and the (supposedly) related loss of public confidence in the Conservative party would be sufficient to bring them back into office after six years in opposition. The 1963 election, then, was a tense contest with a doubtful outcome. The differential impact on candidate recruitment of a safe sustaining pair of elections and two see-saw contests is vividly illustrated in these two pairs of elections.

Let us, then, consider the relationship between outcome variables and initial-state variables. Table 8 presents values of the standardized regression coefficient (B) for each equation in each election. The table also presents standard errors of the coefficients as well as the multiple correlation for the equation. Thus, the first two rows of this table present values for the equations to predict mean status of candi-

TABLE 8. PARAMETERS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INITIAL STATE VARIABLES AND VARIABLES WHICH ARE OUTCOMES OF THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS.

Dependent Variable and Elections	Independent Variables										
	$\bar{X}$ SES 1		Δ SES 1		CAND 1		Comp 1		Urb. 2		Multiple
	B	SE B	B	SE B	B	SE B	B	SE B	B	SE B	R
$\bar{X}$ SES 2											
1949–53	.454	.073	.221	.071	−.075	.069	−.120	.071	.058	.075	.598
1962–63	.588	.064	.185	.059	−.039	.067	−.001	.056	.186	.070	.729
Δ SES 2											
1949–53	.305	.084	.233	.082	.085	.079	−.033	.082	−.101	.087	.384
1962–63	.174	.081	.459	.074	−.173	.084	.054	.070	.011	.088	.496
CAND 2											
1949–53	−.263	.074	−.070	.073	.211	.070	.317	.072	.280	.077	.615
1962–63	−.030	.081	.094	.074	.319	.085	.246	.071	.108	.089	.495

dates in the second of each pair of elections. In both pairs of elections the multiple correlation coefficient is respectably high, with the association being greater for the 1962–63 elections—perhaps because of the shorter interval in that pair of elections. One would expect fewer unmeasured inter-election circumstances to develop that would diminish the association between prior and present variables. Thus, the higher multiple correlation for the 1962–63 pair of elections is as expected. This interpretation is strengthened by noting that the Beta value for mean status in Time one is considerably higher in the 1962–63 pair of elections than in the 1949–53 elections. Thus, the inter-election persistence of the mean status of candidates is higher in 1962–63 than in 1949–53. Although the shorter interim seems the most likely explanation of this greater persistence, it may be that its strength also is enhanced by the uncertain outcome of the 1963 election. A conservative approach to the recruitment process might lead the party organizations to offer as candidates in the second election many of the same individuals as were candidates in the first, on the assumption that their past experience would have made them more visible and "electable." The higher Beta for urbanization in the 1962–63 pair of elections appears to be an election-specific effect. The previously mentioned resurgence of the New Democratic Party in urban areas and their ability, since 1962, to recruit higher status candidates (see Table 2) may have led one or more of the other parties in such areas to try to increase their competitive positions by also recruiting higher status candidates, thus raising the mean in urban constituencies.

A greater opportunity for experimentation in the 1949–53 interval is suggested by the somewhat higher Beta values for Time one competition and status differences among candidates. Thus, in the 1949–53 interval, greater Time one competition tended to diminish Time two mean status while greater status differences among candidates in Time one tended to increase mean status in Time two.

Our interpretation of these data is that in 1953 the minor parties tended to enter candidates in constituencies that were competitive in 1949 and tried to avoid entering candidates in constituencies in which the outcome appeared certain to go against them. Such minor party candidates were likely to be individuals of lower status than the candidates of the major parties. Hence, in such constituencies the average status of candidates would be lower in 1953.

On the other hand, the major parties might be encouraged to enter very high status individuals in 1953 in constituencies where, in the last election, there was an obvious status difference among candidates, so as to take greater advantage of this difference. This also would increase the mean. A second and related interpretation is that in 1949, the minor parties probably were reluctant to contest constituencies in which the major parties' candidates were prestigious people, but, if they did, there was likely to be a "status gap" between their candidates and those of the major parties. If these minor party candidates ran poorly in 1949, they, or their constituency parties, may have been unwilling to try again in 1953, thereby reducing the status gap and raising the average status.

We already have pointed out that the outcome of the 1953 election was never in doubt and that this probably encouraged some experimentation with respect to recruitment. We can speculate that parties that had done poorly in certain constituencies had nothing to lose and considerable to gain by: dropping their chronic losing candidates in favor of new and (hopefully) more successful ones; allocating their resources parsimoniously by not contesting districts that appeared hopeless.[32]

A dominant national party such as the Liberals also would be likely to feel fewer constraints in this environment. Since it had done well in the past and promised to do even better nationally in 1953, it may have contested constituencies in which it had not entered candidates previously on the assumption that *now* it might very well be successful.[33] Alternatively, the Liberals may have wished to test the mettle of new but promising recruits in these constituencies. If they did reasonably well, they would have established their claim to serious consideration as future candidates in more congenial districts (to the party) either at the national or provincial level.[34]

---

[32] In fact, the CCF-NDP entered one candidate less in 1953 than it had in 1949, while the Social Credit party contested six fewer sample constituencies in 1953.

[33] In 1953, the Liberals increased the number of their 1949 candidates by 11. The Conservatives increased their 1949 total of candidates by 10 in 1953.

[34] That this strategy is likely to be employed by parties is suggested by Ranney's study of the recruitment of British MP's. Ranney arrayed British constituencies along a "Winability" continuum and found that previous electoral experience was significantly related to the desirability of the constituencies in which non-incumbents stood. Austin Ranney, *op. cit.*, p. 94. Further, Leo Snowiss reports that in the suburban townships in

Even if they had no real hope of improving their competitive positions, the Liberals and, particularly, the Conservatives, probably had to try to recruit prestigious individuals to contest non-competitive districts in 1953 simply because they felt their images and competitive positions as national parties would suffer if they did not "show the flag" in most constituencies. Although they may have been disadvantaged in these areas, they probably possessed the resources at other levels of government necessary to induce high status, politically ambitious young men to contest apparently hopeless seats.[35]

Moving to the second panel of Table 8 we note that status difference is not as well predicted in the 1949–53 elections as it is in the 1962–63 pair. The appreciably higher Beta value for ΔSES_1 in the 1962–63 pair of elections is consonant with our interpretation of greater persistence in a shorter time period while the higher positive Beta for $\bar{X}$ SES_1 and ΔSES_2 in 1949–53 strengthens our belief that the 1953 election afforded the parties an opportunity to experiment in their candidate recruitment. As was suggested above, the major parties (especially the Liberals since they appeared to be certain winners) were able to recruit high status people, even in constituencies in which previously they had not done well. This would have had the effect of increasing status differences in 1953. On the other hand, in 1963 they may have had greater difficulty inducing high status candidates to enter contests since the election outcome was uncertain and status less indicative of an opponent's potential strength. Consequently, the 1962–63 correlation is lower.

An election-specific event, the resurgence of the minor parties in the sixties and their ability to recruit higher status candidates, seemingly is reflected in the fairly high and negative Beta for $CAND_1$ and ΔSES_2 in 1962–63. The negative Beta tells us that increasing the number of candidates in 1962 tended to decrease status differences in 1963. As Table 2 indicates, the Social Credit party ran 97 more candidates and the New Democratic Party 30 more candidates in 1962. These candidates generally were of higher status than these parties heretofore had recruited and, assuming that a substantial number were again candidates in 1963, their addition decreased status differences in 1963.

Moving to the third panel of this table, we find that the number of candidates is better predicted for the 1949–53 elections than for the 1962–63 elections. On the other hand, we find a higher Beta for the number of candidates in Time one in the latter (1962–63) elections, suggesting (as we have argued) that persistence is stronger in a shorter interim. The magnitude of this Beta for 1962–63, however, is somewhat smaller than we would have expected. This fact, plus the lower multiple correlation for these elections again leads us to the interpretation that, in a tight election in which a resurgence of minor party strength is possible, the variables from the immediately past election may be less important in determining the entry of a candidate than are time-sepcific variables unmeasured in our model.

In the 1949–53 elections we find a moderately high Beta for competition in Time one and a somewhat lower but still significant one in 1962–63. Thus, in both 1953 and 1963 there was a greater tendency for parties, particularly the minor ones, to enter candidates in previously competitive districts, although the tendency was less pronounced in 1963. These data also are consistent with out previous finding that increased competition in 1949 depressed average status in 1953 because it encouraged the entry of minor party candidates in certain constituencies. Urbanization is positively related to number of candidates in both elections, with the lower value being in the 1962–63 elections. The latter appears to be yet another election-specific finding that reflects the increased activity of the Social Credit party in rural areas of Quebec together with the increase in 1963 of opposition to the Conservatives in the rural constituencies of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Mean status of candidates in Time one is negatively related to the number of candidates in the 1949–53 elections, indicating, as was previously suggested, an unwillingness or inability to recruit new candidates to face competition from high status veteran candidates. That this effect is not apparent in the 1963 election suggests that in such a tense election

---

which there was no prospect of winning, the Chicago Democratic organization recruited Congressional candidates from among ambitious young lawyers seeking to establish themselves politically and professionally. Here they might be groomed for future more important (i.e., local) public office. See Snowiss, *op. cit.*, pp. 633–635.

[35] Canadian party organizations have considerable patronage at their disposal if they hold executive office at either the national or provincial levels. Lawyers, in particular, are likely to benefit by being given substantial legal work by national and/or provincial Administrations. In Chicago, Snowiss reports that the considerable patronage available to the Democratic machine undoubtedly enabled them to recruit candidates and workers in areas in which the party was weak. See Snowiss, *ibid.*, pp. 627–639.

status may be a less important indicator of a candidate's strength.

Finally, let us turn to the relationship between competition in the second election and the prior variables. Parameters for these relationships are presented in Table 9. For both pairs of elections, the multiple correlation coefficient is fairly high with the value for the 1962–63 elections being somewhat greater. For both pairs of elections, the Beta for competition in Time one is also quite high—again being greater for the 1962–63 pair of elections. Scanning the remaining Beta values for the 1962–63 elections, we find relatively high values for only two independent variables—the number of candidates in Time one and the number in Time two. Candidates in Time one have a positive Beta of .268 and candidates in Time two have a value of −.266. What do these two values, taken together, tell us about the effect of the number of candidates and the change in the number on competition?

TABLE 9. PARAMETERS FOR THE REGRESSION OF COMPETITION IN THE SECOND ELECTION ON PRIOR VARIABLES.

	1949–53		1962–63	
	B	SE B	B	SE B
Δ SES 1	−.137	.075	+.084	.071
Δ SES 2	+.055	.072	−.043	.067
$\bar{X}$ SES 1	−.171	.082	+.057	.083
$\bar{X}$ SES 2	+.098	.086	+.011	.084
Cand 1	+.137	.070	+.268	.063
Cand 2	−.259	.079	−.266	.062
Comp 1	+.604	.075	+.739	.057
Multiple R	.609		.744	

The positive value in Time one suggests that, given the Time two number of candidates, the Time one number is positively related to competition. The negative value for Time two says that, given the Time one number of candidates, the Time two number is negatively related to competition. Taken together, they say that a change in the number of candidates is negatively related to competition. That is, an increase in candidates tends to decrease competition in Time two over the value expected from the level of Time one competition. Such a finding is, of course, quite reasonable, Added candidates are not likely to do well and, hence, they reduce competition (as we have measured it) in the district.

In the 1949–53 elections the Beta value for Time one candidates is lower while the value for Time two candidates is approximately the same as in 1962–63. However, in both pairs of elections the direction of the relationships is the same, indicating that in both instances added candidates did not fare too well.

Finally, for the 1949–53 elections, the mean status of candidates in Time one has a reasonably high and negative Beta value. The Beta value for mean status in Time two is positive and although it is not statistically significant, both correlations taken together at least suggest that in certain districts an increase in the status of candidates in 1953 over what it was in 1949 also led to increased competition therein. The fact that the equivalent correlations are neither significant nor in the same direction in the 1962–63 elections again strengthens our belief that in a tense election in which the national outcome is doubtful, increasing the status of candidates in a district over what it previously was may not produce the desired effect—an increase in partisan competition.

IV. CONCLUSION

In the construction of our inter-election model we have identified a plausible-seeming causal order among the variables available to us and we have investigated the partial relationships of prior with succeeding variables in the model.

We have conceived of the candidate recruitment process as a "black box." Initial-state variables are the input to this black box and our output variables—the mean status of candidates, the number of candidates, and their status difference—are the result of the process. Underlying the model is the assumption that the aim of the process is to select output variables that maximize Time two competition in the several constituencies. Given the format of our data, it has been reasonable to use legislative districts as observational units rather than parties within districts. Thus, the logic of the situation which flowed from the format of our data led us to assume an aggregate variable—that is, one at the district level—was the one to be maximized. Such a point of view is useful because, in fact, we might suppose that one party's choice of a candidate is not independent of another's choice. Thus, we are forced to assume that, within our black box, a system is in operation in which there is reciprocal interaction. In a future analysis, this reciprocal interaction may be better investigated by focusing separately on variables for each party's candidate choice within each district.

In the present paper, we also have asserted that differential deviation from the competition-maximizing function of recruitment within the several constituencies can be attributed in great part to the impact of the total electoral environment on recruitment within districts. Thus, we investigated our model in two pairs of elections; one, a sustaining pair in which the second electoral outcome was considered known; the other, a pair in which the second outcome was very doubtful. We further stated that in the former, the object of candidate recruitment in many instances may well be party-maintenance, while in the latter, the outcome of recruitment is intended to be immediate electoral success. However, a complicating factor was the difference in the inter-election time gap for each pair of elections we employed. Thus, future investigations will require more analyses of elections with somewhat similar aim-effects but with different time gaps. Assuming, also, that a critical election-specific aim-effect is party maintenance, then, the analysis of a series of more than two elections could be attempted so that decisions whose aims transcend the immediate election might demonstrate their effect.

Again, further attention to measurement of inter-party competition and status difference appears necessary. In other than a multi-party system, for example, Gini measures may not be particularly appropriate.

Finally, it seems likely that we will have to go beyond multiple regression analysis to satisfactorily decompose the recruitment process. Although it is both valuable and important to delineate "net" associations between variables such as, for example, candidate status and inter-party competition, we have seen that this association obviously is mediated by the number of candidates in a contest. Our decomposition of "intervening" variables in this paper largely has been intuitive. The use of a linear causal model of the Simon-Blalock[36] or path analysis[37] type would appear to be particularly useful in the decomposition of the variables involved in recruitment. Although the problem involved in designing such a model would certainly be complex, the probability of generating some theoretical notions, if not *a* theory of recruitment, would make the game well worth the candle.

---

[36] For an explication of their technique see Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), chapters I-III; and Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Influences in Non-experimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), chapters I-III.

[37] Social scientists were introduced to path analysis by geneticist Sewell Wright in a series of articles dating from the 1920's. See, for example, Sewell Wright, "Correlation and Causation," *Journal of Agricultural Research*, 20 (1921), 557–585; "The Method of Path Coefficients," *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, 5 (1934), 161–215; and "Path Coefficients and Path Regressions: Alternative or Complementary Concepts?" *Biometrics*, 16 (1960), 189–202.

A NOTE OF CAUTION IN CAUSAL MODELLING

HUGH DONALD FORBES
Yale University

AND

EDWARD R. TUFTE
Princeton University

Many empirical investigations in the behavioral sciences today aim at tracing the causes of variations in some key dependent variable. The search for satisfying causal explanations is difficult because of the complexity of social phenomena, the crudeness of the measures of many important variables, and the prevalence of simultaneous cause and effect relations among variables. Although these difficulties remain, a number of important methodological contributions have clarified the conditions under which causal inferences can be made from non-experimental data.[1] In particular the Simon-Blalock technique has recently gained considerable attention, and has been profitably used by a number of political scientists in their research.[2] Examination of some of these applications does, however, reveal the need for a better understanding of the purposes and limitations of the technique. This paper reviews two studies: (1) the reanalysis of the Miller-Stokes data by Cnudde and McCrone,[3] and (2) the analysis of the determinants of Negro political participation in the South by Matthews and Prothro.[4] We shall argue that both these applications have two faults: (1) a failure to distinguish conclusions from assumptions, and (2) an inadequate correspondence between the assumptions made in constructing the mathematical models and our prior knowledge about the phenomena being studied. In addition, we shall use the first study to illustrate a principle of general importance in causal analysis: the investigator should check the possibility that different causal mechanisms occur in different subgroups of his data. And we shall use the second study to illustrate the difficulty of separating the effects of two highly correlated independent variables.

The purpose of these criticisms is not to suggest that causal modelling is an inherently misleading technique. On the contrary, this note should be seen as a defense of the technique against some of its proponents. Causal modelling formalizes and extends the common practice of social scientists in much of their work. Potentially, by making the logic of causal inference clearer and by introducing more powerful procedures, causal modelling can lead to great improvements in data analysis. Misguided applications of the technique, however, not only lend a spurious air of certainty to false conclusions; such misapplications can also lead to an unwarranted distrust of the methods which seem to have produced the conclusions.

---

[1] See Herbert A. Simon, "Causal Ordering and Identifiability," and "Spurious Correlation: A Causal Interpretation," reprinted in *Models of Man* (New York: Wiley, 1957), chs. 1–2; and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Evidence and Inference in Social Research," *Daedalus*, 87 (Fall, 1958), 99–130. Blalock's work is reported in Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964).

[2] Political science applications of causal modelling approaches include Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963), 45–56; Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Causal Inferences and Political Analysis," in Joseph Bernd (ed.), *Mathematical Applications in Political Science* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966); and Arthur S. Goldberg, "Discerning a Causal Pattern Among Data on Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 60 (December, 1966), 913–922. Causal modelling ideas have also been used to clarify the study of power; for example, Herbert A. Simon, "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," *op. cit.*, ch. 4; and Robert A. Dahl, "Power," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1968), vol. 12, pp. 405–415.

[3] Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," this REVIEW, 60 (March, 1966), 66–72. More recently the same authors have published an analysis of the causes of democratic political development that suffers from the same faults as their earlier paper. See Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," this REVIEW, 61 (March, 1967), 72–79.

[4] Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), ch. 11.

I. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In any kind of statistical analysis, conclusions about the nature of the world are the result of both the investigator's data and his prior assumptions. A change in assumptions in data analysis may lead to a change in conclusions. For example, a given collection of data may be used to estimate the parameters of many different causal models—models that incorporate different assumptions about the nature of the causal mechanisms that produced the data. The Simon-Blalock technique uses correlation and regression coefficients to test hypotheses about the presence or absence of particular causal links in a given hierarchical model. (Hierarchical models are those in which it is assumed that there is only one-way causation within the whole set of variables being analyzed; simultaneous cause and effect relationships are assumed not to exist, as are feedback loops around several variables.[5]) The structure of the hierarchical model—including the *direction* of all possible causal links between variables—must be decided before a test of the existence or nonexistence of any particular link is possible. Given a fair number of variables, a great many different initial assumptions are logically possible, and a large number may often be equally plausible. To choose any one of these possible hierarchical orderings is, in effect, to decide the directions of causal impact among all of the variables. If several initial assumptions about the ordering of the variables are equally plausible, then the Simon-Blalock technique provides no means for deciding between them.[6] Both the applications of causal modelling examined in this paper ignore this important fact.

In their reanalysis of the Miller-Stokes data Cnudde and McCrone fit a hierarchical causal model to a pattern of six correlations and then make a number of inferences about the relationship between Congressmen and their constituents. Their most important conclusions, seemingly disconfirming the results of other research on Congressmen, are (for civil rights issues): "1. The lack of a direct link between Congressmen's attitudes and district attitudes indicates that elite recruitment is not the basis for constituency control. 2. Unlike the private citizen, the Congressmen does not distort his perceptions to coincide with his own attitudes. Because the costs of misperceiving are so high for an elected official, his perceptions are likely to cause him to modify his attitudes to fit his reasonably accurate perceptions.[7]"

---

[5] These models are called "hierarchical" because they assume that all the variables in the analysis can be ordered *a priori* in a hierarchy of causes and effects. Variables in a model are said to form a causal hierarchy if they can be ranked so that those "higher" in the ranking appear in the equations of the model only as causes, and never as effects, of those variables which are "lower" in the ranking.

[6] Moreover it is not true, in general, that we can "infer the most likely [model]" if we "resort to the use of regression coefficients": Cnudde and McCrone, *op. cit.*, p. 68. A given set of data may be used to estimate the parameters of many different models. The basic logic of model building and testing is especially clearly set out in Stefan Valavanis, *Econometrics: An Introduction to Maximum Likelihood Methods* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), ch. 1.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 71–72. Compare the second proposition with Lewis Anthony Dexter's description of the representative: "A congressman's conception of his district confirms itself, to a considerable extent, and may constitute a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. . . . A congressman hears most often from those who agree with him. . . . Some men automatically interpret what they hear to support their own viewpoints." See "The Representative and His District," in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 9f. See also Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton, 1963), part V. Donald R. Matthews makes the same point with reference to Senators: "Without the most stubborn and conscientious efforts, a senator is almost certain to see and talk mostly with friends and supporters on such a trip [to his constituency]. Since both categories are likely to be in general agreement with him, the image of constituency opinion he brings back to Washington is usually distorted in favor of his own views": Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 229.

The first proposition seems inconsistent with the frequent emphasis on the "localism" of Congressmen; see Samuel P. Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," in David B. Truman (ed.), *The Congress and America's Future* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 5–31, especially Table II, p. 13; also David B. Truman, "Federalism and the Party System," in Arthur W. Macmahon (ed.),


Representative's Attitude
A
.498
.721
.643
Constituency's Attitude
D
.649
R
Representative's Roll Call Behavior
.738
.823
P
Representative's Perception of Constituency's Attitude

[a] Data are Miller-Stokes correlations reported in Cnudde and McCrone, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

FIG. 1. Intercorrelations of variables pertaining to civil rights—whole district.[9]

Their report suggests that these conclusions are empirical findings in the ordinary sense: the Miller-Stokes data imply these conclusions and no others (they are said to "emerge" from the analysis of the data). Using the Simon-Blalock technique, however, the second conclusion—about the direction of causation between Congressmen's attitudes and their perceptions of district opinion—can never be more than a (perhaps justified) prior assumption. The first conclusion—about the existence of a causal link between constituency attitudes and Congressmen's attitudes—is contingent upon the assumption that they present as their second conclusion; change the assumption and the opposite conclusion results. In neither case do their manipulations of correlation coefficients constitute empirical tests of their conclusions.

To illustrate this argument, we shall examine three causal models connecting district attitudes with Congressmen's roll call votes. All three models fit the pattern of correlations. Moreover all three models satisfy two additional restrictions: they treat district attitudes as purely an independent variable and they do not require any direct link between district attitudes and roll call votes.

Figure 1 shows the basic pattern of correlations used in this analysis.

Figure 2 shows three different causal models linking district opinion and the votes of Congressmen. Cnudde and McCrone have shown that Model 2(a) fits the data. Model 2(b) also fits: the addition of the link between district opinion and Congressmen's attitudes generates no new prediction equations that distinguish model 2(b) from 2(a). And model 2(c) also fits as Table 1 shows.

How do we choose between these three different models, each of which suggests a different conclusion about the relationship between attitudes and perceptions? It should be apparent that the choice between them must rest (in the absence of additional data) on the investigator's hunch (or assumption) about what causal mechanisms are likely to exist in the real world. The only other imaginable basis for choice is the criterion of parsimony: the fewer the links (or causal paths) in a model, the better. Model 2(a), suggesting that perceptions cause attitudes, might be accepted over 2(b) (which suggests the opposite) since the former contains one less causal link.[8] But if we were to take parsimony seriously, then Model 2(c) would seem most acceptable: it has the minimum number of links possible between four variables. Thus this criterion of parsimony leads to the surprising conclusion that there is a correspondence between Congressmen's own attitudes and their perceptions of their district's attitudes only because of their participation in roll call voting.[9] One need not accept this conclusion;

Federalism: Mature and Emergent (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 115–136. Even though restricted to the civil rights issue area (in 1958), Cnudde and McCrone's findings, if valid, would be of considerable substantive importance in view of the above literature.

[8] This seems to be the approach of Cnudde and McCrone; see the reasoning leading to their model III (p. 69) and the comment about parsimony (p. 72).

[9] Model 2(c) is actually somewhat plausible; it implies that the representative's perceptions of



(a) (b) (c)

FIG. 2. Three causal models that fit the intercorrelations of variables pertaining to civil rights.

the criterion of parsimony that leads to it is really irrelevant. There is no reason to believe that parsimony in this sense (a relatively small number of unidirectional causal linkages) is a distinguishing characteristic of valid models of social phenomena.

In this case, then, the choice between the three models is, in itself, a decision about the relationship between the attitudes, perceptions, and votes of Congressmen; it is a decision that is logically prior to looking at the data, and one for which the prescription of parsimony provides no guidance. Similarly it is clear that the first proposition (which suggests that elite recruitment is not relevant to district control of Congressmen) rests on the postulated relationship between attitudes and perceptions.[10] Neither of the assertions made by Cnudde and McCrone are "findings."[11]

TABLE 1. PREDICTION EQUATIONS AND DEGREE OF FIT FOR MODEL 2(C) OF CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE[a]

Prediction Equations	Predicted	Actual	Difference
$r_{DP}r_{PR}r_{RA} = r_{DA}$	(.738) (.823) (.721) = .438	.498	.060
$r_{DP}r_{PR} = r_{DR}$	(.738) (.823) = .607	.649	.042
$r_{PR}r_{RA} = r_{PA}$	(.823) (.721) = .493	.543	.050

[a] Data are Miller-Stokes correlations reported in Cnudde and McCrone, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

II. INTERACTION EFFECTS

Applying a single causal model to all the data that an investigator has collected is not always the best way of revealing the structure of the data. To fit a single causal model to a collection of data means, in effect, to assume that the data have been generated by an underlying causal mechanism that is roughly the same for all the units being studied. The structure of the mechanism is represented by the mathematical model, and the data are used to estimate its parameters. But different units can have different causal processes.[12] In any case, the validity of the mechanism hypothesized for all units in the population is not established by using all the data at once

---

constituent attitudes have an impact only when mediated by voting in accordance with district opinion, that is, playing the role of agent of the constituency.

[10] In addition, the absence of a direct link between district opinion and Congressmen's attitudes *in a single issue area* would not seem to be an adequate basis for inferences about "elite recruitment."

[11] The three models just discussed are *hierarchical* models; they force the investigator to decide at the outset, for example, whether attitudes cause perceptions or the other way around. Yet both these alternatives seem excessively strong in the light of research revealing the significant interaction between attitudes and perceptions. Miller and Stokes (*op. cit.*, p. 51) observe: "Out of respect for the processes by which the human actor achieves cognitive congruence we have also drawn arrows between the two intervening factors, since the Congressman probably tends to see his district as having the same opinion as his own and also tends, over time, to bring his own opinion into line with the district's." Lacking adequate theory to justify temporal or psychological priority of one variable over another, one will be unable to select between a number of hierarchical models that fit the data.

The assumptions made in a *reciprocal* model, in contrast to a hierarchical model, allow some variables to be both the cause and effect of each other. Such a model would, in theory at least, help disentangle attitudes and perceptions. Estimation of links in such models is a difficult empirical matter, however. On the problems and requirements in estimating the parameters of reciprocal models, see Valavanis, *op. cit.*, chs. 4 and 6; and J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963), ch. 9.

[12] Alker has drawn attention to the importance of this point in inter-nation comparisons. See Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Regionalism Versus Universalism in Comparing Nations," in Bruce Russett *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 322–340; and also Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Theory Building and the Statistical Concept of Interaction," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (June, 1965), 374–380. In many cases it may be useful to transform the variables to eliminate nonadditive effects. See Joseph B. Kruskal, "Transformations of Data," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (Macmillan, 1968), vol. 16, pp. 182–193.

for a single estimation. Rather the general validity of the model is established by showing that the hypothesized set of relationships holds for various relevant subgroups within the population. This is the familiar notion of controlling for a variable applied to causal modelling; a model ought to be tested within different subgroups of the sample. This method may, indeed, yield interesting results even if a single causal model is inappropriate, since it may be possible to show that different causal processes are operating in different parts of the population. The importance of examining subgroups of the data to establish the wider validity of a causal model is not merely a methodologist's maxim; in this section we shall show the consequences of the failure to test a model among relevant subgroups of the study population.

Miller, in a paper using the Miller-Stokes data on Congressmen, shows that the correlation patterns between district opinion and Congressmen's perceptions, attitudes, and votes vary widely across different types of districts (competitive and noncompetitive) and across three issue areas (social welfare, civil rights, and foreign policy).[13] There are, in short, many different types of representation. The model proposed by Cnudde and McCrone would have been more plausible if it had been tested among various subgroups of Congressmen, and in different issue areas—if they had, in effect, controlled for some of the prominent variables suggested by other studies of Congress.

Additional analysis of the Miller-Stokes data sharply illustrates the dangers of accepting a causal model tested only by reference to correlations across the entire sample. Using the data in Miller's paper, we tested the two major propositions for Congressmen from competitive and noncompetitive districts in the civil rights issue area. The basic Cnudde-McCrone model under consideration holds that there is no relationship between district opinion and the attitudes of the Congressmen when preceptions of district opinion by the Congressman are held constant: "...perceptions are likely to cause him [the Congressman] to modify his attitudes to fit his reasonably accurate perceptions."[14]

Analysis of the data shows that the model fits for one-party districts but does not fit for competitive districts (Table 2). Furthermore, as we saw earlier, there are many other possible models which would fit the data from one-party districts.[15]

TABLE 2. TEST OF THE DISTRICT OPINION—PERCEPTIONS—ATTITUDES MODEL FOR COMPETITIVE AND NONCOMPETITIVE DISTRICTS[a]

Civil Rights	Predicted Correlation	Fit Model?[b]
One-party districts	$\frac{.54}{.78} = .69$	yes
Competitive districts	$\frac{-.16}{.23} = -.70$	no

[a] Data are for majority district opinion from Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 362–363.

[b] The Cnudde-McCrone model implies that $r_{DA} = r_{DP}r_{PA}$. This in turn implies that the ratio r_{DA}/r_{DP} is positive.

III. MULTICOLLINEARITY

In *Negroes and the New Southern Politics*, Matthews and Prothro propose a causal model to account for variations in Negro political participation. Figure 3 shows the model which leads to the conclusion that:

> Community structure . . . is thus seen to have *direct* effects on social and economic attributes of individual southern Negroes and on the community political system, but *not* on Negro attitudes and cogitions *or* on Negro political participation. Individual socio-economic attributes and the political system have direct effects *only* on attitudes and cognitions. *All effects on political participation are interpreted by Negro attitudes and cognitions.*[16]

There are two major difficulties in this use of causal modelling that point to more general problems in multivariate analysis. First is a

---

[13] Warren E. Miller, "Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government," in Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology* (Helsinki: Proceedings of the Westermarck Society, 1964), pp. 343–376.

[14] Cnudde and McCrone, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

[15] Although Cnudde and McCorne restrict themselves to the civil rights issue area, their hypotheses would, if true, have more general significance. We tested their model for welfare and foreign policy issues in competitive and noncompetitive districts (based on the data in Miller, *op. cit.*). The model failed to fit in all four of these tests.

[16] Matthews and Prothro, *op. cit.*, pp. 323–324, emphasis in the original.

FIG. 3. Causal model of negro political participation.


Negro socio-economic attributes
(3)
Negro attitudes and cognitions
(4)
Negro political participation
(5)
r = 0.95
Community structure
(1)
Political system
(5)

Source: Matthews and Prothro, *op. cit.*, pp. 322–323.

difficulty we have already discussed: the reporting of assumptions as conclusions. The causal model of Negro political participation makes dubious assumptions about the relationships between the variables in the model (a good example is the one-way relationship postulated between characteristics of the political system and political participation by individuals), and, in the end, these assumptions are presented as if they were findings based on the analysis of the data.[17]

The second problem, deserving the attention of political scientists using multivariate models, is that of separating out the independent effects of highly correlated independent variables. In the study of Negro political participation, for example, the correlation between the "community structure" variable and the "political system" variable is 0.95. The extremely high correlation immediately raises the question of whether it is possible to disentangle the effects of these two variables, as the model requires, since they are virtually identical. It is, in fact, impossible to assess the independent effects of the "community structure" and the "political system" on Negro political participation in any reliable fashion.[18] This is the problem of "multicollinearity": when two or more independent variables are highly correlated, it is difficult to make reliable inferences about their relative contribution to the determination of the dependent variable. As the correlation between two independent variables approaches unity, it becomes literally impossible to tell one variable from the other. As Blalock puts it:

> Stated in most simple terms, whenever the correlation between two or more independent variables is high, the sampling error of the partial slopes and partial correlations will be quite large. As a result there will be a number of different combinations of regression coefficients, and hence partial correlations, which give almost equally good fittings to the empirical data. In any given case the method of least squares will usually yield unique solutions, but with slight modifications of the magnitude that could easily be due to sampling or measurement error, one might obtain estimates which differ considerably from the original set.[19]

Finally, as a matter of general interest, it should be noted that the difficulties arising from multicollinearity persist regardless of the method of data analysis. In short, multicollinearity not only affects estimates in multiple regression procedures; it also weakens inferences based on cross-tabulations. While occasionally the use of additional information may alleviate the problem, it often happens that when the social scientist must rely on "experiments" performed by nature, he will be unable to obtain the independent variation necessary to assess the independent effects of his explanatory variables.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

This review of two recent applications of causal models to political data suggests the need to stress certain elementary principles of data analysis. As models grow more complex, basic principles may often be lost in the maze of elaborate analyses. We can suggest a number of specific points growing out of the preceding discussion:

1. In complicated multivariate models, there are a number of inherent problems of estimation. These often arise in attempts to dis-

---

[17] See the reasoning about "direction of causation," *ibid.*, pp. 321–323.

[18] The beta weights included in the analysis (*ibid.*, p. 321) also run contrary to the model.

[19] Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Correlated Independent Variables: The Problem of Multicollinearity," *Social Forces*, 62 (December, 1963). p. 233. For more detailed discussions of the problem, see Donald E. Farrar and Robert R. Glauber, "Multicollinearity in Regression Analysis: The Problem Revisited," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 49 (February, 1967), 92–107; and Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 201–207.

tinguish the relative impact of different variables that are themselves highly intercorrelated. The accuracy of the estimates degenerates as the intercorrelation between independent variables approaches unity. Indeed, in the case of perfect correlation between two variables, the variance of the estimates of the relative impact is infinite!

2. Any investigator, and especially those aiming to give a causal interpretation of their findings, should consider the possibility that different causal processes operate in different subgroups of their data. This may be formally incorporated into the model by using statistical procedures that take interaction effects into account.

3. Complex multivariate models require a good many assumptions in order to estimate the parameters of the model. These assumptions are often not testable and they do not, of course, "emerge" from the analysis of the data, and should not be reported as empirically grounded conclusions.

The Simon-Blalock technique does not eliminate these problems. The investigator, regardless of his particular data analysis strategy, must face them and avoid the unthinking manipulation of correlation coefficients in an attempt to "eliminate" causal links.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: For further discussion of these questions, see the Communications by Cnudde-McCrone and Forbes-Tufte at pp. 1269–1271.)

A NOTE ON CENSORSHIP

GORDON TULLOCK
Rice University

In *Toward a Mathematics of Politics*[1] I presented a model of reciprocal interaction between information media and the opinions held by members of the community. It is the purpose of this note to apply a somewhat simplified version of this model to the specific problem of censorship. Testable hypotheses will be deduced and implications which may be of importance for policy will be suggested.

Suppose the population of the country are arrayed on some issue dimension. It makes little difference for our present purposes what the dimension itself represents. It might, for example, indicate the degree of nudity of pictures of women in men's magazines or the strength with which the views of Castro are supported. Let us suppose that the distribution along this issue dimension declines at one end, as shown in Figure 1. Note that the remainder of the distribution can be any shape; in fact, I have drawn in three dashed lines for three possible distributions.[2] If we assume, not unreasonably, that most people who are in the business of producing public information seek to maximize readership, then we would anticipate that in a competitive market the information media would be spread over the possible positions in this line in much the same pattern as the population.[3] Put more bluntly, the managers of such organizations as *Time*, *Newsweek*, and CBS go where the customers are.



FIG. 1

This competitive situation in a sense is an equilibrium situation. Individuals' tastes would be influenced by things they read and what they read would be affected by their tastes. For any individual there would be some tendency to move along the line, but there is no obvious reason why the general population should be shifted. An individual would normally be reading or looking at some things that are not perfect expressions of his optimum taste. The man who thinks, for example, that *Playboy* is ridiculously conservative in its photographic standards might nevertheless occasionally read *Reader's Digest*. Thus, to some extent, insofar as his opinions are affected by the information which he receives he would be subject to some tendency to move to the left on our diagram if increasing nudity is considered to be on the right.

The point of this article, however, is to discuss the effect of censorship. Let us begin by considering what can be called majority or conventional censorship. This is the type of censorship we frequently get in democracies. It is an effort by the majority of the population to prevent some minority from obtaining media to its tastes. A classical example, of course, is the law against pornography, but there are other areas in which similar things may be observed. Thus, let us suppose that the government establishes a censorship which, on our issue dimension, simply prohibits publication of anything to the right of what I have labeled the censor line. This immediately means that the media now publishing to the right of that line must cease publication or shift their editorial policy. It also, however, has a sharp effect on the market of those media which are immediately to the left of this line. They are now the closest approximations of the taste of all the people to the right of the line. Thus one could anticipate a rapid expansion of media in this area. Note that this does not necessarily involve an increase in the number of (let us say) magazines published in that area. It could involve, instead, a sharp improvement in circulation and of quality in those magazines. Looked at from the standpoint of the publishers the change in censorship adjusts the tastes of the population insofar as they can be expressed in purchases of journals so that they fit more or less the dotted line in Figure 1.

---

[1] *Toward a Mathematics of Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), pp. 82–99.

[2] Even the requirement that the distribution decline at one end is not necessary. A highly abstract version of the theorems developed below can be presented with any distribution covering a finite interval.

[3] The relationship between the publication distribution and the distribution of the opinions of the consumers of the publications is complicated by two factors. One is economies of scale, and the second is the poor information held by the operators of the media on public preferences. Working out the implications of these two modifying factors is tedious and difficult. Readers interested in this aspect of the matter should turn to Chapters V and VI (pp. 82–99) of *Toward a Mathematics of Politics*. For our present purposes, however, an extremely simplified model which ignores these factors is a suitable mapping of the more complex basic model. One aspect of the basic model should be mentioned. Due to the very large economies of scale to be found in the field of media production, areas where customers are dense are characterized not by many publications, but by a few large, heavily capitalized journals.

Here we have a readily testable hypothesis. If the theory is correct, attempts to impose conventional standards on "girlie" magazines would lead to a sharp increase in the number of magazines which just pass the police standards. Given the fact that there is a good deal of variation in the rules imposed by different police forces, a comparative analysis of relative frequencies in different cities should show a high concentration of magazines which just pass the minimum standards in each city.

With this new distribution of publications the individuals in the society will be confronted with somewhat different reading matter than they had before, and this over time should work at least some shift in their tastes or political preferences. For example, the people who previously were reading material to the right of the censorship line are now compelled to read material to the left. It is reasonable to assume that after a while their preferences will shift in that direction. This would, if left entirely to itself, produce a small secondary hump in the normal distribution curve at or near the censor line. This would, I presume, be one of the objectives of people who propose the censorship. There is, however, another objective which is frequently mentioned by people who favor censorship. They very frequently are not interested in the "depraved" people who directly consume whatever it is they object to. They tend to say that they are interested in the entire population, particularly the younger portion of the population, and therefore their objective in eliminating the extreme portion of the spectrum is not to save people whose tastes are already widely deviant from conventional morality, but to prevent a movement in that direction by the whole population.

If this is the objective of the censorship, it is by no means obvious that it can be achieved. The development of a concentration of fairly high quality media just inside the censor line will change the information available to people who have more conventional tastes, too. Thus, someone who is approximately at the middle of the population and who would be unlikely to read anything banned by the censorship anyway, may find he is much more likely to read something which is just acceptable now that the volume and quality of material published at that point has been so sharply increased. It is thus possible, although not certain, that imposition of censorship will have an effect of shifting the general population distribution to the right on our diagram at the same time it eliminates the extreme tail. It is fairly easy to make sets of detailed assumptions under which this will either occur or will not occur, but there seems no point in doing so here. Clearly, we have a subject for empirical investigation, rather than theoretical speculation. It should be noted, however, that it is clear that this type of censorship may have results which are highly perverse, from the standpoint of the people who recommend it.

So much for censorship by the majority. Let us now consider its totalitarian equivalent. Figure 2 is like Figure 1, but we assume that some party which holds an extreme position has seized political power. The party has the position shown. Under these circumstances it could, of course, simply take over the press and see to it that everything it published was exactly what the party wishes. This is the early Communist and Nazi technique. If this is done, we would have a fairly simple result with the entire volume of publication represented by that particular point on our horizontal line, and presumably some tendency for the population distribution to shift towards that point.

A great many dictatorships, however, have not followed this technique. Instead, they have simply established a censorship which permits some variance in what the news media will publish. I represented this situation by drawing in the censor line a short distance from the party's own position on Figure 2. Here again, the circulation-maximizing manager of some kind of publication media would find that his opportunities were severely restricted, and it would have the effect upon him very similar to that if the population itself had shifted to the form shown by the dotted line. Thus, we would anticipate a very high concentration of publications which were as close as they could get to the censor line. This would not be because they particularly favored freedom of the press, but simply because they were trying to attract readers. Dictatorships normally do not favor objective research into their policies, but it might be possible to test this hypothesis nevertheless. Even the most monolithic government will change its censorship rules from time to time, and a comparison of the distribution of publications under different rules should show the effect. The effect on the general population of such a concentration of news media at or about the censorship line would presumably be to shift its position to some degree. There is, however, another likely outcome of this concentration. The dictatorial clique or party is now confronted with a very large collection of high quality information media which are almost at its position, but slightly closer to majority opinion. Presumably, the members of this dictatorial clique were able to maintain their opinions against the set of publication media distributed much as the population itself because the publication media which were at a considerable distance from their own position exercised little influence on them. They were convinced that these people were basically wrong. Now, however, confronted with an extremely large concentration of media which are just slightly different from their position, it is likely that the party itself will tend to shift.

This shift (to the left on our diagram) is apt to be accompanied by a similar shift or attrition in the censor line, and hence this scheme although it does influence the populace in a way in which the initial founders in the revolutionary regime would approve is apt to influence these founders and their descendants in a way of which they would disapprove. The long gradual attrition of Czarist censorship in the 19th century would appear to be an example of this. It may appear that the conclusions I have drawn from the use of this extremely simple theoretical model are excessive for the reasoning structure which underlines them. In practice, however, it does seem that the assumptions I have made fit the real world, and the conclusions I have drawn also seem to fit. But casual empiricism is only the start of any investigation. Formal tests are clearly called for, and I hope that some of the readers of this note will undertake them.



FIG. 2

COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

Professor Kaplan's amusing conclusion of his review of my *World Politics: The Global System* (this Review, June, 1968, p. 694) moves me to exonerate the Dorsey Press from his charge "that they could not afford proper critical help to the author . . ." They proferred more critical help—all of it relevant and from highly reputable scholars—than I was willing to accept.

Mr. Kaplan and I could argue about who misunderstands, and how grossly, the literature on strategic doctrine. Some highly placed practicing strategists have assured me that my understanding and interpretation of it in the book are sound. In any case, the *absurdum* to which some strategists have reduced their doctrines in the device of the doomsday machine was not presented as a preferred strategy in my book. As for Mr. Kaplan's magistral assertion that "it is not true that nuclear weapons cannot be used to acquire some future good," would it not serve the purposes of the Review—which is one of our profession's "present means to obtain some apparent future good"—if he were to elaborate, corroborate, and engage in a little dialectic?

Herbert J. Spiro

University of Pennsylvania

(Editor's Note: The Managing Editor regrets that inadequate copy-editing and proofreading allowed this unwarranted statement to appear in the Review, and apologizes to Professor Spiro and the Dorsey Press for any embarrassment it may have caused them.)

To the Editor:

In his article, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power," this Review (1968), pp. 451–60, Richard Merelman is severely critical of our analysis of the nature and process of nondecision-making. Within the limited space permitted us here, we can do no more than point out his major errors.

In Merelman's view, we make the following interrelated points: (a) "non-elites are encased in values foisted on them by the elite"; (b) "non-elites are not even conscious of having major differences with the elite"; therefore (c) conflict in the community is limited to "unimportant matters which do not threaten the elite." (p. 452.) Given this perception of things, says Merelman, we must be "neo-elitists." Worse, our formulation is riddled with logical and empirical problems.

The chief objection to his critique is that it is predicated on a careful misreading of our discussion of nondecision-making. As we see it, the process is at work when the mobilization of bias, created or sustained by its beneficiaries (who may be either elites or non-elites), is *sufficiently dominant*—not necessarily or even usually omnipotent and all-encompassing, as Merelman contends—to prevent a political issue from reaching the decision-making arena. Obviously, if a particular set of political beliefs was universally embraced in a given community, no one could tell whether the consensus was "false" or genuine. Merelman labors this point; but in concentrating on the limiting case, he ignores all those other, more common situations in which consensus on values is lacking, yet persons and groups shaping and supporting currently dominant beliefs are able to utilize these beliefs as a means to silence the opposition or render it ineffectual.

We deny the contention of our pluralist critics that so-called non-events are beyond the reach of empirical investigation. It *is* possible to determine, on the one hand, the nature and degree of covert support for critics of the dominant set of values and, on the other, the extent to which those who stand to lose from public airing of an issue use power or its correlates to sustain the beliefs that will keep the issue from being seriously considered. It seems well established, for example, that Senator Joe McCarthy and his supporters engaged in nondecision-making in the early 1950's, when their exploitation of anti-communist sentiments effectively blocked access to the decision-making arena of demands for social reform. Even more interesting is the evidence we have found in Baltimore, where the value of equal opportunity for blacks has lately gained wide acceptance—only to be used by prominent whites to deny Negroes a greater share in the actual making of community decisions. It is immaterial for present purposes whether white leaders consciously adopted a pro-civil-rights posture in order to isolate the advocates of "black power." What *is* significant is that they exercised authority and influence on the nondecision-making level and did so without creating a community-wide consensus. Need we add that had we relied exclusively on analysis of "concrete" decisions, in the fashion of Merelman and his fellow pluralists, we would have missed this critical aspect of contemporary politics in Baltimore?

From what we have said here and elsewhere, it should be clear that we are not "neo-elitists." We neither presuppose that every community is run by an elite nor that an elite consensus must exist in order for nondecision-making to be operative and effective. We simply reiterate that nondecision-making may be and often is a critical element in the political process and, as such, deserves further theoretical analysis and empirical study. We plan shortly to produce another paper along these lines.

PETER BACHRACH
Temple University
MORTON S. BARATZ
Bryn Mawr College

TO THE EDITOR:

Mercifully, the Bachrach-Baratz letter permits me brevity:

1. Parts III and IV of my article, which deal with cases of nondecision-making involving power and force, are distinguished from Part II by the fact that while the latter presupposes false consensus the former two do not. Therefore, as Bachrach and Baratz can no doubt see, the power and force sections deal with the class of situations they accuse me of ignoring. In fact, I intended Parts III and IV to absolve me of any suspicion that I was only treating a "limiting case."

2. Non-events are, by definition, non-empirical. You cannot observe what has not happened. Therefore, interpretations made about nondecisions are subject to the difficult and peculiar problems of inference I discussed in my article. The fact that you can find evidence supporting your version of why something did not happen in Baltimore, say, does not circumvent the inferential problems I discussed. The situation is analogous to a jury forced to convict on circumstantial evidence. It is always nice to have a *corpus delicti* around. We must, otherwise, make leaps of faith that are usually too great for most political scientists, as scientists and not as citizens, to attempt.

3. Bachrach and Baratz deny that they are neo-elitists, or that they believe that every community is run by an elite, or that elite consensus is necessary for nondecision-making to operate effectively. Of course, only Part II of my article makes the latter two assumptions, which are specifically limited to the false consensus case therein discussed. Since, as paragraphs 1 and 2 above indicate, the Bachrach-Baratz letter has not raised any new issues which dispute my analysis, I will continue to let the article speak for itself. I'm glad we can at least agree that nondecision-making needs more analysis.

RICHARD M. MERELMAN
University of California Los Angeles

TO THE EDITOR:

Forbes and Tufte (this issue of the REVIEW) level three charges against our linkage article. They are: (1) that our model is somehow suspect because underlying the nationwide data are different patterns of linkage for competitive and non-competitive districts; (2) that our assumptions are not reasonable given other literature on representation; and (3) that we state one of our assumptions as a conclusion.

The hypothesis that different models are appropriate for competitive and non-competitive constituencies is an attractive one and worth investigating properly. If the hypothesis were supported by appropriate testing, it would be an important and welcome addition to the literature on representation. Unfortunately, Forbes and Tufte utilize an unsound and misleading methodology in their test.

The magnitude of correlation coefficients depends in part upon the variance which is measured in a variable. When we divide a body of data into subgroups, say into competitive and non-competitive districts, we may differentially affect the variance in variables and, therefore, the correlation coefficients. Since the values of those correlation coefficients depend in part on how we divided the data, they are descriptive of the divided data only and should not be used as comparisons with those from the originally undivided set or from the set divided in other ways. It is not surprising, then, that these writers find a model other than ours in one of their subgroups since their analysis utilized correlation coefficients. (Note that our analysis also uses correlation coefficients and therefore describes our data set only, but we do not attempt comparisons with other sets or subsets.) We suggest that if Forbes and Tufte are serious in the testing of their hypothesis, they should use unstandardized regression coefficients in the future. The procedure they utilize was specifically warned against and reliance on unstandardized coeffients was suggested nearly two years ago in this REVIEW (March, 1967) by Blalock. Ironically, Blalock used the Miller-Stokes data as his case study in warning against reliance on correlation coefficients for this type of model analysis.

We should also note, however, that for Forbes and Tufte to utilize unstandardized regression coeffients for subgroup analysis, they will still have to face the major problem of sampling error in the Miller-Stokes data. To use even regression coefficients for subgroup analysis, we must be able to ignore sampling error. With only 116 districts to be divided into competitive and non-competitive districts and very few (average of 15–20) interviews per district, sampling error might produce disparate results even utilizing regression coefficients.

Finally, we would also like to make clear that even if the model were different for competitive and non-competitive districts, this would constitute a specification of the conditions under which our model was operative or inoperative. It would not constitute grounds for rejecting it.

Their second charge that there is "an inadequate correspondence between the assumptions made in constructing the mathematical models and prior knowledge about the phenomena being studied . . ." is indeed weak. Despite their manipulations of the roll-call behavior in their model 2c, we assume that there is no quarrel over considering district attitudes as independent and roll-call vote as the dependent variable. The objection seems to be that it is unreasonable to think that a congressman's attitudes are affected by his perceptions of district attitudes.

What, then, are their grounds for objection? They cite two studies in which the authors stress misperception as descriptive of congressmen. Dexter, in his article and in *American Business and Public Policy*, for example, sees misperception on fair trade legislation. But is fair trade legislation civil rights legislation? Miller and Stokes find considerable misperception on foreign policy and social welfare, but on civil rights the correlation between perception and district attitude is .74, which is higher than that between his own attitude and his perception (.46). One would expect that if attitudes were causing perceptual distortions the latter correlation would be higher than that between perception and district attitude.

More importantly, however, they fail to make clear, as we did, that two specifying conditions need to be set for accepting the notion that his attitude can be affected by his perceptions. "Because the *costs of misperceiving are so high* for an elected official, his perceptions are likely to cause him to modify his attitudes to fit his *reasonably accurate perceptions*." (Italics added). We feel that .74 correlation is reasonably accurate perception. The Hays-Alford case demonstrates the costs of "error" in civil rights.

As to the third criticism, it has some merit. A pitfall of causal modeling is the ease with which assumptions become conclusions. Their "note of caution" is in order for us and several other practitioners of the art.

In conclusion, we would like to take this opportunity to clear up several misconceptions about our article which we found in Forbes and Tufte and in conversations with colleagues. Our model was *solely* devised as a model of constituency influence on civil rights. We were quite certain that it was not a general model and at no point did we seek to call it one.

Second, when we stated that we accounted for the 88% of the original relationship between district attitude and roll-call vote, many failed to recognize that this original relationship accounts for only 42% of roll-call behavior. In other words, like Miller and Stokes, we dealt only with constituency influence models.

Third, though we argue that perceptions are influential on congressmen's attitudes, we do not mean that they are the sole, or even primary determinant of his attitudes. The magnitude of the correlations leave considerable room for the operation of other influences on Congressmen's attitudes.

CHARLES F. CNUDDE
DONALD J. MCCRONE
The University of Wisconsin

TO THE EDITOR:

Near the end of their communication, Cnudde and McCrone agree with our main criticism of their paper, that they reported their assumptions as conclusions. Their other points, however, suggest a few additional cautionary remarks.

First, their discussion of subgroup analysis should not discourage anyone from controlling for key variables and testing explanatory models within regions of the data. Subgroup analysis is an essential tool for discovery in the detective kit of the data analyst. In such analysis one will face obvious difficulties when the variability within subgroups is small. These difficulties weaken all inferences, not merely those based on comparisons of correlation coefficients across subgroups. In the case of the Miller-Stokes data, Cnudde and McCrone provide no evidence that the variability is severely reduced in the comparison between competitive and non-competitive districts. Miller, of course, has reported a wide range of results for such subgroups of Congressional districts.

Second, their comments about unstandardized regression coefficients are quite misleading. Regression coefficients generally provide a better summary of a linear relationship than a correlation coefficient, although for some data this general rule does not apply. For the Miller-Stokes data, unstandardized regression coefficients are inappropriate because their metrics do not possess the substantive meaning required for the sensible use of such coefficients. Here we would recommend the paper that Blalock somewhat inaccurately cites in his justification of unstandardized coefficients. John Tukey wrote that "correlation coefficients are justified in two and only two circumstances, when they are regression coefficients, or when the measurement of one or both variables on a determinate scale is hopeless. . . .[An] area in which correlation coefficients are prominent includes psychometrics and educational testing in general. This is surely a situation where determinate scales are hopeless." Since this is also the situation for the Miller-Stokes data, the advice of Blalock (seconded by Cnudde and McCrone) is inappropriate.

Hugh Donald Forbes
Edward R. Tufte

To the Editor:

In an otherwise innocuous review of my book *The Politics of the European States* (this Review, June 1968) Mr. Robert A. Rupen confuses a point of my conclusions. He states that "he (Ionescu) wants to get the superpowers out of Europe, although he clearly recognizes that simple simultaneous withdrawal of the USSR and the U.S. would be unlikely to bring about the democratic pan-Europe he ardently desires." I thought that the real point I was making, although subtler, was clear enough when I wrote (p. 282): "What is suggested here has very little to do with either the theory of the third force, or with that of European neutralism, or with the old fashioned theory of 'disengagement.' The point concerns only the difference in the stimulus of the initiative and the novelty of the results, according to whether they originate from the blocs respectively led by the two superpowers or from the European countries. Whereas, in the former case, the worst coming to the worst, a more correlated, more flexible and yet more lasting status quo could be acceptable, if not recommendable, in the latter it is precisely the *status quo* of the general relation between Europe and the two superpowers which is questioned." And (p. 283): "What is meant is that it is more probable that, in a situation of double flux, changes recorded in the *internal sphere* of each country of a 'camp', and of the camp itself, would reverberate more effectively on the process of (European) integration itself."

I believe that the Czechoslovak experience of 1968 confirmed my trend of thinking, if properly understood and fairly presented.

Ghita Ionescu
London School of Economics and Political Science

To the Editor:

Your recent review of *Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism* (issue of June 1968, pp. 623–4) does little more than register the reviewer's annoyance with this report and with the studies of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations on which it is based. The inaccuracies in Thomas J. Anton's review are too numerous to cover in a brief rejoinder, but a few can be cited as illustrations.

Mr. Anton contends that the report criticizes the fragmentation of government in metropolitan areas but fails to state criteria for determining that problems result from this fragmentation; that the report finds conflicts of interest among governments blocking effective action to deal with metropolitan problems, but fails to state what action should be taken on specific issues. Criteria are, however, presented on pp. 30–32 and in case studies of two areas of governmental responsibility: water supply and sewage disposal, and the relocation of people and businesses displaced by public land-takings. More effective action in these two areas is proposed in considerable detail on pp. 141–154. Mr. Anton may well disagree with the criteria and the proposals, but to claim that no standards are presented and no action indicated is a strange way of registering disagreement.

Mr. Anton's critique of Commission findings as confused and inconsistent derives largely from his own faulty summary Thus he attributes to the Commission the view that "the federal government should retain an essentially advisory role," and then finds contradictory recommendations for federal planning standards as a condition of local grants-in-aid. Far from contending that the federal role should be primarily advisory, *Metropolitan America* discusses reasons warranting federal action in metropolitan affairs (pp. 119–123), proposes many positive federal measures, and focuses particularly on ways of improving the grant-in-aid system. The Commission's recommendations for federal action are certainly fair game for criticism, but dismissing them by manufacturing internal contradictions is not a very high level of criticism.

Finally, Mr. Anton rejects the work of the Commission as "organizational tinkering" inappropriate for the solution of serious urban problems. "Organizational tinkering" presumably refers to proposals for change in the governmental system. But present governmental arrangements have much to do with such problems as poverty and inequality of opportunity. The governmental strategies that the Advisory Commission recommends involve redressing fiscal disparities among local governments, enabling communities where the poor are concentrated to support higher levels of public service, expanding the supply of low-income housing, enforcing laws against discrimination, increasing state contributions to local welfare assistance, and providing certain educational and employment programs on a metropolitan basis.

These are not the only possible strategies, and continuing analysis and debate may well suggest others. Effective solutions, however, are not likely to have the tightly organized, consistent quality that Mr. Anton wants. Given the complexity of our urban problems as well as of our governmental system, a simplified and therefore highly consistent solution may make for happier speed-reading, but it will not contribute much to public policy.

BERNARD J. FRIEDEN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

TO THE EDITOR:

Presumably, Mr. Frieden would have us frame recommendations that are (1) loosely organized, (2) inconsistent, and (3) complex. Such recommendations, he thinks, would "contribute" to public policy more effectively than tightly organized, consistent and simplified solutions. Maybe so, but as a slow reader, I have my doubts.

Perhaps it is his quest for complexity that leads Mr. Frieden to misstate part of what I wrote: I did *not* say that criteria for determining the existence of a problem were lacking in his report, but that the expressed criteria were little more than slogans, with neither clarity of meaning nor specificity of application to recommend them. Statements that governments should be large enough to permit economies of scale, should have an area adequate for effective performance, should have the legal and administrative ability to perform assigned services, and the like (pp. 30–32), are quite meaningless unless and until the key terms are given specific content. What defines "adequate" or "effective" performance? What defines legal and administrative "ability"? How large is "large enough" for economies of scale? Stating principles without defining them is rather like proposing marriage without setting a date. In both cases there is reason to suspect the integrity of the proposal.

For the rest, Mr. Frieden seems to me to be playing a semantic game on the issue of what constitutes an "advisory" role for the federal government. He does not, after all, propose that the federal government take over local governments and his report specifically advocates leaving "major reponsibility" for metropolitan problems with State and local governments. (p. 119) And, if Mr. Frieden now thinks that re-structuring urban government will have much impact on poverty or inequality of opportunity, then he is in disagreement not only with me, but with himself, for he expressed the opposite view on pp. 126–127 of *Metropolitan America*. But let us not play silly academic games. Poverty, prejudice, education, housing, environmental quality, money, violence and just plain decency are some of the most pressing problems we face in our urban areas. Surely, it is these problems we must deal with and solve. If our solutions require changed governmental forms, then let us change those forms. We are not likely to have a good idea of what governmental changes to make, however, unless we know what we want to do in our cities. And knowing what to do, in specific as well as general terms, requires work of a different order than that so far produced by the Commission.

THOMAS J. ANTON
The University of Michigan

TO THE EDITOR:

I am perennially annoyed that a fallacious political myth keeps popping up in introductory government texts from which I have taught, and apparently is in no danger of refutation by the hard-minded empiricists among us.

This myth is that a communist government has never been voted into power in a free election.[1] Although this may not be an earth-shaking issue, it is doubly disturbing to me that this bit of folklore is perpetuated by some scholars who are extremely prominent and highly respected in our field.

---

[1] Marian D. Irish and James W. Prothro, *The Politics of American Democracy* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 74; Lee S. Greene and George S. Parthemos, *American Government: Policies and Functions* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 358; Austin Ranney, *The Governing of Men*, rev. ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 178–179; William Ebenstein, C. Herman Pritchett, Henry A. Turner, Dean Mann, *American Democracy in World Perspective* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 664.

In texts where this myth is not blatantly stated, it nevertheless is strongly implied, which probably serves to leave the reader with the same belief as if the myth had been stated baldly, such as in the following case:

> Indeed, whenever the communists have captured power from within (as contrasted with cases where they imposed a puppet regime through the power of the Red Army), they were successful as conspirators or as guerrillas because they recognized the primacy of politics and turned prevailing discontent to their own advantage.[2]

This sort of phraseology is common to several other introductory texts, and while I am just as leery of communism as the next person, I believe that we are intellectually committed to give the devil his due. Certainly we are obliged to delete such unnecessary lapses in research as this one:

> So far, no communist regime has ever been set up after a free election, and thus President Kennedy's commitment to accept such an election result has never been tested in practice.[3]

This kind of statement is to be expected from the oddballs on the radical right whose jingoistic patriotism is overshadowed only by their immense lack of gray matter, but not from authors with doctorates in political science who are writing for college students.

In 1945, San Marino became the first country to elect a communist government in free elections. This government continued in power until 1957, when the voters (again, in free elections) turned them out.[4]

In the year that the communist government of San Marino was voted out, Kerala, India, became the first state to put a communist government in office in free elections. In 1958, numerous mass demonstrations and strikes occurred in Kerala in opposition to an education bill promoted by the communists which would provide state control of the many church- and caste-run private schools. President Prasad of India declared a state of emergency, new elections were held, and the communists were voted out of office, to be replaced by a coalition of opposing parties.

As a result of the general election in February, 1967, Kerala and West Bengal formed United Front ministries in which the Communist Party was the largest single party. The central government of India ousted the West Bengal United Front in November, 1967, and placed West Bengal under President's rule in February, 1968, but the leader of the communists in Kerala, E.M.S. Namboodiripad, was sworn in as chief minister in 1967 and (so far) is still in office.

The preceding examples are in addition to a number of small towns in Italy where the town's elected Council is composed of communists alone, or in which the communists have an absolute majority or are in a controlling position.

I have found no evidence that the communist governments cited above were a product of communists "seizing control," "overrunning" the government, or "capturing" the government. Granted, these instances are largely inconsequential political units. But that is beside the point. The issue is whether communist governments have been freely voted into power.

I offer a suggestion. From now on, why not phrase the myth more accurately, such as the following: communists have never been freely elected to control an important national government. This should satisfy those whose scholarly objectivity is subject to momentary frenzies of patriotism or fear, like a recurring attack of malaria. But I would much rather we simply admit that, on occasion, communists do win elections honestly. This admission is not only straightforward and honest, but it would also enable us, in my opinion, to argue more effectively the case against revolutionary communism.

David Lindsay
Central Missouri State College

---

[2] Leslie Lipson, *The Democratic Civilization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964,) p. 193. I am surprised to read in a govenrment textbook that there is apparently something unethical about a political party's turning prevailing discontent to its own advantage. Is there a better way to get elected?

[3] Ebenstein, Pritchett, Turner, and Mann, p. 193.

[4] The story of the communist rule of San Marino is told entertainingly by Donna Shor in "San Marino: Little Land of Liberty," *National Geographic*, 132 (August, 1967), 233–251.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

BOOK REVIEWS

Chambers and Burnham, editors, The American Party Systems. A. E. KEIR NASH 1275

Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801–1917. FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN 1276

Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. JEAN GROSSHOLTZ 1278

Rudolph and Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India. ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR. 1280

Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy. NORMAN KOGAN 1282

Hyneman (with Gilbert), Popular Government in America: Foundations and Principles. NEAL RIEMER 1284

Muir, Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change: *Johnson*, The Dynamics of Compliance: Supreme Court Decision-Making from a New Perspective. SHELDON GOLDMAN 1285

Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: *Weiss*, Political Protest in the Congo. CRAWFORD YOUNG 1287

Pennock and Chapman, editors, Nomos X: Representation. JAMES A. STEINTRAGER 1289

Plank, editor, Cuba and the United States: Long-Range Perspectives: *Zeitlin*, Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class. RICHARD R. FAGEN . . . 1291

Erdman, The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism. SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH 1293

Bernd, editor, Mathematical Applications in Political Science III. HERBERT F. WEISBERG 1294

Fox and Fox, NATO and the Range of American Choice: *Beaufre*, NATO and Europe: *Cleveland*, The Atlantic Idea and Its European Rivals. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD 1296

Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939. DAVID R. MAYHEW 1298

Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966. SOLOMON B. LEVINE 1300

BOOK NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY 1301

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1325

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS 1349

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW AND ORGANIZATION 1391

BOOK REVIEWS

The American Party Systems. Ed. by William Nisbet Chambers & Walter Dean Burnham. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. 321. $6.75.)

These ten essays—five by historians and five by political scientists—comprise an unusual symposium: without exception they merit publication. Too often unhappy combinations of publishing profligacy and foundation munificence conspire to produce edited proceedings on American politics whose redundant, optimistic vacuity tempts summary by updating Yeats' *The Scholars:*

Roll-call minds oblivious of their wives,
Pluralist, tenured heads of felt,
Edit politics of ghetto knives
That young blacks girding garrison belts
Wield like urban swords of brute despair
To batter Congress' ignorant ear.

All cough consensus into civic ink;
All strut convention floors in rational vests;
All think the moderate thoughts each other
thinks;
All test the happy truths their colleague tests.
Lord, what would they say
Had their Kennedys walked that way?

Not so *The American Party Systems*, which is so much better than the average product of group cogitation that we should direct our attention as much to the source as to the nature of its strength. At least five procedural aspects must have formed the base of its substantive distinction. First, the contributors gathered for four days to discuss early versions of their manuscripts. Second, at those gatherings were seventeen other scholars who came as critics unburdened by impulses to be supportive of fellow-authors in hopes of reciprocation. Third, well before penning final versions the authors—not just the editors—were cognizant of the contents of each other's manuscripts. Fourth, by that stage they had evolved sufficient similarity of approach such that the conceptual framework is not relegated to the silly limbo of editorial preludes and post-ludes but rather permeates the fabric throughout. Fifth, the combination of participants seems to have worked a beneficial confrontation of disciplines: the results are essays by historians who venture beyond chronological explanation and essays by political scientists who—though knowing their behavioral tools—do not treat history with the disdain of Henry Ford.

This intimates the book's chief substantive strength: its coherent and full-bodied exploration of a central theme—that "examination of American party politics over time reveals the existence of not less than five national party systems" (p. 289). In lieu of describing the characteristics which the authors argue informed and distinguished these systems—for only the essays constitute adequate briefs—let me urge some major grounds for taking the argument seriously.

The authors are not only willing to question "accepted wisdom" about the functioning of American parties but also able to offer sophisticated integrations of general explanatory models and historical particulars. In so doing, they build upon each other even as they question their own earlier work. To give two instances: Chambers, McCormick, and Burnham use Hartzian insights to clarify their subjects, while Sorauf and Dawson expand upon an issue first mentioned by Chambers—the question whether party-analysts have tended to exaggerate the independence of American parties from controlling socio-economic conditions. When not being wholly original, they are willing to borrow explanations grand and small in order to analyze historical data. One such instance is Eric McKitrick's amplification of an idea of David Potter's, which McKitrick calls "the most original single idea to emerge from the mass of writings . . . on the Civil War in . . . years" (p. 120). From this nub, McKitrick develops a compelling argument that the absence of a well-defined party-system in the Confederacy barred from Jefferson Davis—even as its presence in the Union permitted to Abraham Lincoln—a crucial means of channelling and controlling dissent. McKitrick's article is so rewarding an essay in comparative history that I cannot forbear "drawing the moral" that American historians would do well to spend more time in this type of enterprise. Just so, I might add, those in political science who are prone to conjure into articles high-level theories about the political system and leave them vaporizing in the empirical virginity of the "suggestive-model" stratostage, might do well to heed Hays' integration of Toennies' community-society model with the pesky quotidian nitty-gritty of American history from 1865 to 1929. Similarly, both behavioralists contemptuous of yesteryear and normatists prone to rely on Plato for tools with which to pound American politics might profitably examine Stokes' and Lowi's uses of 19th and 20th century voting data—the first to analyze temporal shifts in the relative imports of local, state, and national electoral forces, and the second to argue in statistical terms a substantive view of American party politics greatly fortified by thus arguing.

We could go on at length limning *The American Party Systems'* merits, had we but space enough and time. Those lacking, let me rest by pointing to as notable a merit as any other—its fertility in leading to—despite not explicitly tackling—further questions for examination. Given their abundance, I shall have to restrict myself to noting some which are sufficiently stimulating to spur future detailed analysis (see Nash, *Party Systems, Ideology, and Development*, Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1969). Has, possibly, the book's prevalent assumption of a "pragmatic—versus—ideological" conceptual dichotomy in contrasting American and Continental party systems hindered adequate reckoning with conflictual faults in the American system whose dangers events have rendered more clear and more present since the writing of these essays in 1966? (However, note at least partially *contra*, Hays at 162 and Burnham at 304–07.) Similarly, while "importation" of the concept of political development into the American analysis is here fruitful if only for its consequence that the United States is not seen as wholly unproblematic of development, might not an examination of that concept's evolutionary presuppositions have been wise? (But, for a judicious minority customs-examination of this aboriginal package, see Sorauf at 34 ff.) Is not, indeed, such suspicion warranted by the very similarity between Goodman's characterizations here of certain post-revolutionary State parties and sundry analyses elsewhere of party-functioning a century and a half later? Both systems seem "factional"—in fact, sufficiently so to tempt the historical sociologist to rekindle with American fuel the fire of the Butterfield-Namier-Duverger "faction-versus-party" dispute. And, both systems seem at once so restricted in their problem-solving capacities and so terribly "pragmatic" as to lead to a final range of questions. To what extent has an unconscious ideology of pragmatism produced the very loss of control over the direction of American society and politics which, as Sorauf observes, has befallen "party-bosses" concomitant with the decline of old-style residential and social patterns? Might, in short, a "less American," "more Continental" style of party politics have better retained that control by undertaking not merely—as Dawson argues—to react as a dependent variable to socioeconomic changes, but to act as an independent variable channelling and managing the very rural-urban-suburban flow which has dated that power? Might not, in sum, the pragmatism of American party decision-makers have turned most unpragmatic?

These are but a few of the many speculative hooks which this book lets neatly dangle. It is a collection distinguished as much for what it does not; as for what it does, explore—a collection frequently original and fruitfully synthetic, and when not that, almost always lucid and graceful of expression.

A. E. Keir Nash
University of California, Santa Barbara

The Russian Empire 1801–1917. By Hugh Seton-Watson. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. 813. $10.00.)

Professor Seton-Watson's *Russian Empire* is a superb historical study, which says much of value for political scientists. Seton-Watson does not permit the concerns of the present to color his analysis of the past. However, in this study, the values and preferences of a sophisticated believer in cultural freedom, civil liberties and parliamentary government have exerted a salutary influence on the selection and interpretation of issues and evidence. The study focuses on certain dominant themes, and especially on the role of the tsardom. Seton-Watson states (p. 10) that "if there is one single factor which dominates the course of Russian history, at any rate since the Tatar conquest, it is the principle of autocracy."

Seton-Watson regards the history of the Russian people and the other peoples, such as the Poles, who were conquered and subjugated by the tsars as an unusually tragic one. It would, however, be unfair to a very objective scholar to suggest that he regards autocracy and other negative patterns of Russian history as permanent attributes of Russian national character or cultural tradition. While he clearly identifies with the West European political tradition, in which "nations were formed in a long struggle between the monarchical power and the social elite," and finds much to deplore in Russian autocracy, he understands that such factors as Russia's lack of defensible frontiers and its relative economic backwardness help to explain, if not to render appealing, the oppressiveness of Russian political life.

Before turning to some observations about the interplay between political absolutism, on the one hand, and the challenges to the stability of this pattern springing from the internal and external environments, on the other, which for this reviewer constitute the most interesting features of this work, it should be noted that *The Russian Empire* is a general history, in which foreign policy, military history, and social, ideological and cultural development, are treated in detail. This reviewer regrets that Seton-Watson did not treat diplomatic and military events very briefly; if he had, he could have dealt more fully with domestic political dynamics, on which he is insightful and innovative. In Part One, the first of six sections, each of about one hundred twenty pages in length, Seton-Watson sketches the geographic, cultural and religious contexts of Russian development. From the outset, with a grasp that is firmly maintained throughout this enormous eight hundred-page volume, there are delineated the essential structures and the modes of operation of the centralized, military-bureaucratic, inefficient but not ineffective, multi-national empire, the development of which Seton-Watson regards as the prototype of the process of "deliberate modernization" of most countries of the world, a pattern that he contrasts to the more gradual, less coercive modernization of Western Europe and the United States. The excellent organization of the volume makes it easy to follow, from period to period, any particular problem or trend. Although connections are made between external and internal factors, foreign policy is perhaps too often treated as if it were a separate and independent realm. To be sure, Seton-Watson often stresses the baneful effects on internal political stability of unsuccessful or only partly successful foreign wars, such as the Crimean conflict and the Russo-Japanese war. As for World War I, Seton-Watson indicates clearly his belief that the Russian decision to participate in that conflict led to the destruction of the monarchy although he states that in terms of the "conventional wisdom of international diplomacy in 1914, her decision to go to war was fully justified."

One of the outstanding achievements of this book is its presentation of relationships between the dominant Russian nation and the non-Russian peoples, ruled by Russian, or Russianized, civilian, military and police bureaucracies. Of absorbing interest are the descriptions of the aspirations and way of life of various peoples of the Western borderlands, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia and East Asia who were brought under the sway of St. Petersburg as the empire's territories expanded. His honest admissions that with respect to some issues disputed by partisans of various national points of view the outside observer can do little more than to summarize conflicting positions will not be pleasing to extremists. It will, however, furnish reliable guidance to all who seek understanding of one of the most difficult and abiding aspects of Russian history and politics. Seton-Watson is acutely conscious of the significant interconnections between the external and internal dimensions of Russian nationality problems and policies. He understands the reasons for but demonstrates effectively the dysfunctionality for the multi-national Russian empire of the development of an intolerant Great Russian nationalism. He traces the frustrations, humiliations and deprivations inflicted by Russian chauvinism on Finns, Poles and Ukrainians, and of anti-semitism, the "socialism of the imbecile," on Jews.

The main focus of *The Russian Empire* is on the ultimately unsuccessful efforts of the autocratic institution to cope with disequilibrating forces. Although Seton-Watson does not present a theory of autocracy, and perhaps could have done more to explore its "psycho-cultural" aspects, he does furnish valuable insights and extraordinarily interesting data regarding a pattern of leadership and decision-making which in modern parlance might be categorized as "bureaucratic politics." Within this pattern, in which the emperors themselves were the chief initiators and coordinators of policy, there was much petty intrigue, caprice and self-serving struggle for power. However, policies were often inspired by motives higher and perspectives broader than those dictated merely by concern for preservation of personal or group power and privilege. Talented statesmen such as Speranski, during the early years of the reign of Alexander I, Loris-Melikov, who proposed measures designed to bridge the gap between state and society after the assassination of Alexander II, or Witte and Stolypin, assassinated in 1911, by a killer who was at the same time a police agent and a member of the revolutionary SR party, advocated or instituted policies that might, if they had been wholeheartedly and energetically supported by the monarch, have led to the transformation of autocracy into constitutional monarchy. As Seton-Watson perceives the Russian political dilemma, cultural lag at the highest levels of decision-making made it difficult, and perhaps impossible, for the autocracy to adapt adequately for its survival and that of the political and social strata the destiny of which were linked with that of the tsardom. Seton-Watson emphasizes the deep historical roots of the Russian preference for autocracy to oligarchy. He demonstrates that the upbringing of heirs to the throne reinforced their sensitivity to real or fancied threats to the principle of absolute, individual dictatorial authority.

It is not clear whether Seton-Watson believes that the collapse of the Russian old regime was inevitable. He refuses to commit himself to either a rigidly deterministic or a looser, more probabilistic interpretation, although he inclines to the latter. Perhaps his illuminating analysis would have been even more successful if he had utilized, in addition to the concept of modernization, the categories for the analysis of political development and revolutionary change employed by some contemporary social scientists. He often seems to say that bolder, more enlightened and rational policies on the part of the tsars and their chief ministers might have "saved" Russia. However, he also presents impressive evidence indicating that these products of an essentially unscientific, authoritarian socialization process, working under conditions of great stress, generated by foreign and domestic resource-allocation problems, lack of adequate internal political support, and widespread disaffection, could scarcely have been expected to possess either the inclinations or the capabilities to cope with the challenges by which they were beset, which to a surprising degree resembled those which have been dealt with more successfully, and far more ruthlessly, by the bolshevik successors to a less efficient centralized structure. The two regimes are very different in *Weltanschauung*, but similar in their "siege-mindedness," exemplified in a propensity to identify dissent with treason.

Seton-Watson's views regarding the social structure of imperial Russia perhaps represent a more original, if more controversial, contribution even than his valuable analysis of the operations of the decision-making agencies of government. Put briefly, he says that there was no genuine bourgeoisie in old Russia; a Western-style bourgeoisie was only beginning to develop in the last thirty-odd years of imperial rule. There were, he believes, three "middle classes," namely, the bureaucrats, intelligentsia and businessmen. They did not share a common ethos and were not committed to such typically bourgeois values and goals as rule of law, private property or parliamentary government. Because of the weakness in Russia of bourgeois values, political liberalism was weak. Liberals, whether in the civil service or in the professions and, in the early twentieth century, in nascent political parties, tended to be ground between the upper and nether millstones of intolerant conservatism or even more intolerant radicalism.

Seton-Watson sees the revolutionary enemies of Russian autocracy as themselves products of the authoritarian milieu. In his view, revolutionaries such as Pestel, Tkachev, and Lenin, were aware that "in matters of dictatorship, the provisional has a way of lasting." Their declared intentions to impose only a temporary dictatorship cannot be taken literally. On recruitment of revolutionaries, such as the high proportion in their ranks of the children of orthodox priests, he makes insightful observations.

It is difficult, even in a fairly long review, to suggest the richness of this magisterial work. For example, although he does not use the terminology of input-output or structural-functional analysis, he is clearly aware of the decisive role of education. One of his major criticisms of the tsarist regime and its ministers of education, is that, by depriving the mass of the population of even elementary education, they fostered a cultural gap between elite and masses which generated frustration and destructive impulses in the ranks of the intelligentsia. In his strictures on imperial Russian educational policy, Seton-Watson contrasts the Russian record unfavorably to that of Japan following 1868. This comparison is one of many relevant and illuminating ones with which the study is interspersed.

As this reviewer hopes he has made clear, Professor Seton-Watson has produced a very important book, full of thoughtful reflection and wisdom, comparative and objective in approach. It is perhaps not "scientific" in a model-building or hypothesis-testing sense. However, especially in the portions concerned with the roles, outlooks and personalities of individual decision-makers and with the political and administrative structures, the book provides stimulating partial theories and comparisons which should be very useful to students of political and administrative structures and processes. However, its greatest value consists in its power to deepen and enrich our understanding of the similarities, and differences, between the political experience of Russia and that of other nations.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN
Yale University

Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. 3 volumes. BY GUNNAR MYRDAL. (New York: Pantheon Books, Twentieth Century Fund, 1968, Pp. 2,284. $8.50. paper bound.)

Reading these volumes is like jogging around the baseball field. The scenery is familiar, the perseverence required is enormous, and one is easily led to savor the nobility of the effort more than the purpose. But there is more here than a test of endurance for the reader. Professor Myrdal and his colleagues have constructed a "grand theory" of development defining the relationship between all the relevant and significant political, economic and social factors involved. The theory encompasses a set of explicit propositions about the nature of economic growth in the Asian context and a set of supporting propositions defining the political and social relationships that underlie and react to those economic conditions.

The authors argue that the key to economic growth in the Asian environment lies in the agricultural sector and the central factor in the development of agriculture is the utilization of labor. Myrdal is extremely critical of the application of the "capital/output ratio" to development planning and builds a strong case that it is misleading in the Asian context. Instead he would concentrate on labor and devotes the largest part of the manuscript to defining the economic, political and social forces which impede the effective utilization of labor.

Myrdal argues that work practices in agriculture in Asia are labor intensive and low yields per acre are mainly a consequence of underutilization of the labor force. "Without any innovations and even without any investment other than longer and more efficient work, agricultural yields could be raised very substantially." (1253). Existing work practices are a product not only of economic forces, but of population pressure, health conditions, education, traditional values and status commitments, and even climate. In part, the impediments to effective use of labor are a product of social changes triggered by colonial policies. For example, in response to lowered mortality rates and subsequent population increases, the whole social situation was subtly arranged to "absorb the continual increase in the agricultural labor force." (436). In the same way, colonial education policies strengthened the traditional notion that high status was allocated to those who did not work.

Throughout the book, Myrdal emphasizes that the fundamental problem is a lack of social discipline on the part of the elites and populations of South Asia. The discussions of the use of controls and the weakness of the political systems are likely to be the most interesting to political scientists and they are, unfortunately, the least persuasive.

Professor Myrdal's analysis of the political environment concentrates exclusively on something he labels *the* elite. The elites of South Asia have adopted the "modernizing ideal" and, partly because of this ideal, are unwilling to use compulsion to force their people to modernize. The modernizing ideal comprises a series of value premises that Myrdal himself holds, and which he says constitute the goals of the elites. The list includes rationality, development and planning, a rise in productivity, rising levels of living, improved institutions and attitudes, national consolidation, national independence, political democracy, democracy at the grass roots and social discipline. Myrdal recognizes that these are overlapping and poorly defined but he maintains that, taken together, they represent the goals of the elites. Although alien to Asia, these goals "have come to be indigenous in the sense that they have been adopted and shaped by the intellectual elite, who in turn, have endeavored to diffuse them throughout the population." (73). The dilemma arises, both for the reader and the elites, in that a commitment to these goals is a commitment to change and to intervention in the lives of the population and such intervention conflicts with the elite's notion of democracy. Myrdal calls them "soft states" and argues that: "All these countries, whether or not they have a democratic system of government, have generally placed fewer obligations on their citizens and have enforced these obligations much less effectively, than have the Western democracies." (894).

At some points Myrdal seems to be saying the elites are unwilling to do what is required and at others, that if they simply adopted the right policies, the compulsion would follow. At no time, however, does he attempt to sort out the political environment of the countries concerned and the forces and pressures operating on the political leadership. He does not differentiate between party politicians, administrators, planners or opposition groups, but lumps them all together as *the* elite. He seems to have a view of a well defined group of people with common goals permanently in office or at least in charge. Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate the difficulties of this analysis is to raise three questions.

First, what does it mean to say the elite is commited to the modernizing ideal? Are there not mutually contradictory and often obscure goals imbedded in the list of values? In Malaysia, for example, the problem of national consolidation often conflicts with the goal of an overall rise in productivity and the Malaysian elite has, to some extent, opted for consolidation at the expense of productivity. In Sukarno's Indonesia, national independence took first place to rationality and rising levels of living.

Professor Myrdal himself appears to have trouble with these conflicts, putting emphasis on rationality to the exclusion of other goals. For example, in his discussion of confrontation (218-19) he assumes no reason or logic to Sukarno's position and ignores the whole question of the value choices made by the political leadership. Again, with respect to the existence of bicameral legislatures in Indian states, Mr. Myrdal calls them a "luxury" without any investigation of what role they might possibly play in integration or unity. His views on these matters are made clear in his discussion of Myron Weiner's analysis of Indian politics. (291-293). Professor Myrdal asserts that political pragmatism is not compatible with economic growth and the broadening of active political participation but he gives no argument that relates such behavior to his value assertions and goals. Politicians in his view seem to appear in office without any strings, or any need to do anything to remain in power.

Second, why are these states unwilling to use compulsion for output goals when many of them seem quite willing to use compulsion, censorship and, in many cases, extra-legal means to restrict opposition elites? With the exception of the Philippines and India, all the states involved have used implicit or explicit restrictions on the press and on the development of political organizations independent of the ruling group. And certainly the President's rule provision of the Indian Constitution indicates a recognition of the need for compulsion.

If the reason for not using compulsion is a commitment to the democratic ideal, then how is this possible? In addition, Myrdal never investigates the costs and risks of compulsion. Would not the requirements for police or administrative controls be rather heavy expenditures in these fields?

Third, and most important, how can political leadership create social discipline? To what extent does the leadership itself reflect a form of social discipline? In his discussion of controls for example, Myrdal seems to assume the governments will use non-discriminatory controls even though he makes clear such controls can play little role given the social structure and status requirements. The states do not use non-discriminatory controls because "in the absense of anything like perfect markets, many transactions are not of the market type" and "price incentives are weak." Few people calculate in terms of cost and returns and if they do, their economic behavior is not primarily determined by these calculations. In a footnote, Myrdal cites an Indian scholar's statement that "self interest in the shape of desire of wealth is not absent, but it is not the only, nor principle, motor." (912).

What should people be "compelled" to do to change this attitude? One would assume that the same kind of detailed investigations of the assumptions of Western economists that Myrdal has provided, are required in the arena of value considerations and the response of the population. But what is lacking here is a systematic explanation of who is making the decisions, why they make the ones they do, and what forces influence their decisions.

Although the scope of the study extends from the South Asian states of India, Pakistan and Ceylon to Burma, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, in fact most of the empirical data used to support the theoretical propositions is from the Indian case. This is particularly true of the political sections. When Myrdal refers to the elites of Asia, it appears he has in mind Indian intellectuals and, in fact, at one point he cites Nehru as the "ideal type Asian leader who articulated the position of other leaders. This reviewer would question the validity of the comparison, particularly with such diverse types as Sukarno, Magsaysay, Tunku Abdul Rahman, and Sarit Thanarat.

The depressing and frightening result of reading these volumes is to leave the reader with the knowledge that even with perfect information as to the levels of investment of labor and capital required and the interrelatedness of these with environment and resources, nothing will be accomplished without the active commitment and will of the political leadership, and their ability to understand and mobilize their populations. The failings in this regard are major and we know little of their causes.

JEAN GROSSHOLTZ

Mount Holyoke College

The Modernity of Tradition; Political Development in India. BY LLOYD I. RUDOLPH AND SUSANNE H. RUDOLPH. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. 306. $8.95.)

In the typologies of comparative politics, polar models have served to distinguish and heuristically analyze non-western and western systems, agraria and industria, tradition and modernity. Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph argue, however, that such ideal types, which assume that the components of one must necessarily be absent in the other, may be "serious obstacles to understanding social change and modernization." Modernity and tradition, in a dialectical rather than dichotomous relationship, infiltrate and transform each other, "The assumption that modernity and tradition are radically contradictary rests on a misdiagnosis of tradition as it is found in traditional societies, and a misapprehension of the relationship between them." The Rudolphs seek to accord tradition higher priority in the study of modernization, and, in the analytical gap between tradition and modernity, to explore those sectors of traditional Indian society that contain or express potentialities for change.

The Modernity of Tradition draws together and develops various themes explored by Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph over the past few years. The book contains three parts, each examining an aspect of political development in India and unified by a concern for the dialectical relationship of modernity and tradition.

Part One, "Traditional Structures and Modern Politics: Caste," examines the changing structure and function of caste, contending that, as a vehicle for an expanding identity horizon, caste provides a link between tradition and modernity. The development of modern communications, the spread of literacy, and rising prosperity has contributed to the horizontal consolidation of caste communities in India and, as soliderity has increased, caste has been politicized and drawn into the political system as a major actor. The role of caste in modern Indian politics has been decried, by scholar and politician alike, as a vestige of "tribalism" and a fissiparous threat to national unity. Against this view, in a highly influential article in 1960, "The Political Role of India's Caste Associations," Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph argued that as a channel of communication, representation, and leadership, caste provides a potential link between the mass electorate and the modern democratic process by making it comprehensible in traditional terms to a population still largely politically illiterate. The argument was developed, and in some ways modified, in the pages of this journal (LIX, December, 1965), in analyzing "the democratic incarnation of caste."

The modernity of Tradition, in an expanded treatment of these earlier themes, analyzes the relationship of caste and politics in terms of three types of political mobilization: vertical, horizontal, and differential. "Vertical mobilization is the marshalling of political support by traditional notables in local societies that are organized and integrated by rank, mutual dependence, and the legitimacy of traditional authority." These vertical relations of authority and cleavage characterized the traditional caste system of the Indian village.

"Horizontal mobilization involves the marshalling of popular political support by class or community leaders and their specialized organizations, · · · introducing a new pattern of cleavage by challenging the vertical solidarities and structures of traditional societies." Horizontal mobilization of caste is reflected in the formation associations, "paracommunities," voluntary associations drawn from the ascriptive reservoir of traditional caste. At this level, the Randolphs argue, tradition and modernity meet and fuse. The caste association becomes the mechanism of equality. "By initiating, managing, and encouraging the efforts of lower castes to become twice-born, to don the sacred thread symbolizing high ritual rank and culture, it in effect if not in intention drains the caste hierarchy of meaning by homogenizing and democratizing it."

"Differential mobilization involves the marshalling of direct and indirect support by political parties and other integrative structures) from viable, but internally differentiated, communities through parallel appeals to ideology, sentiment, and interest." Competitive politics stimulates the formation of the caste association, the democratic incarnation of caste, but at the same time, as the caste differentiates internally, political parties weaken caste organization by articulating and mobilizing the divisions within them. Modern politics paradoxically "appears to be an instrument for both the revival and the supersession of traditional society."

The transformation of caste must also involve "a profound change in the nature of human sensibility." Here the Rudolphs are concerned with the spread of fellow feeling, with the future of equality. The examine the mechanisms of caste mobility and change and conclude that the diffusion of political power, democratization of twice-born culture and status, expansion of ascriptive boundaries, westernization, and secularization have brought Indians "closer to political equality, cultural homogeneity, and structural unity." The test of fellow feeling is untouchability. In the struggle for equality, protective discrimination, as in special benefits and in the reservation of seats for untouchables, has to a degree yielded access to economic opportunity and political power, but, as the Rudolphs admit, most village untouchables remain subject to the traditional forms of domination by the upper castes upon whom they are economically dependent. They argue, however, that continued private commitment to tradition is not incompatible with modernization, but, in fact, may facilitate it, as long as it remains private, by providing adaptive institutions.

Part Two, "The Traditional Roots of Charisma: Gandhi," explores, in the life and personality of the nationalist leader, the transformation of traditional ideals for modern political purposes. As in his life, so in his memory, Gandhi most normally evokes extreme reactions–either one of fawning adoration of of jaundiced skepticism. The Rudolphs, with sensitivity and balance, avoid either extreme. He is at once saintly, yet profoundly, foibly human; ethereally idealistic, yet organizationally astute. The Rudolph's deal little with Gandhi's role in the struggle for independence. His most important contribution, they contend, is what he did for Indian character. "Gandhi's leadership, regardless of its objective success or failure, had important subjective consequences, repairing wounds in self-esteem inflicted by generations of imperial subjection, restoring courage and potency, recruiting and mobilizing new constituencies and leaders, helping India acquire national coherence."

Part Three, "Legal Cultures and Social Change: Panchayats, Pandits, and Professionals," analyzes the relationship between the parochial system of customary law, and the national, Anglo-Indian legal system, combining norms of Brahmanical law with the procedure and values of British law.

At a time when India's future seems so unsertain and its problems so overpowering, many scholars may find it difficult to share the basic optimism of the Rudolphs. India has entered "the dangerous decades," but the predictions of national disintegration and the collapse of democracy have not been fulfilled. With all of its difficulties, India continues to manifest remarkable stability. The Rudolph argument suggests that this stability may be due to the relationship between tradition and modernity, to the modernity of tradition, its resiliance and capacity to transform itself. It may be, however, that a perhaps temporary stability has been purchased at the price of failure to achieve the fundamental transformation necessary to sustain a viable and developing nation.

The Rudolphs avoid the dangers of the mutually exclusive bi-polar model of tradition and modernity. Although they never fully conceptualize the two elements of the dialectical process they examine, the book, calls for serious re-examination of the established notions of modernity and provides an incisive and refreshing analysis of the area to which our theoretical lens must move. *The Modernity of Tradition*, written with sensitivity to that which is unique in India, is guided by a fundamental concern for the process of change and is an important contribution to our understanding of modernization.

ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR.
The University of Texas at Austin

Peasant Communism in Southern Italy. BY SIDNEY G. TARROW. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. 389. $8.75.)

Relating socio-economic patterns to political processes is one of the major problems facing the students of government, especially comparative government. The changes that take place in political parties as they operate in different milieus, particularly parties that have linkages to international movements, create other fascinating issues. This has been especially true of the international communist movement. In this regard close attention has been paid to the national variations among communist parties, variations often attributed to different national political cultures. But there is no reason to suppose that the same kinds of variations would not be present within a nation if substantially different regional cultures were present. It would be necessary to demonstrate, however, that the political cultures of the regions did indeed differ substantially and that these differences were the product of underlying contrasts in the socio-economic-cultural milieus.

This is precisely what Sidney Tarrow in his extremely interesting, and in some respects fascinating, book on southern Italian communism has tried to do. In addition, he has tried to show that a national strategy developed by the Italian Communist Party at the end of World War II, called the "Italian Way to Socialism," was elaborated and implemented for northern Italy, where it perhaps could be justified, and then imposed by the Party on southern Italy, where substantially different milieu doomed it to failure. At the same time this imposition prevented the southern Party from elaborating a strategy which might have been appropriate to southern conditions.

I remain basically unconvinced of Tarrow's theses. I do not believe the political culture of Italy is so dualistic. Where Tarrow sees a fundamental difference of kind, I see only a difference of degree. Where he sees sharp discontinuities, I see gradations. I agree with the Sicilian writer Sebastiano Aglianò, who points out that the social characteristics of his native island are the characteristics of Italian society in general, but merely more extreme. The statistical data collected by Almond and Verba for *The Civic Culture* buttress this viewpoint. In many significant categories, political cognition, political efficacy, and administrative efficacy, the differences between north and south are not very wide. Nor are they significant when it comes to measuring the qualities of Italians as political participants or political subjects. In the north and the south the Italians are poor participants and poor subjects. In both parts of the country they are politically alienated.

In making his case Tarrow exaggerates the modernity and rationality of the north and to some extent the extreme backwardness of the south, based on a traditional-ascriptive social order. To do this he overrates the importance of some statistical differences. For example, when discussing the career patterns of national Communist leaders he writes "While an average of 24.8 percent of the [Communist] national leaders from the Center-North had held local CGIL posts in 1964, 31.6 percent had been CGIL leaders in the South." To me the important information is that in all of Italy over two-thirds of these national leaders had not held local CGIL posts.

The characteristic of cynicism is not peculiar to the South. The Florentines are its historic and present masters. Neither is the *furbo-fesso* syndrome (the high value placed on being sly and the shame borne by a sucker). The *padrone-dipendente* (master domination of dependents) pattern is present in the most advanced parts of the north. Enrico Mattei ran the huge ENI public holding corporation in a personal and autocratic manner; Vittorio Valletta ran Fiat, the largest private Italian firm in the same fashion. The partisan intervention by prefects in the politics and elections in communes and provinces is well known. But it is not confined to the South. It dates back to the days of Cavour in Piedmont after 1848. Tarrow writes that in the North the prefect "is a humble functionary whose duties are performed quietly and apolitically." I doubt that there is a single mayor in northern Italy who would subscribe to that statement, especially the Communist mayors of the red belt.

What I have written is not to reduce the worth of Tarrow's work. On the contrary, I consider it all the more valuable, for many of his acute and penetrating insights have an even wider application than he is willing to grant them. His discussion of "clientelism" in southern politics, a crucial aspect of the political culture, is relevant here. In my opinion the relationship of the Communist leaders of the cooperatives in Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany to their members and employees is essentially clientelistic. Tarrow emphasizes the distinction between the old-style clientelism of the southern notables and the new clientelism of the party bureaucrats. The new style is "Patronage channeled through an organization rather than through a chain of individuals." But to me an organization *is* a chain of individuals (more tightly or more loosely structured) and the party bureaucrat is a new notable added to the others, whose manipulation of clienteles and patronage is important in all of Italy.

Tarrow tends to waver in his definition of the North. Sometimes he means all of Italy above the regions of Lazio and Abruzzi; on other occasions he is really describing the northwest industrialized triangle of Liguria, Piedmont and western Lombardy. At times he makes the distinctions between northwest, northeast, and center-north clear; at other times he does not. There are political differences between western and eastern Lombardy, and between Emilia-Romagna and the Veneto. There are also many Souths, and sometimes he is clear about this while othertimes not. Western Sicily is different from eastern Sicily because, if for no other reason, the Mafia is present in the west while it is absent in the east.

I am bothered by two of his positions on the causes and consequences of political modernization. He believes modernization of the South can only come from substantial industrialization. I feel that modernization does not necessarily require this; Denmark is an example of an advanced country based on modern agriculture and commerce, but little industrialization. This is an important issue because the feasibility of the major industrialization of southern Italy is currently being debated by Italian economists and industrialists. Tarrow believes that modernization creates coherent class and group distinctions, simplifying conflicts and providing natural economic and political alignments. I feel the opposite is true; the more modern the society the less clear the social and class identifications. At the theoretical extreme of advancement everybody is middle class.

Tarrow gives us a first-rate analysis of the thought of Antonio Gramsci, the patron saint of Italian communism. He makes a major contribution in showing us how Palmiro Togliatti and his followers departed from Gramsci while claiming to follow in his footsteps. Togliatti's populistic alliance of all social groups and elements, excluding only the large monopolists, is far different from Gramsci's revolutionary alliance between northern workers and southern peasants. Tarrow believes that Togliatti's strategy, imposed from the north onto the south, threw away the revolutionary potential of landless farm laborers and desperately poor share tenants in the south. Instead, it achieved at best, through its emphasis on land reform and the breaking up of the great estates, an increase in Communist votes but also an enlarged class of basically conservative peasant proprietors, many of whom would be added to the clienteles of Christian Democracy. Although the question is academic since the alternative was not attempted, I doubt that a strategy of revolutionary alliance could have worked in the south. National and international forces would have blocked it. It also, would have required a revolutionary working class. But, as the Communist leader Giorgio Amendola has complained, the Italian workers, even those in the Communist-controlled unions, have neither a revolutionary consciousness nor a general political consciousness.

NORMAN KOGAN
The University of Connecticut

Popular Government in America: Foundations and Principles. By Charles S. Hyneman with the collaboration of Charles E. Gilbert. (New York: Atherton Press, 1968. Pp. 320. $8.50.)

In this thoughtful and stimulating book a mature political scientist reexamines some of the basic problems of democratic government. His task is guided by a conscious theoretical commitment: "to prepare the ground for theory making, and perhaps to take a first few steps in proposing theory about democratic government." Hyneman's "concern" is with "a political system in which the people have effective means for expressing expectations and preferences and for inducing compliance with their demands." He seeks to provide an "analysis," and to offer some "perspectives," to help student and scholar alike clarify "the basic rationale of popular government in the United States . . . . " He is particularly concerned with the basic proposition "that the democratic character of a political system is determined by finding answers to a three-part question: How much of the population shares, in how much of the critical decision-making, with how much impact or influence."

The essays in the book—which were pieced together, revised, and supplemented with the help of Charles Gilbert—cover five main topics: I. Democratic Ideals; II. Popular Government; III. The Structure of Authority; IV. Limited Government; and V. Democracy on Trial. Under these headings Hyneman clarifies the social requisites of democratic government in terms of three key concepts: individual and group autonomy, the commitment to equality, and commonality. Autonomy involves free choice for the individual and a pluralist social structure. Equality involves the concept of equity, of fairness, of the opportunity which permits free men to realize their potential and contribute to the common good. Commonality is a term Hyneman employs to emphasize common beliefs, purposes, and methods, and includes the mutual acceptance of the rules of the democratic game. Professor Hyneman also identifies two systems of demand and response which figure importantly in determining how much of the population shares in how much of the critical decision-making with how much influence. One of these he calls the group competition thesis or the pluralist demand-response system. The other he calls the equalization of influence thesis or the populist demand-response system. These two theses are used to illuminate varying aspects of popular government throughout the book. Hyneman also stresses the crucial role of the "critical electorate" and the ways in which various types of voters (e.g., issue oriented, candidate oriented, and party oriented voters) exercise control of government. He is vitally interested in "distributed self-government," his term for the division of power among national, state, and local political communities. He explores key questions concerning the authority, fitness, and answerability of legislative representatives; repeats his earlier professional concern about (indeed, his fear of) Presidential power and an inadequately controlled Administration; probes the ways by which limited government can be made more secure; raises serious questions about the price of free speech and the problems of democratic self-protection; and concludes with an analysis of the Negroes' challenge, the contemporary movement of protest and resistance, and the continuing task of preserving democracy's foundations.

Hyneman argues that the treatment of black men in America constitutes a serious challenge to personal and group autonomy, to equality, and to commonality. Yet although he recognizes the legitimacy of the black man's effort to secure first-class citizenship, his focus is less on the effort required to bring American practice into accord with American ideals and democratic requisites than it is on the need to probe the bounds of permissible protest and resistance. His operational presumptions are in favor of verbal protest and against refusal to comply with the law. He is very much concerned with identifying the protesters, their objectives, strategies and tactics, and the consequences of their actions. He endorses protest and resistance which will gain for black men and women not only the right to vote but a better life in all aspects; but, although he is willing to accept the sting and inconvenience involved in this protest, he opposes violation of the law or even non-violent action that provokes violence.

In Hyneman's judgment, commonality is in greater jeopardy today than autonomy or equality. As he is more sympathetic to anti-subversive legislation to preserve democratic government, so he is less sympathetic to the "communicating elite" whose bias, distortion, and partisanship—he holds—corrode that moderate leadership and that spirit of toleration essential to commonality.

This somewhat selective summary of his thesis and argument does not, alas, do justice to his consistent concern for theory. Throughout the book he employs thoughtful questions, simple models, and reasoned argument to explore how theory may be employed in illuminating democratic government. Throughout Hyneman emphasizes the need to develop and employ theory to clarify and appraise competing values, to guide empirical research, and to facilitate sound political judgment on troublesome questions of public policy.

Hyneman, himself, is clearly partial to a politics of compromise and toleration, to the equalization of influence thesis (the populist demand-response system), to Congressional (rather than to Presidential) power, to "distributed self-government" (rather than to the concentration of power in Washington), to the legitimacy of careful anti-subversive legislation designed to protect popular government itself, to a more conservative interpretation of the bounds to free speech, and Negro protest and resistance. Yet his more conservative liberalism should not obscure the value of his analysis at key points, his efforts to advance the cause of democratic theory, and his seasoned judgments on many of the controversial problems of popular government. Those to his left politically may challenge his views on free speech and subversion, or on the Negro Revolt, or on current movements of protest and resistance, but—perhaps ironically—they may (in the light of the war in Vietnam and other exercises of power under President Johnson) share his misgivings over the dangers of inadequately controlled Presidential power. In fairness to Professor Hyneman's detached, calm, and non-partisan analysis, I hasten to add, he does not illustrate his fears of Presidential power by reference to Vietnam or President Johnson.

However, whether we agree or disagree with his critique, we can profitably probe democratic theory and practice in many of the ways he suggests. His book constitutes a healthy antidote for much of the uncritical, unhistorical, unphilosophical, and self-righteous propaganda of partisans of the New Left. Their very sound commitment to authentic human beings, to civil rights, to the Negro, to the poor, to enhanced democratic participation in political and social life, to honest institutions, and to a speedy end to the terrible and tragic war in Vietnam, may be served by their greater willingness to explore democratic theory by engaging in a more genuine dialogue nourished by many of the normative, empirical, and prudential considerations that Professor Hyneman raises. Such a dialogue, moreover, would be mutually beneficial.

In such a debate, those on the Left might cogently urge Professor Hyneman to adopt a broader view of the citizen's role in the polity, and not to focus so sharply on voting and other aspects of the formally legal government. They might suggest that his own logic in favor of "participative democracy" should move him toward a more radical diagnosis of racism in America and ways to overcome it. They might point out that his commitment to the equalization of influence thesis most definitely requires him to ask how the influence of the poor can be enhanced? And can it be enhanced without increased power for the President and the national government? They might also raise the question, "What price commonality?" as Professor Hyneman has raised the questions "What price free speech" and "What price protest and resistance?" They might defend many of the "communicating elite" for challenging unhealthy aspects of the status quo even if this elite's exaggerated rhetoric sometimes violates a gentlemanly ethos.

Hyneman, on the other hand, might underscore the need in a democratic society to balance the preferred and the feasible. He might emphasize the dangers of intolerance. He might note that the unrighteous as well as the righteous may violate the law and resort to violence. He might challenge the power of even the righteous minority. He might emphasize (to their delight) that fundamental policy (e.g., the undeclared war in Vietnam) must be made and changed only with the concurrence of the representative assembly. He might question efforts of some on the "righteous Left" to silence those with whom they passionately disagree or to subvert a lawful institution (e.g., a University) because some of its practices are objectionable to them.

The ensuing debate, if carried on in accord with Hyneman's guide lines (e.g., who protests? what are their objectives? strategy and tactics? what are the consequences of their actions?), might be very productive. It would certainly emphasize dramatically the several tasks that Professor Hyneman sees as cardinal tasks for the political theorist in a democratic society: the clarification of democratic values, meaningful understanding of significant empirical political patterns, and the sharpening of prudential judgment on key issues of public policy.

NEAL RIEMER
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change. BY WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. 170. $5.95.)

The Dynamics of Compliance: Supreme Court Decision-Making from a New Perspective. BY RICHARD M. JOHNSON. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967. Pp. 176. $5.95.)

It is of course a truism for students of public law that Supreme Court policies are generally not self-executing. But only within the last decade has there been much effort to study systematically the impact of Court decisions and the nature of compliance to Court policies. Increasingly such studies have been theoretically oriented and concerned with developing rigorous methodology. This has involved, in part, a concern with attitudes and public opinion and the use of survey techniques. *Prayer in the Public Schools* by William Muir and *The Dynamics of Compliance* by Richard Johnson are recent studies of this genre.

Both books are impact/compliance studies of the Supreme Court's 1963 prayer decision (*Abington School District* v. *Schempp*) on a local public school system. Both are theoretically oriented and employ survey techniques. And both are welcome additions to the developing literature.

William Muir's principal interest was with certain attitudes of the public educational elite of a medium-size city he calls "Midland" as those attitudes were affected by the policy pronouncement in *Schempp* and the subsequent voluntary decision of the Midland school board to comply. Muir interviewed his sample of 28 school officials both six months before and about eight months after *Schempp*. The reinterviews gave Muir the opportunity to compare pre-*Schempp* attitudes to post-*Schempp* attitudes and thus to attempt to answer the broad questions "Can law change deep-rooted attitudes?" (p. 1) and "under what circumstances [does] law change them positively?" (p. 3).

In answering these questions Muir heavily relied upon cognitive dissonance theory. For others than those who were "vindicated," Muir hypothesized and then found his respondents' patterns of public and private (attitudinal) response to "the law" as having been one of four types. Muir assumes that the immediate motive for the varying patterns of perceptual and attitudinal response is the reduction of cognitive dissonance which itself is assumed to occur after the individual commits himself to compliance or non-compliance. Muir's task was to explain why his respondents demonstrated one response pattern rather than another. To get at this he examined and classified his respondents pre and post *Schempp* responses to questions concerning their role perceptions or "self-images" (Muir's term) concerning schoolhouse religion, their specific policy preferences concerning religious practices in the public schools, and their attitudes toward law and the Supreme Court. Muir further relied on "armchair" psychological analyses of his respondents. The findings are many and should be of interest to scholars in this field.

Some mention should be made of Muir's "armchair" analyses. (Muir himself, in a different context, provides a convenient definition of this term: "my intuition about the respondents, an intuition which was tutored equally by their words and by their gestures, facial expressions, and hesitancies, by nonverbal cues that become invisible on the typewritten record" p. 62). Muir goes about this with a novelist's eye and neo-Freudian's gleam. Although these analyses are imaginative and occasionally persuasive, one can perhaps be skeptical of their veracity. Muir purports to have discerned "the mental frames" (p. 35) and "perceptual habits" (p. 31) of his respondents on the basis of two interviews. Of one principal, for example, we are told that the Church "provided her a picture of reality which gave a context to some of her perceptions" (p. 34). Of a Jewish principal who Muir claims (although on what basis it is unclear) "had lost the respect of Jews" (p. 35), we are told "he committed himself to an almost paranoic view of the world in which he was the victim" (p. 35). Lest the reader conclude that the city school system was bursting with neurotics, Muir notes

> The majority had its "door open," its "ear to the ground." Its perceptual habits were healthy, not morbid. (p. 35)

At another point we are told that "The Midland staff became angry at the prayer ban" and "took its agression out on the Supreme Court" (p. 118). In short, armchair psychology is one "methodology" which must be cautiously used if it is to be taken seriously. In a few instances (e.g. those cited above) such caution is lacking. Yet it should also be noted that Muir skillfully interweaves the armchair psychology with his more empirically based analyses to provide plausible (if not altogether convincing) answers to his research questions.

Muir, with commendable candor, recognizes methodological limitations of his study. He does this in several places in the text (pp. 47, 62, 73 n. 1) and in a methodological postscript in which he notes his study's "methodological looseness which should challenge the reader to question both the findings and the generalizations" (p. 139). He also frankly reveals "I frequently created and employed a method because its results corroborated conclusions I had previously intuited" (p. 140). Yet he also argues that "methodological makeshift... is justifiable and appropriate in venturing into a field not previously studied" (p. 140) and it is difficult to disagree especially when the "makeshift" is as imaginative as that constructed by Muir.

Muir's emphasis is on the psychology of compliance. Richard Johnson's book although concerned with this is also concerned with the politics of compliance. Indeed, Johnson's purpose is to provide a general framework in which to study compliance and to present a test case of that framework with the issue of schoolhouse religion in a rural Illinois school district comprising the towns he calls "Eastville-Westville."

Utilizing communications theory, Johnson analyzes the Supreme Court as a "message source," the substance of the schoolhouse religion "messages" in terms of the incentives to induce compliance contained within them, and both the formal and extralegal transmission of the "messages." Johnson examines the extralegal transmission to "Eastville-Westville" by way of a content analysis of the area newspapers and other media.

Cognitive balance theory is used to explain individual reactions to the transmitted messages both before ("cognitive imbalance") and after ("cognitive dissonance") the individual selects a course of action. Johnson's research design, unlike Muir's, was not attuned to investigate attitude change but rather the attitudes held by 176 respondents to a mail questionnaire almost a year after *Schempp* was decided and months after the school superintendent had achieved compliance within the school district. Johnson classified the respondents as to their modes of response and found seven types. Using a factor analysis of questionnaire responses and a scoring method built on it, Johnson further explored the bases of acceptance or rejection of the Court's policy associated with each response type.

One of Johnson's major conclusions is that the legitimacy and expertise bases of Supreme Court power are sufficient to induce compliance by those who acknowledge these bases despite their private disagreement with Court policy. This leads Johnson to advocate the furtherance of The Judicial Myth lest "important bases of Supreme Court power... be seriously undermined" (p. 150). This conclusion, however, may be premature. First it is questionable whether a disbelief in the myth is necessarily incompatible with a belief in the Court's legitimacy and expertise. More refined questions aimed at differentiating attitudes towards and the nature of the Court's systemic role from the myth per se would be desirable. Secondly, Muir's study suggests that those who privately disagreed with the Court's ruling but nevertheless complied with it did so *not* because of a belief in the myth but because of other reasons e.g. exaggeration of the Court's power and the perception of compulsion, social pressures, a desire to minimize community conflict. Third, one can conclude from both the Johnson and Muir studies that crucial to compliance was a key individual in the school system (the school superintendent in one, a lawyer on the school board in the other) willing to take the initiative in securing compliance because he strongly agreed with the Court's ruling but not necessarily the myth. In brief, the necessity for belief in the myth for compliance has yet to be demonstrated.

Both Muir and Johnson do not question the validity of the theory they utilize. Muir states in his preface "Creation and proof of dissonance theory are the psychologist's job, not the political scientist's" (p. viii). But this begs the question. Whether and to what extent cognitive imbalance existed when the prayer ruling was announced, and whether and to what degree cognitive dissonance existed subsequent to the individual decision to comply or not comply are empirical questions which should be recognized as such. Muir's findings (but not Johnson's) lend some support to cognitive dissonance theory but further research must be done by political scientists if such theory is to be accepted as a component of a compliance model.

It should be understood, however, that both Muir and Johnson through their imaginative research designs and creative use of theory have pushed the study of impact/compliance an important step forward. They have produced major studies which can be expected to have an impact on the field.

SHELDON GOLDMAN
University of Massachusetts

Uncertain Mandate. BY ERNEST W. LEFEVER. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 254. $7.50.)

Political Protest in the Congo. BY HERBERT WEISS. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. 326. $8.50.)

Locked in uncomfortable embrace in this review are two quite disparate studies. They share the Congo (Kinshasa) as subject matter, but the similarity ends there. Herbert Weiss places one of the most important of the 1960 generation of Congolese political parties under minute scrutiny, while Ernest Lefever is primarily concerned with the functioning of the United Nations peace-keeping machinery in the Congo from 1960 to 1964.

The Weiss study is by far the more valuable of the two. Between its covers are the results of more than half a decade of painstaking research, begun in 1959 when the author was associated with the M.I.T. Center for International Studies. The major part of his field investigation took place in 1959–1960; he arrived at a particularly strategic moment, and enjoyed an intimacy of access into several of the most important Congolese political movements which is most unlikely to be available again to an overseas scholar. The present study focuses upon the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA), a militant movement which at its height in late 1959 and the first part of 1960 was beyond doubt a mass single party within the geographical confines of Kwilu District, in southwestern Congo. The Weiss kit of photocopying equipment rarely ceased operation during his Kwilu work and an implausible wealth of party documents were amassed for the study; indeed, as he confesses in the introduction, his collection was in the end better than that of the party itself in many respects.

The central theme which Weiss distills from his vast stores of data is rural radicalism. In the interesting autobiography of the book which is offered by way of introduction, he retraces the evolution of his thinking in this regard. Initially, he shared the then orthodox view that radical nationalism was the artifact of a new, urban-oriented, Western-educated elite group, which drew in its train a reluctant, apathetic rural mass by charisma and cajolery. But his observation of rural organization by the PSA, and other militant parties such as the ABAKO, and Mouvement National Congolais/Lumumba (MNC/L) suggested that this model needed to be stood upon its head. In Kwilu, in Lower Congo, in Orientale province party organizers were all but submerged by the radical pressures from their rural constituents.

There can be no doubt as to the accuracy of the author's perceptions in the regions where his data was gathered. Further research into the origins of modern nationalism elsewhere in Africa also lend some support to the Weiss arguments, in particular work of a group of historians at Dar es Salaam. Yet nagging doubts remain about the rural radicalism hypothesis. The highly centralized colonial system fashioned by Belgium assured a relative uniformity of experience in different areas of the Congo, yet the Kwilu pattern of response was by no means uniform for the whole country, although it might eventually have become so. There are enormous temporal fluctuations to explain as well; retracing Weiss's footsteps two years later, the reviewer found apathy, disillusion and social demobilization where Weiss had seen effervescent ebullience. The pendulum took another violent swing 18 months later, when the Mulele rebellion swept a portion of the area, and this in turn has been succeeded by renewed quiescent despair. That the tensions of enforced change and oppression have secreted a volatile protest potential is clear. But far more needs to be ascertained about the conditions in which it becomes activated into overt group behavior, the organizational form in which it becomes manifest, and the determinants of the system of values through which frustration is expressed.

But the contribution of the Weiss study goes far beyond the issue of rural radicalism. As a detailed exploration of the birth and growth of a major political party, it is an invaluable case study, made particularly important by the fact that the PSA was not a capital-centered movement. The process of giving organizational form, however shortlived, to the volatile sentiments of the countryside is illuminating. During its brief life as an effective party, the PSA had two election campaigns to confront; in the first, it organized and enforced a boycott, and in the second it had the difficult task of establishing lists for a complex proportional representation system, with both national and provincial seats at stake. The study stops at independence; one might have hoped for some account of the phase of disintegration of the PSA rural organization in the months following, or its life as a parliamentary clique in Kinshasa.

Weiss proposes a typology of the major Congolese parties which is of considerable interest and comparative value in its own right. He goes far beyond the mass v. patron dichotomy which dominated early literature on African parties, and suggests ten attributes which may be used to establish a party profile, including style, duration, orbit, sociological base, and nature of leadership.

A companion study on the development of the MNC/Lumumba is promised for the near future. There seems every reason to assume that it will be of the same high quality as the PSA study, and to wish it an accelerated gestation.

The Lefever volume is not in the same class. The author, now a staff member of the Brookings Institution, began his study while in the employ of the Institute for Defense Analyses. There is a substantial overlap between the present work, and an earlier Lefever study, *Crisis in the Congo: A U.N. Force in Action* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1965), although *Uncertain Mandate* does focus more explicitly on the roles of the various national actors. The author has circled the globe in search of material, pursuing prominent participants to the ends of the earth; respondents were bagged from Rome to New Delhi, from Ottawa to Addis Ababa. Curiously, field work in the Congo itself appears to have been very cursory, and Lefever seems to have interrogated very few Congolese, which perhaps explains the inadequacy of the treatment of Congolese internal politics.

The primary purpose of the study is to investigate the practicality of multi-national peace-keeping forces through the U.N. mechanism. He explores in turn the rule of the General Secretary, the host country, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, Belgium, and the smaller states in the U.N. operation in the Congo from 1960 to 1964. He has been thorough in his coverage of U.N. official documents, and has interviewed a large percentage of the international personnel associated with ONUC. The official sponsorship of the initial phase of the investigation presumably assured him access to an array of classified American materials. All of these resources ensure the basis for a useful summary of the U.N. operation. Lefever concludes, plausibly, that the Congo experiment clearly demonstrated the limitations of the U.N. mechanism in this type of crisis. The U.N. could and did restrict the capacity of local power contenders, with their international allies, to impose their will by force. Physical force remained a key determinant of outcomes, but its operation was much more subtle than, say, in Nigeria today. But the breathless expectations of 1960 on the East River—that the U.N. could serve a helpless new state as a benevolent colonial surrogate without colonial authority—were utterly disappointed. As Lefever suggests, the U.N. achievement was by no means negligible; for an investment of $411 million in cash, and the human resources of a large number of highly competent international civil servants, the Congo gained four years of breathing space. While the Congo situation by 1964 may not have been very good, the grisly slaughter in Nigeria suggests how much worse it might have been.

The book would have benefited from a more detached perspective from the author. Lefever seems to have little doubt that United States interests have a special sanctity, and that the best evaluative standard for a multi-national operation is the "goodness of fit" between its performance and U.S. policy. On this score card, the U.N. in the Congo receives high ratings. Lefever confirms the observations of Soviet and radical Afro-Asian commentators that ONUC was dominated by an American-led coalition. Through this looking-glass, the support for Lumumba by radical African states was "simplistic" (p. 169); African states in using the U.N. to achieve their national objectives are guilty of hypocrisy and a double standard (p. 218), while the U.S. apparently obeys the dictates of a higher law in doing the same thing; U.N. officials were exhorted to display the "courage to withstand Communist and neutralist pressures" (p. 147), presumably saesoned by the good sense to truckle immediately to Western pressures. A modicum of empathy would have softened many of the harsher judgements, and produced conclusions more persuasive to those outside of the official policy-making community.

CRAWFORD YOUNG

University of Wisconsin

Nomos X: Representation. EDITED BY J. ROLAND PENNOCK AND JOHN W. CHAPMAN. (New York: Atherton Press, 1968. Pp. 317. $6.95.)

What happens when 19 diverse intellectuals, representing political science (including two Polish Marxists), law, philosophy and mathematics, write on the concept of representation? Perhaps surprisingly, a rather high degree of consensus emerges. The mandate-independence controversies of the past are rejected, both empirically and normatively. Complex and diverse issues both compel and make it desirable that the representative act with independence. As Marek Sobolewski argues, the Marxist concept of the mandate is inadequate for present political realities. But the representative is not only increasingly independent *vis-a-vis* his constituency. There has been a decline in party discipline as well. The range of issues makes it difficult for a party to present an integrated program which will hold all of its members on every or almost every issue. Consequently control over the representative is not to be found in specific acts of party discipline or in votes by the electorate, although these continue to have some influence. The representative is both informed of popular desires and controlled in more general ways. A variety of pressure groups and channels of communication exist to transmit the desires of the people to the representative. But he is not strictly determined. He knows what his constituents want, and undoubtedly he will be affected. But he also knows that the interests of that larger constituency, the nation, must be considered and that the prevailing issue-ignorance of the public free him to consider what, in fact, would be good for the country. This responsible responsiveness is reinforced or hindered by the concept of representation held by the representative and by the public. At least to some degree, he is independent if he considers that his role demands independence and responsible if he feels he ought to be responsible. Conversely, he may fail to consider wider interests if, as David Apter suggests, either he or his constituents have an inadequate notion of his role. Roles formed in an industrial setting but transferred to a nonindustrial one may unduly tax the political system. A plunder psychology may develop which demands immediate need-satisfaction where what is required is long-range planning. Or, as Eric Nordlinger argues, the constituents may have a mandate concept of the representative's role and, accordingly, be deeply suspicious of his attempts to act outside his mandate. This suspicion may endanger the legitimacy of his actions and, therewith, the very principle of representation itself.

What emerges, then, from the Tenth Yearbook of the American Society for Legal and Political Philosophy is a pluralistic concept of representation which is admirably summarized in "Political Representation: An Overview" by J. Roland Pennock. It also shows up in the rather startling frequency with which the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions are criticized. Charles Black, Stuart Brown, Lewis Dexter and Robert Dixon follow diverse approaches and arguments in arriving at the same general conclusion: Reapportionment was necessary but the Court's opinions were careless, thoughtless, and simplistic. As Brown argues, the Court opted for one theory of representation without any sufficient reason and that theory, a radical egalitarianism linked to the concept of a mandate, is precisely the theory rejected throughout the volume. Dixon points out, morevoer, that the Court tried to correct substantive evils with a formalistic egalitarianism. In doing so, the Court embraced an unrestricted majoritarianism which may well endanger minority rights. Only Donald Stokes defends the Court. As he sees it the Court's decision to make one man, one vote the criteria for each house in the states will strengthen party control which is necessary for efficient government which, in turn, is necessary to insure governmental legitimacy. Unfortunately Stokes' arguments sound tired and, in general, do not meet the objections raised by the Court's critics. (The mathematical implications of weighted voting and one man, one vote are also considered in papers by William Riker, Lloyd Shapley and Robert Nozick, which in general continue the criticisms of the Court.)

It is necessary to express some reservations about this heady consensus over the virtues of pluralism. One finds it disturbing that so much of the discussion should have centered on the Court's reapportionment decisions when so little is said about the more interesting challenges raised by Negro disaffection and alienation from pluralistic democracy. What of the tendency toward withdrawal into homogeneous communities? More generally, what about the problems implicit in voter ignorance, apathy, and indifference? The issues raised by Black nationalists, by the radical left as well as some on the right, ought really to have received more serious consideration (even granting that the papers are the outgrowth of the Association's 1965 meeting). Very little attention is paid to what *ought* the represented to want and expect from government. What *ought* to be the ends pursued by government? One suspects that many of the writers would agree with Sobolewski that class interests, *i.e.*, economic considerations, are the main determinants of voting behavior and *the* reflection of popular desires. But such crass materialism is not even compatible with Marx's fuller notion of alienation. The problem of what the individual does and ought to want hinges on what one thinks man ought to be. Is politics intended to contribute to the growth of the individual, to the fulfillment of his identity—an identity which includes but transcends merely economic needs? How much of a person's identity ought to be or can be represented? Julius Cohen does touch on these problems and suggests their complexity when he remarks that "there is somehow a social dimension to the identity of the principal . . . his identity is not exhausted merely by treating him as Mill once did, as an isolated independent entity." (p. 47) It may be, when all is said and done, that the issues raised by the new left and the Black radicals are only bread and butter economic issues—though one suspects, or hopes, that there is something more to it than that.

One must be fair. Some attention is given to the procedural problems of representation which have been raised by the dissidents. Joseph Witherspoon considers methods of increasing popular participation in the bureaucratic process since the legislative process, in fact, so often begins in the bureaucracy where problems are defined and programs formulated. As he points out, citizen involvement improves the flow of information not only to but from the government, hopefully improving the programs and gaining more acceptance for them. Both the Poles, but especially Witold Zakrzewski, grapple with the manner of increasing citizen involvement through a variety of local governments (though given recent developments in Poland there is a hollow ring to their remarks). The importance of involvement is suggested by Apter's argument that a hierarchy with insufficient participation and a low flow of information increases the likelihood of coercive governmental action since coercion is often a response to uncertainty. But throughout the emphasis tends to be on questions of govermental stability rather than on what the goals of governments and men ought to be. Perhaps only Harvey Mansfield, Jr. fully raises the more general questions. Mansfield argues, contrary to current scholarly opinion, that representative government is a modern innovation, decisively different from premodern government. All premodern government, regardless of the form, was government by divine right. In rejecting divine right, in the name of freedom and toleration, modern political philosophy rejected the political relevance of man's noblest aspirations. "Modern representation requires a representable society consecrated by an undemanding god, a society without aspirations." (p. 73) Unfortunately, the general failure of the other essays to discuss modern representative government in terms of man's nobler aspirations may give support to Mansfield's arguments. There are some, however, who hope that it is not impossible to combine the nobility and the virtues of classical and medieval life and thought with the freedom and diversity of modern representative government.

JAMES A. STEINTRAGER
University of Texas at Austin

Cuba and the United States: Long-Range Perspectives. EDITED BY JOHN PLANK. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. 248. $6.75.)

Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class. BY MAURICE ZEITLIN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. 295. $8.50.)

The literature on the Cuban Revolution, although voluminous, is very thin when viewed from scholarly perspectives. Being generous, no more than a dozen books in Spanish, English, and French combined would go on the "must" reading list. Here are two more candidates for honors; of the two, Zeitlin makes it, Plank does not.

The book edited by Plank is an anthology of ten essays commissioned by the Brookings Institution, submitted to the editor in 1963, 1964, and 1965, and finally published in 1967. The essays are aimed at "the concerned citizen" and in one way or another all of them (with the exception of Robert Smith's contribution on domestic politics) attempt to locate the Revolution in its international settings. Thus there is "A Hemispheric Perspective" by Kalman Silvert, "A European Perspective" by Raymond Aron and Alfred Grosser, "Castro on the Chessboard of the Cold War" by Leon Lipson, and essays of much the same tone and style by Henry Wriston, Tad Szulc, Raymond Carr, Hanson Baldwin, and others.

A book of this sort about the Cuban Revolution must inevitably miss the mark for two very obvious reasons. First, by the time it reaches the public, it is frightfully out of date. For instance, the imprint of the missile crisis of October, 1962, is still heavy on many of the essays, for this was the most recent major international event involving Cuba at the time that many of the papers were written. Needless to say, much of relevance has happened for and to Cuba since then. Secondly, the audience of "concerned citizens" for whom the volume is intended probably does not exist as an audience that can be "written for." It is composed of harried bureaucrats, educated housewives, preoccupied businessmen, professors and students among others. If this clientele is ever going to learn anything about Cuba, it needs more diverse fare. As it stands, the book is composed of essays that are neither fish nor fowl. They lack the bite, topicality and vividness of first-rate reporting, and none has the data base nor achieves the objectivity, insight and analytical sophistication that we expect of first class scholarship. This is not to say that some are not interesting and intelligent; they are. Aron's essay in particular captures and communicates well the bewilderment of a European intellectual confronted by the tangled history and mad logic of United States policy toward Cuba. But even though a few of the articles rise to this level of insight and sophistication, the bulk of the book is pretty standard stuff, admixed at times with not a little scare-talk, jingoism, and self-congratulation, a style that is most manifest in Bayless Manning's colsing essay, "An Overall Perspective."

Zeitlin's book is of quite another type. It has the distinction of being the only book-length study on the Cuban Revolution in any language that is based on field research on the island. (The Cubans have done some studies of this sort, but they have never been released for publication). This alone elevates Zeitlin's work to the "must" list. There are other books based on a trip or two to the island, documentary sources, and chats with officials, but Zeitlin actually conducted formal interviews during the summer of 1962 with a sample of 202 randomly selected Cuban workers from 21 industrial plants. The study was carried out with the support and approval of the then Cuban Minister of Industries, Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Zeitlin deserves great credit for designing and executing such a study after the break in diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States. It was no mean feat, and there is little evidence that he compromised his design or scholarly purposes in order to gain access.

With the exception of Chapter Ten in which the author dichotomizes his sample into those who support free speech for opponents of the revolution and those who would suppress it, the main dependent variable of the study is the worker's attitude toward the revolution. This was measured by a well-constructed six point Guttman scale which Zeitlin collapsed into the trichotomy "favorable," "indecisive," and "hostile" for purposes of analysis. He also makes considerable use of the variable 'attitude toward the Communists before the revolution," measured in a much less satisfactory manner by a single retrospective question. In Chapters Two through Nine he analyzes variations in these two attitudinal dimensions (toward the revolution and toward the Communists) in the light of workers' economic insecurities, race, level of skill, sex and marital status (in a chapter delightfully mistitled "Sex and the Single Worker"), social mobility, plant relations, alienation from their work, and the political generations to which they belong. Chapter Ten, as suggested above, analyzes the determinants or at least the concomitants of more as opposed to less liberal attitudes of workers toward those who would criticize the revolution. The eleventh and final chapter is an overview of the "meanings" for members of the working class of the recent history of Cuba and workers' perceptions of their role and place in the revolutionary process.

In a short review, it is not possible even to suggest much less to discuss the bulk of Zeitlin's findings, but his work on political generations does deserve special mention. Whereas the other analyses in the book depend on fairly standard sociological variables combed out of the questionnaire materials, the chapter on political generations is more imaginative. Zeitlin divides his sample into five generations, taking as his chronological cutting points historical events deemed relevant to the working class. He then predicts a rank-ordering by generation of support for the Communists and another of support for the revolution. Particularly in the case of support for the revolution, his predictions are not at all "obvious," deriving as they do from expectations about the consequences of national events for individual political socialization. His predictions are almost completely borne out by the data, including his expectation that the youngest generation (those from 21 to 27 years old at the time of the study) would be one of the two groups least favorable to the revolution (actually they were the least favorable). This chapter stands as an impressive demonstration of the manner in which data on individuals can be made much more meaningful through being embedded in the context of national events. More importantly, it is also a powerful argument in favor of viewing relevant political attitudes and postures—at least when studying developing countries—as deeply affected by adult socialization experiences rather than as predominantly determined in family or school settings.

Just as *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class* is a book worth reading, it is also a book worth criticising. Zeitlin created for himself a magnificent opportunity to write a classic about the Cuban Revolution. His book falls significantly short of this potential achievement for a number of reasons—two of which will be mentioned here: First, many of the questions which he set out to answer derive from, are shaped by, and are cast in a vocabulary taken from 19th and early 20th Century Marxism and anarchosyndicalism. If we grant that as philosophical and organizational traditions these had some importance in the evolution of the Cuban labor movement, this does not justify dragging them in to shape the sociological analysis of revolutionary Cuba. The smoke of old battles drifts across the pages and footnotes of this book, and the ghosts of old European warriors come to haunt and confuse our understanding of Castro's Cuba. There is even a more modern aspect of all this extraneous and sometimes antiquated theorizing. Working with data on the political beliefs and "tolerance" of Cuban workers, Zeitlin attacks Lipset's thesis on working-class authoritarianism. Lipset probably deserves all the knocks that Zeitlin gives him, but if so, it is a case of the right battle fought at the wrong time, in the wrong book, and with the wrong data. Let me make perfectly clear that I do not object to either the undertones or overtones of political radicalism and sociological revisionism that run through the book. I would simply argue that there are more modern weapons than anarchosyndicalist thought and more powerful intellectual allies than Friedrich Engels for one who wishes to do battle against middle-class Yankee sociology while at the same time analyzing the Cuban Revolution. In Zeitlin's case, both his politics and his sociology are weakened by his allegiance to these particular reference groups.

In the second place, the data generated by

Zeitlin's field work are unevenly and incompletely analyzed. Such is almost always the case with survey research, but in this instance the shortcomings are acute and the consequences perhaps more unfortunate than usual. His field questionnaire contained 92 items; perhaps less than half of the data generated by these questions found their way into the analyses presented in the book. One suspects that the author himself was embarrassed by the amount of data that did not get analyzed and reported, for *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class* does not contain either the original Spanish of the English version of the qustionnaire. To read Zeitlin's questionnaire one must go to his Ph.D. dissertation, which is, to say the least, an inconvenience. Especially after reading the full interview schedule, one comes away from the book with a sense of opportunities missed. But even confining the critique to the data actually used, there is a certain heaviness about the manner in which the author keeps returning to attitude toward the revolution and attitude toward Communism as the two dependent variables. Given the importance of the topic, the uniqueness of the field opportunity, the author's tenacity and resourcefulness in gathering the data, and the five years which then passed before the book was issued, one might hope for a more complete and multifaceted analysis. Essential reading on the Cuban Revolution it is; a classic it is not.

RICHARD R. FAGEN

Stanford University

The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism. BY HOWARD L. ERDMAN. (New York; Cambridge University Press, 1967. Pp. 356. $9.50.)

Mr. Erdman's lucidly written, well-organized and thoroughly researched book offers a comprehensive view of the Swatantra Party's origins, structure, leadership, ideology and decision making processes through India's fourth general election held in early 1967. By relating his analysis to conservatism in Indian thought and society and to the economic and social forces that constitute the party's environmental challenge, he provides perspectives and insights hitherto unavailable in studies of Indian politics. Conservatism, both manifest and latent, has been obscured by the shadow of Nehru and neglected by scholars concerned with economic and political development. By calling our attention to latent conservatism, he makes clear that the Swatantra Party has mobilized only a fraction of the conservative forces in the country. The analysis is based on national party files and records, published commentary and statements by the party organizations and its notables, and extensive and detailed interviews conducted throughout India in 1962/63 and again in 1966/67 with elected and party officials and party supporters. Mr. Erdman was remarkably successful in winning and holding the confidence of those whom he interviewed and in writing an account that keeps faith both with them and with scholarship, no mean accomplishment in these days when American scholars abroad are everywhere suspect. Although it does not attend to the doctrines of representation that introduce Samuel H. Beer's superb study of Britain's Labour and Tory parties, Mr. Erdman's book provides a comparable understanding of one of India's major parties.

The Swatantra Party's outlook ranges from the modified Gandhianism of its aged and nationally respected leader, C. Rajagopalachari, through the "feudal" landed conservatism of princes and nobles, to the modern liberalism of urban professionals and Bombay industrialists. Heterogeneity of outlook is matched by heterogeneity of support. While Minoo Masani was general secretary, he pressed for more rationalized professional and centralized party organization, emphasized in the party program and image its liberal qualities and gave strategic priority in the allocation of finance and official support to national parliamentary as against state legislative candidates. The party's state and local elites, made up primarily of rural based "feudalists," the former rulers and noblemen of princely India, command most of the party's electoral support in the states where it is strong, Rajasthan, Orissa, Gujarat and, for a time, Bihar. They have resisted the attempts of the party's national elite, made up primarliy of ex-civil servants and modern businessmen, to use the party's central organs to achieve the goals pursued by Masani when he was general secretary. They are self-financing, and able to rely upon what in eighteenth century Britain were called interests and connections, that is, command of the political resources provided by organic and hierarchical territorial communities and the aggregation of these and other kinds of political resources through channels of kinship, dependence, patronage, friendship and personality. More concerned than the national elite to capture state power, they have also been more sympathetic to doctrines and programs that speak to rural electorates in terms of religious fundamentalism and local pride.

Mr. Erdman makes clear that the Swatantra national office has not had the resources to make good its preferences. It is ironic that the leading *laissez-faire* party in India has found that the commercial and industrial leaders from whom funds for the national office might be raised were, in the words of C. Rajagoplachari, "in the grip of the ruling [Congress] party." (p. 172) Through the 1967 general elections most businessmen felt they could protect themselves better from Congress socialism by giving more to the Congress than to Swatantra. (Now that Congress dominance has been shattered, it has brought in legislation barring corporate giving to political parties.) Given these constraints and limitation, Mr. Erdman remains cautious in his prognostications concerning the party's future.

Mr. Erdman's book invites comparison with other entries in the literature on Indian parties. Like several of them—Myron Weiner's 1957 account of the non-communist parties in opposition to Congress; Marshall Windmiller and the late Eugene Overstreet's 1959 study of the then Communist Party of India—it focusses on the national level of party structure, leadership, ideology and behavior. Unlike them it pays much more attention to the state level and to patterns of interaction between national and state parties. It does not concern itself explicitly and systematically with the relationship between district and state politics as does Paul Brass' 1965 study of Congress factionalism in Uttar Pradesh nor with the interaction and mutual penetration at the district level between modern political structures represented by the Congress and the various organized economic and social forces found in the environment, as does Weiner's most recent study. These contrasting research strategies yield somewhat different kinds of knowledge about Indian parties. Erdman's study and the other national studies tell us more about ideology, program and party organization while Brass and the second Weiner study tell us more, for example, about paracommunities and personal followings. Such differences are not only the result of varying research strategies employed in the study of Indian parties; they are also artifacts of system level differences and of the parties themselves. It is not until one reaches the national level, for example, that ideological differences within and among parties become a meaningful independent variable. By focussing as much as he does on the state level system, Erdman manages to maximize the range of his observations and findings. And there is much less point in attending to districts in a study of the Swatantra Party for the simple reason that it, unlike Congress, lacks viable district organizations.

It is difficult to cavil at Mr. Erdman's decision to set his analysis of the Swatantra Party in the context of conservatism generally and Indian conservatism in particular. This was the book that he intended to write. Yet in doing so he dealt with some questions only by implication; the evidence is there but the questions and concepts necessary to provide answers are missing. For example, how are Swatantra's strategy and structure shaped by its place in the party system, by the electoral system and by larger political environment? To what extent does the party shape social forces and cleavages and to what extent is it shaped by them? To what extent is its organizational looseness a consequence of the Indian political system, particularly its federal dimension? Finally (and here the evidence is not provided), how does the Swatantra Party compare to conservative parties in other countries, including European countries, not only today but as they took shape and entered earlier political arenas?

The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism is work of enduring value. By directing our attention to the India of businessmen, princes and peasants it provides a much needed corrective to the India of modern nationalists and urban radicals of the left or the right so often featured in Indian political studies.

SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH
University of Chicago

Mathematical Applications in Political Science, III. EDITED BY JOSEPH L. BERND. (Charlottesville, Virginia: The University press of Virginia, 1967. Pp. 119. $5.00.)

This volume is a collection of papers from the third National Science Foundation sponsored conference on Mathematical Applications in Political Science. The essays involve mathematical applications in five different areas. Otto A. Davis and Melvin Hinich extend the mathematical model of the electoral process which they developed in the second volume of this series. Gerald H. Kramer uses the theory of finite automata to obtain a result concerning the impossibility of a form of rational decision-making. William H. Riker uses experimental games to verify two theories from game theory. S. Sidney Ulmer proposes a discriminant function model as a means of predicting judicial decisions. Richard L. Merritt describes procedures for graphic display of time-series data on the attitudes of countries toward one another.

Merritt's chapter is the most elementary mathematically. He analyzes 1954–1964 European survey data concerning attitudes toward other countries. Basic trends are obtained through regressing friendliness and salience scores for a pair of countries on time. Merritt then shows which pairs of countries became more and less friendly over time, utilizing several suggestive means of graphic representation. The result is an interesting data analysis which regrettably lacks theoretic focus.

Ulmer's essay is another in the series of articles dealing with the problem of prediction of judicial decisions from "the facts of the case." Ulmer factor analyzes the facts of several cases in order to reduce the number of predictor variables sufficiently for his model. The factor scores of the cases are then used as the independent variables and the court's decisions on the cases as dichotomous dependent variables in a discriminant function model. Finally Ulmer selects the prediction equation which yields the highest proportion of correctly predicted cases from the smallest number of factors. The maximization of the proportion of correct predictions is a reasonable criterion, though the discussion remains insensitive to the interpretability of the resulting equation. The successful prediction of an additional one to five per cent of the cases is of little importance if the final predictors lack theoretic meaning. There is insufficient emphasis in this article on the role of subtsantive theory in the search for the best statistical model.

Riker examines coalition formation in three-person bargaining experiments in order to test two results from game theory. There were proposals and counter-proposals of coalitions in the experiments until a pair of players agreed on how they would divide the money they would be given if they formed a two-person coalition. The average payoffs within possible coalitions fit very closely with the values predicted mathematically. This fit of the model is explained in terms of the concept of trust—proposals of coalitions giving a player more than his quota were not trusted. Thus there is political relevance in Riker's discussion of the mechanisms of the bargaining situation, though the games themselves are apolitical in face content. Yet the basic use of game theory as a theory giving predictions which require empirical verification remains questionable. The utility of a mathematical theory does not rest on its descriptive validity.

Kramer is concerned with the feasibility of rational behavior given the limited computational capacities of real decision-makers. He constructs an analogy between a decision-maker and an information-processing device, an automaton. The question becomes whether any conceivable program can be devised for such an automaton which leads to decision-making behavior which is consistent with rationality. Rationality is here defined as acting in accordance with a set of consistent preferences. The theory of automata is then employed to establish that rationality with respect to an infinite number of alternatives is incompatible with a computing device which is finite. It would seem doubtful whether an infinite number of alternatives either could be represented by the input language for the device or could be processed by a finite device in a finite period of time. Kramer's terse prose style leaves the reader uncertain as to whether these conditions are required by his proof, so the significance of his result is not clear.

The Davis and Hinich essay continues their work on a multidimensional model of party competition. In their earlier article, Davis and Hinich assumed that on a given issue each voter has the same level of concern. They now relax this assumption, instead assuming that the level of concern on a given issue is variable but is independent of the position of the voter on that issue. With this new assumption, the dominant strategy for a candidate still is to take the mean position on each of the issues, if the distribution of voters in the space is multivariate normal. The candidate whose platform is closest to that mean will win the election. The Davis and Hinich model is extremely elegant, though their basic result would seem to require much less elaborate machinery. Given a symmetric and unimodal density of voters in the space, such as the multivariate normal distribution, with either equal or symmetric levels of concern on issues, the mean is the dominant strategy for the candidates. If this assertion is not intuitively obvious, a simple geometric proof would seem possible. Also it is not entirely clear whether they have significantly relaxed the assumption of an equal level of concern for all voters in this article. They restrict the standard deviation of the concern of voters to be much less than the smallest eigenvalue of the matrix of average concern. Notwithstanding their assertion to the contrary, this condition would seem to make the variation permitted nearly trivial relative to the average size of the level of concern. At a minimum, a more complete discussion of both this restriction and the meaning of the general model would have been appreciated.

"Mathematical applications in political science" must be judged simultaneously on the basis of their relevance to political science and their usage of mathematics. "Mathematical applications" involve sophisticated use of mathematics, though the mathematics used need not be sophisticated. Experimentation with novel forms of mathematics is to be encouraged, if their application is truly appropriate. Mathematics more powerful than is required to solve the problem at hand should not be employed unless the formalization in terms of high-power mathematics is likely to lead to insights in the solution of a more general problem. Mathematical modelling should involve more than statistical modelling and routine data analysis. Still a confrontation with empirical materials need not be avoided. The use of mathematics heightens the responsibility of an author to communicate to his audience in a readable manner. Finally the emphasis on mathematical sophistication does not alter the conventional standards of judgment of a work: substantive merit and theoretic importance are of greater significance than technical considerations of method.

There is a definite and growing need for the publication of volumes of essays on "mathematical applications in political science." Articles dealing with substantively important questions in a mathematically technical form can rarely be printed in the major political science journals which must balance the importance of the article against the reaction of their readers. Yet it is hoped that the articles in future volumes of this series will contain a more skillful blending of the technical and the substantive, mathematical sophistication with theoretic significance.

HERBERT F. WEISBERG
The University of Michigan

NATO and the Range of American Choice. BY WILLIAM T. R. FOX AND ANNETTE BAKER FOX. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. 352. $7.95.)

NATO and Europe. BY ANDRÉ BEAUFRE. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1966. Pp. 170. $3.95.)

The Atlantic Idea and Its European Rivals. BY HAROLD VAN B. CLEVELAND. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966. Pp. 186. $5.95.)

It is part of the conventional wisdom that NATO is something special as peace-time alliances go. It maintains an infrastructure of communications, airfields, etc.; it functions under a partially integrated command structure; and it has troops and airplanes at its disposal. These and other novel features smacking of supranationalism are taken as evidence that NATO is significantly more than the usual contingency pact—*just how much more and why* has been a matter of conjecture among students of alliances, in general, and the North Atlantic Area, in particular. But for all its successes, NATO has had notable failures and periods of general malaise. Most significantly, troop commitments have seldom been met and the dominant role of the United States has led to periodic—perhaps continual—resentment among the other members of the system. Within the last five to ten years centrifugal forces have been particularly strong. Gaullist prodding has succeeded in raising basic questions about the future of the Alliance. Indeed, there is reason to wonder whether NATO has a future—except perhaps as a traditional contingency pact.

All three of the books covered in this review devote considerable attention to diagnosing NATO's current ills. Two of them, Beaufre and Cleveland, offer prescriptions for the future. Fox and Fox, on the other hand, give the reader a sense of the practicability of these prescriptions by focusing in some detail on a variety of constraints and choices impinging on U. S. policy makers. It is interesting that with respect to diagnosis, all three, the French general, the convinced Atlanticist, and the academic analysts, are in fundamental agreement. In addition, all three books share a common perspective; they are concerned first and foremost with American behavior. They all, in other words, accept at least implicitly American leadership.

NATO's ills are, first of all, traced to the stabilization of the strategic balance and the emergence of a Soviet-American detente. Since the basic premise of all the authors is that NATO is primarily a military alliance, they agree that as the Soviet threat has receded, the willingness to participate fully in the alliance has declined. Secondly, there seems to be general agreement that the strategic balance has reduced the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee. Finally, given reduced threat and reduced credibility, the allies have become increasingly unwilling to accept the dominant role which the United States has played in NATO policy making in general, and in control of the nuclear deterrent in particular. NATO conflicts turn out to be partially over policy and partially over structure.

With respect to structure, all the authors agree that control of the nuclear deterrent is indivisible. Beaufre, thus, writes off the MLF as impracticable. If Cleveland is more positive, it is simply because he saw the MLF as a device which might have locked Germany more securely into the NATO system and reduced the likelihood that the Germans would seek their own deterrent. In any case, Beaufre sees the MLF as just another instance of the U. S. failing to coordinate and consult with its allies before policy decisions are made and announced. Beaufre's major concern is with the establishment of simple but effective procedures to assure real consultation. Cleveland strongly argues that relationships within the alliance are based on power realities; accordingly, he claims that while the U. S. should strive for consensus, it should be willing to settle for something less. He feels, for example, that the U. S. should have pushed ahead with the MLF using whatever leverage was at its disposal, so long as the MLF was deemed useful. *Real-politik* within a framework of reciprocal interests is Mr. Cleveland's vision.

These perceived reciprocal interests serve as the foundation for the substantive policy prescriptions espoused by Beaufre and Cleveland. For both men the Soviet-American détente depends for the foreseeable future on the continuation of a stable strategic balance. Accordingly, they agree that the Alliance is necessary, although neither makes it clear just exactly why the strategic balance is dependent on the alliance rather than simply on U. S. and Soviet nuclear capacities. Presumably the link is that within this balance, the USSR must not be tempted to nibble at the periphery of Western Europe. It is assumed by Cleveland that U. S. interests in a non-Communist Europe would necessitate an American response to such nibbling. Beaufre also believes that the U. S. has a stake in preventing conventional military action in Europe, because such a war could not possibly be contained—presumably the *force de frappe* would trigger the escalation.

What then should the United States do to maintain the alliance? The European allies are, on the one hand, restive under American control. On the other hand, the Europeans are not inclined to take on the costly responsibilities for their own defense. Beaufre and Cleveland offer prescriptions which in the medium term are not significantly different, since they both suggest that the U. S. accept and recognize the growing strength and cohesion of Europe. But because their long term visions of Europe differ markedly, there is disagreement as to whether European autonomy should be encouraged or simply tolerated.

Cleveland casts his vote for toleration and so his policy recommendation amounts to temporizing with the current situation. The U. S. should not work against European unity, but should cease to promote it. In any case, the European idea has lost its vitality; it is stalled and will continue to be stalled somewhere between a collection of discrete nation states and a federal union. Accordingly, the United States must work to drive home to the Europeans the importance of the reciprocal interests—military, financial, and commercial—which bind the Atlantic Area into what Stanley Hoffmann has called a "partial international system." According to Cleveland, the keys to successful policy are: (1) to promote the cause of the British who will serve as the linking force between the U. S. and Europe, and (2) to make certain that the Germans are kept reasonably satisfied, since Cleveland sees a revisionist Germany as far and away the biggest threat to a generally acceptable status quo. Thus, Cleveland suggests that the U. S. not oppose a European nuclear force if it is the price de Gaulle demands for British entry into Europe and if providing for German participation binds Germany more firmly into the Atlantic system.

Beaufre's prescription is more radical, for he wants the U. S. to encourage European autonomy by promoting the staged development of an independent European military force. The medium-term goal is total European takeover of responsibility for ground defense of Europe. Eventually, this European military establishment should include a nuclear force as well. For Beaufre, military integration and defense responsibilities are the key to real union. Beaufre agrees with Cleveland that the drive towards European union has been stalled, but unlike Cleveland, Beaufre believes that it can be revived. Again, in sharp contrast to Cleveland, "Europe" for Beaufre must in the final analysis stretch from the Atlantic to the Soviet border. If in the short run Beaufre's scheme assumes limited European autonomy combined with more intensive NATO consultation and enhanced joint planning, in the long run it adds up to an orthodox Gaullist third force strategy.

Beaufre and Cleveland, thus, present different prescriptions for reviving the alliance. Fox and Fox offer the reader a decision-making perspective on the feasibility of these alternatives. The reader can, for example, infer from Fox and Fox just what kinds of obstacles are likely to be raised within the American system to establishing more intensive consultative machinery. Similarly, it is possible to assess the effectiveness of such machinery should it be accepted.

In order to indicate the general lines of their analyses I will discuss the feasibility of the two prescriptions from the Fox and Fox perspective. But first let me emphasize that this exercise is only illustrative. The book is, first of all, inordinately rich in detail and balanced in judgment. Accordingly, the data are surely open to other inferences. Moreover, I am considering the problem only in terms of internal U. S. decision-making processes while their analysis extends to NATO processes, to alternative claims on American policy makers, and to the variety of purposes that NATO is perceived to serve. With these caveats in mind, let us consider the two prescriptions.

First, it seems reasonably clear that the Cleveland policy would be more acceptable simply because it calls for the most limited departure from current stands. NATO policy making in the U. S. Government is a very cumbersome process. If it is difficult to achieve consensus with our allies, this task is almost as difficult within the government. Coordination within the executive branch involves intradepartmental struggles as well as coordination between Defense and State. In addition, any policies requiring substantial expenditures or having to do with atomic energy must be driven through a polycentric Congress and therefore made acceptable to Congressmen who are not very often responsive to the policy as such, but simply to whether or not it threatens to accelerate government expenditures or aggravate the balance of payments.

While all government policies must run this political gauntlet, Fox and Fox point out some of the special handicaps under which NATO policy labors. Virtually any NATO issue will stir up interservice rivalries. Moreover, NATO has not been a high priority problem area even at times of crisis and so the President has not been inclined to devote his scarce attention resources and limited political capital to such issues. Still another difficulty is that many of the policy makers charged with responsibility for NATO are not really attuned to NATO problems. The military seems to have done a better job than the diplomats in building a concern for and understanding of NATO into its bureaucracy, but in neither department are NATO duties perceived as strong pegs upon which to hang a career. Finally, the history of NATO has given rise to expectations by American decision-makers that our leads will be followed. This is not simply an expectation based on what have been the power realities of the alliance. NATO is perceived to be anchored in a strong mutuality of interests and empathies. Accordingly, we seem to expect our partners to accept our offers in a spirit of friendly cooperation.

What all this adds up to is, on the one hand, a general policy inertia and, on the other, the likelihood that reforms aimed at bringing our allies into the policy making process may be more trouble than they are worth. Such reforms will probably be resisted in Congress and in the executive branch—given the rather restricted NATO constituency and the burden of adding more decision makers to the already cumbersome process. Even if accepted, a device like Mr. McNamara's "select nuclear committee" may not make the system more responsive. Indeed, it may increase frustrations by further complicating matters.

As I indicated, it is not really possible to do justice to Fox and Fox within the compass of this kind of joint review. The book manages to bring together, synthesize, and evaluate within a useful process framework vast amounts of information. As such, it is a real contribution to a literature cluttered by policy studies and abstract theorizing. It lays a foundation for some of the middle range theory that scholars in the international relations field have been calling for for so long, and may well catalyze important new research projects.

STUART A. SCHEINGOLD
University of Wisconsin

Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939. BY JAMES T. PATTERSON. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967. Pp. 356. $8.50.)

The writers connected with the Survey Research Center must often wish that someone had started gathering their data in the 1930's rather than later. It would be fascinating to be able to gauge party identification in a period of change rather than in one of electoral stability. For like reasons the 1930's ought to be attractive to Congressional roll-call analysts, and it is a little surprising—even given the lack of ordered data—that the Congressional voting of the New Deal decade has been given so little attention. Changes in electoral patterns in the 1930's surely provoked changes in Congressional alignments, and the latter are no less subject to statistical analysis than the former.

James T. Patterson, an Indiana University historian, has not written a "roll-call study," but he has made good use of roll-calls in providing a blow-by-blow account of Congressional politics in the 1930's. His subject is the rise of the "conservative coalition" between 1933 and 1939. The emphasis is on heretical Democrats, and especially heretical Democrats in the Senate. Patterson wastes no time worrying over a definition of "conservatism"; he uses the term conventionally but, in the context, sensibly, to denote opposition to Rooseveltian domestic reforms.

It goes without saying that Republicans alone could not sustain an effective opposition, conservative or otherwise, in the 1930's. At their lowest point, just after the 1936 election, they numbered only 16 in the Senate and 89 in the House. Their strategy by 1937 was to keep silent and supply back-bench votes for the causes of vocal anti-Roosevelt Democrats. Patterson's study of the disaffected Democrats is a study in gradual alienation. In the Congress on 1933–1934, there were only 5 Democratic Senators who were consistently opposed to major New Deal measures: Byrd and Glass of Virginia, Bailey of North Carolina, Tydings of Maryland, and Gore of Oklahoma. By the end of the 1935 session, after the intense struggles over the utilities holding-company bill and the "wealth tax," some 19 Senate Democrats had broken with the President on two or more major issues. The bitter Court controversy of 1937 drove many more into opposition and cemented an alliance of Republicans and conservative Democrats. After the 1938 election this cross-party coalition was in a position to take over the Senate. Over in the House the trend from 1933 through 1939 was more or less the same. One difference in the larger body was that the opposition made more use of formal machinery; soon after the 1936 election the Rules Committee moved into its familiar blocking role and Martin Dies surfaced with his passion for investigations.

Who were the renegade Democrats? To put it another way, how were they different from Democrats who remained loyal New Dealers? Patterson finds no significant difference between the two groups either in age or in seniority. Nor was region as critical a variable as one might retrospectively assume. Before 1936 it was not even true that the opposition was *disproportionately* Southern. Senators like Byrnes of South Carolina and Harrison of Mississippi remained loyal to the President long after colleagues like Gerry of Rhode Island, Copeland of New York and Burke of Nebraska had vociferously declared their independence. In Patterson's list of the 35 "most conservative" Democratic Senators of the 1933–1939 period, only 10 were Southerners and only 5 more were from the Border states. It is true that by 1939 the opposition had a Southern cast to it, but even then Southern Senators were not as cohesively conservative as they later became in the 1950's and 1960's. Senator Bilbo, among others, was still waving a New Deal flag.

A merit of Patterson's study is that it provides suggestive evidence for the kinds of inductive generalization and theoretical speculation political scientists like to engage in. What, for example, has been the relation between electoral realignments and Congressional roll-call behavior? It seems clear that "dimensions of voting" in Congress, rather stable since World War II, were thoroughly reshuffled in the 1930's. An extended longitudinal study of roll-call voting might turn up the same pattern of normal stability broken by occasional realignment that V. O. Key, Jr., Walter D. Burnham and others have found in the partisan behavior of the electorate. The Democrats, both at the grass roots and in Congress, shifted their center gravity north and east during the New Deal decade. One consequence of the Democratic shift was a rearrangement of forces within the Congressional Republican Party. The New Deal dealt a death blow to Midwestern and Western Republican Progressivism, but at the same time gave birth to a new Republican heresy in the formerly orthodox Northeast. The new sectional leanings became apparent in 1937 when the only Senate Republicans to support Roosevelt's minimum wage bill were Lodge of Massachusetts and Davis of Pennsylvania. Ten years later the old and proud Republican Progressive tradition survived only in the erratic career of Senator Langer of North Dakota.

Patterson's account of the confrontations between New Dealers and anti-New Dealers is also of relevance to coalition theorists. What was the logic of the opposing strategists? The propositions of William H. Riker's *Theory of Political Coalitions* seem to fit the facts surprisingly well. After 1934 the Roosevelt Administration followed Riker's principle that it makes no sense to maintain an excessively large crowd on a winning bandwagon; that is, Roosevelt, instead of trying to keep his party united, served his liberal adherents by submitting legislative proposals sweeping enough to command the support only of narrow majorities in House and Senate. The utilities holding-company bill, for example, survived a key vote in the Senate by only 45–44. Not long after the 1936 election it became possible and expedient to throw off the bandwagon the leaders of the Senate Democratic establishment—Byrnes, Harrison, and also Vice President Garner—and thrown off they were. How did the conservative opposition react to Roosevelt's strategy? In general, by seeking support wherever they could find it. There were times in 1937 and 1938 when the conservatives could hope to win Senate majorities only by making Burton Wheeler their informal leader; they quickly suppressed the animosities of two decades and rallied behind Wheeler. Roosevelt's strategy of maximal immediate accomplishment doubtless served the interests of his New Deal following, but there was a price to be paid for it later. When Democratic Congressional majorities fell to a "normal" level after 1938, the President had to work with Congressmen and Senators who displayed toward him the sullen hostility described by Allen Drury in his *Senate Journal, 1943–1945.*

Besides being thought-provoking, Patterson's study is well-written, well-documented, and consistently analytic rather than discursive.

DAVID R. MAYHEW

Yale University

The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966. BY ROBERT A. SCALAPINO. (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1967. Pp. 412. $6.75.)

We have come to expect of Professor Scalapino exhaustive and insightful analyses of Japan's experience in political party development. This well-organized and brilliantly written study is no exception—a product of a decade or more of research in depth into a wide range of Japanese and non-Japanese documentary sources and a limited series of interviews with key figures active in or close to the JCP. Ample footnotes and an excellent bibliography are also included.

The author concludes that communism in Japan is an isolated, minority movement. "Barring external interference," it shows little promise of success in a society which "having attained modernity, can afford freedom." (p. 354). Few, except Marxist-Leninists, would take issue with this conclusion. On the basis of the detailed chronology Professor Scalapino presents, communism in Japan has missed whatever opportunities it might have had as a revolutionary force. However, a more penetrating analysis of economic and social factors might make the hypothesis fully convincing, especially in an era when "revisionism" appears to be becoming orthodox throughout the communist world.

The study, jointly sponsored by the RAND Corporation and Berkeley's Center for Japanese and Korean Studies, traces communism in Japan from its earliest origins in 1898 and follows the gyrations of the movement through the pre- and post-World War II eras, continually couched within the context of communist policy developments in the U.S.S.R. and, after 1949, in Red China. The major portion of the book deals with the events since Japan's surrender to the Allies.

The first six chapters provide a highly detailed chronology of the JCP. The last two are given over to an assessment of the party's current status and its future prospects. Communism's prewar legacy (Chapter I), developed when the party for the most part was illegal and suppressed and had fewer than 1,000 members, was "an unending series of frustrations and defeats," unable to compete with Japanese nationalism (and eventually ultranationalism), led by increasingly extremist intellectuals, lacking a working class base, and after 1924 controlled by the Soviets. Heaped upon these was a constant plague of internal factionalism, fed by characteristic Japanese organizational cliques. The major bid of the communists to gain ascendency came with the Allied Occupation's call for drastic political, economic, and social reforms, release of communist leaders from jail, and strong encouragement of "progressive" groups. "Making communism loveable" (Chapter II) failed when SCAP reversed its policy after 1947, the united front of leftists crumbled, and the Russians attacked the JCP leadership for its "Japanization" of Marxism-Leninism. Yet, this precursor of today's nationalist communism did vault the JCP to its greatest proportionate strength, capturing almost 10 percent of the popular vote in the 1949 general election and 35 seats in the Diet's lower house. Since then, the party's fortunes ebbed, barely registering more than five percent of the votes, as the socialists and other minority groups (such as the Clean Government Party) retained the great bulk of the populace opposed to the conservative party in power.

As Japan's economy recovered and entered its period of "miraculous" growth, the JCP has been unable to achieve widespread popular identification and has suffered from the stigma of foreign control. At best, it has been a catch-basin for protest against imbalances, inequities, and grievances felt by scattered groups in the burst of Japan's recent dynamic changes.

Shifting to the left after 1950 (Chapter III), the party's bitter factionalism reemerged as the communists' success in mainland China spurred on dreams of Maoist guerilla warfare from mountain hideouts. By 1955 Peking dominance was clear, and with de-Stalinization, the stage was set for the JCP to become caught in the rise of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Despite a return to legalism after 1955 (Chapter IV), the JCP, attempting to find an impossible solution between the Russian and Chinese positions, lost out again in an effort to form a united front and capitalize upon deep sentiments among the Japanese for preserving the peace, banning the bomb, assuring Japan's independence, and advancing democracy. In the early 1960's, the communists were more isolated than ever and, swinging to Peking in 1963 (Chapter V), lost dissidents who favored either "internationalism" or "structural reform." A "struggle on two fronts" (Chapter VI) then ensued, continuing to the present as the mainstream struggled over "how to use and abuse the social democrats at the same time" and how to achieve internal party unity. As "modern revisionism" gripped the communist world, by 1966 "never in its history had the Japanese Communist Party attempted so ardently to place itself in the mainstream of Japanese evolution, to fit itself into the pendulum-like swing toward and away from external influences that had characterized the most basic political forces operative in Japan." (p. 276). While as elsewhere Japanese communism is increasingly autonomous, it remains nonetheless isolated both domestically and internationally.

How "isolated" is a problem difficult to gauge from the study. The author finds (Chapter VII) the party's membership of 270,000 predominantly urban, young, more "bourgeois" than "proletariat" (and little "peasantry"), relatively well-educated, intellectual, and gradually gaining voting strength. The JCP also appears well-financed (probably from foreign sources) and tightly organized. Yet its chances for achieving a united front, the main hope of the JCP, remain slim, as the socialists, labor unions, student movement, and other left groups themselves continue to hew orthodox Marxism without embracing the communist formula because they continue to capitalize upon the alliance with the U. S., uneven economic development, the lack of Japanese "individualism," and, the impact of the Chinese communist victory (Chapter VIII).

This study should be of immense value to any student of communism or of Japanese politics, although it is possible to raise doubts about the selection of materials used and the emphases given to them, as the author himself acknowledges. It evokes a number of questions for further penetration into the basic premises that the process of Japanese government is comparatively well-established, that Japanese generally are highly socialized to accept its legitimacy, and that the changes now occurring so rapidly in Japan can be readily accommodated in an "advanced" society. The answers to questions such as these may hold the key to the future of the whole Japanese Left (and perhaps extreme Right) and the role of communism within it.

SOLOMON B. LEVINE
University of Illinois

NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

The Power Structure: Political Process in American Society. BY ARNOLD M. ROSE. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. 506. $8.50.)

Who Rules America? BY G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967. Pp. 184. $4.95.)

The Emergent American Society. BY LLOYD WARNER, ET AL. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. 667 $15.00.)

All three of these books are best read and regarded not as the efforts in social science they purport to be but rather as expressions of political ideology. To be sure, each bears respectable methodological hallmarks and all present the fruits of impressive empirical homework. Still and all, it is abundantly clear that in each case the authors had their conclusions well in mind before they began to search for materials that would support their points of view.

All writing on a subject such as power is bound to be ideological in that an author's selection—and omission—of illustrations and emphases will inevitably reflect his personal judgments about the quality of the society he is purporting to depict. To be sure, it usually remains for the reader to locate these moral premises: part of the fun of the game stems from the fact that certain cards are always kept face down.

Arnold Rose, who died shortly after completing his book, sets out to rebut and refute C. Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter. This is not really very difficult once you decide to depict the Mills-Hunter position as a simple-minded monolithism. It is ironic how much academic energy has been expended attempting to lay to rest these two stimulating but hardly research-worthy tracts. Nevertheless, to coin a paraphrase, it takes an ideologue to catch an ideologue. Rose's unstated opinion is that the United States is a pretty good place by any objective or comparative standard: the society is pluralistic, power is dispersed, and political influence is diffused throughout a vigorous population. In short, not much is wrong with the way things are. This position—not at all uncommon among political scientists—combines elements of liberalism and conservatism. That is to say, it supports a New Deal conception of the good society—more or less, a Hubert Humphrey view—with a liberal government in an essentially capitalist culture. However such an outlook is necessarily conservative if only because it has so much to defend. New Dealers are compelled to justify the existing contours of American politics and society, for that structure is in large measure a product of the policies to which they have long been committed. To suggest that almost three decades of this kind of government has still left the nation in a seriously unsatisfactory state would be to condemn one's own handiwork. Thus *The Power Structure* is, in these terms, an apologia for the America in which we now live. The status-quo is defined as democracy; and democracy is seen as suffusing the status-quo. It is instructive that an author of Rose's disposition saw fit to invest so much time and effort in attacking critics on his ideological left; yet it is understandable that he do so, as they are claiming that all his successes were in fact failures.

Professor Domhoff, in contrast, is a young man with no commitments to the policies or programs of the past. His mercifully slender volume purports to show than an intertwined circle—he prefers to call it a "class"—presides over the major instruments of power in American life. The book names names, draws lines of relationships, and concludes that a small and concerted group in fact rules America. Quite plainly, Domhoff considers that United States to be a most undemocratic and inequalitarian society; by his moral measure it is a hypocritical and decadent culture direly in need of thoroughgoing reform. However while he draws on and has much sympathy with the thinking of C. Wright Mills, Domhoff wears at least one of Rose's ideological blinders. For all his radicalism, he is temperamentally too much in the American grain to acknowledge that the power structure he is examining remains essentially capitalist in character. Hence his elaborate preoccupation with the people in high places, but hardly any attention to the institutional complexes which provide the chairs in which they sit.

My own judgment is that Rose's description of power in our national life is a very partial picture, having selected for empirical analysis only those areas where in fact a relatively broad and diversified series of publics participates in the making of policy. (No one, not even Paul Sweezy, has ever suggested that PTA's are puppets of a ruling class.) But Domhoff's assiduous mining of the *Social Registers* never comes to grips with the fact that the United States is a system built on private ownership, advanced technology, and a government which must necessarily expend most of its efforts reacting to conditions not of its own making. His problem is that he has no coherent conception of the macro-structure which elevates all the board-room types he enumerates. I am not suggesting that the answer is somewhere in Volume IV of *Capital;* however I would assert that until Domhoff and others like him begin to look at American power in its capitalist context, they will only be charting effects rather than causes. (Let me add that those of Rose's persuasion are convinced that capitalism disappeared between the break-up of the old Standard Oil Company in 1912 and the inauguration of Social Security in 1935. They have such an intellectual vested interest in the assumed irrelevance of Marx that it is too much to ask them to rethink their conclusions about that mode of perception.)

Finally, Warner's non-book—and a $15.00 non-book at that. The formula is of course familiar. First persuade yourself that you are qualified to delve into a very significant subject; next convince a foundation that you are the man to preside over a research project that will produce the definitive statement for our generation; and then proceed to spend lots and lots of money gathering lots and lots of facts. Here we are presented with fifteen chapters, by different authors, on churches and corporations, unions and universities, trade associations and government agencies. Literally thousands of questionnaires were sent out and their replies sedulously recorded. Some of the facts are quite intriguing. (For example, most religious associations have governing bodies with 50 or more members whereas most groups devoted to the advancement of education are presided over by boards having less than 20 members.) But the general conclusion is a non-conclusion: large and complex organizations in contemporary American society are large and complex. On first glance, it would seem that Warner and his colleagues are not infected with an ideological glaze. After all, no conclusion should be a sign of no ideology. But further scrutiny reveals that what we have here is not simply knowledge that has been produced by mechanical means: more important, the very substance of that knowledge has been shaped by the machines it has employed. Ideology is basically a manner of perceiving reality, and here the distorting lens is inherent in the method; for the Warner volume assumes that only information which can be secured by certain mechanical means is entitled to be regarded as reportable knowledge. Needless to say, this limits one's purview.

With all deference to Karl Mannheim, I do not believe that scholars can somehow raise themselves above the ideological smog which infects the senses of lesser men. But I do believe that we can do a lot more to understand the scope of our preconceptions and the limits they impose on our perceptions. I also have a hunch that if we were not so cautious about soiling our career credentials we might even preface our books by acknowledging our biases about the good, the true, and the beautiful. Certainly to continue to claim that we can immunize our writing from ideology is pretentious nonsense.—ANDREW HACKER, *Cornell University.*

Political Philosophy and Time. BY JOHN G. GUNNELL. (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1968. Pp. 314. $10.00.)

Plato's capacity to elicit writing of the highest quality from his commentators is instanced once more by Prof. Gunnell's *Political Philosophy and Time.* It is one of the wonders of intellectual history that given talent and sympathy, a scholar can be raised almost above himself by the force and beauty of Plato's dialogues. They infect the studious admirer with some measure of their own excellence: they insist that a man be at his absolute best when he responds to them, and they insensibly, mimetically, impart inspiration to him. Aside from Rousseau and Burke, it would be hard to think of any other political theorist who possesses this power of enchantment to nearly the same degree. Naturally, agreement or disagreement with Plato (or Rousseau or Burke) is not in question. Rather, it is a matter of honoring with attention imaginative genius wherever it appears. Gunnell's book is the fruit of such devotion.

His thesis is that ". . . political philosophy was at its inception, that is, with Plato, a reconstruction, on the level of conscious thought, of the vision of political order as a mediating space, a mesocosm, which would assimilate man to or integrate him with that which is most eternal and overcome historical existence, which in terms of the Greek experience meant essentially the fall from order." Long before the time of Plato, several ancient societies had achieved that "integration" by means of myth. Gunnell gives a chapter to Egypt and Mesopotamia. In each society, ". . . life is lived essentially in the 'present' . . . the 'future' exists only as a repetition of the 'past'; the uniqueness of events is not perceived, and temporal distance contracts into the present. . . . In mythic thought, change in the sense of becoming or the experience of unique events is sublimated in the concrete, recurrent, and spatially grounded rhythms of nature. . . . Primordial time is the time of cosmic creation, and the events narrated in the myth are continually made present and serve as archetypes which give meaning to experience. The unique event or act is meaningful only to the extent that it can be joined to an archetype. Here life moves not historically, but ritualistically between significant points in the cycle of nature and society. . . ." There is no sense of history as a continuous flow full of the possibility of novelty, either for good or bad; there is consequently no sense of individuality, no idea of the self, which is dependent on the sense of history.

Gunnell does not say why he assumes societies built on such myths survive unaltered for long periods of time. Were the myths sufficiently close to the needs of human nature, sufficiently "true?" Or, would *any* mythic orientation which enclosed the individual in a social system purporting to be regulated in accordance with the perceived order of nature have been adequate? Or, was it the *cunning* of social devices, made even more cunning by having the sanction of myth thrown over them, which accounted for the longevity of certain ancient societies? In any case, there the examples of Egypt and Mesopotamia were: they served as precursors, and perhaps as direct influences, on the later Platonic, non-mythic effort to abolish time, and with it, change, disorder, and decay. After examining the reluctance of the Hebrews to associate the rescue from time with a coherently articulated political society, and their consequent trust in God's ability to redeem them through the very workings of time, Gunnell reaches the heart of his book, three long and brilliant chapters on the Greeks.

First, Gunnell traces the attenuation of "the integral myth" in Greece. He takes up Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and a few other poets, and shows through them the steady growth in complexity of the Greek idea of time: a combination of historical and intellectual developments led to a common awareness of the inexhaustible potency which life has for ruining the social structures men laboriously build. The inherited integral myth proved powerless when faced with the ravages of time. Though the Greeks' idea of cosmic time was cyclical, their understanding of human time had a different pattern, the pattern of tragedy. Awe before the eternal yielded to the passion to perform those individual deeds of political and military greatness which earned immortality. The self became the world, though, to be sure, not the modern romantic self in all its depth and cultivated idiosyncrasy. But just as the self contained passional elements which drove men to aspire and hence to suffer, so it contained the divine element, an element of reason, at last fully recognized, which could serve as the basis for a new vision of order.

It fell to Plato, in Gunnell's account, to make a system out of Greek impulses to save men from "the futility of action" and constant political upheaval. Through reason, the philosopher could detect the underlying reason of nature and use it as the paradigm for social order. Reason would thus restore the unity of self, society and nature of the earlier mythic orientation, but now a unity founded on genuine knowledge, not merely dim intimations. Gunnell presents an extremely skillful and creative reading of the *Republic,* and then of the *Laws,* in the light of his general thesis. Of special interest is his sustained comparison of the *Republic* with the *Laws:* the latter book emerges as the culmination of Plato's obsession with the problem of order. A far less beautiful book than the *Republic,* it nevertheless is marked by an utterly serious practicality of purpose lacking in the *Republic.* Several themes stand out in Gunnell's book: the way in which the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus* provide the bridge between the cosmologies of the *Republic* and the *Laws;* the nature of the philosophical understanding which the higher office-holders in the *Laws* must have, as distinguished from that of the rulers in the *Republic;* the meaning of Plato's assertion that the polity of the *Laws* was "second best" in comparison to the ideal polity of the *Republic;* the change in Plato's use of the word, "law"; the meaning of Plato's concept of life as "serious play" in the polity of the *Laws.*

One's only complaint is that Gunnell does not deal with the major contention of Glenn R. Morrow's great book, *Plato's Cretan City* (1960), that the practices advocated in the *Laws* were heavily dependent on both contemporary Athenian practices, and the practices of the "ancestral" Athenian constitution. But that is only a small complaint. Gunnell has made a substantial contribution to the history of political ideas. In addition to that —I do not mean to say "more important than that"—he has shown that a reading of some of the major texts in political theory can be, without artifice or strain, perhaps even unintentionally, a substantial contribution to political science.—George Kateb, *Amherst College.*

Aus Nächster Nähe: Lebenserinnerugen. Vol. I. 1884-1927. *Mit der Kraft des Geistes.* Vol. II. 1927-1967. By Arnold Brecht (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967. Pp. 526, 496. DM 38 each.)

During the German war of liberation against Napoleon, Goethe, in the opening poem in his cycle *Der West-östliche Divan,* viewed the turmoil in western Europe with a total lack of engagement and urged his readers to flee these unpleasant realities "and in the purer east enjoy the air of sages." To many respectable Germans in the nineteenth century, this seemed sound advice, and they were encouraged by it to abstain from political activity —indeed, to regard politics as a distasteful and demeaning business with which a cultivated man would have nothing to do. "Politics," according to the popular saying, "destroys character." Essentially, of course, this was an irresponsible attitude; it left all effective power in Germany in the hands of people who could not be held accountable for the way in which they exercised it; and in the long run it had catastrophic results. It would be wholly appropriate, Arnold Brecht writes with an allusion to the lines quoted above, to compose an essay entitled "Goethe's Co-Responsibility for the World War."

For the first thirty years of his life, Brecht was himself—as he admits ruefully but with a certain nostalgia for lost pleasures and quieter times—a "Goethe-German." Thereafter, however, as if he meant to atone for his long abstention from it, politics became his life. From the birth until the death of the Weimar Republic, he was never far from the center of events; and when Hitler's takeover forced him to leave Germany, it was to the study of the political process that he devoted himself during his years at the New School for Social Research in New York, where, among other things, he wrote his brief memoir of the last days of the German republic—*Prelude to Silence* (1944) —and his magisterial study *Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought* (1959).

Now, in these two big volumes of reminiscence, Brecht tells the story of his years of active service in the Weimar Republic, and it is difficult to comment on his achievement without breaking out in a rash of superlatives. Written with a remarkable objectivity and a freedom from rancor that is rare in books by men who have been forced to leave their country, rich in reflection upon the structural defects of the democratic constitution and the personalities and policies of the men who tried to make it work or, alternatively, to destroy it, and presenting a not inconsiderable amount of new data on the political struggles of the 1920's and the permanent crisis of the years 1930-1933, this book will become required reading for all serious students of the period, and will doubtless, because of its wealth of anecdote, be mined assiduously by college lecturers.

The uniqueness of these recollections is to be explained in part by the position from which Brecht was able to view the early history of the republic. After completing his legal training and serving for brief periods as counsel in the Reichsjustizamt and the Office of Economics, his investigation of the war aims of the allied powers and his attempts to improve German propaganda with respect to claims in general brought his name to the attention of the last imperial chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, who, in October 1918, offered him a post in the Reichskanzlei. Here Brecht remained for the next three years, working under seven chancellors (Prince Max, Ebert, Scheidemann, Bauer, Hermann Müller, Fehrenbach and Wirth) and experiencing, and playing a role in, the abdication of the Kaiser, the revolutionary disorders of 1918 and 1919, the drafting of the constitution, the crisis caused by the Versailles peace terms, the Kapp *Putsch,* the loss of the democratic majority in the elections of June 1920 (which he calls the germ of death for the democratic system), the reparations debate, the murder of Matthias Erzberger, and the beginning of the policy of fulfillment.

His account of these events, and of the general history of these years, is that of an insider at the elbow of those making the decisions, and, even when the story he tells is well known, the vantage point throws new light upon it. From his notes of cabinet meetings in November 1918, for instance, we learn what the ministers of state were worrying about on the eve of the revolution that was to make most of their concerns irrelevant. We learn, from one who observed it himself, of the fearful impression that the murder of Rosa Luxemburg made upon Ebert, and of the frustration felt by the much-maligned Gustav Noske when he was compelled to rehabilitate the old military system because the working class refused to provide the volunteers who would have made possible the establishment of a new one. And we learn (with a surprised shock of recognition) of the cabinet's attempts to buttress federal authority, end the excesses of private justice, and strengthen the rule of law in the country by working for gun-control laws and the surrender of weapons. One of Brecht's special missions was to go to Munich in 1921 to urge the Bavarian police chief Pöhner to cooperate with the federal government in this policy; and it was in Pöhner that he encountered for the first time the political mentality that was to dominate Germany in 1933. "If any commie dog tries to take my gun away from me," Pöhner told him, "I'll put a bullet through his head."

Brecht left the Reichskanzlei in 1921 to become head of the division of political and constitutional matters in the Federal Ministry of the Interior. During his term there, Rathenau was assassinated, the French occupied the Ruhr, Hitler made his first attempt to seize power, and the country moved, by way of the Dawes Plan and the Locarno Treaties, into the period of stabilization. Brecht has comments on all of these matters, although his role in most of them was minor. (He is one of the few survivors of that period, he says, who does *not* claim to have a hand in the stabilization of the currency in 1924.) His real interest by this time was in the question of the relations between the federal government and the states. Because of ill-defined separation of powers, this had, on numerous occasions and particularly in 1923, caused major crises; and it was Brecht's belief that a basic reform was needed that would clarify the question of competence and at the same time rectify the gross discrepancy in the relative size of the various states. This question, which in his mind was one of life or death for the republic, continued to hold his passionate interest after he was dismissed from the Ministry of the Interior by a conservative government in 1927, because his views were too democratic, and had entered the Prussian service to become that state's representative on the Federal Council. Like many other proposals that might have strengthened the republic, *Reichsreform* was lost in the rush of events that overcame German politicians after 1930; but Brecht's analysis of the problem and the proposed solutions is highly instructive.

The most dramatic aspect of Brecht's official life came in 1932 when, after Papen's dissolution of the Prussian government on 20 July, he appealed to the highest court of the land for a ruling on the constitutionality of the action. Dismissed by Papen but reinstated by the court, he carried on the fight during the short period of Schleicher's chancellorship, only to have his hopes defeated, and to be deprived once more of his seat in the Reichsrat, after Hitler's accession to power. In his lively account of these events, he shows little respect for Papen, recalling Briand's comment on the gentleman jockey, that the longer he knew him the more he admired his horse; but he is clear in his own mind that it was this dilettante who made the first serious breach in the Weimar constitution (a view, incidentally, which he shared with Hitler who, in a war-time conversation, ironically thanked Papen for smoothing his path to power).

Brecht's portraits of the leading personalities of the period are almost invariably striking and always fair. The best, perhaps, are those of Erzberger, Rathenau, Wirth, Bruening, and particularly Otto Braun, the long-term prime minister of Prussia. Toward Hindenburg he is more charitable than most writers, feeling that he loyally defended the constitution as long as he recognized the issues at stake; but he feels that the Field Marshal's reelection in 1932 was a tragedy for the country and wishes that his own candidate, Dr. Hugo Eckener, had run in his place. With Stresemann, Brecht seems to have had no intimate contact, and the Foreign Minister remains an almost shadowy figure in these pages.

Brecht is not, however, a believer in the great man theory of history. In an interesting passage in his first volume, he talks of his friendship with Kurt Hahn, an assistant of Prince Max von Baden and later the founder of the Salem School in Baden and Gordonstoun School in Scotland. Hahn was always talking about the necessity of educating boys to be leaders, but his constant iteration of the word *Führer* worried Brecht. It was, after all, leaders that the "Goethe-Germans" wanted, to relieve them of political responsibility. Brecht himself wanted more engagement by more people on every level of politics in the interests of a healthy democracy.—GORDON A. CRAIG, *Stanford University.*

The Social Psychology of Organizations. BY DANIEL KATZ AND ROBERT L. KAHN. (New York: John Wiley, 1966. Pp. 498. $8.50.)

This book might well have been subtitled "A General Basis for the Study of Behavior in Political Systems." As far as I can judge and know the field, it comes closer than any other work to putting into one frame of reference an interrelated body of significant and powerful propositions about the central focus of (much) political study —how people behave in organizations.

The treatment is in terms of an *open systems meta-theory;* organizations are viewed—so far as I can see, almost always successfully and systematically—as in constant transactions with their environments, receiving inputs, transforming them, and transmitting outputs. "An open system is defined by its boundaries for the selective reception of inputs (a coding process) and for its typical transmission of outputs. It is further characterized by such properties as negentropy . . . feedback . . . homeostasis . . . equifinality . . . and differentiation." As Bennis says in reviewing the book in the *American Sociological Review,* "no other writers have used (open systems theory) in so systematic and radical a way . . . (In so doing), they have succeeded in removing some substantial roadblocks to further development (of organizational theory)."

For purposes of optimum use by political scientists, the book would have to be radically reorganized and revised; it is, after all, not addressed to our particular traditions; the writers are social psychologists, whose major focus is on industrial management. So far as I can guess, most political science adaptations would best start off with the seventh chapter on "the taking of organizational roles." Human organizations are defined as contrived entities, the structure of which *consists* of acts or events (rather than of physical properties; I found my own long standing concern about the effect of political "structures" upon outcomes greatly clarified by this open-system approach to organizations). Organizations, therefore, attain constancy and stability in terms of relationships between units, rather than in terms of units themselves. This constancy is provided by role expectations, the prescriptions and proscriptions held by members of a role set (the occupants of offices adjacent to a member within organizational space). Obviously, many role expectations are irrelevant to or run athwart the formal job descriptions. "The crucial point is that the activities which define a role are maintained through expectations of members of the role set and that these expectations are communicated or sent to the focal persons . . . Acts of role sending can be characterized in terms of such dimensions as magnitude, specificity, intensity, etc." They then proceed to show how the fit or lack of fit between the sent role and the received role may be due to such factors as differential relationships to the productive process, differential reward receipts, noise in the communications channels, etc.

Any review or summary of a book of this character is likely to be unjust or demeaning. This is so because a successful synthesis is, taken as a whole, substantially greater than any of its parts; and so whatever the reviewer selects for praise is, taken out of context, less impressive than within it. It happens that Katz and Kahn follow up the discussion of organizational role taking with what I regard as a very useful treatment of power and authority; summarized by itself, I do not know that it would immediately strike the reader as a great advance over everything in, say, March's *Handbook of Organizations* (Rand, McNally, 1966). But the precise point is that their treatment of power and authority is presented in general and carefully thought-out relationship to role episodes and to open systems analysis in general.

This is, of course, only a portion of what they offer; they provide, for instance, the clearest description and definition of policy decisions which I have seen. As the co-author of a book on *American Business and Public Policy,* (Atherton, 1963) I am glad finally to get some clarification on that very popular notion, "policy." Similarly, their treatment of communications in organizations seems to me to permit interpreting and generalizing a good many studies of political communications (including incidentally *American Business, etc.*).

I myself have used the book with satisfaction in a graduate seminar (at Berkeley) on interest groups; it helped make sense out of the loose notions of influence and pressure which help to confuse that topic. I also found the Katz and Kahn approach helped to clarify my own forthcoming discussion of The Job of Government Relations; Washington Representation (Bobbs Merrill, 1969). I expect to use the book in future seminars in Military Policy and in Problems of Undergraduate Social Science Teaching (in the latter case to help illuminate the organizational issues which teachers need to take account of in curriculum construction and course planning). Finally, I followed the ideas of Katz and Kahn (though I did not use the book itself) in a junior level second course on Administration (Michigan State U.) in order to relate the Case Studies in Public Administration to each other.

One of the reasons I did not use it as a text in this undergraduate course was its very wealth of ideas. On the fifth reading, I still find myself seeing new implications. Beyond that, non-psychologists will generally be discouraged by its vocabulary. And many readers will be thrown off by the fact that the carefully worked out, convincing examples are largely from the field of industrial management (plus, to be sure, some from university life and a few from hospitals, etc). The authors certainly are not as familiar on a day-to-day basis with state government, political campaigning, etc; and, unfortunately, many of the political examples they choose are (as compared with those from business) rather superficial. However, despite a somewhat negative first reaction to this latter circumstance, I have been able to see how examples from state and national government, comparable to those they cite from business, can be used to show the illuminating character of their theory, meta-theory, conceptions, and generalizations.

More objectionable is a kind of compulsive optimism, which at points Sinclair Lewis would have satirized. "Conflict" they tell us "clarifies." In Biafra? In La Violencia in Colombia? In border warfare in Scotland in 1400? In big city slum gang fights? A wider historical and anthropological perspective would have aided; most of the examples from outside the United States are from Western Europe, especially from Norway. Or, such theorists of tragedy as Thomas Hobbes and Niebuhr would have helped the writers to handle the fundamental problems of conflict and change; it is not surprising that in this otherwise extraordinary book, their attempt to tackle organizational change fails entirely to handle revolutionary or catastrophic situations. As with many other works —as with any textbook I can think of on American government—students need to be warned against the professional, middle-class, Western European-North American focus of the value assumptions and interpretations. But, unlike most American government texts, these writers supply a theory and meta-theory which permits correction in the light of incongruous data.

These reservations are important and should, since the volume ought to be recognized as classic, in any case be mentioned. But I am emphasizing them here, not in order to criticize the book negatively, but merely in order to point out some of the reasons the contribution Katz and Kahn have made has not been recognized in our field (and may not be so recognized) as quickly as it ought to be.—LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER, *Belmont, Mass.*

Contemporary Radical Ideologies. Totalitarian Thought in the Twentieth Century. BY A. JAMES GREGOR. (New York: Random House, 1968. Pp. 370. $5.95.)

It takes courage to devote another volume to the theoretical explication of totalitarian systems of government. Professor Gregor, whose *Survey of Marxism* (1965) was greeted with critiual acclaim, has that courage. He is also a professional philosopher, and the lucidity and severity one expects from men of his discipline stands him in good stead as he takes us over the well-trodden ground, beginning with the founding father, Hegel, on to Marx, Lenin, and the Leninists on the one hand, and to Croce, Gentile, and the fascist spokesmen on the other. Some readers might consider the treatment of the classical elitists (Mosca and Pareto) as "protofascists" too conventional; others will find the space allotted to Apartheid and to native African socialism (more than one fourth of the book) excessive. But the students of national socialism will welcome the addition of the little known figure of Ludwig Woltmann to the gallery of thinkers who informed and misinformed the mind of Adolf Hitler.

As a professional philosopher, the author chooses to remain "indifferent to the efforts made to explain empirically the advent and prevalence of any specific ideology and ideologies in general." (4) He is emphatic on this point: "Assessment of the validity of the various theories advanced to account for ideologies is not one of the obligations of critical social and political philosophy." (5) Only at the very end of his trail does Professor Gregor sufficiently relent to admit that "all radical collectivist movements represent a manifest radicalization of trends . . . increasingly apparent even in nontotalitarian states." He dutifully lists the well-known empirical facts: economic and political centralization and bureaucratization, the development of mass communications. Indeed, "some of the principal species traits of totalitarianism are already common to all industrially advanced countries . . . Without the rapid technological advance . . . totalitarianism would be impossible." (339)

But Professor Gregor does not rely on the usual distinction between terroristic and non-terroristic regimes. Instead, he prefers to contrast Western political pluralism and the one-party state which "fixes upon a *unique* community as the ultimate and fundamental source of values . . ." (327) That legitimation will be either class origin, or race, or the concept of the nation, and of these three "the nation has become the focal community of contemporary movements of solidarity . . ." (336). Not class: "the fundamental issue of our century is not the *ownership* of property but its *management*" (340), and we are told that "Leninist parties . . . have never succeeded in winning the allegiance of the proletarian class wherever there was a proletarian class to be won" (338),—a statement which students of French and Italian politics will find more difficult to accept than the observation that even in the Soviet fatherland of scientific socialism "the critical search for truth is the privilege of the elite." (332)

Hitlerism, based on the ideas of the racial folk and its leader, appears to be "unique insofar as it was apparently seriously committed to an intuitionist and mystical epistomology." (Ibid.) But only apparently so, for "one of the principal theses of this work will be that even radical social and political ideologies are in significant measure the products of reason, experience, and observation, and are, consequently, to some degree corrigible . . ." (vii-viii). Even national socialism comes under these headings. The conventional distinction between the pseudo-rational marxist and the intuitionist fascist versions of totalitarianism is boldly discarded and inverted. "The employment of myths or political formulas calculated to engender . . . the acquiescence to rule, is not irrational or transrational in itself." The fact that "the anomic masses . . . can be, and perhaps must be, lead through the manipulation of sentiment does not characterize a political strategy or the movement that employs it as irrational." (329) It is in *this* sense, then, that "all totalitarian or protototalitarian collectivisms share a constellation of diagnostic traits that makes them more nearly like each other than like any other system of government . . ." (337). They also share in over-all anticapitalistic tendency: "There is scant data . . . to support the thesis that the totalitarianism of the right, Italian Fascism or German National Socialism, is the 'creation' of large-scale capitalist interests." (341)

All this is presented as an "attempt to provide the exposition of radical ideologies without polemics . . . The essential function of this volume is the rational reconstruction of the justificatory arguments advanced to support radical ideologies." (ix) But something more than that emerges, something like a very personal conclusion: "In our own time it has become increasingly evident that fascism typifies the form that totalitarianism has taken and in all probability will continue to take during the twentieth century" (334), and since nationalism has proved, at least to the author, its superiority over the competing ideologies of class and race, it is Italian fascism that emerges as "paradigmatic of twentieth century totalitarianism . . . (336). Almost thirty years ago, Professor G. A. Borgese, then a refugee from Italy, proclaimed the same view in Thomas Mann's Princeton home. He asserted heatedly that Mussolini, not Hitler, was the more important, and more dangerous of the two dictators. When Mrs. Mann commented: Borgese, your Italian nationalism is showing!" the distinguished antifascist author was not amused.
—James H. Meisel, *The University of Michigan.*

The Logic of Choice: An Investigation of the Concepts of Rule and Rationality. By Gidon Gottlieb. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968. Pp. 188. $5.95.)

This is a book on what judicial decision-making *is* and, to a lesser extent, what it *ought* to be. It is written from an analytic jurisprudence point of view by a professor of legal philosophy at the New York University Law School. The book is related to the writings of Llewellyn, Cardozo, and Frank but is more closely related to Hart, Austin, and Wittgenstein. It clearly illustrates the great concern shown for detailed definitions, conceptual schemes, and the use of words by analytic legal philosophers as contrasted to generalizing about judicial behavior from numerous specific instances.

According to Gottlieb, the essence of judicial decision-making, at least at the appellate level, is reasoning with rules. Such reasoning consists of a *process of deliberation* arising out of a set of *relevant facts* designed to arrive at a *decision* governed by procedural and substantive *rules* which are based on certain *purposes* (ch. 3). Subsequent chapters are devoted to defining each of these basic elements ending with a discussion of rationality or good reasoning. Once the facts and rules are given, the process of deciding is essentially deductive (ch. 5). Determining what facts are relevant depends on the substantive and procedural rules and purposes (ch. 4). Likewise determining the rules or precedents depends on the facts in the precedent cases, the rules pre-existing the precedent cases, and the purposes upheld by the courts (ch. 6). To interpret an ambiguous rule involves looking at its language, intent, anticipated appellate decisions, the reasonable man's common sense, and free discretion (ch. 7). To decide between conflicting rules requires looking to the purposes behind the rules (ch. 8).

Where purposes conflict, Gottlieb takes a position between Black and Frankfurter (ch. 10). He (like Black) advocates making an absolutist interpretation of the Constitution or other relevant fundamental document rather than weighing or balancing the values involved. If, however, there is no fundamental document relevant to the dispute, he (like Frankfurter) advocates strict judicial restraint relative to the legislative. Gottlieb also seeks to escape down the middle of the law and morality conflict by emphasizing how reasoning from rules applies equally to legal rules and moral rules and by emphasizing how moral rules tend to be part of the purposes behind legal rules (ch. 9).

In deciding between conflicting facts, rules, or purposes, Gottlieb recognizes the importance of attempting to predict the impact of the alternatives on the parties, society, and future cases (ch.

5 and 11). He does not, however, recognize the role that social science can play in testing generalizations about the impact of alternative behaviors on subsequent attitudes and behaviors. He goes so far as to say (p. 22): "It is clear that reasoning with rules is manifestly non-scientific. There is nothing testable about a decision, for the consequences which it may occasion can themselves be evaluated only in non-empirical terms." In reality most consequences are really means and can thus be evaluated in terms of their observable ability to achieve other consequences. Intuitive acceptance is only necessary in the rare situations where ultimate consequences or purposes are involved.

Likewise Gottlieb impliedly recognizes subjectivity in proving facts, but he fails to recognize the subjectivity of choosing among conflicting facts, rules, or purposes when he dismisses Jerome Frank by saying (p. 53): "A defective mode of proof does not impair the rationality of the process of reasoning on the basis of the facts proved and believed." One does not have to be a Marxist to recognize the importance of class identification and orientation in shaping the legal reasoning process among different judges in many situations where there are conflicting facts, rules, or purposes.

In his initial and concluding chapters, Gottlieb defines rationality or good reasoning in terms of reasoning procedure rather than in terms of the relation between consequences and purposes. Thus a judge is deciding rationally if his reasoning is governed by the relevant facts, rules, and purposes as determined by the above-described procedures. The alternative would be to say a judge is deciding rationally if the consequences of his decision are in conformity with his purposes. Social scientists including political scientists can thus contribute to making judicial decision making more rational by testing generalizations as to the nature of the purposes of judges and the public and the nature of the social conseqences of alternative decisions.—Stuart S. Nagel, *University of Illinois.*

The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, By Shlomo Avineri. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Pp. 269. $8.50.)

As the author himself remarks, yet another book on Marx may be difficult to justify. Not so, however, with this one. In addition to its substantive contributions, of which more below, Avineri's concise and thoughtful explications of Marx's basic ideas will serve general readers and beginning students alike as one of the more lucid available interpretations of a complex subject. Professional scholars are no doubt perfectly competent to deal with Marx's specialized and archaic philosophical vocabulary, but many novices will surely be thankful for Avineri's clear explanations of seemingly arcane passages, like the following from the early writings: "Subject and predicate [in Hegel's philosophy] have, therefore, an inverted relation to each other; a *mystical subject-object,* or a *Subjectivity reaching beyond the object,* the *absolute subject* as a process of self-alienation and of return from alienation into itself, and at the same time of reabsorption of this alienation, the *subject* of this process; pure, *unceasing* revolving within itself."

The author's primary aim, of course, is to provide more than a clear rendering of the complexities of Marx's thought. He has designed this book as a contribution to the historic and continuing debate over what in that thought is vital—humanism, determinism, liberalism, authoritarianism, neurosis, prophecy, social myopia, or whatever. He believes, and many scholars will concur, that the debate has been slanted by distortions flowing from diverse political objectives and academic vogues. Thus we now have Marx à la Engels, Lenin, Lukacs, Hook, Sartre, Calvez, Cornu, Fromm, Tucker, and others. Europeans quote Marx to criticize the Soviet Union, Americans reconstruct Marx to condemn Communism, and the New Left revives Marx to berate the Establishment. The result, according to Avineri, is that partisan exegetes have upset the inner balance of Marx's thought, especially by distinguishing sharply the young from the elder man, and we have thereby lost sight of much of the unity and fundamental harmony of the principles he espoused. *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* seeks simply to restore the balance, to rescue Marx from both his friends and enemies.

Avineri's substantive and polemical accomplishment, then, is his closely reasoned and carefully documented argument that the bulk of what Marx said and wrote remains consistent throughout. His rationale is intricate, covers two hundred and fifty pages, and cannot be summarized with justice here. But two major points of emphasis do deserve mention. The first is the transformative method, which Marx borrowed from Feuerbach and used to upend Hegel. Avineri shows how this philosophical device is first expounded in the early writings and then woven into later works. Employed as a critical tool, it provides the constant framework of inquiry which generates Marx's early interest in alienation and later concern with economics. Secondly, Avineri devotes several chapters to Marx's views on *praxis* and revolution, tracing them through a variety of sources including the early writings, the *Manifesto,* Book III of *Capital,* letters, speeches, and works on the mid-century revolutions and the Paris Commune. In these sources, according to the author, the founder of Marxism-Leninism maintained that the historical consciousness of the proletariat, and an increasing degree of managerial control of industry, will develop dialectically. Where the two trends merge, capitalism will gradually transform itself into socialism without the midwifery of either a conspiratorial Communist Party or a Jacobin-style paroxysm of violence. That is to say, Marx never really abandoned his early humanism to a harsh materialistic determinism.

This reviewer thinks Avineri's interpretation of Marx a good one, cogently and persuasively argued, never unreasonable or dogmatic. If it stimulates a re-evaluation of Marx, as the author hopes, so much the better. Others no doubt will research the enormous bibliography of writings by Marx, his disciples and students, and deploy a different combination of key quotations in order to contradict Avineri's findings. Their conclusions will not decisively refute his, however, for it is in the nature of such inquiry that while facts are readily procured, their meaning in totality cannot be definitely ascertained. Meanwhile, even scholars who question the book's broad theme of consistency will profit from scores of well-informed and perceptive comments on important extant interpretations ranging from Kautsky, Weber and Lenin to Calvez, Cornu, Meyer, Tucker, and Lichtheim.—DAVID M. RICCI, *Pennsylvania State University*.

America's Political Dilemma: From Limited to Unlimited Democracy. BY GOTTFRIED DIETZE. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. Pp. 298. $7.95.)

From the preface to the last chapter of his book, Gottfried Dietze asserts and reasserts the argument that the expansion of American democracy in the twentieth century has resulted in the undermining of constitutionalism, free government and individual liberties. Embracing the values of the Federalists, he is at a loss to understand how any departure from their political philosophy could rationally be construed as anything less than tragic. The wisdom and insight of Madison, Hamilton and Marshall are contrasted to the naive and foolish views and actions of men such as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy. One cannot but admire the author's boldness and directness in presenting a position that will find few adherents. Unfortunately, his argument is supported neither by reason nor fact.

On the topic of economic rights, he states: "When American popular government, traditionally favoring the individual, became one favoring the masses, when the United States came to be considered a democracy rather than a republic, the ethnical melting pot was complemented by a federal one in which the protection of economic rights melted away." (Pp. 73-4). In a typically Federalist manner, Dietze assumes that a government that expands the economic rights of "the masses" also undermines the rights of "the individual" (presumably the natural aristocracy) and thus departs from the Constitution and "free government."

It is no surprise that he believes also that the recently passed civil rights statutes are basic deprivations of individual freedoms and contrary to the Constitution. Overlooking the fact that there is no freedom of contract clause in the Constitution, he asserts, "Freedom of contract is one of the foremost American liberties." (p. 132). In erroneously thinking that civil rights statutes prohibit prejudice (they prohibit discrimination) he declares that, "Although prejudice should not be promoted, it should be permitted out of respect for the dignity of man." (p. 136).

In Professor Dietze's view, the Supreme Court has abdicated its role as guardian of the Constitution since, during the past thirty years, it has not had "the courage to seriously challenge [the] majority" by invalidating laws which regulate economic activities. The fact that during the same period the Court held eighteen Congressional statutes, or parts thereof, unconstitutional on the grounds that they infringed personal liberties safeguarded by the Constitution does not impress Dietze. Clearly, he and the Court fundamentally disagree on the relative importance of economic and human rights. An equally clear difference between Dietze and the Court is that the latter makes a reasoned argument for holding to a double standard while Professor Dietze makes none.

Because strong presidents are inclined to favor regulation of property, Dietze advocates an amendment that would restrict presidential tenure to one term of office. He believes that if Hamilton lived today, he too would favor a weak presidency. He concludes his indictment of what he considers to be the excesses of democracy with a discussion on foreign policy. If postwar presidents had not been under pressure from public opinion, the United States, he argues, would have rightly gone well beyond a policy of containment of the Soviet Union. In his view a showdown with the Soviet Union would have cleared the air.—PETER BACHRACH, *Temple University*.

The Function of "China" in Marx, Lenin, and Mao. BY DONALD M. LOWE. (Berkeley University of California Press, 1966. pp. 200. $5.00.)

Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism. BY MAURICE MEISNER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. 326. $4.95.)

The two books under review have much in common. Both were written by intellectual historians who exhibit a firm grasp of Marxist-Leninist theory in general. Both are well-written and thoroughly documented. Both have a theoretical orientation representing a promising direction in China scholarship.

The two books neatly complement one another in illuminating the "function of 'China'" in Marx, Lenin, Le Ta-chao, and Mao Tse-tung. They document, at the same time, a shift of focus from Eurocentric to Asiatic (Chinese, to the exact) Marxism. Professor Meisner's sweep is necessarily narrower than Professor Lowe's, but the former painstakingly draws a consistently informative picture of a major figure in Chinese Communist history and of the Chinese intellectual situation at the turn of the century.

Towe's central concern is "the correlation of the changing ideas of China with the changing Marxist unity of theory and practice in different, changing situations" (pp. xiii-xiv). Successively and systematically, he gives an exposition of the intellectual situation in Western Europe, Russia, and China and relates each to emerging theory in Marx, Lenin, and Mao, respectively.

Marx inherited from his intellectual predecessors an image of China as a despotic, reactionary, and static society. The image was gradually transformed into a view of China as caught up in the vast process of universal history. This change was due to Marx's interpretation of the opium war as having introduced capitalism into China, having ended China's isolation, and having made her a part of the international capitalist market. This argument, as Lowe points out, contradicted the materialist interpretation of history and the view of change as instigated by internal forces, rather than being externally induced. Marx further anticipated that the Taiping rebellion in China would lead to an economic crisis in England, since the rebellion would inevitably bring about a disruption of the Chinese economy on which the British economy in part rested. Indeed, Marx predicted that China would precipitate a general European crisis, a series of revolutions on the continent. In his Eurocentrism, in short, Marx was concerned with China not in its own right but in its relation to Europe.

Lenin's conception of China was ancillary to his constant endeavor "to correlate Western-oriented theory and Russian-preoccupied practice," to identify "Russia's equivalence to the West" (passim). Before the abortive Russian revolution of 1905, Lenin subscribed to the prevalent image of China (and "the East" generally) as stagnant, reactionary, and despotic. After the 1905 revolution, and particularly after the October Revolution, Lenin began to see the East as changing, moving, revolutionary. In his quest for a revised model of the Marxian revolution, the East suddenly became "politically alive" (p. 67). World War I, Lenin believed, had dragged the East and all colonial and semicolonial countries into the world revolutionary process. He developed his well-known strategy of the dual revolution in colonial and semicolonial countries, a strategy that permeated the revolutionary movement in China.

The first major step toward the Sinification of Marxism was taken by Li Ta-chao, who was an ardent nationalist, the first important Chinese intellectual to declare his support for the Russian October Revolution, and the foremost interpreter of Marxism before Mao. Li's intellectual development—from preoccupation with the Chinese classics, to exposure to Western philosophies (particularly Bergson's voluntarism and Emerson's transcendentalism), to conversion to Marxism, to the advocacy of a peasant revolution in China—is carefully detailed by Meisner. Born in 1888 and secretly executed in 1927, Li is now honored by the CCP as its true founder and greatest martyr. Li became chief librarian at Peking University in 1918, in which capacity he influenced his young assistant, Mao Tse-tung.

Throughout his intellectual development, Li subscribed to a mystical vision of an imminent global regeneration in which China played a central role, a vision that was reinforced by the October Revolution. China was a "proletarian nation," which although lacking the economic base for socialism, was ready for a Marxist revolutionary movement; she would join the forces of world proletariat because China as a nation had suffered under international capitalism. Li's populism made it easy for him to support the Communist alliance with the KMT in 1923; in fact, he became the only Communist member of the KMT presidium.

Though strong, Li's populism showed reservations toward the urban proletariat. Thus, after the failure of the CCP-KMT alliance, Li was among the first to turn his attention to the peasantry and the countryside. As early as 1919 he had called upon the Chinese youth to go to the villages in order to liberate the peasants as a revolutionary force. In a 1925 article on "Land and the Peasants" (highly suggestive of Mao's "Hunan Report") Li assigned the peasantry the central role in a communist revolution in China.

This strategic modification of doctrine became a key factor in Mao-Tse-tung's thoroughgoing Sinification of Marxism. Mao became progressively disillusioned with the efficacy of the Soviet model for China and he increasingly stressed the unique features of the Chinese situation. Mao retained the nationalist and populist ideas of Li but he was a far more astute student of Lenin than his mentor. Li did not appreciate the pivotal role of the

Communist party in organizing and leading the peasants. He did not fully perceive the importance of military organization and military activity. And he did not see the unity of peasant revolutionary activity in the countryside and proletarian revolutionary activity in the urban centers.

These two books represent a step in the right direction in China scholarship—a move toward a theoretical approach to an understanding of communism in China. The studies of China—as the early studies of the Soviet Union—have been overburdened with descriptive and historical detail, Franz Schurmann's brilliant *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (1966) being a major exception. What is needed is a more conceptual treatment of China as a type of communist regime—the kind of treatment now well under way in Soviet studies and best exemplified in the work of Alfred G. Meyer and Robert C. Tucker, among others. It is time, in short, to begin the crucial task of incorporating the mass of available data into a theoretical structure for the study of Communist China in the context of the comparative study of communist political systems.—MOSTAFA REJAI, *Miami University*.

Bolingbroke and His Circle: the Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole. BY ISAAC KRAMNICK. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 321. $6.95.)

This book should do much to disabuse students of political thought of the notion that Augustan England was, as dismissed in Sabine's classic guide, "a period of quiescence or even of stagnation." For, in seeking to determine reasons for the Bolingbroke-Walpole feud—and the appeal of the former, reputedly a *philosophe,* to later Tories, Professor Kramnick bares an ideological division in English political life in the years from Locke to Hume. The struggle betwen Walpole's government and Bolingbroke's opposition did not, he finds, turn mainly upon a concern with the dignity and emolument of public office; more importantly, it involved a clash of different sets of ideas about society and politics. Thus the central figure of this study emerges, not as a mere opportunist inventing principles to suit the exigencies of the moment, but as the "full-blown spokesman" of gentry discontent with basic social assumptions "from which he never wavered" (p. 37).

The author interprets Bolingbroke's political attitudes, and those of his coadjutors—principally Swift, Pope, Gay, and Lyttleton, as, in a negative way, "inextricably bound" to the financial revolution of 1690-1740. The Viscount assailed the new world of liberal capitalism—endorsed and, in part, sponsored by Walpole's regime—because, in corrupting political life and undermining a traditional society, it was threatening the fundamental constitutional balance. Here, Bolingbroke is seen as a "frightened Harringtonian" who knew that, with the rise of moneyed and decline of landed property, the law of the balance, which had elevated the gentry-led Commons and perfected the Tudor constitution, now militated against nobility, gentry, and family. Yet he abandoned Harrington for Machiavelli in "the summation of his political writings and career" (p. 163), and looked to a great man, above politics, to again restore the constitution and reform a corrupt society. "The *Patriot King,* the great testament of Bolingbroke's Opposition," Kramnick concludes, "explains . . . the movement's failure . . . Bolingbroke, because of his . . . obsession with morality, example, and the just ruler, befuddled his institutional insights" (p. 168).

To support his claim of an Augustan ideological conflict, the author compares positions in the Bolingbroke-Walpole confrontation. In almost all areas, they are seen as opposed. Bolingbroke, e.g., used traditional Whig conceptions of the past to argue, against—paradoxically—Tory interpretations in the Walpole press, that 1688 had but restored and renewed the liberties of an immemorial constitution; he challenged Locke because the latter, "given the official stamp of the government and the Whig Establishment" (p. 117), was being used to negate the institutions and values of a 'genuine' polity; he rejected Walpole's two-party-struggle view of politics and distinguished between a faction (the 'anti-constitutional' Whig regime) and a national 'party' (his 'constitutional' opposition); and he espoused the right of constituents (reflecting the national consensus) to instruct their delegates (being corrupted by the ministry and moneyed interest) while Walpole's apologists denounced the radical theory of representation. Thus is explained Bolingbroke's role as both conservative and 'populist' spokesman for the declining gentry, and his appeal to later Tories—and radicals.

Professor Kramnick's is, on the whole, an excellent book—erudite, penetrating, and extremely well-written. But, while his knowledge of Bolingbroke is most impressive, when he moves away from the fulcrum of his inquiry, he is, in places, on somewhat less sure ground. Defoe is a case in point. To credit his "huge literary output" with consistently liberal views and then assert that *all* that he wrote "paid tribute to the ideas, institutions, and society . . . over which Walpole presided" (pp. 188-189) needs explaining. On one side, Defoe clearly "embodied the projecting spirit" (p. 193). Yet his was a bifocal mental outlook; he, too, could, on occasion, condemn the 'villainy' of projecting and stockjobbing, attack the big companies for various forms of 'knavery' including 'parliament-jobbing,' and demand corrupt-practices legislation. And, rather than being mere popularizations of Locke (p. 189), his *serious* views on the origins of government are closer to Bolingbroke's. Both, e.g., saw family groups as the fundamental units in a pre-political condition, landed property as the basis of legitimate power, the state as formed by an association of families, and the contract as between people (family heads) and prince. Furthermore, both scored party government. Finally, the author's ignoring of Defoe as a link in the revival of the radical theory of representation (pp. 169-174, 243-250) is perplexing; for, in his prime, he was the foremost exponent of the theory—and of the doctrine of the 'original power' of the people (both flatly rejected by Walpole). All of this, Defoe's and Swift's simultaneous counseling of the same minister (Harley), and Defoe's service, in 1713-1714, to Bolingbroke himself (on the *Mercator*) suggest that the total Augustan ideological situation was even more badly tangled than is conceded in the last chapter ("The Ambivalence of the Augustan Commonwealthman") of this valuable study.—James V. Elliott, *Tufts University*.

The Origins of Modern African Thought: Its Development in West Africa During the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. By Robert W. July. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 480. $10.00.)

It is with a great deal of interest that one picks up a book which sets out to examine the origins of modern African thought—a subject of considerable relevance and interest at the present time. Professor July suggests that modern Africa has been shaped largely by "two of her most recent invasions," Islam in the mid-seventh century and the "scientific-technological revolution introduced from Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century." (p. 15) Of these two major influences the author chooses to examine the latter in detail since "the more recent arrival of western scientific-technological thought seems more completely to have influenced the institutions and ideas of the modern states of mid-twentieth-century Africa." (p. 15) The geographic emphasis of the study is the West Coast of Africa, in particular the areas of what are now Senegal, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana, and Nigeria.

The focus on *origins* of modern African thought poses serious problems for Professor July. He does not tell us how he wishes to use the term. On the basis of the author's Preface (and especially the book jacket) we are led to assume that he means "origin" in the sense of the source or determinants of modern African thought. We expect that the author will set out these themes and show us the links between nineteenth and early twentieth century thought and modern African thought. Except for a brief effort in the Epilogue, we are destined to disappointment. By "origin" it appears that the author means that which came before the modern period. If he means more than this, it is not evident in his presentation or analysis.

Professor July devotes the major part of his effort to an examination of the thought and writing of important West African thinkers and activists. All of these men had at least a limited "western" education and had accepted the legitimacy and to some extent the necessity of British and French influence in Africa. Some, such as Paul Holle and Blaise Diagne, regarded the contact with Europe as providing the means for the betterment of Africa. Indeed we see the paradox of Africans like Holle and Abbé Boilat viewing with disdain the efforts of Frenchmen like Governor Faidherbe to study and guard local customs. In sharp contrast, other Africans like Edward Blyden were concerned about the maintenance of African values and the debilitating influences of much of what came with the benefits of external contacts.

Some of the studies of these early thinkers and writers are very well done, showing great sensitivity and understanding. It is here that *The Origins of Modern African Thought* makes a significant contribution. A number of important conflicts become clearer—that created by the contact between relatively highly modernized societies and non-modernized societies; the disruptive influences as well as the contributions of western education and religion; the identity crises of those torn between traditional ties and a strong attraction to foreign ideas and religions, and their often torturous efforts to justify and come to grips with their new roles. Men like Bishop Crowther tried to resolve some of these conflicts in arguing (in his early writings) for a synthesis of European ideas, Christian teaching, and indigenous African customs (p. 187).

These studies of West African thinkers also contribute to an understanding of the diffusion of ideas along the coast of Africa, especially the major influence of the slaves returned to Sierra Leone who later moved up and down the coast, and the strong assimilationist influences of both the French and English.

Unfortunately the studies of individual thinkers are of a varying quality. All too often we are at a loss to know what the author thinks and why he deems a particular writer worth quoting or sees his work as significant. Can we accept what "X" says as valid? We are seldom told. What was his contribution to modern African thought? Often one must guess. Only two paragraphs, for example, are devoted to "the significance of Africanus Horton" at the end of a chapter on his work. In addition, the way in which secondary sources are used is often confusing. We find statements like this:

"Everywhere Christian worship became standard, and European schooling was much sought after. . ." (p. 131). While I do not think that Professor July believes this as a general statement in the light of what he says elsewhere, comments such as this one are confusing at best. Again and again we are confronted with the problem of lack of definitions. The author talks about "the modern African mind" (p. 22), the "unusual turn of the Gallic mind" (p. 28), or English and French "national character" (p. 30), without ever specifying what it is that differentiates them from each other. To understand their influences we must first know what they are.

The importance of the individual thinkers studied in this book is not questioned here. What is generally lacking, however, is a systematic effort to relate their activity to modern African thought and to set out general themes which ought to emerge from this study. As it is, we can only infer many of the author's conclusions. We must ourselves draw most of our conclusions from the material—sadly, without the benefit of the extensive and impressive work that went into the preparation of this study. Perhaps as political scientists we are asking too much of Professor July who is an historian speaking no doubt to an audience consisting largely of historians. Yet in this instance, I think we are not. The author sets out to examine origins, the relationship of the contact between individuals in societies with fundamentally different ideas and traditions, and the influence of western ideas on modern thought in Africa. It is in the analysis of these questions that the work is most deficient.

In short, this study is of uneven quality. At times the author shows considerable sensitivity and insight, at other times he is oblique and lacking in clear analysis. Despite its shortcomings, *The Origins of Modern African Thought* will be useful as a reference work for those interested in the political thought and influence of nineteenth and early twentieth century West African thinkers who had extensive contact with the West.—FRED M. HAYWARD, *University of Wisconsin.*

Freud: Political and Social Thought. BY PAUL ROAZEN. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968. Pp. 322. $6.95.)

The author notes at the outset that a theory of human nature has been an integral part of political philosophy throughout its entire history. In the *Republic,* for example, Plato offers not only a theory concerning the nature of the human psyche but also (books VIII and IX) the first social psychology in Western thought. Very little of subsequent political philosophy is as explicit as Plato is on this point, but the theme is never entirely absent and is always of fundamental importance.

Although the significance of the theory of human nature is quite obvious, it is often overlooked or not fully appreciated in writings on political philosophy. Periodic reminders are thus not inappropriate, and Professor Roazen's book ought to be welcomed on this account. Nothing in twentieth-century Western thought can rival Freudian theory as an original contribution to the historical concern with the problem of human nature; it follows that no serious work in political philosophy can fail to come to terms with Freud's thought. Professor Roazen has attempted to remind us of this fact and to show in systematic fashion the relevance of Freudian theory for present-day work in the social sciences.

The author's main contention in this book is that Freud's work has been divided into two distinct strains: the clinical tradition on the one hand, which concentrates on a narrow therapeutic approach, and social theory on the other, which puts exclusive emphasis on Freud's metapsychological writings and neglects his clinical contributions. Prof. Roazen argues that this situation is detrimental to both psychoanalysis and social theory, and especially to the latter; he writes (p. 19) that it is "impossible to understand these late social and political speculations of Freud's without fitting them into the context of his theories of clinical psychoanalysis." By examining Freud's clinical writings Prof. Roazen tries to demonstrate that Freudian theory can supply a vital ingredient for social science: a "systematic notion of human motivation" and a theory of the human personality.

By far the most valuable part of this book for political scientists is the section (pp. 59 ff.) dealing with an application of the insights afforded by psychoanalysis to the research techniques widely used at present in political science. Prof. Roazen shows that, if the data gathered in questionnaires and surveys and in the analysis of political behavior (e.g. voting) is evaluated without the sophistication in the understanding of human motivation made possible by psychoanalysis, such empirical studies are likely to be of little value. Since much effort is currently invested in these studies, his challenge is quite important. Unfortunately his discussion of this point is too brief, and one would hope that the author would publish a more extensive account of this topic in the future.

Certainly further pursuit of this aspect of Prof. Roazen's analysis is necessary for political science. But the main contention of this book is more problematical. He wants to rescue Freud from mistreatment by philosophers and metaphysicians who, he claims, have distorted Freud's work by emphasizing his metapsychological theories and ignoring his clinical writings. He does not only want to restore the balance, but to reverse the priority of attention; and he argues that "clinical psychoanalysis has a logical independence from Freud's own social theories" (p. 112).

It is hard to know just which philosophers and metaphysicians the author has in mind in making this indictment, for he does not mention any names. In fact much creative work has been done in applying psychoanalytic conceptions to social theory, even by philosophers. Outstanding examples are: some of Wilhelm Reich's writings, studies by individuals associated with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Herbert Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* and his essays in the volume *Freud und der Gegenwart,* and Norman O. Brown's *Life Against Death.* The interpretations of Freud by Brown and Marcuse are just the opposite of Prof. Roazen's. They maintain that Freud's metapsychological inquiries cannot be separated from his earlier clinical work: "the psychoanalytic theory of therapy has to be a theory of culture" (Brown); "Freud's theory of civilization grows out of his psychological theory" (Marcuse). As a result Brown and Marcuse have been able to indicate quite clearly the interconnections between Freudian theory and the traditional concerns of social theory. If Prof. Roazen thinks that they have done Freud a disservice, he ought to show us where they have gone wrong.

One cannot establish the "logical independence" of Freud's earlier and later work by quoting his private comments expressing dissatisfaction with his metapsychological efforts or by suggesting (p. 102) that Freud's later writings represent his attempt to "stave off his own personal disintegration" by "appealing to society through social theory." What is required is a much closer examination of the texts. Such an examination reveals a great many complexities and indeed difficulties—for example, in the problem of the relationship between the individual and society; but that is what makes the study of Freud so valuable for the political theorist.—William Leiss, *University of Saskatchewan, Regina.*

Democracy's Dilemma: The Totalitarian Party in a Free Society. By Benjamin E. Lippincott. (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1965. Pp. 293.)

Professor Lippincott's main thesis is that the presence of a "totalitarian" party in a "free" society poses no genuine dilemma for democratic political theory. The Communist Party in western countries is not a *bona fide* party according to the author, but a revolutionary conspiracy masquerading as a party. As such it stands outside the pale of liberal politics, especially as it would abrogate political pluralism and tolerance if it ever captured state power. Thus the problem of the CP in a liberal democracy is never one of freedom of speech of individuals, but rather a problem of illegal action by a conspiratorial association. As a consequence, the Communist Party has no moral right to exist and can be outlawed or otherwise controlled without involving democratic theory in self-contradiction. What specific measures are taken against the Party is a matter of mere expediency, having no implications for the civil liberties of genuine democrats.

A subsidiary argument of Lippincott's seeks to demonstrate that the failure of democratic theory to recognize the "true" nature of the Communist Party and the liberals' preoccupation with rights and disregard of duties have impaired the ability of democracies to withstand the internal and external onslaught of Communism. The third purpose of *Democracy's Dilemma* is to provide evidence of the democratic theoretical shortcomings by a survey of the writings of American and British socialist, liberal, conservative, and Catholic intellectuals and political leaders between 1917 and 1952.

The structure of the book reflects these three concerns. Lippincott opens with a short historical chapter purporting to demonstrate the awesome and evil power of Communism in America and to link it to the inappropriate scruples of liberal democrats whose paralyzing sense of an insoluble dilemma has prevented them from dealing with the situation self-confidently and with a good conscience. The following three chapters are devoted to a report on the results of an examination of 6,000 books and articles that deal (or at least might have dealt) with democracy's dilemma, and to an account of the position of traditional ("orthodox") liberals and so-called "realistic" authors. (The "realists," unlike the "traditionalists," recognize in the "totalitarian" party an agency for revolution which—given a chance—would deny the very freedoms on which it relies to promote its subversive aims.) Lippincott finds that only few writers dealt fundamentally with what he thinks is "the most crucial internal dilemma confronting democracy in the twentieth century." Forty-four American and British authors who did confront that "dilemma," however, receive more extensive treatment. The account of their arguments is reliable, fair, and unpolemical. These chapters—the distillate of a prodigious amount of reading—constitute a handy summary on an important subject and are the most valuable part of the book. The central core of Professor Lippincott's concern, however, is reached only in the following three chapters in which the traditionalist liberal view of the dilemma is severely criticized and the author's own thesis is presented according to which the suppression of "totalitarian" parties in democratic states does not involve democratic theory in self-contradiction. The work concludes with recommendations for meeting the danger of internal subversion by, and external threat from, the supposedly world-wide Communist conspiracy.

We can do here no more than merely suggest briefly some of the major difficulties that vitiate Lippincott's book. Underlying them all is the ideologically distorted view of the world as a battlefield on which the forces of Good (the "free" world) are locked in mortal combat with the forces of Evil (the centrally directed Communists, bent on enslaving mankind). Constrained by this mythology, Lippincott remains unaware of the ideological content and the role of the concept "totalitarianism" whose use blinds him to the differences between Fascism and Communism, and to the analytical distinctions between revolution and counter-revolution. Indeed, except for two peripheral comments (pp. 38 and 221f), there is no indication that Lippincott is aware of the dynamics of social revolution. On the contrary, much of his argument depends on the implicit judgment that the maintenance of the *status quo*, tempered by incremental reformism, is a good in itself which the United States has a moral commitment to uphold all around the globe, and that the world-wide forces of radical social change can be understood only as the agents and dupes of the Kremlin.

The reader will search in vain in Lippincott's book for a realistic analysis of the post-industrial state, or for an inkling of the pervasive crisis of confidence in liberal pluralism, in its compatibility with democracy, and in its capacity to organize a just and authentically free society. Rather, when Professor Lippincott speaks of "democracy," "free society," or "equality," these terms remain purely formal, devoid of any realistic content. He never defines freedom at all and confuses the notion of the correlative nature of rights and duties (which holds that the rights of one person create necessarily obligations in another person, and not, as Lippincott would have it, in the person claiming the rights) with a theory of contingent rights (which insists that the valid claim to a right depends on the fulfillment of certain conditions).

A more exhaustive review would have to question Lippincott's almost total disregard of the relevant Supreme Court decisions (Yates, Lightfoot, and Albertson are not even mentioned; Scales and Noto receive one footnote each); his dubious interpretation of the Dennis case (Lippincott sees no difference between the "clear and present danger" and the "grave and probable danger" doctrines); his failure to use the many recent studies on the politics of integration and the dynamics of economic development (indeed, of all the books cited, only twenty three were published after 1956, only twelve of them in the 1960's, and the most recent systematic political science source used is Duverger's *Political Parties* of 1959!); and Lippincott's parochial analysis of political parties. A more extended criticism would, finally, have to take issue with Lippinuott's unbalanced version of the history of the Cold War and with the numerous misjudgments concerning European, especially German and Austrian, political events of the interwar years; his disregard of important changes in, and profound divergencies among, Communist states; his very incomplete account of the role of revolution and violence in Marxist and Leninist theories; and his championing not only of the data developed by the House Un-American Activities Committee, but also of its record of "expos[ing] for the sake of exposure," without even mentioning the Watkins decision.—KURT P. TAUBER, *Williams College*.

The Revival of Democratic Theory. BY NEAL RIEMER. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962. Pp. 190. $2.25.)

The Democratic Experiment: American Political Theory. BY NEAL RIEMER. Vol. I. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967. Pp. 245. $2.85.)

Riemer's main purpose in *The Revival of Democratic Theory* is "to analyze the decline and to suggest a case for the revival of democratic theory." Drawing principally from the writings of Strauss, Easton, Brecht, Cobban, and Morgenthau, he adduces five reasons for the failure of political theory "to unify and undergird political science." All of this consumes some 17 pages. Next, he explores "democratic theory in particular" in light of the more general malaise that has overtaken political theory. He writes: "Democratic theory lacks a conceptual scheme which unites the values, facts, and policies of a democratic society. Consequently, a major task of the democratic theorist is to relate harmoniously the normative, empirical, and prudential components of democratic political life." This is a recurrent theme of the book and the very task to which Riemer devotes himself in the remaining chapters (3-7).

What is the function of the "prudential" component of political theory? In the main it serves "to harmonize the values relevant to the good political life *and* the empirical realities which inevitably affect our strivings to fulfill these values." What is the good life? It comes down to a "commitment to *individual realization within the framework of the common good*." There is some discussion and analysis of the perplexing questions that arise from such a formulation, though not nearly enough to guide an individual intent upon following Riemer's prescriptions. What is more significant at this juncture, however, is Riemer's evident concern to avoid being labelled an "absolutist" or one possessed of "THE TRUTH." On the other hand, he evidences a queasiness towards moral "relativism" (as perforce he must unless he wants to pull the cornerstone out of his entire enterprise). Whether he really negotiates this channel or not (we need not ask here the broader and more interesting question of whether any such "channel" exists) is certainly open to debate. Ultimately his commitment to his formulation of the good life is a matter of "reasoned faith."

In a chapter entitled "Umpiring the Struggle for Power," Riemer stresses the need for "democratic and constitutional accommodation" for the resolution of conflicts that inevitably arise in the body politic. Here we find a defense of majority rule in conjunction with a textbookish examination of the role and functions of American institutions—parties, the Presidency, the Supreme Court, and the Congress. The last of the substantive chapters deals with what Riemer perceives to be two of the major challenges confronting a modern democratic theory: "the lonely crowd and world disorder." There is a plea for a "theory of transition" which will guide underdeveloped countries, if they so desire, to move in the direction of becoming mature and stable democracies. We are informed that accommodation between the Soviet Union and United States is quite likely because the two powers "will in actuality move closer to the meeting ground of democratic socialism." The final and very short chapter repeats and expands upon the theme that "the seeming decline and apparent ineffectiveness of democratic political theory may be attributable fundamentally to the failure of political theorists to view theory as the harmonious relationship of its normative, empirical, and prudential components."

The Democratic Experiment represents the first of a projected "three volume study of the political theory of American Democracy." The "theme" of this volume "is the creative Democratic experiment in reconciling Liberty and Authority in a large state." Riemer sets out to deal with a number of recurrent problems in the "American political community." "What is the nature, and what are the uses, of political theory?" (We already know the answer to that question.) "To what extent are we captives of, or emancipated from, our inheritance?" "Does Puritanism produce the good political life?" "What has been, is, and should be the theory of revolution in democratic America?" "Is just republican government possible in a large state?" "Upon what principles can we build a strong and prosperous nation?" "How do we perceive the American vision?" To answer these and related questions Riemer examines—in seven chapters, a "Prologue," and an "Epilogue"—the writings of Roger Williams, Edmund Burke, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, John Marshall, John Quincy Adams, and, among others, Andrew Jackson. Chapter 2, "America's Inheritance: Two [the Judaic-Christian and British Constitutional] Traditions," is designed to give us some historical and theoretical background for a better understanding of the American tradition. The very scope of the book precludes detailed analysis here.

What can be said of these two works? If they were intended, and we cannot be at all sure of this given the claims made for them by the author, to be simply texts designed to introduce the undergraduate to some of the enduring problems associated with democratic and American political thought, then something positive can be said about them. *The Democratic Experiment* is comparable in scope and depth to the major texts in the American theory field, and the *Revival* volume does raise a number of salient questions and issues, so that it, too, is suitable for assignment in undergraduate courses that center on democratic theory and practices. Beyond this we cannot go. Neither volume advances the existing frontiers of thought in the realm of democratic or American theory. Surely one who can see fit to write "Locke, with superb common sense, sums up the best in Coke, the Levellers, and Harrington. He reaches back to Hooker, Aquinas, Cicero, and the best in the medieval and classical traditions. . . ." is totally unaffected by a vast corpus of scholarly literature that interprets Locke in a totally different way. And this is no small point, for a reassessment of Locke might well have served to change the thrust of Riemer's arguments, particularly those in *The Democratic Experiment*. Or one who views Jefferson's stance toward the Alien and Sedition Acts as libertarian (a) is probably wrong, but more importantly (b) glosses over a complex of issues that would lead us to a better understanding of the American tradition. Or, again, for one who claims that Madison ranks among the very best of our "modern political philosophers" but cannot conjure up intelligible reasons why Madison believed "rightful [rather than factional or "bad"] majorities . . . will normally have their way" in our extended republic (a crucial point in Madison's theory), certainly cannot be awarded any merit badges for either imagination or intensive theoretical analysis. And, finally, the presumed "revival" of democratic theory which was promised never materializes. The problems treated, as Riemer's footnotes and bibliography will amply attest, are not original or novel. All of them have been explored with greater sophistication and depth than we find in this particular volume. In fact, off of Riemer's own showing, we can only conclude that democratic theory was never—not until now, anyway—in a somnambulant state.—GEORGE W. CAREY, *Georgetown University*.

The Political Creature. By PETER ZOLLINGER. (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1967. Pp. 303, $7.50.)

Like some of the classics of political philosophy, Peter Zollinger's tract in political theory begins with the state of nature. This time, however, we start not from a jungle, whether nasty or idyllic, but from a negatively charged, dynamic, miniscule electron orbiting around a relatively huge, immobile proton. What is important about this primal state, if you will, is that in 1927 it was discovered by Heisenberg that it is impossible to isolate p (position) and q (momentum) of subatomic particles. The two are aspects of a single event, related in such a manner that the more precisely p can be obtained, the vaguer becomes q and vice versa.

According to Dr. Zollinger it is not merely the fact that the physical base of the universe is indeterminate that is critical to our fate as social and political man. Even more important is the principle derived by Niels Bohr in analyzing Heisenberg's findings, namely the principle of "complementarity," the fact that position and momentum were *complementary aspects* of a single unitary event, not separate realities. It is the universality of complementarity, the fundamental interdependence of everything with everything within any system from the microphysical to the macroscopic, which is the law that is the basis of all matter, both living and non-living, and is the force that has pushed the evolution of things from the hydrogen atom to our own civilization.

The author takes us on a journey, one almost wants to say a Space-Time Odyssey, through the negatively and positively electrically charged microphysical particles to the negative dynamic spermatozoon and positive, static ovum to static, immobile, protonic plants and dynamic, electronic animals. The journey, and I am paraphrasing the author in following it continues into the social sphere with its conventions and domesticity, dominated by the vegetative-protonic sex, the women, and the dynamic-electronic sex with its trade, science, technology, the life military and political, the animalic male sex. Thus, the author tries to show the repetitiousness in evolution with the principle of complementarity the basis of all stages.

In this way Dr. Zollinger traces evolution as it is driven onward by the principle of complementarity. He discusses the emergence of organic and biological life in its most primitive forms and shows the development into more advanced forms, conscious life. He suggests that one must understand social and political life by the same principle and shows, for example, that social life must be understood in terms of the need for both self-preservation and species preservation. From an evolutionary point of view species preservation is of supreme import with functional diversity and integration, the bases of complementarity, allowing for more and more advanced stages of civilization. Dr. Zollinger tells us that it is only when men understand and act according to the principle of complementarity that they can utilize this principle to preserve civilization and species development.

There are a variety of questions that must be asked in evaluating a book of this kind. The first has to do with what new insights or understanding this effort at political theory attains. Dr. Zollinger himself, one expects, would suggest that the most important achievement of the book is the connection he has tried to establish between a social and political ethics and the fundamental principles of the universe. One wonders, however, how the complementarity of proton and electron bears on the nature of an ethics that we search for. The nature of diversity, functional integration, and complementarity at the subatomic level has a formal similarity to the diversity and integration that one finds and tries to encourage among men, but one learns little about how men ought to act in merely saying complementarity is important, even essential. Dr. Zollinger places great importance on Heisenberg's not being able to isolate different aspects of the same microphysical phenomena. For some mysterious reason he concludes from this indeterminacy that somehow there is "freedom" at this level. The physicist should and usually does realize that to speak of the "freedom" of the atom because of its indeterminacy is to say very little about ethics or will. Surely the political theorist or that matter, any man, does not depend on the findings of men like Bohr and Heisenberg to discover his freedom and the freedom of his species. It is this fear of the loss of freedom (or, for that matter, the hope of finding freedom) in scientific work that limits people's understanding of science, particularly in the academic community. Thus, the complementarity and freedom that Zollinger discovers in the physical world seems to be of marginal worth in the problem of social and political ethics.

One might also ask of this book what contribution it makes to political philosophy. Using his "new understanding," Dr. Zollinger concludes that a tension between self-preservation and species preservation is desirable, that a tension between the individual and the state is desirable, that a tension between law and ethics is desirable, etc. The discussion of the nature of these tensions which must be resolved through complementarity adds little to what has already been written by the great political philosophers. The contributions to political and social theory found in this book add little to what we understand. Nevertheless, this effort is a Space-time fantasy and those readers who are wary of the fantasies of Hollywood producers like Stanley Kubrick might find the voyage in this book a diversion that complements their more "electronic" activities.—SIDNEY WALDMAN, *Haverford College.*

The Notion of the State: An Introduction to Political Theory. By ALEXANDER PASSERIN D'ENTRÈVES. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. 233. $2.95.)

D'Entrèves implies that it is the shortcomings of "certain modern theorists," indeed, of "contemporary political science" (p. 9), which motivates him to defend a more inclusive theory of the State. The new political science "bears a striking resemblance to certain old notions of the State as merely a relation of force" (p. 9), whereas in truth this force must be regularized through legal rules and these rules themselves stand in need of legitimation, i.e., a feeling on the part of the people that they 'ought' to be obeyed. His book is intended to redress the modern imbalance by reasserting the need for political philosophy as the guide to legitimacy.

Since no work more recent than David Easton's *Political System* (1953) is cited, one can hardly say the "contemporary" literature has been exhausted. One would think, e.g., that some of the recent studies precisely on legitimacy would have attracted d'Entrèves' attention. But if he does less than justice to modern political analysis, this does nothing to detract from his generally incisive assessment of the contributions of the major political philosophers to one or more of his three categories of the State. He devotes a chapter each to Force ('Might'), Legality ('Power'), and Legitimacy ('Authority').

It is not surprising that Thrasymachus becomes the first spokesman for the State as Force. D'Entrèves' analysis is good. He does not mistake Thrasymachus' embarrassed withdrawal from his Socratic confrontation for a withdrawal of force from the ruler. On the contrary, "Strength must be joined to wisdom" (p. 16). Socrates and Thrasymachus are both essential to the State.

The treatment of St. Augustine is less clear. According to d'Entrèves' earlier definition, legitimation involves "a sense of obligation," "'agreement' on the ends to be pursued," "a civic sense, love of country, complete dedication to the common cause" (pp. 5-6). Nothing is said of the *quality* of the ends. But later, Augustine's state is denied legitimacy. It is "'ethically neutral,'" "strictly factual," one in which "all consideration of values is left out," as is "any reference to its ends." While for Augustine it is a state even though unjust, for d'Entrèves, without justice it is "a simple organization of force" (pp. 23-24). From legitimacy consisting in what people do in fact accept as obligatory, d'Entrèves moves to what they ought to accept. Legitimacy is impossible without knowledge of this 'ought.' This is a hard, perhaps impossible, demand, though a noble one. It would seem to call not only for political philosophy but for empirical studies of possible factual 'oughts.'

The State thought of as Legality, the limitation and direction of Force by law, takes d'Entrèves through Aristotle, Cicero, the Romans, the Middle Ages, Bodin, and Hobbes. Space does not permit detailed coverage. One should say, however, that in building his case in this part, the author has done a masterful job of mustering the evidence with no distortion of the sources. Thus, for example, he covers accurately and to the point the differing stages of law as "declaratory" or as "creative"; Bodin's origination of the word "sovereignty" to express supreme legal power in an independent national territory; and the legal criteria for Hobbes' force, in contradistinction from Machiavelli's. Also good is his timely reminder that the divided exercise of power does not challenge the principle of unified sovereignty.

As for Legitimacy, we have learned that the State depends not only on its acceptance by the people but on its pursuit of 'right,' of 'just,' ends (pp. 24, 159). What happens if people do not accept this pursuit of justice, d'Entrèves does not discuss, any more than does Locke in posing as the criteria for legitimacy the twin concepts of consent, on the one hand, and action in accordance with the law of nature, i.e., reason, on the other. But with the consequences before us of the German Nazi plurality vote in 1932, can any theorist any longer ignore this question?

In terms of 'just' and 'right' ends, Aristotle's conception of the polis as natural, with its own ends but also instrumental to human virtue, was a normative concept. When this natural standard for the State was no longer accepted, the normative need was attached to the state of nature and the social contract (p. 166). D'Entrèves is correct in this attribution, but it would have added to his book had he evaluated the seeming paradox involved in considering as normative a state of nature which men found it necessary to leave, or, alternatively, which was only a construct to begin with.

Contrary to inegalitarian elitists, d'Entrèves argues that the origin of legitimacy is in the fundamental equality of rights of all men. As with Madison, presumably this would not preclude inequality of political function as long as based upon consent. Indeed, seemingly only this kind of democratic elitism could actualize the justice essential to his legitimacy.

The book ends with a discussion of the ambiguity of individual rights and interests, on the one hand, and the common good, on the other, as legitimations of power. He rightly cites Locke in this respect, but surprisingly considers it worth noting how strongly rooted was the idea of the common good "still in Locke's day" (p. 224). Since he had already shown familiarity with Madison, he might have lengthened his "still" by one hundred years and noted some of Madison's references to the public interest. Madison boldly joined in the same sentence the "permanent and aggregate interests of the community" and the "rights of other citizens" (*Federalist* No. 10), and believed that because of social pluralism and the separation of powers the two could be mutually reinforcing. D'Entreves might have explored this possibility, especially since we live in an age stressing individual rights and he is heavily committed to the common good.

Though subtitled 'An Introduction to Political Theory,' this revised English version of the original 1962 Italian edition would be hard going for a beginner. It would be most rewarding at the end of a course using original sources. Both its insights and its omissions could then be appreciated. It is one of those rare books which, good as it stands, would be better were it longer.—MAYNARD SMITH, *Hobart and William Smith Colleges.*

Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory of Propositions. BY JAMES L. PRICE. (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968. Pp. 212. $3.75.)

The relevance of organizational theory for political theory has not escaped recent notice. Wolin in *Politics and Vision* complained about the assumption of identity between elments in contemporary organizational and political theories. Kaufman in a piece in this *Review* several years ago was intrigued by the "parallels between organization theory and political theory." And recently, Denhardt in the *Public Administration Review* has reminded us that "citizenship" and "membership" may refer to the same phenomena. It thus should not surprise the reader that Price has utilized a conception of the organization's "political system" to order a major part of his inventory. The propositions there justify political scientists giving it a try. Those who study bureaucracies or political organizations should find the book even more worth the effort. My choice of words is deliberate for Price's purpose and style (which is in part a consequence of his purpose) make this book difficult no matter the interest of the reader. Those who prefer a more systematic and cumulative social science ought not complain about the purpose; for those same reasons they may rightfully complain about the results.

The author's purpose (with acknowledgement to Berelson and Steiner) ". . . is to present the core of what the behavioral sciences now know about the effectiveness of organizations: what we really know, what we nearly know, what we think we know, and what we claim to know." (p. 1). Fifty studies of "administrative organization" (". . . an organization composed primarily of full-time members" p. 8.) were inventoried for "information pertinent to effectiveness." Productivity, morale, conformity, adaptiveness, and institutionalization were presumed to be more positively than negatively related to "effectiveness" and hence "functional" with respect to it. (In the final model these are listed as "intervening variables.") The format of the propositions is designed to alert the reader to the level of measurement presumably attained on each variable as well as to inform him of conditions imposed on the relationship. Accepting the conceptualizations and findings of his sources as given, Price casts those materials relevant to his interests into a series of primarily bivariate relationships with "effectiveness" the dependent variable. (Effectiveness is defined as the degree of achievement of "operative" as opposed to "official" goals.) Five sets of "determinants" are discussed: the economic system, the internal political system, the external political system, the control system, population and ecology. The resulting schemata also delineate potential relationships for future inquiry and are called "models" of effectiveness in organizations. The propositions are subsequently summarized and ordered in terms of the variables most likely to be related to "high effectiveness."

Ordinarily it is not fair to fault an author for more rather than less rigor. In this work, however, the author's attempted precision complicates explication and comprehension. Some examples should illustrate the unfortunate results.

Proposition 3.3 reads: "Except where there is a high degree of complexity, organizations which have a low degree of centralization with respect to tactical decisions are more likely to have a high degree of effectiveness than organizations which have a low degree of centralization and respect to tactical decisions." (p. 60). Later, on page 90, we read: "Therefore, when Katz, Maccoby, and Morse note that close supervision is inversely related to productivity, this inventory interprets this to mean that a *very high* degree of centralization is negatively associated with productivity. Proposition 3.3 refers, not to very high, but merely to a high degree of centralization. Data which suggest that a very high degree of centralization is dysfunctional or effectiveness thus do not necessarily contradict the proposed relation. . . ." To be sure, the relationship may be curvilinear. But then again it may not be. Comparable feats of extrication by degrees appear elsewhere and highlight the fact that the concept "degree" and the differences between a low degree, a "mere" high degree, and a very high degree are cause for more concern than the author has shown them.

The use of "positive" and "negative" illustrations must be carefully followed for "positive" means high x, high y, while "negative" means low x, low y. The concept of organizational "size" is defined as "volume of output" and is also measured in "degrees." At another point, the inventory's propositions refer to "degrees" of sanctions while the discussion refers variously to numbers and supplies.

The costs of concision are no better illustrated than on page 132 where we find: "The type of external political system most likely to result in a high degree of effectiveness will have a high degree of autonomy; an ideology which has high degrees of congruence, priority, and conformity; co-optation; major elite co-optation; a high degree of representation; major elite representation and a major elite constituency." The author must mean to say something like "Organizations are more likely to be more effective when their external political systems foster. . . ." Indeed he ultimately says as much on page 204.

Several minor notes as well. Surely there is a typo in Proposition 3.1 (page 49) which now reads: "Organizations which have a high degree of legitimacy are more likely to have a degree of effectiveness than organizations which have a low degree of legitimacy." And we need not be reminded to the point of irritation that illustration is not proof.

Synthesis and systematization of a literature as voluminous as that surveyed by Price is no mean chore. And while I have quarreled over several features of the final product I would also take issue with any who would disparage this or any other equally comprehensive review of a literature. We truly need to know what we know about a lot of things. Price had contributed to our knowledge of organizational effectiveness through his efforts.—DALE A. NEUMAN, *University of Missouri at Kansas City.*

The Industrial Society: Three Essays on Ideology and Development. BY RAYMOND ARON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 183. $4.95.)

The three essays comprising this volume are linked more by M. Aron's remarkable person than by any systematic presentation of ideas. Thus, however one may wish to resist the temptation to indulge in the sociology of political knowledge, to examine such a volume otherwise is simply not to take seriously perhaps the most important singular factor in the book as such: Aron's aesthetic vision. The three papers are also connected by a systematic attack on the Left. The first paper is a critique of the thesis which unites the underdevelopment phenomenon with the fully developed nations. The second paper is a stong assault on evolutionary theory, or at least those forms of evolutionary theory which feed the flames of historicism. The third paper is an assault on the convergence hypothesis, which maintains that capitalism and socialism are beginning to approximate one another.

However limited much of the writing is, and although Aron remains a prisoner of the ideological parameters he so detests, important coordinates are raised. While Aron's book is not the first effort to attack the idea that socialism is necessary to initiate the developmental process in the Third World, it is one of the few attempting to relate problems of development to those of international peace and order.

In his first paper Aron shows how developmental theory raises a series of causal issues that continue to plague the field. He centers on what is perhaps the major problem, whether underdevelopment is caused by or necessarily responsive to the fully developed and advanced nations. While he takes issue with those who would deny that every nation, like every man, is responsible for the consequences of his own behavior, he does not really show how national behavior is autonomous. For example, he fails to explain why nations which were not impoverished in previous epochs, nonetheless remain backward. Nor does he explain how the widespread monopoly of research and development gives advanced nations leverage over the underdeveloped nations despite intensive efforts on their part. And while Aron realizes that the single crop economy is a weak point in underdeveloped economies, he does not indicate why, these single crop economies seem to persist—although all reasonable evidence indicates the wisdom of diversification. As in so many of his works there is emphasis on ideology at the *expense* of economics rather than as a *consequence* of economics. Too often Aron tends to see the problem of underdeveloped areas in terms of administrative strategy rather than as a matter of social structure.

The second study in the volume, ostensibly a response to the tenets set forth by Morris Ginsberg, that the evolutionary or rationalistic interpretation of development has lost ground, permits Aron a statement of his own faith and reason. He makes some shrewd observations about what he terms the "schedule of development." He notes that whether one starts from a Marxian or Rostovian premise, development seems to imply a range of choices and decisions. The volitional character of development thus means that the quality of existence will be differential no less than the goals sought.

Aron's position is that rational choice should not be equated with a plan for social life to proceed through inexorable stages of history or development, but rather as a chance to live in the modern world without having to confront "development" and force it upon the political processes. Unfortunately, Aron, while describing the schedule of development, does not take note of when and how this developmental process is to be realized. Since developmental theory no longer accepts any historical explanation, it remains more rooted than ever in teleology. In hunting for the future by arguing with the past, Aron's volume must be seen as a justification for the continuation of a middle class growth pattern. While the basis of a reliable schedule of growth remains the touchstone of developmental strategy, Aron would prefer to think that it is the cultural artifacts produced in the West that remain the essential model to be employed by the underdeveloped world. However, Aron does draw our attention to the problem of determining just what can be measured in the developmental process. As an extreme rationalist he is unwilling to accept that forces outside human volition determine the outcomes of the developmental process. Too often he allows his own detestation of determinism to drift off into dramaturgy. Just as God seems to lurk behind the rationalist *philosophes* of the eighteenth century, so too Culture seems to lurk behind the idealist social thought of Aron.

As readers of Aron well appreciate, if his critical acumen can at times rise to oracular brilliance, his constructive skills remain pedestrian and at times even absurd. In his criticism of Anglo-American theorists such as Aiken, Lichtheim, and Rostow, Aron exhibits both of these elements. When he criticizes these men, we have some sterling writing, but when constructive alternatives should be posited, he gives us nothing. The conclusion to the book is a series of dreary banalities, such as the following: "The breakdown of ideological syntheses does not lead to insipid pragmatism or lessen the value of intellectual controversy. On the contrary, it encourages a recurrence of rational discussion of problems which, in any case, must be solved pragmatically." Then, in complete denial of the premises upon which his book is built, he notes that: "We are more fortunate than previous generations in that we are not forced to make a choice between conservatism and fanaticism." Presumably what will save us is that, "We know that modern methods, scientific and technological progress, and the rational organization of labor enable us to achieve the objectives to which liberals and socialists of previous centuries aspired." And finally, as if his palliatives were insufficient, we are given a set of prognostications which have the predictive force of Chinese fortune cookies. "History from now to the end of the century will be dominated by two facts: the hydrogen bomb and the population explosion." And on the very last page we are told that: "On a political level, human liberties will never be guaranteed by prosperity. The single party system and the indoctrination of the masses are and will remain threats or temptations." All of Aron's longings and musings get wrapped up into a gnarled bundle of twine that he seems too impatient to bother unraveling.

The book is more a study of developmentalists or at least some developmentalists than it is of development. This would not be so bad had Aron acknowledged this to begin with; however his failure to appreciate the limits of the text inclines one to ponder the depth of analysis. To appreciate how thoroughly out of tune Aron is with recent developmental literature, one has to keep in mind that his notion of Western developmentalists does not extend beyond Walt Rostow and James Burnham, neither of whom can be considered as recent; and Henry Aiken and Herbert Marcuse, neither of whom can be considered developmentalists. The work of modern developmentalists, the books by people such as Adelman, Apter, Pye, Moore, Verba, *et al.*, and on the Soviet side, Liberman and Kurakov, simply don't exist for Aron. The tragedy is that so many conflicts which are real for him no longer exist in the political world. Although Aron's book can be read either for fun or for profit, it is not likely that contemporary American social scientists will turn to it as an example of how to deal with the relationship between modern industrial processes and developmental orientations. Perhaps M. Aron will yet favor us with the big book on this subject.—IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ, *Washington University at St. Louis.*

Systems of Political Science. BY ORAN R. YOUNG. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968. Pp. 113. $4.50.)

Young's book is so very badly done that I would not, ordinarily, agree to review it. Yet it illustrates a trend in contemporary publishing in political science whose implications for the discipline are worth careful examination. Since Young is not responsible for that trend, it is perhaps unfair to use him as a whipping boy, but the point I am trying to make is, I believe, sufficiently important to justify what has been done.

First, the book. Young sets out to expound critically a variety of "approaches" to the study of politics-general systems theory, structural-functional analysis, communications theory, etc. He fails, for reasons that are both procedural and substantive. First, the writing is atrocious. Cliches abound, often in most unusual form: ". . . pin down the level of interdependence which forms the breaking point. . . ." [p. 25] Clauses dangle; punctuation is erratic and often incorrect; there is even an incomplete sentence [p. 21]. Overall, the writing is repellant, and what is more important, confusing.

The substantive inadequacies of the book are equally serious. Key concepts are ambiguously defined, or even remain undefined. The methodological assumptions implicit in the treatment of inquiry are hopelessly naive. The descriptive accounts offered for the various "approaches" are grossly inadequate if not positively misleading. The criticisms offered for these "approaches" are trivial or merely confusing. Space does not permit more than a bare enumeration of the worst faults and a few illustrations.

The methodological confusion is so severe that it is hard to illustrate. The treatment of "theory," for example, makes use of a concept identified as "inductive testing" without in any way spelling out what is meant by the term. The distinction between logical and empirical limitations on inquiry is simply ignored. The general conception of the goals of inquiry is idiosyncratic to the point of being bizarre. A single illustration—the treatment of "description"—will illustrate the difficulties:

> Probably the most basic set of variables and organizing concepts in any discipline can be labeled descriptive. The subject matter of much work in political science falls into this category of description, whose effort is more to delineate relevant phenomena, to generate useful classifications and breakdowns, and to pinpoint the important characteristics of political activities than to explain complex patterns of events, to extrapolate and evaluate trends, or to make predictions. [p. 5]

The confusion of meanings here is quite hopeless.

Some of the more substantive inadequacies of the book can be illustrated from the treatment of "general systems theory"—a topic on which Young has written earlier. The content, if any, of general systems theory is left unstated; we are told something of the *kind* of propositions included in the theory, but not given the propositions themselves. We are warned [pp. 20, 25] on three occasions that "the propositions" of the theory are badly scattered through the literature, but provided with no examples. In one place [p. 19] we learn that

> . . . above all, the communication and transfer of insights along the channels of isomorphisms (sic) and interlocking systems provided a real impetus for empirical work.

A few pages later [p. 26] it appears that Young has changed his mind, for he asserts that:

> . . . general systems theory proper has been utilized very little in the social sciences and (that) it is very difficult to judge its utility at this time.

The manner in which the book's poor organization and conceptual inadequacy is reinforced by extremely poor writing is well demonstrated by the treatment of the very important notions of "isomorphism" and "homology."

> The concept of *isomorphism* has been defined as "A one-to-one correspondence between objects in different systems which preserves the relationship between the objects."[8] An isomorphism is therefore more than an analogy since it refers to relationships that are closer than simple likenesses or partial similarities. In this sense, the notion of *homology* corresponds more nearly with the meaning of isomorphism in general systems theory. Both concepts can refer to important structural correspondences across systems. But the notion of isomorphism has a broader reference than that of homology. In fact, from the standpoint of general systems theory, the most important isomorphisms are functional (rather than structural) correspondences across systems or fundamental similarities in the governing principles or processes of systems, and not homologies at all. [pp. 16-17]

That paragraph contains *all* of the information supplied on the subject of homology!

Young has written a very bad book. But what is striking about the whole affair is not the quality of the book but the fact that it appears on the open market, is expected to be successful, and has been chosen for review by at least one of the prime journals in the field. How can this be? The answer, apparently, is that books are judged by sponsorship rather than content. Young's volume appears in a series marketed by a major publisher and edited by one of the more prestigious bellwethers in the political science flock; that alone is enough to sell the book to a great many political scientists. But if academic sponsorship is so important for sales, then academic sponsors have some responsibility for the quality of the product they endorse, for the books they include in "their" series, unless *caveat emptor* in the name of monetary gain is to be the rule. Those who offer us books dealing with the "foundations" of our discipline should not package an edifice of sand and market it as an item of steel and concrete. In the case of Young's book, that responsibility has been shirked by all concerned.—EUGENE J. MEEHAN, *University of Illinois (Urbana).*

The Political Philosophy of Spinoza. BY ROBERT J. MCSHEA. (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1968, Pp. 214. $7.50.)

The dust-jacket announces this book as "the first systematic treatment of Spinoza's political thought to appear in over half a century." The author more modestly disavows novelty or the explication of "knotty problems," but claims to provide clarification of some central political ideas and an explication of Spinoza's "system" (vi, vii).

Unfortunately he begins from an ambiguous distinction between Spinoza's "metaphysics" and his "ethic of personal salvation" (30-31). McShea claims that Spinoza is not primarily interested in politics or metaphysics, "but in an ethical program for the achievement of personal autonomy" (30; cf. 204). This distinction assumes the independence of ethics from metaphysics, or at least the subordination of the latter to the former. It seems to reduce political philosophy to a means toward the end of individual perfection. What then are we to understand by Spinoza's "system?" What of the claim in the *Improvement of the Understanding* that all sciences are directed toward one goal? If the goal is personal autonomy or salvation, how is this deducible from the "philosophy of science" which McShea sees in Spinoza's metaphysics? (42; cf. 33-34). McShea himself says that Spinoza's political philosophy is derived from his metaphysics by way of his ethics (32). This would seem to imply that ethics is subordinate to metaphysics, and to confirm the cognitively low status of politics.

McShea quotes as the central statement of Spinoza's political thought: "I start from the natural rights of the individual, which are co-extensive with his desires and powers." To this, he adds: "if there is any point at which one could separate [Spinoza's political] thought from his metaphysics, it would be here, although only in the light of the metaphysics can the full force of the point be seen. Spinoza knew how critical was his natural right theory to his system; he spoke of it as being the principal distinction between his own political theory and that of Thomas Hobbes" (58). Because McShea underestimates the importance of Stoicism on Spinoza's own teaching, he does not realize that the natural distribution of power is Spinoza's version of the classical doctrine of a hierarchy of natural kinds. The equation of right and power is precisely the point of connection between Spinoza's metaphysics and his politics. One cannot distinguish between his ethics and his metaphysics because salvation or freedom is identical with knowledge of the natural order. This is the key to the metaphysical difference between Spinoza and Hobbes. For Spinoza, man is one natural being among others; the study of man proceeds precisely as does the study of non-human nature. For Hobbes, natural right is essentially and peculiarly human, a result of the specific patterns of human motion. Hence man cannot be explained exclusively in terms of non-human motion; the "natural order" is a political or anthropomorphic interpretation. The philosopher therefore has no special political status for Hobbes, whereas for Spinoza, freedom is identical with philosophy. For this reason, it is false to say that "Spinoza was a more consistent Hobbist than Hobbes" (138, 142). McShea means by this that, whereas Hobbes illegitimately restricts men's right in the state of nature by some form of political obligation, Spinoza does not (138-39, 172). But he also observes that Spinoza is not a narrow utilitarian egocentric (167), and that he is "more than a Hobbist" in preserving the right of the individual to rebel against the government (193), although he furnishes "no rule . . . for determining when and how much to resist government" (194).

McShea cannot unify these assertions because his conception of Spinoza as a systematic philosopher of science leaves no room for the ethical partisan of personal salvation. Even when he equates freedom with "power to know," he obscures the absolute dependence of self-preservation (=freedom) upon philosophy as the highest (=most powerful) human activity. Thus he says that our ability to grasp the truth of Spinoza's teaching "is a matter of 'chance' or 'grace'," whereas it is obviously a function of our power to know, or natural intelligence (62-65). So far as the political teaching is concerned, McShea cannot explain the basis for the differences between Spinoza and Hobbes, nor can he account for the link between personal salvation and political obligation in Spinoza. His analysis of this link seems almost to rest upon a quotation from Locke (194, fn. 67); the ambiguity as he presents it is exactly as it is criticized in Hobbes.

To summarize: this book has some helpful passages (e.g. 168, 173, 185ff., 201), but too many defects. Almost all the remarks on "metaphysics," natural law and pre-Machiavellian philosophy are intolerably vulgar. (Slightly better are the comments on Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke; but Rousseau is taken exclusively as the author of the *Social Contract.*) The summary of Spinoza's political teaching is incomplete, and while pleasantly written, superficial. McShea radically overestimates the ease with which Spinoza may be understood at first reading (7, 180); that is, he fails to appreciate the complexity of Spinoza's rhetoric. And this in turn is because he does not grasp the complexity of traditional philosophy and religion, which he seems to regard as beneath rational consideration (13, 17-18, 42, 53-54, 132, 137, 179ff.). He shares some of Spinoza's conclusions without possessing Spinoza's reasons. His treatment of Spinoza's attitude toward religion, although not altogether wrong, is altogether inadequate. He never clearly explains why it is permissible for a contemporary student to disregard the long polemic with Judaism generally and with Maimonides in particular. He naively accepts Spinoza's assurance that political control over religion would be public or external rather than private or internal (182); that is, he has failed to ponder over Spinoza's statement that "men are to be so led that they think themselves not to be led but to live by their own mind and their own free opinion" (TP, X, 7), and that, by the equation of right and power, freedom of thought is necessarily restricted to the philosopher or free man. He therefore cannot understand why Spinoza is relatively silent about "the civil rights or liberties of citizens," and is forced to disregard Spinoza's *ipsissima verba* in order to retain the notion of democratic individualism so appealing to contemporary readers (188-89). Finally, McShea's misunderstanding of Spinoza's metaphysics leads him to underestimate the degree to which Spinoza was a political revolutionary (cf. 196, fn. 73). He is therefore unable to speak with force or certitude on the contemporary relevance of Spinoza's naturalistic ethics (176, 202).—STANLEY ROSEN, *Pennsylvania State University.*

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Party Leaders in the House of Representatives. By RANDALL B. RIPLEY. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. 221. $6.75.)

With the publication of *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives,* Randall B. Ripley and the Brookings Institution have given the legislative literature its most thorough analysis of House leadership and its role in the functioning of the lower Chamber. As it happens, the literature in the legislative field is particularly well developed, but Ripley has made several important contributions with this study. First, he provides a longitudinal analysis of the changing function of party leadership; second, he gives us some suggestion about the direction of future development of party leadership; and third, there is occasional insight into the relationship between the structure and process of party leadership and the larger functioning of the legislative process.

Ripley traces the growth and changing function of party leadership in the House starting in the Nineteenth Century with highly centralized power in the hands of the Speaker and a "few close lieutenants"; moving to more regularized patterns of power distribution through the use of seniority and career service patterns; and leading, after the second Roosevelt, to the clear bureaucratization of the party structures in the House. In short, the party and their leadership structures have evolved in a pattern closely similar to the development of government and American society generally.

The complexities of Twentiety Century American life appear to have their parallel in the structures and pattern of leadership in Congress. More formal lines of authority and communication; the proliferation and formalization of staffing; and the development of intra-House and party cliques, associations, and voting blocs have all in their way been a reflection of the changing shape of American society generally. It should be no surprise that the function and structure of party leadership in the House have responded to these forces. What is significant is that a scholar of Ripley's ability has taken a close look at these developments and has typed them and offered us a systematic analysis of their meaning to the functioning of party leadership in the House of Representatives.

Ripley is at his best in describing the ways in which the leadership patterns relate to the techniques of leadership. In a series of vignettes from recent legislative issues he illustrates that legislative party leaders, like other leaders, have to rely on techniques of persuasion, control of information and the development of mutual trust with their colleagues as they work to forge the majorities that enact legislation. Ripley effectively relates the abstractions of leadership resources (tangible preferment, psychological preferment, and control over communication) to the structural and partisan realities of the House. The role of the White House and agency congressional liaison personnel, as well as internal House practices, is tied into the leadership function.

Inter and intra-party relationships, leadership-committee interaction, and the majority-minority status of the parties are all shown to have relevance for the functioning of the leadership and therefore to the decisions of the House.

For this reviewer, one of the most intriguing parts of the book is a short section on the party leader's dominance of the internal communication process. As rich as the legislative literature is, there is very little empirical analysis of the patterns of information flow in Congress. Sources of information, the initiation of information distribution, and the route such distribution follows are just some of the more obvious questions to which our literature has not yet addressed itself. In part, this lack of systematic attention to the communication system in Congress derives from its sub rosa character. Where the formal lines of communication are visible in large complex organizations, the Congress for all its bureaucratization still remains non-hierarchical and decentralized. One of the significant consequences of this pattern is to decentralize the sources of important information, making it difficult to uncover and analyze.

Ripley offers us a start with some interview data reflecting the various sources of information for the membership of the two parties. For example, committee chairmen and senior members of committees were less important to Democrats as major sources of information on party positions than to Republicans who have not had the White House and majority party leadership to look to. There is much that is suggestive in this discussion of the communication process which needs to be developed. It is one of the important next subjects deserving concerted attention by our discipline, for as Ripley puts it, "The leaders are at the center of the communications network in the House and can use this position to influence legislative results."

A few words are in order about Ripley's methodology. He has nicely balanced a variety of data from several sources: roll call data; personal observations of the House over a four-year period; formal and informal interviews with House members and staff personnel; and a rich use of historical materials. The balance of these data gives the book a perspective so often absent from many recent studies of our political institutions. Ripley in his introduction sums up the principal strength of his method and as a result of the book itself: "... some of the specific historical judgments ... may be found in error by subsequent research. But the disadvantages of using historical material that is uneven in quality and quantity are outweighed by the advantages of viewing the House in broad historical perspective and of developing categories for understanding changes that have occurred in it."

In a style that is occasionally flat, Randall B. Ripley has given the discipline an important addition to the legislative literature. He has added to our understanding of changes that have occurred and are occurring within the House of Representatives.—EUGENE EIDENBERG, *University of Minnesota.*

Ideology and Electoral Action: A Comparative Case Study of the National Committee for an Effective Congress. BY HARRY M. SCOBLE. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967. Pp. 298. $5.75.)

This book is by an engaged man; Harry Scoble has strong views about American politics and how it ought to be studied. Scoble points to an important problem in current American politics by asking: "When the career of the educated American orients him to accept continent-wide moves as normal aspects of occupational success, when the media he uses increasingly insist upon the relevance of positive neutralism by Kenya, of agitation by tin miners in Bolivia, of princely feudalism in Laos—how will the individual relate himself and this external world to such issues as the factional condition of the parties in Virginia, the significance of a House by-election in Texas, or the contest being waged to represent a few thousand Alaskans in the Senate?" The author sees the National Committee for an Effective Congress as a new organizational pattern that makes it possible for such a concerned individual to participate in a meaningful way. Professor Scoble regards himself as "a hard-data, empirical, positivistic political *scientist*" who believes the "central focus of political scientists should be the distribution, bases, techniques and effects of political power—that is, the ability to control the behavior of others through public policies sustained by sanctioned force." Consequently he devotes much of his book to the development of measures for comparing the power of the NCEC with that exerted by other interest groups.

The analysis of power in this context suggests attention to five related questions: the amount of political resource potential, the degree of potential resource commitment to politics, the efficiency of the exploitation of those committed resources, the translation of efficiency into electoral power, and the translation of electoral power into legislative power. Since the principal technique of the NCEC is raising money and disbursing it to favored candidates, Scoble's indicators of efficiency necessarily deal with campaign finance. On the amount of political resource potential, he points to the amount of money raised, the number of contributors, and the willingness of many to give money more than once. The degree of resource commitment of politics is measured by disbursements to candidates, and the ratio of NCEC disbursement to those of other groups is suggested as an index figure of relative commitment. Efficiency is gauged by the concentration of expenditures in close races (between 46% and 54%) where money presumably will have more effect. Electroal power is seen as a function of the number of victories, and an ordinal scale with eight magnitudes is developed on the basis of distinctions between whether the NCEC-backed candidate won or lost, whether he was an incumbent or not, and whether his party won or lost the seat involved. The last consideration becomes the basis for a summary measure of net partisan change:

$$I = \frac{\text{no. seats gained—no. seats lost}}{\text{total contests}}$$

This index number, which will fall into the range of -1.0 to $+1.0$, represents the net impact of each group on the electoral process. The translation of electoral power into legislative power is measured by the proportion of leadership positions and seats on relevant committees held by NCEC-backed legislators. An index of committee power is:

$$I_{cs} = \frac{\text{members supported—members opposed unsuccessfully}}{\text{total membership}}$$

Illustrations of these measures are given using data on the NCEC and, where additional data are available, the NCEC is compared with other relevant groups: the A.D.A., organized labor, and the Democratic and Republican Senate Campaign Committees.

Ideology and Electoral Action also has intrinsic interest because of the nature of the group it describes. There are three organizational elements: the staff, the members (a few liberal co-founders plus coopted others of whom about ten could be regarded as active), and the contributors who now number over 35,000. Power within the organization is concentrated; almost all major decisions have been made by the principal founder, Maurice Rosenblatt, and the long-time staff director, George Agree. Their ability to retain effective control and see their organization prosper has been due to two things: their discovery of an appropriate role in American politics and a coincidence between their policy views and those of their contributors. Professor Scoble describes a variety of activities in which the NCEC has engaged since it was founded in 1948 essentially as a successor group (with somewhat broader foreign policy interests) to the American League for a Free Palestine. Over the years, the NCEC has experimented with an information clearing house for those opposing Senator Joseph McCarthy, fund-raising for primary elections, special funds such as a Clean Politics Appeal, and "Citizens for Jones" Committees for candidates who required special backing. Their efforts can be viewed as a trial-and-error learning experience. When a technique did not work, it was dropped; when support was forthcoming from the American political environment, the use of the technique was expanded. Their basic strategem has been fund-raising largely in urban areas and transmitting these monies to general election candidates, most frequently from mid-west or plains states, who have internationalist-civil libertarian views. Until 1960 their efforts were concentrated on the Senate. Since that time, they have been increasingly active in House races. The contributors have tended to be politically active, Stevensonian Democrats, issue oriented, concerned with domestic and international politics, and satisfied with the NCEC serves these interests in a way the major political parties do not. Scoble presents considerable survey data on the contributors, but because "the purpose of this book is to focus on the NCEC as an *organization*," they are scattered in footnotes throughout the book. I do not follow this reasoning, but references to a "larger study" suggest the author may be saving the data for a more intensive analysis at a later date.

I think the book is less valuable as a contribution to group theory. Professor Scoble argues that earlier group theory has neglected ideology. However, the essential stuff of ideology can be viewed easily as David Truman's "shared attitudes." Likewise the author argues that the NCEC cannot be analyzed as a primary group. True, but if group theory *is* the appropriate frame of reference for an organization with 35,000 contributors, then Cooley's "secondary groups," or Hyman's "reference groups" could have been pressed into service. In fact, this book strikes me as a fine example of what Thomas Kuhn calls normal science, "empirical work undertaken to articulate the paradigm theory, resolving some of its residual ambiguities and permitting the solution of problems to which it had previously only drawn attention." The major parameters of the relevant paradigm come from the work of David Truman, Robert Dahl, and V. O. Key. This being the case, it was disconcerting to find in the last chapter an undeveloped attack on what Scoble takes to be the values of his mentors. An incorrectly cited chapter in a V. O. Key text is dismissed as "myopic . . . a value-laden response of a middle-class Harvard professor." It has become fashionable for those with romantic notions of confrontation to spice their writings with barbed comments about "the WASP mind," "the establishment," and "middle class values." But Professor Scoble ought to realize that practice is just as mindless and just as irrelevant to political *science* as the worship of institutional reform which he deplores in an earlier generation of political scientists.—JOHN H. KESSEL, *Allegheny College.*

Politics and Television. BY KURT AND GLADYS ENGEL LANG. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968. Pp. 315. $6.95.)

Political Television. BY BERNARD RUBIN. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1967. Pp. 200.)

As another Presidential year unfolds before our eyes, professional and lay interest in the way a lot of it unfolds—as 525 lines per second, 430 dots per line—experiences its periodic upsurge. Plans are already laid, I suppose (and will have been executed by the time this is read) for measuring the impact of television debates. There is again concern about the costs of campaigning and television's substantial contribution to those costs. Once more questions of equity, bias, and completeness come to the fore.

What don't seem to get raised are the broader trends and implications of this medium. One of the trends with negative attributes is the apparent shortening of the half-lives of programming innovations. This is most evident in the entertainment segment of the medium, because that is the predominant use. Trial periods are shorter; "seasons" last five months; theme fads disappear unlamented. All in all the networks spend more time, and develop more frustration, trying to divine when and what the next crest will be—when in fact they may be witnessing a qualitative shift in public interest and consumption of television programming that transcends particular decisions about westerns, blue comedy, and old movies.

On the margins, political programming may also be undergoing the same sort of revised public appraisal. The past five years have witnessed an increasing tempo of format tinkering with regular news programs—the move to a half-hour, computer election forecasting, assorted personnel ploys (mostly to counter Huntley-Brinkley), extemporaneous chit-chat, and so forth. Much of this is designed, of course, to affect the division of viewers among the networks; but one can also envisage it as an attempt to hold back the ebbing of addiction to indiscriminate viewing.

Similarly we must entertain the possibility that certain kinds of special programming no longer have the impact they did. A great deal was made at the time of the Kennedy-Nixon television debates of 1960. Can we assume safely that such effects will flow from comparable encounters now? Or is the literature on the 1960 debates as irrelevant, if fascinating, for contemporary understandings as the literature on Orson Wells' "invasion from Mars?"

These questions of secular transformation are not terribly profound, yet they lie beyond the commentary and analysis of too many observers in and out of our professions. Both of the books considered here fail in most respects to move beyond rudimentary levels of analysis, and both fall victim to the pace of television change, dwelling almost nostalgically in the glorious and traumatic days of early television: MacArthur's return in 1950, the 1952 conventions, Murrow's devastating program on Joseph McCarthy, the Kefauver crime hearings, the Army-McCarthy hearings, and so forth.

All this makes enjoyable reading for the general market (for which these books were designed) but for the most part not professionally useful. The Langs offer their own original research, some of it now fifteen years old. Parts of it may be important, but suffer methodologically. Their somewhat informal study of television versus in-person perceptions of the MacArthur parade in Chicago demonstrated the ability to exaggerate crowd size and enthusiasm through selective camera work and narration—clever then, perhaps, but a technique millions of viewers of such January extravaganzas as the Liberty Bowl know how to discount these days. Other aspects of their work is of marginal importance. I find it questionable, for instance, to label as either significant or as biased the kinds of variation in coverage and comprehension exhibited by the three networks television political conventions.

There are some important policy questions raised by these books: does, for instance, the presence of television cameras tend to generate "artificial news?" In certain senses the answer is obviously, yes. We are all aware of the proclivities of rioters to create a little extra action for the camera, and of the self-conscious piety that masks a public figure's face when a zoom lens focuses on him at a King or Kennedy funeral. Of the two books, *Politics and Television* deals more effectively with this and related problems of the indeterminacy effect. Yet one longs for a recognition that television is hardly an artificial intruder these days, but is decidedly part of the scene, as much as an audience for a speech is. The pervasiveness of news coverage is such that the *absence* of televised coverage must be considered the abnormality. Again, data or speculation about secular trends might have been helpful; is it not probable that increasing expectation and familiarity with the presence of television, coupled with technological innovation (expecially miniaturization, longer-range lenses and microphones), will diminish this problem decisively?

Political Television has greater trouble than the Lang book keeping its eye on the screen. Substantial portions of the book provide general background, in the Theodore White vein, background to the events which among other things involved television. These portions may be helpful and interesting to younger readers whose political awareness was not too acute in the 1950s and early 60s; this presumably does not include many readers of the *Review*. The Rubin and Lang books both tend to be careless from time to time about the distinctiveness of television as against other media. All of the advantages of television are found to one degree or another in the other media: visuality in the press and movies, immediacy and voice in radio, confluence of sight and sound in movies, ease of consumer access particularly in radio (much more than television), personalization in radio (Lowell Thomas used to seem as real as Brinkley) and in opinion newspaper columns, and so forth. So too are some of the neutral, controversial, or negative characteristics: candidates and rioters also respond to the presence to radio microphones and newspaper reporters. I don't mean to underestimate the significance of television, but to emphasize that its contributions to our culture, political or otherwise, are incremental and in certain respects interactional (in the statistical sense). Our investigative talents for isolating and measuring the increments and the interactional effects have not really been imaginatively mobilized.

Troubles with delineation of variables extend to the political behaviors television affects. These authors properly allude to the barrenness of studies identifying viewers' perceptions of "who won" television debates. But their own dependent variables suffer, variously, from imprecise definition, insufficient measurement, and demonstrated or even conjectural relationship to the electoral process or more broadly to the political system. For example, at some level deviations from cognitive accuracy flowing from network bias, naiveté, or incompetence may significantly affect the political process—but not the kind of infinitesimal variations of coverage of the 1952 Democratic Convention studied in depth by the Langs. Rubin discusses in some detail the 70 hours of coverage following the John Kennedy assassination. The impact of that length and intensity of viewing may have been significant, perhaps in the long- as well as the short-run. But Rubin offers no systematic analysis of even the theoretical possibilities, nor of the specific contribution of television.

Reference to that assassination underscores an omission that is sorely missed by this reviewer: an exploration of the role of television in the political socialization of children. The socialization effects of Kennedy's death are known to some extent, thanks to the burst of studies that followed it; and those effects are primarily traceable to televiewing. More broadly; television has to be assessed as an agent of socialization noticeably stronger vis-à-vis family and school than other media have been in the past. This is particularly the case cognitively and in certain segments of politics (e.g., international relations) in which the family effect has usually been weaker.

The most perplexing question about television is its subtle contribution, along with other media and other acculturizing agents, to the setting of cognitive and affective boundaries in the minds of members of a political society. In their concluding chapter the Langs express some of the frustration in trying to track this contribution:

"No one has yet been able to 'demonstrate' through a convincing experiment what the long-range effects of television have been. Nor are they likely to. To trace a change in a political climate or a realignment within the electorate straight to the door of television is a task foredoomed to failure."

Perhaps so; certainly so if attempted at the level of these two books.—BRADBURY SEASHOLES, *Tufts University.*

The Warren Court: Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform. BY ARCHIBALD COX. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 144. $4.95.)

These brief lectures, which former Solicitor Genral Cox delivered at the University of Hawaii in 1967, have two main objects: (1) to survey and evaluate recent constitutional developments, and (2) to explore the implications of the Warren Court's egalitarian activism for the judiciary's role in the political system. Since the nucleus of Cox's argument was published in the November, 1966 issue of the *Harvard Law Review,* prospective purchasers may fairly ask, what new material justifies the extra expense? The answer does not lie in the subtitle; the theme there announced is not completely realized. Nor does Cox emphasize his personal experiences in shaping the litigation discussed—an omission one hopes he will someday correct. Rather, the lectures enable him to enlarge his focus, elaborate his argument, and get some criticisms off his chest regarding the Court's current course. Though his incisive earlier discussion of state action forms the key chapters of the book, he also covers judicial reform of criminal procedure, displacement of state libel laws, and supervision of reapportionment and voting rights. Specific litigation is then anchored in introductory and closing sections which amplify his variations on the "role of the Court" theme.

The result is a tight little volume of considerable appeal. Cox has exceptional ability to discern emerging trends and to express them with economy of language. He is persuasive, for example, in ranking the Civil Rights Act decisions of 1966 with those upholding the Wagner Act for the potential power of Congress to combat private discrimination. His nimble trip through the wiretapping bog is a model of concision. Since his viewpoint reflects the varying perspectives of advocate, scholar, and critic, there is throughout a healthy appreciation of political realities and tolerance for the rationality, if not wisdom, of contrary views. Consequently, the lectures can be recommended to teachers as concise, fresh interpretations of recent litigation, to scholars as food for thought with a minimum of waste, and to analysts of decision-making as neat illustrations of how a skillful constitutional lawyer goes about his business as midwife of incremental change.

The most arguable theme is Cox's criticism of the Warren Court for excessive innovation. Here the forward-looking frontiersman of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, who warmly supports the institution and its egalitarian goals, grapples with a lawyer's doubts about the Court's methods and constitutional reform as a staple diet. Refreshingly, Cox wastes no words wondering whether the high tribunal is a political or legal body. He assumes that it is both and that role conflict is inevitable. He also concedes that judicial pioneering has been invited by politicians' default, that Justices have latent functions of moral leadership and can generate support as they proceed. But in the end the lawyer triumphs. Cox advances most of the stock criticisms of the Court for unprofessional methods, too much politics and too little law, endangering the popular consent on which judicial power ultimately rests, etc. He concludes that legislative rather than judicial action is the preferable way to create sustained constitutional obligations in defense of human rights.

It is not always clear whether Cox's main objection to judicial crusading is functional, democratic, or simply prudential—i.e., entails excessive political risks. Implicit also are several debatable assumptions about the objectivity of the judicial process and the popular basis of judicial power. Whatever may be said for "neutral" principles and all that, political scientists are likely to find fault with his political analysis. Cox offers no balance-sheet of the Court's political gains and losses among client groups, no suggestion why it is so damaging for the Justices to lose a battle with

Congress. Basically, his argument rests on rather uncritical acceptance of the maxim, first advanced by de Tocqueville, that judicial power is ultimately public opinion. The trouble with this maxim is that it says nothing distinctive about judges and fails to differentiate their publics. Cox's notion that courts derive no authority from popular participation underestimates representation via the adversary system and overestimates popular control elsewhere. The notion that Supreme Court power depends on "ability to command a national consensus" underestimates the leverage of the Court's allies and overestimates its saliency in mass opinion. Disarmingly, Cox admits he cannot prove the connection between craftsmanship and legitimacy. Neither can we disprove it—yet. My quarrel is that Cox, like most writers who wrestle with "role of the Court" justification, made little effort to check his political maxims against empirical studies of popular attitudes about the judiciary. Lawyers often ask what social science can do for law. Bathing normative assumptions in the acid of fact is surely one way empiricism might contribute to a perennial normative concern—if only lawyers would look!—J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., *Johns Hopkins University.*

The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era. BY RICHARD P. MCCORMICK. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1966. Pp. 389. $7.50.)

Basic patterns of American party politics were set for generations to come by the party system the Jacksonian era produced. For anyone who wants to understand this formative stage of political development and party action, this volume is essential reading. It is meticulously researched and carefully stated throughout, and brings more discrimination to the subject than any previous study.

At the outset Professor McCormick provides a useful summation of the first party system of Jeffersonian Republicans and Federalists, and its collapse in the years of James Monroe's presidency. By comparison the second party system, he argues, was more popular, more competitive from state to state, high organized, firmly geared to the contest for the presidency, less issue-oriented, and far more given to mass appeals, drama, and "hurrah"—in short, more "modern," as the United States has known parties. Yet it also lived by muting sectional tensions; as a result, it fell sudden victim to intense conflict over the slavery issue in the 1850's, and was soon replaced by a third party system. In its heyday, however, it was more evenly balanced in every section and state than earlier or later party systems were.

Some four-fifths of the book is given to political patterns in the twenty-three states that were relevant in party formation. These chapters, arranged broadly by geographical section, are virtually encyclopedic and never limited to mere narrative; Professor McCormick promises us an analytical-historical study, and keeps his promise. The state chapters vary in length and detail, but in every case they provide data concerning constitutional and governmental structure and the state's heritage of political practices and styles. We are informed about suffrage and voter turnout, relevant experience in the Jeffersonian-Republican era, leadership patterns, and the state's progress—or lack of it—in the years from 1824 to 1840 that brought Democrats and Whigs into being.

Party formation was halting and erratic. To proclaim a national Democratic party with Andrew Jackson's election in 1828, a National Republican phalanx in 1832, and a national Whig party in 1834, as much conventional historiography does, not only races the clock unconscionably, as Professor McCormick shows. It also ignores a whole array of conditions which he argues were crucial in explaining why at least proto-party structures emerged in some states as early as 1828, and in others not until the 1830's or 1840. It also passes over such important matters as the differential rate with which state political management through legislative caucuses gave way to delegate conventions and party committees, matters Professor McCormick treats carefully as an aspect of the creation of modern party structures.

Throughout, the book's major thesis is that the second party system arose as a response to the revival of contests for the presidency. Thus Jackson's challenges to John Quincy Adams in 1824 and 1828 began the process in several states; the fact that Henry Clay as Jackson's rival in 1832 could not command Adams' sectional support in New England brought the growth of party competition there; the process was advanced when the Whigs made the most of Martin Van Buren's unpopularity in the South and elsewhere as the Democratic candidate in 1836; and party structure and competition was brought to apogee by the innovative, bandwagon campaign for William Henry Harrison against Van Buren in 1840. Keen party competition in elections was highly correlated with voting turnout in state and nation, despite some local variations. National turnout in presidential elections, which rose from about 26 per cent of adult white males in 1824 to about 55 per cent in 1828 and 1832, reached a peak of nearly 80 per cent in 1840 and remained at high levels.

The stress Professor McCormick places on presidential contests and other institutional factors as an explanation for party formation is debatable. His emphasis on such features leads him to give short shrift to other probably relevant conditions of social structure, political culture, and political development in general. He also reiterates and recapitulates relatively narrow hypotheses in space that might better have been used for synthesis and for broader, summary analysis; indeed, many analytical historians as well as political scientists will not find themselves wholly satisfied with his conceptual framework and ultimate explanation. Finally, his useful concern with inquiry into state and local roots comes at the expense of similar attention to the articulation of national, if always federal, party structures.

Taken over all, nonetheless, *The Second American Party System* is not only a gold mine for scholars and students. It is also the most significant assay so far of a crucial, innovative stage in American party development.—WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS, *Washington University (St. Louis).*

The Upper House in Revolutionary America, 1763-1788. By JACKSON TURNER MAIN. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967. Pp. 311. $7.50.)

In this work the author, a professor of American history at Stony Brook, attempts to trace the evolution of the upper house in the quarter century preceding the adoption of the Constitution. The main outlines of his argument are as follows. The upper houses or councils in Colonial America functioned in practice as legislative bodies, though their theoretical status as such was cloudy and their members were chosen by and served at the pleasure of the governors. Despite the fact that a number of councils were dominated by "placemen," recent immigrants or native colonials who held lucrative offices in addition to their positions on the councils, in most colonies their membership was drawn primarily from the established, stable upper class. The most important function these bodies assumed was defense of royal authority. Nonetheless, they were far from a wholly negative force. Though they were unrepresentative of the colonial upper class which was broader than the old, wealthy elite, they defended the economic and social interests of this class and also performed important legislative functions as reviewers and perfectors of bills.

With the coming of the Revolution the upper houses were not abolished, but rather modified and retained. The framers of the state constitutions recognized that the councils, due to the greater wisdom and ability of their members, had performed valuable legislative functions and thus wished not to destroy them but only to make them truly independent legislative bodies. In addition, the desire of the upper class to protect property interests as well as the general attachment of the articulate portion of the population to Whig notions of a balanced constitution containing monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements figured in their retention. The new upper houses or senates, however, proved a disappointment to aristocratic hopes. They were or became by 1788 radically different bodies than the councils of the pre-Revolutionary period. Despite the efforts of the upper class or elite elements, the property restrictions on membership that were imposed barred few men who wanted to serve and the great majority of senators were elected for short terms by small property holders. Thus, the composition of the senates was broader than that of the councils. They were no longer composed mainly of established, upper class elements, but rather of a far more diversive group of men of moderate property. As a result, they no longer served as instruments of the upper class, but rather became indistinguishable from the lower houses. In short, both houses became arenas of factional conflict, arenas in which various interests competed for advantage. All in all, however, the most important function the senates performed was legislative, i.e., the initiation and revision of bills. Though this role was old, its extent and importance in the senates was new.

Finally, experience both before and after 1776 with upper houses had an important impact on the Federal Constitution. Though the debates in the Convention were curiously anachronistic in that they failed to recognize the new character of the upper houses, the senates in the states had proved so valuable that there was no question as to the existence of a federal senate, but only to its form. In addition, adherence to Whig notions of a balanced constitution as well as belief in the necessity of a second house to temper the passions of the lower house and limit its power contributed to the desire for an upper house. The federal senate that emerged was in many respects an entirely new body. Its members needed no property to hold office and it was as responsive to majority will as the lower house. Within a few years it like the state senates became the vehicle of party and when this occurred the transformation of the councils was completed.

To present the argument of the book so briefly and simply, however, is to do it more justice than it deserves. What also must be noted, and to some extent it is obvious even in our summary, is that the book contains much that is contradictory, vague, and/or inadequately supported. On the one hand, the information the author has gathered, though impressive at times in terms of the scholarly labor involved, is nonetheless often contradictory, inconclusive, or incomplete. Moreover, this source of difficulty is compounded by other deficiencies. The author's use of many of his key concepts, such as function, role, class, elite, representative, etc., is vague and varied. In addition, he largely separates and confines his discussion of institutional context and theoretical status to a single, highly general chapter late in the book. As a consequence, he severely impairs his ability either to provide guidelines and perspective in his lengthy treatment of the composition and activities of particular upper houses or to relate his brief treatment of context and theory to the events and trends he identifies. On the other hand, the author is prone to repeated mulling over of his themes. Each chapter and each of the three major subdivisions of the book contain sections of review and conclusion and in these various sections themes are stated and restated with both major and minor changes of tone and meaning. In part, this derives from the author's wish to deduce his conclusions from a colony by colony and state by state review of the evidence. But one suspects that in large part it also derives from defects in his information, analytic framework, and use of concepts.

In any event the result of these defects combined with a continuing process of digesting themes is a melange of statements regarding the nature and causes of the experience under analysis. Thus, in truth, the argument of the book is immersed in a welter of conflicting statements and facts and the summary provided above to a large extent represents a piecing together of what appear to be the main themes without regard for the contradictions. To cite one example the author undercuts perhaps his most crucial point regarding the changed character of the senates by also noting that the senates protected property far better than the lower houses and that most issues did not become the subjects of factional conflict.

Nor, as we have suggested, is contradiction the only problem. As can be gleaned even from the summary we have provided, there is much that is vague in the author's argument. Indeed, such vagueness pertains not only to particular points, e.g., the changed dimensions of the legislative role of the senates, but to the contours of the whole experience. We cannot be sure because the author himself seems not entirely sure whether he is simply dealing with developments between 1763 and 1788 or whether he is postulating the emergence of a new, discrete, and enduring form of upper house in this period. Lastly, the degree to which key points are not supported by the evidence is disturbing. We may note, for example, that though the author in most of the book attributes primary causal significance to the superior ability of members of the councils and senates and the great value of these bodies as legislative mechanisms, there is little or no direct or indirect evidence to substantiate these points. Here as elsewhere, the standing of key points that are not necessarily convincing on their face rest simply on the authority of the author despite the mass of information he has gathered.—Joseph Cooper, *Rice University*.

Censorship of the Movies: The Social and Political Control of a Mass Medium. By Richard S. Randall. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968. Pp. 280. $7.95.)

Generally, Americans who write about censorship either assume a libertarian posture that cannot tolerate official restraint on any form of communication, or they argue that the freedom to corrupt public morals is not protected by the Constitution and that society may shield itself against moral debasement. In his book Professor Randall espouses neither position but carefully analyzes the censorial techniques that have been used on one of the most powerful segments of the mass media, the movies. He considers the censorship interest as "political energy, pressure, or force rather than as value" and succeeds reasonably well in remaining neutral on the merits of censorship while describing how it has operated over the years beginning with the protest against a peep-show in Atlantic City called *Dolorita in the Passion Dance,* in 1894. Mr. Randall maintains that two events, the coming of television and the judicial inclusion of movies under the protection of the First Amendment revolutionized movie making. After many years of providing morally safe but artistically immature family entertainment, movies recently have acquired a new quality and maturity, but at the same time, they have become guilty of excesses in the detailing of erotica, nudity and violence as well as giving rise to the "exploitation film" depicting nudist camps, girls in various states of undress and sado-masochism, the advertising for which can be seen daily in any big-city newspaper. Like television and newspapers movies are aimed at a mass audience, but the movies differ from their sister media, says Randall, in that they are uncontrolled by advertisers and now deal with themes that at one time were limited to the theater and to the hard cover book —both of which aimed essentially at an elite audience. Thus movies raise in "acute form" the question of "how a free speech society can coexist with a mass democratic society." Perhaps the proper question to ask is whether modern, mass, industrial society ought to permit as much freedom as it does since, to paraphrase the late Zechariah Chafee, the degree of unity and harmony required for a decent society is not the inevitable consequence of freedom but is the result of political and moral effort. If freedom is not accompanied by self-control, public control will inevitably follow.

The movies are in a peculiar position since, on the one hand, they claim, and rightly, that they are engaged in the creative arts and in communicating ideas and should be free of official restraint, but on the other, they are manufacturing a commodity for the mass market for profit—tremendous profit. But is not the writer or artist also engaged in work for financial gain? How, then, do the movies differ from the printed page or from the painted canvas? Randall suggests that the key to distinguishing motion pictures from printed media, and this would also hold true for the painting, lies in the amount of "distance" placed between the viewer and the simulated reality. That is, movies in sweeping away the ordinary barriers that stand between the viewer and physical reality —words, lack of motion, diminution—may reasonably be required to substitute new barriers such as indirection, stylization or absence of detail since they are capable of simulating reality to an extent unknown in the past. In this sense a movie that meets the "redeeming social importance" test might nevertheless be declared obscene if it were to show detailed scenes of sexual intercourse. It would then be failing to place enough "distance" between the viewer and simulated reality. All of which indicates that the constitutional standards for obscenity in literature cannot be precisely applied to cinematic productions. Unless a majority of the Supreme Court adopts the Black-Douglas position that all prior restraint on movies is bad, and this seems unlikely, some standard might be devised that takes into account the special characteristics of the medium. Randall's idea that obscenity be viewed as a "variable phenomenon" makes sense. It is flexible enough to embrace not only what is being shown but the way in which it is shown, and it is particularly adaptable to motion pictures. Already the movies are constitutionally distinguishable from the press in that the doctrine of *Near v. Minnesota* proscribes any censorship of the printed word whereas the cinema, with all its freedom, is constitutionally subject to prior restraint.

The sections of the study that describe the operation of censorship, public and private, are extremely well researched, and, while in part they confirm one's suspicions, they also dispel a good deal of mythology. Of the thirty-eight cities and towns with motion picture censorship laws, only ten actively censor movies. But the fact that only a few municipalities actively engage in restraining the showing of certain themes is somewhat misleading, since censorship has an extraterritorial effect in that suburban authorities may follow the lead of a big-city censorship board. Furthermore, some cities have extra-legal citizens advisory committees which may be just as effective as legal censors when they exact voluntary compliance by local exhibitors. Although most censors admit that they would be more restrictive than recent court decisions permit, they are, nevertheless, attempting to comply with the new legal doctrine. Regardless of what statutes and ordinances allow, the vast majority of censorship orders are confined to erotica and most censors are familiar with the Roth-Alberts test in some degree.

Randall finds that the old stereotype of the censor as one lacking in aesthetic sensibility and morbidly interested in seeking out obscene matter to keep from his fellow citizens does not characterize today's movie censor. Although not generally recruited under methods of high standards censors seem no less well-balanced as personalities than those who exercise much more power over the content of movies, namely producers, distributors, and exhibitors. Sitting on Chicago's Motion Picture Appeal Board, for example, are Dr. Ner Littner, a psychiatrist on the staff of the University of Chicago, and Dr. Henry Rago, editor of the monthly, *Poetry,* the latter actually being against censorship and a strong advocate of classification. In conclusion Randall declares that prior censorship is more of a disadvantage in form than in substance and that movies have far greater freedom over content than any of the other mass media. Today films displaying nudity, sado-masochistic violence, erotically suggestive dances and dialogue are routinely passed, generally without an audience classification. If anything, informal censorship, completely lacking in standards of due process, is a greater threat to free expression in films than formal boards, and the libertarian view that government is the enemy is just not true in this instance.

Although the book is a careful and balanced account of the nature and development of public control over the content of films, it is presented from a single perspective, that of a problem in politics. But more is at issue than a political struggle between those who make and exhibit movies and the general public. There are questions of standards in the arts which are, as William Ernest Hocking wrote, "man's own religion of self-elevation." Overemphasis on the erotic is a corrosion of good taste and no self-respecting civilized society can permit the individual the liberty to degrade the arts at will. To do so is to insult humanity itself. Randall makes no such judgment, but perhaps he should have.—Robert J. Steamer, *Lake Forest College.*

Prairie State Politics: Popular Democracy in South Dakota. By Alan L. Clem. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1967. Pp. 174. $5.00.)

Over the next decade or more, those who write in the area of comparative state politics will find Alan Clem's book a useful storehouse of data. In *Prairie State Politics* one can find facts and figures accompanied by analyses and descriptions concerning every conceivable aspect of South Dakota politics, ranging from party loyalty in the legislature (p. 111) to personal characteristics of the governors (p. 93) and members of Congress (pp. 119f). Few people will read *Prairie State Politics* for pleasure. It is too crowded with data to attract a lay audience. However, serious students of politics will make use of the book to their profit.

The dominant impression of South Dakota politics carried away by the reader is of a politics of frustration. In fact, one gets a distinct feeling that Mr. Clem feels more than a little tired and depressed as he surveys the state's political scene.

He establishes at the outset that South Dakota's political behavior differs from both the national and regional norms. By means of a comparative study of voting results in neighboring midwestern states, he finds that the currents of political change that have affected other midwestern states, as well as the nation, have largely bypassed South Dakota. South Dakota remains very nearly as Republican as ever.

Secondly, he determines by means of a chronological account of the state's political history that the drift of its politics has been toward an ever more conservative and isolated political posture. True, in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, South Dakota did have its share of populists and liberal or Bull Moose Republicans, such as Peter Norbeck. However, in the mid-twentieth century, the party is increasingly dominated by men of comparatively limited political horizons, such as Senator Karl Mundt.

If I interpret Mr. Clem aright, the reason for South Dakota's political isolation is that it is literally a "backwater" state—isolated geographically and culturally from the rest of the nation. According to Mr. Clem, its members of Congress are almost uniformly undistinguished souls. It seems that they rarely, if ever, head any committees at all, let alone important committees, and they are even less likely to provide national leadership in Congress on important national issues.

Similarly, according to Mr. Clem, the delegates from South Dakota to the national Republican and Democratic conventions are just as uniformly undistinguished. They always "play it safe" in the convention, are outside the main currents of the party, and rarely, if ever, play a meaningful part in the decision-making process.

All of this leaves Alan Clem feeling a little glum when he writes his conclusions concerning the political party system in South Dakota. He writes that "the party as such in South Dakota contributes little imagination or initiative to the state's political life" (p. 183). One of the factors responsible for South Dakota's rather grim political picture seems to be the physical isolation of Pierre, the state capital, located as it is in the rangeland center of the state and separated by "seas of grass" from the population centers in the western and eastern ends of the state.

Clem concludes, "It is in the midst of this vast sea of grass that the nerves of state government are collected. Those nerves are thickly insulated by the vastness of the prairie from popular pressures, and as a result the response of state government to many needs and wishes has often been relatively slow" (p. 137). However, Mr. Clem is equally unenthusiastic about South Dakota politics and government when the voter does have an impact on policies. He observes with all the dourness one can muster while surveying an endless sea of grass that the state's political problems are also partially attributable to the "comparatively large degree of popular control in South Dakota government. The masses are not known for their ability to perceive present problems touching a small number of institutions, let alone the future problems" (p. 137).

We can forgive the sour turn taken by Alan Clem's prose as he peers outward from Pierre's grass, for the book is well done.—JOHN H. FENTON, *University of Massachusetts.*

Origins of the Fifth Amendment. BY LEONARD W. LEVY. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Pp. 561. $12.50.)

The decision in *Miranda* v. *Arizona,* in which the Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination as a limitation on the efforts of police to obtain confessions from suspects through interrogation, has rekindled the public controversy over the wisdom and utility of this guarantee that flourished a decade ago when witnesses before various congressional and state legislative committees investigating Communism frequently found it expedient to rely on the Fifth Amendment as a justification for refusal to answer questions about their past or present politics. Leonard Levy began the research for this book during the earlier phase of this controversy, and has completed it, with perfect appropriateness, in time to make an important and useful contribution to the current phase, as well as a matchless contribution to our understanding of the historical background underlying the adoption of a major provision of the Bill of Rights.

Professor Levy is an historian who believes in calling a historical spade a spade, and who rejects totally the view that research into history is undertaken in order to discover those facts—and only those facts—that tend to support the ideological predispositions of the researcher. In his book, *Legacy of Suppression,* he effectively demolished, beyond hope of serious redemption, the view put forward by overeager libertarians that the framers of the First Amendment literally meant to forbid all abridgment of speech by the federal government, that toleration of absolute freedom of speech was the practice as well as the intent of the founding fathers in that golden age of American liberty, and that, by interpreting the guarantee of the First Amendment as something less than absolute, we had fallen disastrously from the pinnacle of freedom then attained. He demonstrated, with evidence piled upon evidence, that the practice and intent of even the most revered of the founding fathers was vigorously to suppress speech and publications that they thought dangerous. Consequently, when, in this work, his evidence brings him to the conclusion that the right against compulsory self-incrimination (Levy refers to it always as a "right," rejecting as unnecessarily denigrating the common reference to this guarantee as a "privilege") was looked upon as fundamental in the United States at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and that the overwhelmingly predominant practice even then was to respect this right during trials, grand jury proceedings, preliminary examinations prior to trial, and legislative or executive inquiries, there is reason for confidence in the reliability of his data.

But there would be grounds for confidence even without knowledge of Professor Levy's earlier works, for this book is manifestly the product of painstaking and exhaustive research into available primary and secondary sources, fully and critically documented. By far the largest portion of the book deals with English history through the seventeenth century, because the origins of the constitutional guarantee are primarily to be found there, and also because the English sources (particularly including reports of trials) appear to be considerably more complete and richer in detail than the relatively sparse material available for colonial America. The English history centers around the High Commission, the ecclesiastical court that was reconstituted by Queen Elizabeth in 1583 at the behest of John Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, for the purpose of exposing and punishing Puritans, and which proceeded inquisitorially by means of the oath *ex officio*. It culminates with the abolition of the oath by the Long Parliament in 1641 and the establishment of the common-law right against self-incrimination in the trials of the Leveller leader, John Lilburne.

The book ends with the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and, as Professor Levy emphatically states in his Preface, "nothing in this book is intended to prove or disprove any position relating to the contemporary controversy about the right against self-incrimination. I care only for an explanation of its background." (p. viii.) Yet, despite this disclaimer, the book is highly relevant to the contemporary controversy. Critics of the right against self-incrimination, such as Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth century and Sidney Hook in the twentieth, have stressed its inutility and illogicality. Its end result is severely to limit the capacity of the government to obtain evidence by forbidding both the questioning of those persons in the best position to provide it, and the drawing of presumptions of guilt from refusals to answer. As a matter of logic, this position is difficult to refute, but, as a matter of history, as Professor Levy has shown, it appears to be too easy to move from the simple questioning of suspects to harsher methods of interrogation born out of frustration at the failure to obtain desired answers, or to indiscriminate interrogation of individuals, without reasonable grounds for suspicion, in the hope that something incriminating might turn up. The imposition of constitutional checks on the freedom of both investigating committees and police interrogators to obtain self-incriminating testimony would appear to be historically justified. The accusatorial system is less subject to abuse than the inquisitorial.—DEAN ALFANGE, JR., *University of Massachusetts.*

On Law and Justice. BY PAUL A. FREUND. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 259. $4.95.)

This is a collection of articles and shorter pieces by one of the best known commentators on the work of the Supreme Court. Written over two decades, their diversity of subject matter and variety of mood makes difficult an adequate appraisal of their value in a short review.

Most readers will probably find most interesting the essays of varying length on some of the leading justices, of which those on Brandeis, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Black are more appealing to a general student of the Court. One might have expected a more acerbic analysis of Black's judicial craftsmanship from one whose approach to constitutional exgesis seems poles apart from that of Black, yet, perhaps inhibited by the occasion of publication (the anniversary of Justice Black's appointment to the Court), he touches lightly on Black's flat rejection of natural law thinking and judge-made law to concentrate on the moral force of Black's contribution to our public law.

One senses the author's greater affinity with the judicial philosophies of the late justice, Jackson and Frankfurter. Both jurists were wary of those who saw great social issues in simple terms. Though he challenges Justice Frankfurter's over reliance on history (in favor of greater reliance on philosophy), he admires the craftsmanship evident in the opinions of both justices, their careful delineation of issues, their detailing of the conflicting values. Freund deplores the fact that the Court is so pressed for time that its opinions only rarely reflect the full explorations of issues so characteristic of Justice Frankfurter's opinions, and suggests "a more selective granting of review and more systematic procedures within the Court for consultation, interchange, and collaborative endeavor leading toward persuasive and scholarly exposition," (at 162).

While applauding Justice Jackson's cautions to his activist-minded colleagues, Freund argues that the "nay-saying counsel must yield substantial ground," especially with respect to the constitutional guaranties "not excluding those stated in the open-ended or ambiguous terms of the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments—" (at 167). He reminds us that "the moral and educational effect of a number of those decisions has been great, indeed comparable to the sobering effect of questions in the House of Commons or even to the English literary classics of the liberal spirit—the essays of the trinity of Johns, Milton, Locke, and Mill." (at 167).

It is perhaps in rationality in Judicial Decisions," reprinted from *Rational Decision* (Nomos VII) that Freund attempts to deal most thoroughly with the central concern of all of these essays. How can the great conflicts of interests and values in our society be resolved through legal processes? It would be unfair to the author, and futile to try to summarize his perceptive exposition. Nor is it in a carping spirit that one concludes that in using the framework of Cardozo (*The Nature of the Judicial Process*) to explicate the role of rationality in the judicial process, his analysis does not take us much beyond the boundaries reached by that master of the Common Law. Logic, precedent, history, and social utility all play a part. Reason, tests of consistency, exposure of bias, neutrality, and creativity are concepts with which the enlightened judge must live his daily life, but any prescription of how a judge must balance values and competing considerations, of how he must remain true to the law as received doctrine and yet press imaginatively toward a new accommodation of the law to perceived needs and reasoned demands, defies persuasive and meaningful analysis. Once we depart from general statements and reach concrete questions, reasonable men seem bound to differ on the means to be used and the ends to be achieved by the judicial process.

To many readers these essays may seem excessively philosophical, somewhat remote from the daily life of men performing a difficult job by command of their fellows, with little of the earthy flavor of politics, and not the slightest gesture indicating that the social sciences can provide significant data or insights to those seeking to understand the role of the Court in our political and social system. Nevertheless, as intelligent commentary by one who has studied the Court and its work with intensity and devotion, there are numerous observations and insights here than can hardly fail to stimulate the imagination of students of the Court and suggest forms of research which may yield substantial documentation to support or modify Professor Freund's philosophically held views.—WILLIAM M. BEANEY, *Princeton University.*

American Legal Realism: Skepticism, Reform, and the Judicial Process. BY WILFRED E. RUMBLE, JR. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968. Pp. 245. $6.75.)

Anyone who believes that the legal realists were characterized by a disregard for the normative content of law and that they tended to identify law and power should read Wilfrid Rumble's *American Legal Realism* as a healthy corrective for such oversimplified interpretations. Rumble's carefully documented description and appraisal of the realist movement presents a convincing argument that legal realism shared the moral fervor which marked American pragmatic reform several decades ago. Men like Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank were more interested in liberating the judicial process from a rigid and often hypocritical formalism than they were concerned with establishing a scientific sociology of law. Rule-skepticism and attention to the behavior of judges were weapons in a campaign to make American law more comprehensible, honest, adaptable to social change and perhaps authentic in the terms of contemporary existentialism. Certainly the rhetoric of realism does not resemble the language of research reports. We are told that legal jargon "befoozles" the ordinary man; that the classical conception of law obscures the ethical character of every judicial question. and thus "serves to perpetuate class prejudices." Of course, since realism was a movement rather than a school of jurisprudence with fixed doctrinal principles, the various practitioners struck personal balances between reformist zeal and attention to a science of law. While Felix Cohen attempted to reconcile the theories of G. E. Moore and Bentham, Underhill Moore anticipated current work in judicial behavior.

Although Rumble tries to comprehend the entire scope of legal realism in his essay, his most significant analysis appears in the chapter devoted to realist efforts in the area of judicial methodology. Both Frank and Llewellyn addressed themselves to the problem of elaborating norms for reaching judicial decisions. They both attacked the traditional conception that courts should adhere to precedent with the familiar arguments that conflicting rules can be applied to litigated cases and that no two disputes brought to court are the same in all relevant respects. They also agreed that judges should be as conscious as possible of the reasons why they made their particular decisions. Responding to traditionalist criticisms that pragmatism would render the legal process unpredictable, they contended that self-conscious judges would be more consistent than judges hiding behind a façade of precedent. Frank and Llewellyn clashed, however, on the means for attaining judicial self-knowledge. Frank suggested that judges undergo a form of psychoanalysis so that they could recognize their prejudices and decide cases in accordance with a clarified "sense of justice." Judicial opinions would be psychological reports of how the decisions were reached. Llewellyn felt that opinions should be written in the "Grand Style," explaining why certain precedents were chosen rather than others and "*why* the technically solid argument of the loser had no business to be listened to."

Rumble deals at some length with the objections which have been raised against the realist accounts of preferred judicial methodologies. First, the realists have been accused of offering no prescription of the values which decisions should reflect. Whether or not this criticism is damaging depends on the ethical theory to which a man subscribes. Rumble contends that moral guidance for judges is needed, "if the range of choice which confronts them is as wide as the realists claimed." In this case the realists seem to be more contemporary than their intellectual biographer. Like the realists, recent existentialists and situation ethicists have stressed self-knowledge and free commitment rather than obedience to codes as the appropriate bases for decision. The recognition of choice does not "assert that nothing can be gained from systematic, conscious analysis" of values, as Rumble implies. Acceptance of freedom does imply that after ethical debate has ended the judge must still make a decision in a particular case. He is acting in bad faith if he holds that the compulsion of precedents or external norms are responsible for his decision rather than the commitment he has made after study of the law and moral dialog. This is the primary ethical insight of the legal realists, which they share with many twentieth century philosophers and theologians.

A more interesting line of argument against Frank and Llewellyn is that judicial self-consciousness is undesirable because myths that the law can be found with certainty preserve the power and prestige of courts. Thurman Arnold, a realist in other respects, contended that traditional ideals furthered public acceptance of the judicial system and that "realism, despite its liberating virtues, is not a sustaining force for a stable civilization." Arnold's views are consonant with the positions of the political scientists termed "democratic elitists" by Peter Bachrach. Aside from the familiar moral objections to elite theory, the attack on legal realism is subject to the particular criticism that once old ideals have been discredited, compulsively proclaiming them will not restore their appeal. Rumble, in fact, calls attention to evidence that public acceptance of judicial myth is itself a myth. Whether or not a more appealing restatement of judicial infallibility should be devised to promote deference is a crucial question which has its counterparts in current debates on democratic theory. American political thought is currently undergoing a creative surge and it is to Rumble's credit that he has published a work which brings to light theories which should be useful to those of us wishing to reestablish the tradition of radical democratic theory.

While Rumble has succeeded in refuting the charge that the legal realists were skeptics and no more, his otherwise excellent essay is flawed by its lack of historical perspective and its absence of comment on the current relevance of the movement. Rumble implies that the insights of realism have been incorporated by contemporary jurisprudence and the excesses remedied. This is quite doubtful. However, *American Legal Realism* is a rich mine of argumentation which appears at just the right time.—MICHAEL A. WEINSTEIN, *Purdue University.*

The Pendergast Machine. BY LYLE W. DORSETT. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Pp. 163. $6.00.)

Historian Lyle Dorsett has posed the following questions in his study of the Pendergast machine: What is a political machine? How does it function? What does it do with its power? How does it meet the challenges that it faces? (p. xi.)

Professor Dorsett has done an impressive job of research in the attempt to answer these questions, and has made an important contribution to the study of American urban political history. Had he employed research procedures in common use among political scientists, however, his book would be even more valuable.

The Dorsett study agrees on most points with previous analyses of machine politics. That is, the machine is seen as a political organization which is based upon "specific material inducements" (Banfield's and Wilson's term), i.e., the provision of favors and patronage jobs to its supporters. The author provides a wealth of examples illustrating this point, which makes his study stand out as a successful attempt to recreate the political environment of Kansas City's past.

At two points, however, Dorsett's study differs from the conventional wisdom on the rise and fall of machine politics. Most writers on the subject have conceived of the machine as a system whose foundation is immigrant ethnic groups of low social and economic rank. Dorsett argues, however, that the Kansas City machine, at least in its later stages, drew just as much support from the nativist middle class as from the immigrant working class. ". . . the majority of Kansas City's population was middle class . . . in the 1920's less than 6 per cent of Kansas City's registered voters were foreign-born. The Negro population was larger than in some major cities, but by 1930 less than 10 per cent of the Kansas City population was colored. Primarily a mercantile and financial center, the metropolis in the heart of America was populated by a large native-American middle class. (p. 82)." For this reason, according to Dorsett, a majority of the electorate backed the 1925 campaign for a charter establishing a nonpartisan form of government. Boss Pendergast, therefore, decided to support the proposal, which was enacted. Kansas City's nonpartisanship, however, was *de jure* only, and actually strengthened the boss's hand. He was now able to pose as the "spokesman for efficient city government conducted on sound business principles. (p. 81)." Pendergast extended his organization into middle-class areas, where the inducements he offered residents were of a purely social nature. The political clubs in these areas functioned year round, sponsoring teas, parties, dances, picnics, and athletic contests. "In these various ways, then, the Pendergast machine provided a social outlet for many citizens who could not afford to belong to the city's expensive and exclusive country clubs. (p. 83.)"

Second, Dorsett notes that the rise of the welfare state did not hurt the Pendergast machine in the slightest, but rather strengthened it. This point also flies in the face of the conventional wisdom, which credits the welfare state's provision of services formerly available only through the machine with a key role in the demise of the latter institution. Pendergast, however, controlled the distribution of New Deal alphabet agency jobs in Kansas City, and thereby greatly increased his political resources and power. Since the Pendergast machine collapsed in 1940 after the exposure of its enormous corruption and the resultant scandal, one might argue that the machine would have declined at the hands of the welfare state had it somehow managed to survive the crisis in which it was destroyed. As the author points out, however, there is no empirical evidence anywhere in the literature to support this generally held assumption of writers in the field.

As valuable as Dorsett's book is, there are serious problems relating to the sources and methodology upon which the thesis of the middle-class machine is based. Although the author provides us with four handsome charts of the changing ward boundaries of the city, there is not a single table of figures relating to the extensive census and election returns data available. Kansas City did have a notably low per cent of foreign born residents during the Pendergast era, compared to other large American cities. The figures quoted above are misleading, however, for one-third of Kansas City's population was either of foreign stock (as opposed to foreign-born) or Negro in 1930. Second, Dorsett does not define what he means by "middle class," and presents no evidence to document his point that Kansas City's population was predominately middle class in 1930. (And thus, by implication, more middle class in composition than other major American cities.) Third, there is no investigation of voting returns by wards, a prerequisite for any assertions about the strength of the machine in middle class areas. As Arthur Mann's recent study (*LaGuardia Comes To Power*) shows, there is no reason for an historian to be so disdainful of quantitative empirical evidence.—DOUGLAS FOX, *Bowdoin College.*

The President as Chief Administrator. BY A. J. WANN. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1968. Pp. 219. $6.00.)

Professor Wann has written an excellent administrative history of the Roosevelt era. Not before nor since those exciting times have such significant developments occurred affecting the bureaucracy. The Roosevelt administration was one of bureaucratic expansion, experimentation, controversy, and on many occasions "muddling through." Professor Wann illustrates all of these occurrences, and undoubtedly his book will cause some nostalgia among those who lived through and participated in the bureaucracy during the Thirties and Forties.

This book pulls together most of the diverse literature relating to the administrative branch under Roosevelt. Certainly the New Deal was one of the most chronicled in our history. Ample use is made of the memoirs of the period, as well as relevant documents, newspaper accounts, and secondary sources. The synthesis of these materials is well done and valuable. Not only does the book refresh the memories of and provide new insights for scholars of administration, but also it is particularly valuable for students of administration who all too frequently these days have little understanding of the historical roots of the administrative branch. It is somewhat shocking how many contemporary students of political science have never heard of the Bureau of the Budget, the Executive Office of the President, the Reorganization Acts, the independent regulatory commissions, the President's Committee on Administrative Management and even the Hoover Commissions! And this list is only the beginning of what is a long list of important developments shaping the bureaucracy that are often ignored today although they were considered of central importance during the

Thirties, Forties, and early Fifties. Should our government begin to focus upon domestic problems once again as during the Thirties, increased attention will be given to problems of administrative planning and management.

Professor Wann uses as his basing point the widely accepted view that the President has a constitutional responsibility to be "Chief Administrator." The author accepts this Hamiltonian concept, although at one point he is careful to point out that Congress has a large measure of authority over the bureaucracy. In judging the successes and failures of Presidents in the performance of the role of "Chief Administrator" it should be emphasized that the thrust of the Constitution was not entirely in this direction. Fragmentation of the governmental process through the separation of powers encouraged the fragmentation of the bureaucracy, and the placement of agencies outside of the control of the President. The President is swimming against the tide whenever he attempts to tighten the reins he holds to the administrative branch. The book vividly illustrates this in connection with F.D.R.'s unsuccessful attempt to get Congress to implement the recommendations of the President's Committee on Administrative Management of 1937. In that instance he came face to face with intrenched bureaucratic interests that did not want to be reorganized, and intense pressure was exerted on Congress, particularly by the clientele groups of the old line agencies which also had a vested interest in the status quo, to defeat the reorganization proposals. Perhaps the pervasiveness of the view that the President is "Chief Administrator" should be modified in light of the constitutional and political facts, so that Presidents confronted with bureaucratic intransigence will not feel that they are failing to perform their constitutional "duty." Such a recognition of reality might also soften the views of those who like to criticize various Presidents for failing as "Chief Administrator."

In light of the foregoing considerations, was F.D.R. a successful "Chief Administrator"? The author makes the statement that "although Roosevelt was always interested throughout his career in questions of administrative organization, it is accurate to say that his interest in administration was subordinate to his interest in politics. Perhaps it is really more accurate to say that Roosevelt as President never actually distinguished politics and administration from each other in any clear-cut way." In my view this is the very reason F.D.R. was successful in many of his dealings with the bureaucracy. Whether or not the author would accept the view that politics and administration are inevitably intertwined is not made completely clear, although the facts of his book support this view. Public administration is politics, and to master the art of public administration it is necessary to ignore many of the "principles" of scientific management and concentrate upon the political management of men. Roosevelt proved this. There was a conflict between what he and many of his contemporaries considered to be the proper principles of management, and his instincts about politics. For example, on the one hand he preached the importance of hierarchical control and elimination of overlapping responsibilities, and on the other purposely pitted men and agencies against each other to receive from the clash of viewpoints the components of a good decision, which in his terms meant a wise political decision. There is no contradiction in this except for those who fail to see the true nature of the politics of administration. Although on occasion this book suggests a separation of politics and public administration, its contents actually vividly illustrate the connection between them.—PETER WOLL, *Brandeis University.*

The Political World of the High School Teacher. BY HARMON ZEIGLER. (Eugene: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, University of Oregon, 1966. Pp. 160. $2.00.)

The Political Life of American Teachers. BY HARMON ZEIGLER. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. 149. $4.95.)

We live in an era of increasing unrest and militancy of American teachers. Teachers may very soon come to display the kind of vocal protest now characteristic of college students and Negroes. Both high school and college teachers are often faced with low salaries, unpleasant community and school conditions, and little effective voice in the decisions that most affect them. That they should turn to strikes, mass resignations, sanctions and other tactics in making their demands heard should not surprise us. The question for political science is, will we be prepared to offer any illuminating scholarly insight and evidence on these problems, or will we be caught once again in the same ineffective position that we now are in with respect to Negro and student radical activism?

Against this background, one welcomes Harmon Zeigler's work on the occupational and political perceptions of teachers. Using a sample survey of 803 high school teachers in Oregon, Zeigler attempts to provide a basis for understanding several facets of teachers' political roles. He focuses upon their varying perceptions of the teaching experience and job satisfaction, involvement in the teacher's association, expectations about the goals and performance of the teacher organization and its leaders, abstract political and educational values, perceptions of the role of the teacher as an agent of political socialization, and beliefs concerning the sanctions that can be brought to bear by others to constrain the teacher's performance of his or her political and educational roles.

The theme given perhaps most emphasis in both versions of the book is that there are many interesting and important differences in the perceptions of men and women teachers. Men are, for example, less satisfied with their jobs, participate less in the Oregon teacher organization, and are more likely to want the organization to involve itself with wider political matters and less with educational politics *per se*. Although one might be well-advised to wait for other, replicative evidence before putting as heavy reliance on these sex differences as an explanatory device as does the author, such differences are suggestive of sources of discontent in the teacher ranks. In particular, the less successful male teacher, a fairly misanthropic creature in Zeigler's analysis, might bear closer scrutiny in future work. And, it is striking that in one of the few occupations that has long afforded equal access to the sexes, male high school teachers exhibit a political syndrome of lower efficacy and involvement that is more typical of women in the general population. The possible clash of such professionally-defined roles of men with those they have in the more general culture may thus well provide some motive power to radicalize them in the future. That males are less politically conservative and more apt to be attracted to unionization is also suggestive of greater militancy, especially as the proportion of males in the profession rises.

The differences between the two versions of the book are important, especially for the political science reader. *The Political World of the High School Teacher* presents the data used to make the generalizations presented in both versions. Only *The Political World* therefore provides the reader with a basis for assessing the extent and significance of the relationships presented. *The Political Life* version is evidently aimed at a nontechnically oriented audience in that it contains few tables or direct references to the data.

The latter, however, does expand the interpretation somewhat. Given how threadbare were the interpretative aspects of *The Political World,* even small improvements are welcomed in *The Political Life*. Nevertheless, the book still lacks theoretical integration. It consists essentially of a collection of fairly isolated hypotheses about teacher perceptions. Even the male-female difference theme is largely unsuccessful as a unifying device. The author had perhaps too many disparate empirical purposes when he set out originally to collect his data. The result is that his attempt to weave his various purposes into whole cloth was doomed to failure from the beginning. Combined with a tendency of his writing style to lapse into "dissertationese," such theoretical diffuseness clearly limits the work's utility and readability.

In spite of these flaws, the book may well serve to focus attention upon some important questions for further analysis, especially how the changing composition of the teacher profession together with its changing environment may lead it to greater political action. The work also suggests some interesting questions for future research into the role of the teacher and the school in political socialization. As for many attempts to break new ground, it contributes most in raising new hypotheses and suggesting further lines of inquiry.—JACK DENNIS, *University of Wisconsin.*

The Politics of Food for Peace: Executive-Legislative Interaction. BY PETER A. TOMA, with the assistance of FREDERICK A. SCHOENFELD. (Tucson, The University of Arizona Press, 1967. Pp. 195. $3.95.)

Professor Toma's study is concerned with both the past history and future prospects of food-aid, however it focuses on "executive-legislative interaction" in the 1964 Congressional hearings on the extension of Food for Peace. "Why did the Congressional attitude toward Food for Peace change in 1964, Toma queries, ". . . an answer to this question becomes fundamental to understanding the future of food-aid in the context of American policy."

To set the stage for a discussion of the 1964 hearings, Toma briefly reviews "Agricultural Politics and Policy in the United States," the history and scope of the Food for Peace Program, beginning with the passage of Public Law 480 in 1954, and the "attitudes" and "images" of Congress in years when food-aid legislation was extended or modified. He emphasizes that, while the primary motives for the initiation of Public Law 480 were domestic concerns (i.e. surplus disposal), by 1964, food-aid had become primarily an "instrument of U.S. Foreign policy." This trend was reinforced by the "Food for Peace" label attached to the program by the Eisenhower Administration and, especially, by the organizational and policy changes which were introduced following the election of President Kennedy.

During the period from 1954 through 1961, according to Toma, there was also a trend of growing Congressional support. However future support was endangered by several unresolved issues which had recurred in the successive legislative hearings. The most important of these issues were (a) the intent of the program (i.e. to serve foreign or domestic policy objectives), (b) the appropriate term for legislative extensions, (c) whether or not to assist Communist nations, (d) the degree to which Congress should directly supervise program operations, (e) the accumulation and handling of

Title I proceeds (from concessional sales) and (f) "the question of organizational efficiency to implement the program according to Congressional desires." An additional problem which was to lead to future difficulties was the lack of an effective method of evaluating the program.

Up to this point, the analysis is relatively clear and straightforward, although the discussion of "Agricultural politics and policy" in Chapter One is extraneous to subsequent material. However, in the more detailed consideration of the events of January-September 1964, the thread of the argument becomes difficult to follow.

There are three major problems with Toma's analysis of this period and the conclusions and implications which he derives therefrom. First, there is no clear conceptual framework or theoretical focus. There is a fragmentary and somewhat puzzling discussion of Congressional and Executive decision-making as "systems" (using a version of Easton's paradigm) but the model is neither elaborated nor applied.

A second problem derives from the neglect of relevant literature on legislative processes and administrative decision making in government. Much of this literature discusses the kinds of issues with which Toma is concerned (i.e. the budgetary process, legislative strategies of administration officials, the position and power of committee chairmen in their respective houses, House-Senate similarities and differences, etc.). Wildavsky's *Politics of the Budgetary Process,* for example, would support Toma's contention that the lack of "evaluative documentation" was a handicap to the administration in its relations with Congress. However Wildavsky's study would raise serious doubts about the conclusion that Congressional "penetration" of the "facade" of executive unity is a very helpful explanation of the defeat of the administration proposals. Virtually every important legislative proposal tends to be the result of discussion and compromise in the Executive branch and in the case of Food for Peace the degree of "unity" seems to have been relatively high. To cite another example, the analysis of Congressional decision-making in Chapter Five is virtually *de novo* as if (to cite just a few relevant works) Matthews' *U.S. Senators and their World* (1960), Clapp's, *The Congressmen* (1963) and Carroll's *The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs* (1958) had never been written.

The third problem is Toma's use of the Pearson *chi*^{2} to identify "variables" which had "causal influence" on decision-making patterns of Congressional committee members. Toma has taken ten variables from the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* and computed contingency coefficients between these variables (individually) and an incomplete record of committee voting on the 1964 bill derived from a mailed questionnaire. The response to this questionnaire was sixty-five per cent (26 responses out of 40) with a strong possibility of systematic variation in the response-non response patterns. From these data, he draws conclusions about the relationship between the "independent variables" of (a) Party, (b) Party unity, (c) Liberal-conservative, (d) Presidential support, (e) Attendance at hearings, (f) Farm Constituency, (g) PL 480 constituency, (h) Age and (i) Seniority and the "dependent variable of "Executive support," "indifference" or "opposition." Where a "statistically significant relationship" (at the .05 level) exists, Toma concludes that the dependent and independent variables are causally related. He then uses the *chi*^{2} significance values to order the independent variables with respect to their "intensity of influence" on the dependent variable. There is general agreement, I think, that significance tests cannot be used in this way. Omitting the problem of meeting the mathematical assumptions of the statistical model (which Toma's "sample" clearly fails to do) a measure of the strength of relationship between variables (for example, the *omega* coefficient) is what would be needed to draw these types of conclusions. In Toma's presentation, there is no connection established between data and conclusions; only the illusion of such a connection.

Because the topic of investigation is a worthy one, it is too bad that these types of problems arise in Toma's analysis. Public Law 480 represented a rather unique symbiosis of domestic and foreign policy interests. Thus the Food for Peace idea has survived the legislative "minuet" better than most foreign assistance legislation and would be a most interesting focus for detailed study of interrelated foreign and domestic issues in the legislative process. Moreover, there is also a need for a book which would increase public awareness of the War on Hunger and its significance, much as McGovern's *War Against Want* attempted to do several years ago. *The Politics of Food for Peace* accomplishes neither objective. The non professional who is concerned with the general background and significance of food-aid will find that the style of presentation is too technical and pedantic to hold his interest. The political scientist who is concerned with the legislative or administrative processes of government will find that the connections established between data and conclusions are far from convincing.—JOHN M. RICHARDSON, JR., *University of Minnesota.*

Legislative Representative in the Contemporary South. BY MALCOLM E. JEWELL. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967. Pp. 141. $5.50.)

One of the by-products of the "Reapportionment Revolution" has been renewed interest by political scientists, and members of other disciplines, in representation theory, practice, and results. The state legislatures have served as laboratories for empirical analyses of various representative systems and their consequences. From them, considerable hard data have emerged to add to our knowledge and understanding of the American political system, and of the implications and effects of diverse representation schemes.

Malcolm E. Jewell has undertaken a comparative analysis of certain aspects of legislative representation in eight states in *Legislative Representation in the Contemporary South.* He examines legislative politics in Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. He is concerned chiefly with the extent of Democratic primary competition, the existence of factional political systems and the development of two-party competition. But, while there is much valuable material here, the problems of comparative studies among the states and especially among their political sub-systems force the conclusions, where they are even possible, to be very broad.

Jewell concludes that the levels of primary competition "vary substantially from state to state" but the data led him to discount as causal factors the length of terms, the number of incumbents who run, and the proportion of Negro or metropolitan districts. In each of the states, however, it appears that one or more of these factors contribute to the incidence of primary competition. Incumbency seems to be an important variable in determining competition—the lack of an incumbent seems to produce a higher level of competition. Also there is somewhat more competition in metropolitan districts and "occasionally" less in the more rural districts.

In assessing the influence of factionalism, Professor Jewell is compelled to focus only upon Kentucky, Louisiana, and Texas because in the other five states there is little evidence of factionalism in legislative primaries. Even in the three states, only limited conclusions can be drawn since factionalism as evident in slating arrangements occurs in too great a variety of situations to permit broad generalizations to stand.

Firmer trends emerge from the consideration of two-party competition. Professor Jewell finds increasing competition from Republicans in legislative elections. This competition is manifested both in more Republican candidates and more Republican success in winning legislative seats. Further, Republicanism has spread from traditionally Republican areas to metropolitan counties, and particularly those in which Republican presidential and gubernatorial candidates have run well. Jewell notes that these counties too are those in which the Democratic primaries are most competitive and where reapportionment is producing additional legislative seats.

In his final chapter, Professor Jewell speculates on the future of competition in these states. He identifies reapportionment and a growing Negro vote as the two major factors that will affect legislative contests, and lead to increased levels of competition in both primaries and general elections. Reapportionment will allot proportionately more legislative seats to areas already characterized by higher levels of competition and enlarge the size of rural districts where long incumbency seemed most deeply rooted. At the least, reapportionment changes the pattern of election systems by altering historic districting schemes to add more legislators from multi-member districts, increase the number of multi-county districts, and introduce single-member districts into metropolitan areas. The impact of the Negro vote increasingly can be expected to be felt in both metropolitan and rural areas as Negroes become participants in Southern political society. Already evident in metropolitan areas, Negro voting in black-belt areas potentially can affect the entire structure of Southern politics. Together with reapportionment, it can lead to more primary and party competition.

This study is useful to understanding state legislative systems as well as Southern politics. Even though he finds that many of his hypotheses about legislative representation in a one-party environment are not confirmed, Professor Jewell contributes valuable data about legislative politics in the eight states. The analysis of Kentucky, Louisiana, and Texas slating practices has the greatest depth, and the data on party competition is most useful from a comparative standpoint in the Southern region.—RALPH EISENBERG, *University of Virginia.*

Anti-Politics in America: Reflections on the Anti-Political Temper and its Distortions of the Democratic Process. BY JOHN H. BUNZEL. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967. Pp. 291. $6.95.)

Anti-Politics in America is a book of reflections rather than a research report. Many of the reflections are undoubtedly accurate; at any rate, they are banal and unoriginal. Some of the reflections are fascinating, and testable, propositions about the political attitudes of people outside of the mainstream of American politics. Prof. Bunzel's greatest failing in this book is that he has in no meaningful way attempted to verify these propositions. Reflections on impressions gathered at Bay Area brunches and cocktail parties can no longer be accepted as serious scholarship in political science unless these impressions are supported by some hard data.

The author's failure to gather any meaningful data is particularly unfortunate because he is dealing with a major theoretical problem. Anti-politics, according to Bunzel, is the rejection of politics "in the name of some non-political 'truth.'" (p. 3) He lists among the people rejecting politics those on the radical right, the far left, pacifists, psychological determinists, and utopians. Their common characteristic, he asserts (but does not test) is unwillingness to compromise major goals; such people are anti-political because politics necessarily involves compromise following conflict.

Before discussing the book's technical shortcomings in detail, it is necessary to consider some theoretical issues. The first is that there may be some issues on which a reasonable man will not compromise. Bunzel's commitment to democratic procedures seems to be of this nature. The second is that Bunzel seems to claim that there cannot be politics outside of democratic systems. "There is no politics in a totalitarian society because conflict is looked upon as a form of illness." (p. 7) Are we to take this to mean that the process of making binding decisions in totalitarian societies is something other than a political process? And what are we to think of Chairman Mao and his theory of contradictions? Finally, Bunzel writes that politics "leads not to order and stability but to instability and change." (p. 10) Perhaps the author is working in terms of a highly individual conception of stability and instability, but one of the main currents in social thought today seems to be the quest for change with stability. At any rate, it seems more reasonable to argue that politics can lead to any combination of those four terms.

Bunzel's critiques of the manifestations of the anti-political sentiment are generally summaries of the writings of other social theorists, most of whom are at Berkeley, and the reader should be advised that the original works are better. At times, the effusive citations approach sycophancy: the radical right is subjected to the critiques of Franz Neumann, Daniel Bell, and Richard Hofstadter; C. Wright Mills runs Nelson Polsby's formidable gauntlet; the most telling points on psychological determinism are made by Norman Jacobson and Gabriel Almond. But it is not until the last two chapters that this technique reaches its full strength. In the chapter on the utopians and the elimination of politics, we read, "As Bendix and Fisher have observed. . . " (p. 247), "As Bendix and Fisher have pointed out. . . ." (p. 248), "As Wolin says . . ." (p. 249), and "As Wolin points out . . ." (p. 250). In the final chapter, "The Commitment to Democratic Politics," there is a quotation running from page 280 to page 282 from Charles Lindblom's "A New Look at Latin America," which is footnoted in the following way: "I thought so highly of his approach and analysis that I had the same piece reprinted in a book of readings I edited for college undergraduates. . . ." (p. 282) and then plugs the book. Perhaps these are only matters of style, but a book devoid of data should not also commit the sin of being aesthetically offensive.

Let us continue to examine the book's methodological problems. Bunzel's basic technique is to infer from the writings of a movement's leaders to the attitudes and probable behavior of the movement's followers. These inferences are generally supported by referring to anecdotes and to the author's conversations with students and other acquaintances who are engaged in such movements. Even Bunzel must realize that this is a risky sort of verification, for at one point he writes that H. Stuart "Hughes, like many followers of the peace movement, reveals subtly that his ringing statements are actually more extreme than would be his own personal actions were he in a position of political responsibility, but that the voicing of such positions is necessary." (p. 169) If this is the case, why does Bunzel assume that all Birchites agree with *The Blue Book,* that all members of the radical left share the thoughts of C. Wright Mills and the Lynds, that *a large proportion of* Quakers prefer absolute truth and peace to the give and take of politics (Bunzel claims, by the way, that community action programs are nonpolitical. p. 153), and so on for each of the groups he reflects upon.

Bunzel would have made a significant contribution to our understanding of extremest politics had he gone out and measured the degree of ideological thinking among followers of such movements, and had he correlated the beliefs of leaders with the beliefs of followers. Let me list a few of his conjectures that merit rigorous testing:

1) Thinking only in terms of moral outrage, she ["a friend of mine"] believed an issue to be more important than an institution or a procedure. (p. 28)
2) The hostility to democratic politics on the part of the right wing is in large measure a result of its fundamentalist roots. (p. 65)
3) The extremists of the far right . . . are a religious people who are separated from the rest of mankind for the great purpose of preserving and propagating the true religion. . . . Worship of the past is coupled with a mistrust of modernity. (pp. 86-87)
4) Their deepseated suspicion of everyone but themselves merely underscores their belief in the betrayal of the American Dream by hidden conspiracies and reaffirms their fervor for immediate and total solutions. (p. 87)
5) Yet anyone who understands or is sympathetic to the ways of politics in this country knows that many businessmen, bankers, and other "elite" members of the community are very often too indifferent to public affairs for the simple reason that they are too busy making money. (p. 108)
6) The religiously dedicated members of the peace movement see a definite dichotomy between politics and their own action. (p. 166)
7) There is a real tendency [for pacifists] to apply a double standard to the United States and the Soviet Union. (p. 180)

It is a shame that Prof. Bunzel has not tried to gather the kinds of data which might have verified some of these propositions. I would guess that some of them are correct; others seem to be patently false. Serious testing of these propositions and analysis of their implications for the maintenance of the democratic process would be a significant contribution to the discipline. As it is, we are left with a disappointing and frustrating book, which, in the words of one of my colleagues, "ranges from banality to bêtise to bunkum."—KENNETH S. SHERRILL, *Hunter College, City University of New York*.

The Admirals' Lobby. BY VINCENT DAVIS. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. 329. $7.50.)

"In the councils of Government we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes." Thus cautioned General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Professor Davis' study of the U.S. Navy's officer corps reads as a well argued brief for the defense —at least in defense of the U.S. Navy. He finds that naval officers do not like to engage in activities that clearly have political purposes (p. 302). And in a "propositional" summary at the end of the book he concludes they engage in such activity only when the following two conditions are met: (1) ". . . a dire and immediate sense of threat to the continued existence of the Navy. . . ." and (2) ". . . leadership, or at least tacit support, from one or more ranking civilian officials, usually the Secretary. . . ." (p. 319). While these findings may not entirely console those who share the fears of the former Commander-in-Chief, the evidence offered in support of them is even less assuring. Especially distressing is the Navy's tendency to interpret everything from Army Air Corps' doctrine in the 1920's, the National Security Act of 1947, to Secretary McNamara's management practices as threats to survival. The author attributes most such reactions to "The Navy's traditional sense of being misunderstood and unappreciated by the American public" (p. 270).

Beyond providing evidence of paranoic tendencies, the bulk of the study presents the reader with a wealth of material which suggests there is nothing particularly sinister or overbearing about the political activities of the Navy. That naval officers and, less frequently, offices engage in lobbying, propaganda, and information manipulation is incontrovertible and the author provides many examples of each. The relevant questions are, how endemic is such activity, to what purposes has it been put, what restraints and checks operate? The answers, considered at length, are for the most part reassuring.

More than anything else, the book is a recounting of the perceptions and attitudes of naval officers themselves. The author has gone to great effort to uncover and set forth a "frame of reference" or "cognitive map" characterizing the officer corps. Drawing from published and some unpublished sources, extensive personal interviews, and very probably his own insights as a former naval aviator and Annapolis graduate, the author attributes to the Navy a vision of strategy, technology, and politics not inconsistent with the colorful statement attributed to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson: "The Navy is a religion, Neptune is god, Alfred T. Mahan his prophet, and the U.S. Navy the one true church." Officers have a healthy distrust of the virtues of centralized defense organization (Place the Navy at the mercy of a Secretary of Defense who might not appreciate the nature of sea power? Never!). There is a lack of vision in assessing the impact of new technology (We are told for example, "As for the control of nuclear energy, its military significance is dramatized at least as much by its application to propulsion systems for submarines as by its more spectacular uses in ordnance devices" (p. 58). By the way, it is not clear whether this represents the author's or the Navy's belief.). Finally, there is dogged belief in "command of the seas" as a vital element of national security, achievable only through a "balanced Navy." Most interestingly, politics is viewed as a somewhat tainted activity, beneath the dignity of a professional and certainly not the domain of a military professional committed to the norm of civilian supremacy in matters of higher national policy.

The study devotes about equal attention to the development of attitudes and positions prior to World War II and to their evolution during the post-war period. What emerges is a picture of the military as just another bureaucracy devoted to its own particular subgoals and survival interests. Norms which inhibit political activity serve to reduce the Navy's effectiveness in the rough and tumble of the national policy process—but not too much. Despite promises of a conceptual analysis of the subject made in the Preface and notwithstanding the "propositional" summary at the end, the book is primarily a chronology of views and events—closer to military of institutional history than to interest group or organizational analysis. The book's virtues are also its vices. Often drawing on unpublished and frequently anonymous sources, the author creates an interesting and plausible sketch of perceptions among naval officers—accounting for their origins and tracing out some of their implications. However, these merits are achieved at the cost of treating the subject in virtual isolation from the domestic and international events which give the perceptions meaning (for example, little treatment of changing national views about opponents and the threats they might constitute). Foregone are countless opportunities for applying or testing relevant hypotheses from the literature of contemporary studies in politics and organizational behavior. Perhaps most disappointing is the failure to shed much light on what is billed as ". . . really a hypothesis intended to be tested in the research," namely, ". . . that the nature and employment of armed forces within and by any given nation-state would be to a large degree determined by the nature and culture of that nation" (vii). Perhaps the best judgment of this book is the one the author makes in the Preface, ". . . regard the work in hand as only an early report on an ongoing research project that will require far more work to complete with any substantial degree of thoroughness" (xi).—J. C. Ries, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion. By Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967. Pp. 239. $10.00.)

The contents of this book are more accurately represented by adding onto the present title, *The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion,* the term, Pre-election, 1964. For this is a study based on 3215 national cross-section interviews conducted in September and October of 1964 by the Gallup Poll.

The bill-of-fare will be familiar to the student of public opinion accustomed to perusing bivariate cross-tabulations among issue positions, party and class identifications, socio-economic and demographic characteristics, and psychological attributes. However, the reader with an interest in voting behavior is served notice that his appetite will only be whetted by a rare entry or two concerning the relationship between political beliefs and opinions and voting intentions. It is true that the usefulness of working with voting intentions, as opposed to the vote report available from a post-election study, may be questioned due to the discrepancy between intention and behavior. However, given the author's concern with liberal-conservative ideology, the unusually sharp distinction between the Presidential candidates in this respect, the rate of defection from partisan affiliations in candidates choices, and the professed interest in providing an analysis for the use of politicians and the student of practical politics, more attention to voting intentions would seem to have been justified.

The audience to which the book is directed, and the type of analysis employed, is quite accurately stated by Free in the Acknowledgments. "The level of analysis . . . has necessarily been determined by the fact that I am a pollster and political analyst, not a psychologist or a sociologist. . . . In selecting the information to be gathered and in analyzing and presenting it, I have had primarily in mind the politician and the student of practical politics. Accordingly, I have not attempted to trace causation in depth." And that's the way it is.

Apparently the contribution by Cantril is very much restricted to the last chapter. Once again, according to the Acknowledgments by Free, ". . . my associate, Hadley Cantril, insists that I confess to being primarily guilty for most of it. On the other hand, I insist on making it clear that his is the responsibility especially for the last chapter, the most important and difficult to formulate."

In the last chapter, Cantril observes the need to develop an American ideology which is consistent with the way we behave. The observed inconsistency is between the support for a conservative ideology of private initiative and a limited federal government on the one hand, and support for the welfare programs of the federal government on the other. The empirical base of the observation is provided by the distribution of the population on two scales: an "ideological spectrum" and an "operational spectrum." On the operational spectrum, consisting of five items on federal aid to education, medicare, federal housing, urban renewal, and the eradication of poverty, 65 percent of the population is classified as predominantly or completely liberal. On the ideological spectrum, based on attitudes towards federal intervention in private enterprise, state, and local affairs, and individual initiative, the conservative pole is favored with 50 percent predominantly or completely conservative and only 16 percent in the two most liberal categories.

The apparent inconsistency may be discounted partially on two points of methodology and on one point of interpretation. The first methodological point is that, because of the item content and format, individuals disposed to acquiesce to plausible statements and to accept the status quo are well on the way to becoming ideological conservatives and operational liberals—in the absence of any informed or firmly held opinions to the contrary.

A second methodological issue is raised by the failure to state the basis for selecting the items to be included in the two scales. Why, for example, is an item concerning the amount of power exercised by the Federal Government excluded from the ideological spectrum scale? Its inclusion in the ideological scale, with two-thirds of the population supporting the present, or an increased, exercise of federal power, would help to shift the distribution on the ideological spectrum towards the thinly populated liberal end. Indeed, the strong Guttman scalar relationship between the orderings on the ideological and operational spectrum suggests that a common dimension underlies both measures, with the difference in the distributions on the two spectra a function of item bias.

The observation of a strong Guttman scalar relationship between the ideological and operational spectrum scales is relevant to the point of interpretation that is being questioned here; that *the electorate is characterized by a sharp inconsistency of ideology and behavior.* No more than a fourth of the population is conservative on the ideological spectrum and liberal on the operational spectrum. Nearly all of the remaining respondents are either liberal to middle-of-the-road on both scales or conservative to middle-of-the-road on both.

Certainly the American political system faces graver challenges than that posed by a quarter of the population, at the very most, subscribing to a conservative ideology while supporting specific programs somewhat at variance with that ideology. It is more likely that the promulgation of this more or less unsubstantiated view of the American electorate serves primarily as a source of frustration for the Republicans who, as the authors put it, "have a philosophy but no program," while "the Democrats have a program but no philosophy."

By implication, this review has suggested that the contradiction between conservative ideals and liberal practice is the only concern of this work. Although the data analysis repeatedly involves the ideological and operational spectra, the interests of the author(s) are much more diffusive. I leave the reader to select among the varied data presentations according to his special interests and needs.

In conclusion, this book may be useful as an "outside reading" for an undergraduate course and it may serve specific purposes at the graduate level without making the prelim reading list. The professional-academic analyst of American public opinion may find it stimulating at points to the extent that he is energized by particular pieces of data.—AAGE CLAUSEN, *University of Wisconsin.*

Claus Spreckels: The Sugar King of Hawaii. BY JACOB ADLER. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1966. Pp. 339. $8.50.)

Interviewed by a *San Francisco Bulletin* reporter during his campaign against annexation of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States, Claus Spreckels, The Sugar King, proclaimed that the Islands may be annexed "by and by, some time . . . but not now. I'll guarantee to deliver them at any time" (p. 248). This claim of political omnipotence by "His Royal Saccharinity," as his enemies called him, was promptly challenged. Nevertheless, it caused such concern that one of the supporters of Hawaii's revolutionary, Provisional Government warned that Spreckels

> can largely control Maui, and can have great influence in other parts of the Islands. . . . He is a strong factor . . . and it is important to use him and not quarrel with him (p. 251).

This political jousting occurred at a significant time in Hawaii's political history and in the course of Spreckels' Hawaiian adventure. Both strands of these intertwined narratives are skillfully traced by Adler, who concentrates on the decisive part played by Spreckels in Hawaii's political history during the final quarter of the 19th century. Adler thereby helps us better to understand the decline of the Hawaiian monarchy and the revolutionary outbursts by which it was finally destroyed.

As Adler makes clear, a grasp of these developments is indispensable to those seeking to understand a broad aspect of The Islands' political development: the transition from the monarchic-oligarchic regime of the late 19th century to Hawaii's increasingly egalitarian, democratic regime of today. The importance of Adler's work transcends its analysis of Hawaii's political history by providing political scientists with an opportunity to reflect on a question of fundamental importance: What is the nature of oligarchic rule, the character of the oligarchic regime?

As recounted and interpreted by Adler, Spreckels' career provides an arresting model of the oligarchic man. A remarkably short time after his arrival in the U.S.—in steerage, and with but a single *taler* in his pocket—Spreckels advanced to a position of enormous financial and political power in California, where he became the acknowledged Sugar King of the West Coast during the 1870s. Not surprisingly, Spreckels turned to Hawaii to supply his California refineries with the enormous, unending flow of raw sugar they required. Thus, it was in Hawaii that he created the world's largest and most efficient sugar plantations.

Adler is at his best as he reveals the scope of Spreckels' genius in matters of finance and production. Guided by an almost uncanny grasp of the possibilities for creating an all-inclusive, vertically integrated, near monopolistic control of the Hawaiian-West Coast sugar industry, Spreckels simultaneously developed plantations, railroads, utilities, shipping lines, banks, and refineries. His oligopolistic, centralized, "factory-in-the-field" pattern of agricultural production was the work of a brilliant and far-sighted man, and was to serve as the model for commercial agriculture, in Hawaii and—many decades later—on the American mainland. Indeed, contemporary students of economic development in the emerging nations would do well to consider Adler's analysis of how Spreckels constructed his empire.

Spreckels faced seemingly insuperable obstacles to his goals. But, as Adler makes clear, he was armed with the maxim, "Every man has his price," and he alternately bribed, then intimidated, Hawaii's royalty in his successful efforts to secure land, water rights, and special privileges of all sorts. At the peak of his power, he controlled over half of the enormous sugar industry in the Hawaiian Islands, and he boasted, "When Kalakaua was King, I practically ran the country" (p. 231).

Nevertheless, Spreckels' methods of achieving his ends in the sphere of production emphasized the defects of his character and perspective. These proved to be his undoing. Unable to comprehend the outlook and motives of non-oligarchic men, Spreckels never believed that King Kalakaua could dare to bite the hand that bribed him. Yet so it happened. Kalakaua, made furious by Spreckels' boasts and bullying, turned to others for assistance. At the same time, the democratic leaders of Hawaii, men such as George Washington Pilipo, a courageous and intelligent native Hawaiian, and Sanford Dole, continued to battle unceasingly against Spreckels in the legislature. These men believed that their political community should be more than an enormous sugar plantation or joint stock company and the goal of human life more than mere production. They were intent on developing Hawaii's agriculture in the traditional pattern of American family farming in order to insure the development of a sturdy, self-sufficient, and free citizenry.

With the overthrow of Hawaii's monarchy in 1893, Spreckels' political defeat was completed. He was unable to restore Queen Liliuokalani to her throne or, subsequently, to prevent the annexation of Hawaii by the United States. His political power crushed, the great oligarch was unable to maintain his economic position, and he lived to see the ownership of his stupendous enterprises fall into the hands of Hawaii-born descendants of the missionaries.

Even though Spreckels' political and economic power had been broken, a powerful oligarchic element remained in Hawaii. It is to a much needed and comprehensive consideration of this aspect of Hawaii's political-economic history that Adler's study of Spreckels points us. As Adler notes, the definitive study of Hawaii's "Big Five" corporate structure remains to be written, as does an adequate account of the persistently monopolistic patterns of land ownership and utilization in Hawaii. Adler's efforts will undoubtedly guide and stimulate this further work. We are thus all the more indebted to him for an extraordinarily useful, important, and fascinating study.—**Robert Horwitz**, *Kenyon College.*

North Carolina Politics: An Introduction. By Jack D. Fleer. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1968. Pp. 165.)

This book is an introduction to electoral politics in North Carolina since 1940. Professor Fleer of Wake Forest University has utilized aggregate data, historical documentation, and statutory regulations to produce a clear though simple picture of the state's electoral politics. It is a very useful book for high school and introductory college courses. The author has used scholarly accounts, plus the data he collected and analyzed, to go beyond the extremely simplistic introductions to the politics of individual states which one often finds in books of this nature.

The work includes a brief introductory section on the political environment which describes the elective offices, statutory regulations relating to them, and the effects of reapportionment and redistricting. This is followed by a chapter on the electorate in which the author describes the qualifications for voting, the registration system, and rates of participation. Next comes a chapter on party organization—emphasizing party regulation and activities at various levels. Then a chapter on the electoral process with sections on nominations, campaigning, financing, and elections follows. Analyses of party competition cover the two final substantive chapters—one of these being about intraparty competition, the other about interparty competition.

As with most books, this book could have been made stronger. Data about political opinion, interest aggregations, and other aspects of the informal political structure are missing. (Which might cause some persons to suggest that "The North Carolina Electoral System" rather than "North Carolina Politics" would have been a more accurate title.)

A section on Negro and white political attitudes and involvement in North Carolina politics would have been particularly relevant and helpful. Even though data of this nature for generalizing to the entire state does not exist currently, several studies in recent years have provided valuable individual data about important segments of the North Carolina electorate. Incorporation of these data in the section on the political environment and the section about elections would have added considerable depth to the book.

The book obviously is based on adequate data. However, the documentation often does not show this. The decision to omit all but a few references undoubtedly was a publisher's decision. And, for the beginning student of state party politics, this lack of documentation throughout will be no problem. However, this is a problem for the serious scholar, who would like to pursue the many leads Professor Fleer has provided.

For the political scientist, the value of this book is in the many interesting implicit and explicit hypotheses which the author has raised about North Carolina politics. Currently, survey data are being collected which may provide support or refutation for many of these hypotheses. Both the continuing Southeastern survey and the survey for the Comparative State Elections Study in 1968 include North Carolina as a survey universe. Both will provide data for some of Professor Fleer's hypotheses.—LEWIS BOWMAN, *Emory University*.

Social Welfare and Urban Problems. EDITED BY THOMAS D. SHERRARD. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 210. $6.00.)

This volume presents some of the papers prepared for the 94th Annual Forum of the National Conference on Social Welfare, held in the spring of 1967. It is a mixed bag, without any very coherent theme or focus. There is one report of field research, presenting evidence that not all black ghettos are alike. There are two essays concerned with the barriers to and the possibilities of social mobility for poor slum-dwellers. Two papers are concerned with significant trends in the practice of social welfare—the use of neighborhood organizations for the delivery of services and the growth of quasi-legal and legal representation in public assistance administration. Another is concerned with the need for comprehensive social and physical urban planning, rather than a varied collection of particular program plans, as a requisite for improving slum conditions. The final paper argues the case for a federal guarantee of minimum income. The introduction, by the editor, is the most general and wide-ranging of the papers, with a good many trenchant opinions about current social welfare problems.

Although there are interesting insights and ideas in many of the papers, a reader led by the title to expect something resembling a comprehensive presentation of a "social welfare" approach or viewpoint toward urban problems will probably be disappointed. The primary concern is with poverty and deprivation; only one of the papers (that by Meltzer and Whitley on social and physical planning) devotes much attention to relating these problems directly to any general urban context or system.

Even in the absence of a central theme or organization, several ideas implicit in all, or at least several, of the papers may be singled out. First, of course, is the general sense of crisis, of current failure, of need for important changes in policy and practice. Another is the clear feeling on the part of at least several of the authors that the provision of financial support for the poor should be separated from "social work" proper. Third is the apparent acceptance of the likelihood of positive effort on the part of the underprivileged themselves to change the existing situation, often through methods which will contravene or disrupt the efforts of those who think they are trying to help. Not only are such efforts—labeled variously "indigenous organization," "self-help," or "black power"—expected; encouragement and help for them, even with public funds, is suggested.

Every occupation develops special uses of words that are presumably meaningful among the initiates, though not so clear to "laymen." These papers include some examples. When an author talks of the need to remedy "cognitive deficiency in adults," I am not sure whether he means ignorance or stupidity; if the latter, it may not be easy to remedy. When another writes of the need to enlist large numbers of the poor in "people-helping" occupations, he is probably not thinking of jobs as garage mechanics or typists, though some people might well feel that such efforts belong within the category.

The varying approaches and arguments of these papers themselves constitute excellent evidence supporting the statement of the editor: "No major field of human activity in this country operates with less theoretical and scientific guidance than the field of social welfare" (p. 30). It is a professional field even more heavily laden than political science with sweeping value judgments and unproved assumptions about human behavior. One of the most encouraging things about this volume is the fact, clear in many of the papers, that the leaders of the profession recognize clearly that the profession itself, and the crucially important functions which it performs, are deeply troubled, and that major changes are in the cards.—YORK WILLBERN, *Indiana University*.

The Development of Political Attitudes in Children. BY ROBERT D. HESS AND JUDITH V. TORNEY. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967. Pp. 288. $9.75.)

Interested scholars have long awaited book length publication of findings from the large study of political socialization undertaken by Hess and Easton in the early 1960's. Apparently another book by Easton and Dennis will follow this one and will be written more to the concerns of political scientists. Meanwhile, the Hess and Torney book provides a good deal of useful information for scholars in the field as well as students and laymen.

The study is based on questionnaire evidence from 12,000 students drawn from eight cities in four regions of the United States and covers grades two through eight. The sample is biased in that it covers no rural schools, no parochial schools, and contains a disporportionate number of higher status children. The authors are frank about these shortcomings. On the other hand, a large sample of 12,000 enables one to have reasonable confidence in the results once one is aware of the biases. The study was competently executed methodologically and some clever ideas were employed in data gathering and analysis that students in the field should review for possible use before launching their own studies. Measurement of variables was not particularly elegant and the authors, appropriately, have not tried to push the data in statistical analysis. As a matter of fact, the analysis is rather simple and straightforward so that readers not sophisticated in statistical evaluation can readily grasp it.

Fundamentally the book is a developmental analysis; the title is closely accurate as to its contents and flavor. The authors posit four models for developmental processes (the accumulation model, interpersonal transfer model, identification model, and cognitive-developmental model) and suggest at various points in the book which model best fits their interpretation of the findings. Most of the book is devoted to presentation of findings and relatively little space is given to discussion of their implications. Political scientists will not be impressed with the quality of their analysis of politics; the book should be seen, rather, as a contribution to theories of child development. It seems to this writer that the book is inadequately organized; there is a good deal of redundancy from chapter to chapter. On the other hand, summaries appear at frequent intervals and are an aid to review and skimming. Another nice feature is the inclusion of quotations from interviews with children which provide the reader with the flavor of the way kids think about politics.

The reader who is familiar with the literature on political participation, voting behavior, and political socialization will find the great proportion of findings from this study confirming what he already knows from previous studies. For example, political participation and social participation are significantly correlated. More interesting are the findings unique to this study. For example, most adult studies have not been able to use IQ as a variable but it is available here. They find that children with high IQ are much more likely to feel efficacious politically; they become politicized much more thoroughly and speedily; and they have more reservations about government thus developing a need to try and influence it.

Some of the more global generalizations about development are of special interest as well. Political socialization is already well advanced by grade eight; party identification is established in many children and their knowledge of how government works and how they can relate to it is reasonably adequate. As grade level rises the following things happen: Their definition of "good citizen" increasingly emphasizes voting and keeping informed while helpfulness to others and obedience to laws declines. The tendency to see the President as personally responsive and benevolent declines. The tendency to equate parties with candidates declines and they more adequately distinguish the stands of the parties. The tendency of young children to prefer a political image of unity and lack of conflict declines in favor of more acceptance of party disagreement and political contention in general.

The authors conclude that the schools are the central socializing agent, their predominance over the family in teaching about politics is especially marked in low status homes. The family seems predominant only in socializing political party identification, probably because the schools shy away from partisanship. The authors are critical of the schools for emphasizing a norm of citizen duty to vote but not for citizens to be active in a partisan way or to join with others in group activity designed to influence government. The norm to support candidates rather than parties rises with grade level and is most marked among high IQ students. Children, even at grade eight, have difficulty grasping the meaning and role of pressure groups and seem unable to assess their influence. The schools are propagating a belief in individual access to power via the vote which the authors feel is unrealistic and will later be seen as false and disillusioning. They call for a thorough reassessment of the role and curriculum of the schools in political socialization.—Lester W. Milbrath, *SUNY at Buffalo.*

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. By Arend Lijphart. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. Pp. 222. $5.75.)

This book will be welcomed as an important contribution to the scarce literature on the political system of the Netherlands as well as an interesting attempt to formulate amendments to pluralist theory. The way in which it integrates modern theory, survey data and historical data in a mosaic is in many respects admirable. It is based on a thorough knowledge of Dutch and other literature. It adds some new empirical data; and above all it gives evidence of an original and stimulating vision.

The author's starting-point is what he calls a paradox: on the one hand, the political system of the Netherlands is characterized by an extraordinary degree of social cleavage (deep religious and class divisions). On the other hand Holland is also one of the most notable examples of a successful democracy (pp. 1, 2). Lijphart tries to explain this paradox in terms of pluralist theory.

After an interesting analysis of several versions of the so-called crosscutting cleavage proposition, Lijphart starts from the conviction: "The Dutch case is prima facie contrary to the crosscutting cleavages proposition. Expressed in the jargon of the cited writers, Dutch politics is characterized by 'mutually reinforcing,' 'superimposed,' 'congruent' and 'parallel' rather than 'crosscutting' affiliations and organizational patterns: class and religious cleavages separate self-contained 'inclusive' groups with sharply defined 'political subcultures.' . . . But Dutch democracy is eminently stable and effective!" (p. 15).

I must confess that I do not fully agree with this starting-point. In the first place, the question arises as to the criteria by which a political system can be classified as one of "crosscutting" rather than "mutually reinforcing" cleavages. The answer on this question will, among other things, have to do with perceptions of the political relevance of the several cleavages. These perceptions in their turn will depend on perceptions of public policy, issues and objectives. Lijphart pays relatively little attention to the latter perceptions and I think this is one reason for a fundamental ambiguity in the book: on most pages the Dutch political system is seen as a system characterized by mutually reinforcing cleavages, but on other pages one can read for instance "that the basic cleavages in Dutch society—religion and class—do cut across each other at an almost perfectly straight angle" (p. 205, see also page 90 and 15, footnote 41).

Personally I think that the cleavages in the Netherlands are, generally speaking, more crosscutting than mutually reinforcing. What characterizes Dutch politics in this respect is that, on the one hand, there are Catholic and Protestant parties, each of which resembles the class composition of the population as a whole very closely, and on the other hand there are liberal and socialist parties, each of which is more homogeneous as far as class is concerned, but more heterogeneous as far as religion is concerned. The fact that not only several parties, but also labor unions, employers' associations, farmers' organizations, newspapers, radio and television organizations and schools are partly based on religious cleavages, does not take away the fundamental crosscutting of the two basic cleavages: religion and class.

This crosscutting is camouflaged in part by the way in which Lijphart repeatedly divides the Dutch population into a Catholic, a Secular and a Calvinist bloc. The Secular bloc comprises, according to Lijphart: (a) those without religious affiliation, (b) the Dutch Reformed irregulars (members of the Duch Reformed Church who attend church less than once a week), (c) Catholic irregulars and (d) the 4% adherents of other religions than Catholic, Dutch Reformed or Reformed (p. 30). I think the terms "secular" and "bloc" are misleading if used for such a heterogeneous collection of categories. Still more confusion is created when the author identifies this religious "bloc" with two political blocs, for instance when he speaks of "the secular bloc (i.e. the Liberal plus the Socialist blocs)" (p. 30). How rough this identification is can be read from table 5 on page 31, which shows for instance that 6% of the adherents of the Labor Party belong to the Catholic regulars, whereas no less than 22% of the adherents of one of the protestant parties (the Christian Historical Union) belong to the Dutch Reformed *irregulars*.

It is a pity that Lijphart's national survey, conducted in November 1964, consisted apparently of only a few questions. This limited severely the possibility of testing one of the convictions with which the book opens, namely that "Social communication across class religious boundary lines is minimal" (p. 2, see also pp. 54-57). Especially with regard to the problem of crosscutting cleavages, I am sorry that the author did not have a look at Dutch survey data available on political opinions within several churches, which make clear that within the churches political progressives confront political conservatives. The book was apparently written too early to take into account most of the Dutch survey data of 1967, which prove that the author's premises about the "firm persistence of a stable, effective, and legitimate parliamentary democracy, which has served the people well and which has by and large enjoyed their active support or acquiescence" (p. 2) are outdated. To mention only one thing: in 1967 no less than 64% of the Dutch voters agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: "The members of the second chamber do not enough take into consideration what the voters want." This is in clear contradiction to the remark that "the dilemma of whether an elected official should be a representative or a delegate is not a dilemma in Holland: Leaders lead; followers follow" (p. 158). The picture of Dutch politics that one gets from the book is in several respects more that of, say, 1948, than that of 1968.

To the heart of the book belongs the term accommodation, which is used "in the sense of settlement of divisive issues and conflicts where only a minimal consensus exists. Pragmatic solutions are forged for all problems, even those with clear religious-ideological overtones on which the opposing parties may appear irreconcilable, and which therefore may seem insoluble and likely to split the country apart" (p. 103). Some special characteristics of the pattern of the politics of accommodation are (1) the pre-eminent role of the top leaders, (2) the participation of the leaders of *all* blocs in the settlement and (3) the principle of proportionality in the substance of the settlement (p. 111). The chapter on the spirit of accommodation is, as most other chapters, excellent.

In a final chapter Lijphart argues that the Dutch case, which is according to him a deviant case, does not invalidate the basic pluralist thesis concerning the moderating effect of crosscutting cleavages and cross pressures, but rather suggests a number of amendments to it. The amendments that Lijphart proposes—for instance that overarching cooperation at the elite level can be a substitute for crosscutting affiliations at the mass level—are very much worth study.

However, I do not think the Dutch case is as deviant as Lijphart supposes. Whereas the author concludes that "the politics of accommodation fits perfectly within the context of (amended) pluralist theory as a genuinely alternative model to the model of pluralistic theory based on crosscutting cleavages" (p. 20), I think the Dutch politics of accommodation which Lijphart analyzed so well is simply one particular case of pluralist democracy based on crosscutting cleavages. It must be added that there is a growing effort in the Netherlands to strengthen both the element of crosscutting affiliations and democracy. I hope professor Lijphart will enrich us in the future with a further analysis of Dutch politics in transition.—ANDRIES HOOGERWERF, *Free University, Amsterdam.*

Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation. BY SAMUEL H. BARNES. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. 279, $7.50.)

This volume is an inquiry into the functioning of democracy in modern society by means of a study of the internal politics of the Arezzo Provincial Federation of the Italian Socialist Party. The theoretical point of departure is the line of inquiry begun by Robert Michels in his classic *Political Parties* and continued by Lipset, Trow and Coleman in *Union Democracy;* namely, the problematic relationship between complex organization and democracy.

For Barnes the strategic factor of democracy is the existence of multiple autonomous communication channels that tie together the diverse parts of a unit and permit the extensive exercise of influence. The chapters of the book consist of the variables that are presumed to facilitate or hinder the establishment and maintenance of such communication channels.

In addition to an insightful and concise review of Italian politics and a discussion of the development of the socialist party, the bulk of the volume is devoted to a comparative analysis of the attitudes of party leaders on the one hand and followers on the other. The data for this analysis is based on interviews with 58 of the 59 incumbents of formal leadership positions as well as 301 rank and file members. Particular chapters focus on levels of participation and political competence, socialization and recruitment patterns, primary and secondary group influences or membership behavior, the relevance of ideology, membership attitudes toward party politics, communications and party politics and finally, some speculations on democracy and the organization of political parties. These chapters demonstrate that party leaders and activists differ with the rank and file membership along a number of dimensions. The activists come from more middle class backgrounds than the non-activists and also tend to score higher on measures of political competence, political knowledge, efficacy, ideological sensitivity and mass media exposure.

One of the most interesting of these chapters is devoted to a consideration of various conceptions of party democracy held by the membership. Since members' expectations about party democracy in part determine the interpretations they place on the actions of the leaders, respondents were asked to choose one of the following conceptions of democracy: Classic—members are able to participate and influence the policies of the party; Neoliberal—members can choose among various leaders and policies; Marxian—when the party represents the true interests of the most numerous and needy class. The rank and file chose the Marxian conception of democracy in much greater proportions than those with opposite characteristics. And, as this conception emphasized democracy as a goal rather than as a process, the majority chose a view that said nothing about the importance of participation or choice on the part of the individual. This view of democracy as economic equality rather than participation in decision-making was partially offset by the active members, however, the majority of whom valued participation and choice as criteria of internal democracy. It is, consequently, not only skill and party position that encourage activists and leaders to support internal democracy: they are also the ones most ideologically committed to it.

Another central chapter is devoted to communications. There Barnes reports that the most severe limitation on anti-democratic tendencies within the party is the inability of the leadership to dominate all communication channels reaching the membership. He finds that the bulk of the nonparticipants are not deeply enmeshed in any communications network, whereas the activists are. The latter are not only the most attentive but also the least dependent on the party newspaper and are informed by a variety of media, including radio, television, nonparty newspapers, etc. They thus acquire wide perspectives on party affairs and cannot be deprived of independent, or at least divergent, interpretations of intraparty matters.

Now this inability of the leadership to control all the communication networks reaching the membership is seen by Barnes to be a major factor facilitating democracy. But the behavioral characteristics of the members provide a weak defense against anti-democratic tendencies; the majority simply do not possess the political competence to oppose the leadership. Moreover, there is little in the belief systems of the members that requires democracy. For most, democracy means more equality and more of everything: it is not a process but an end product. If nondemocratic means are more effective for achieving these ends, then they are quite acceptable to the membership.

But, paradoxically, when political competence is in short supply, its value as a commodity rises sharply and since the leaders recognize this and seek to coopt new talent, the party leadership remains an "open stratum." This cooptation process, the continuing factional disputes over party goals and the relatively independent sources of information, combine to facilitate the building of coalitions which bind together levels in order to aggregate the demands of subunits, filter them and translate them into policy alternatives.

The volume concludes with an intriguing discussion of the suitability of the PSI in achieving membership goals; that is, how can the lower social strata who possess low levels of political competence secure capable leadership? Barnes suggests that evaluations of left wing parties should not be based on classical notions of democracy as participation but should concentrate, instead, on the extent to which such organizations increase the numbers in the meaningful communication network. By this criterion the PSI meaningfully mobilizes segments of Italian society that would not otherwise be mobilized.

Overall the volume is imaginatively conceived, tightly argued and makes skillful use of a wide body of literature. But even with these positive qualities, the work does have shortcomings. Barnes emphasizes the point that his conception of democracy as multiple antonomous communication channels is in principle quantifiable, but he never proceeds beyond the definitional level to construct direct measures of communication channels and flows. Because of this limitation, the fundamental task of explaining variation in the dependent variable is rendered difficult. The reader is forced to infer that such channels exist from data on party structure and the behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of the leaders and rank and file members. The volume would have been considerably strengthened by a variety of sociometric data on interactions between leaders and followers as well as records of actual communication flows. Such additional data would give empirical grounding to the view of the party as a communications channel connecting politically relevant units which, in turn, could place cadre, mass, totalitarian and democratic parties within the same analytical framework.

Despite this criticism, there is much of this volume of genuine value for those concerned with the problem of democracy in political parties. Its greatest strength consists in the author's skillful integration of data on the characteristics of party leaders, activists and followers with information on the structural characteristics of the party. In this sense, *Party Democracy* is a contribution to the line of inquiry begun by Michels and continued by Lipset, Trow and Coleman.—TIMOTHY M. HENNESSEY, *Michigan State University.*

L'Attivista di Partito. BY FRANCESCO ALBERONI, VITTORIO CAPECCHI, AGOPIK MANOUKIAN, FRANCA OLIVETTI, AND ANTONIO TOSI. (Bologna: Societa' Editrice Il Mulino, 1967. Pp. 616. L. 10.000.)

Most social scientists don't read Italian. That fact is probably the only obstacle to this book's becoming a classic in its field. It is a sensitive, theoretically-informed, and methodologically-sophisticated study of the background, beliefs, and behavior of Italian party activists. Fortunately, some of the more important sections of the research will soon be available in English, particularly in a forthcoming volume by Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, tentatively entitled *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy.* This latter work will present a summary of the results of a massive series of studies conducted by the Carlo Cattaneo Research Institute on many aspects of elite and mass political behavior in Italy; *L'Attivista di Partito* reports the findings of one of the studies in this larger research program.

"How is it that some people and not others at a certain moment feel themselves called [to] dedicate their lives to partisan political activity? What weight in their choice had and have the many factors which one can abstractly hypothesize: from childhood and adolescent experiences to family tradition, from social class position to crucial individual or collective experiences in the course of their lives and that of their community? How do they see and judge things: from the grand problems debated and codified in ideological terms to those of daily personal and family experience? What sort of lives do they lead and what weight does their role of activist have among their other roles—what compatibilities and incompatibilities are there? How do they participate in the community and how are they integrated in it and at the same time segregated from it? How do these things differ between the two great Italian parties and how have they changed over time from the period between the wars until today?" (p. 12) These are the questions which the authors of this study set themselves. Obviously, the issues involved are quite broad and have attracted the attention of numerous scholars, with results, however, more often theoretical and speculative than empirical.

The authors sensibly argue that survey research methods are not likely to reach the depths of personal faith and experience of interest to them. They use a technique of extended (6-7 hours), focussed, non-directive conversations with a sample of 108 Communist and Christian Democratic party activists, nine members of each party in each of six middle-sized communities, chosen to represent different regions, stages of socio-economic development, and types of party competition. The authors are understandably diffident about claiming statistical representativeness for their sample, but there seem to be no biases sufficiently striking to call into doubt the main findings. Transcripts of each interview were studied and impressionistically "scored" on the relevant dimensions by a panel of four of the researchers. The data were then subjected to a variety of statistical techniques, from simple 2 × 2 crossbreaks to factor analysis and causal modelling.

Any brief statement cannot adequately summarize the rich, diverse, and intricate conclusions of the research nor convey the fascination and insight provided by the extensive quotations. Three sets of findings seem to this reviewer particularly interesting and important.

One current interpretation of political activism, especially of the "ideological" kind found in Italy, and more especially of communism, traces it to social deviance and psychological weakness. This interpretation comes off rather badly when applied to the findings of *L'Attivista di Partito*. Both Communist and Christian Democratic activists are well-integrated, well-adjusted members of their communities. Their political and ideological dispositions were formed in supportive family and community environments and their active involvement matured gradually in the context of work groups (particularly for the Communists) and religious and other associations (particularly for the Christian Democrats). By and large, these are men at peace with themselves and their immediate environment; the evidence suggests that the intensity of the Communists' commitment to their cause stems less from alienation from "the system" (important though that is) than from involvement in a traditional Communist sub-culture.

In a statistical sense, of course, these activists are "deviants" from the typical patterns of Italian mass political behavior. They are not Almond and Verba's apathetic "subjects." Nor are they, for the most part, Banfield's "amoral familists." On the whole, activists from both parties share some commitment to "ideological" tenets. (In this sense, their motivation is much more "principled" than, for example, Eldersveld's Detroit activists.) This important similarity apart, the Christian Democrats and the Communists differ significantly from each other in both sources and styles of participation. The Party occupies a much more central position in the life and loyalties of the Communist. His emotional commitment to the Party is based, as one respondent said, on *"giustizia e fraternita',"* on both moral conviction and intense comradeship. The involvement of the Christian Democrat, by contrast, is mediated through the Church and other non-party associations and based on relatively more concrete political concerns. The Communists' view of politics and society is, the authors find, more dichotomous and stereotyped than is that of the *democristiani.*

This last generalization, however, brings us to perhaps the most significant finding of the study: on nearly every dimension members of both parties are becoming markedly more open, pragmatic, and "democratic" (in the sense normally used in Western liberal democracies). Having interviewed party workers whose periods of maximum activity ranged from 1945-1950 to 1956-1963, the authors are able to provide evidence on the changing nature of party cadres in the post-war period. In both parties the intensity and dogmatism of political activity is declining, as is dichotomous, "black-white" thinking. Acceptance of intra-party differences and willingness to criticize party leaders are increasing among Communists. Fewer and fewer members of the PCI are wholly and unreconcilably opposed to the existing political system. More and more see "the democratic way to socialism" as not merely good tactics, but intrinsically right. Fewer now use the Soviet Union or any other "utopian" models in dealing with Italian social reality. Similarly, Christian Democratic activists are decreasingly "knee-jerk," intolerant anti-Communists, and increasingly they feel themselves independent of the directives of the Church hierarchy. This trend from an activism which is totalitarian, crusading, and antagonistic towards an activism which is more professionalized, rational, and conciliatory is of inestimable importance for Italian politics.

This reviewer's enthusiasm must be tempered by several weaknesses in the book's style, scope, and method. It is composed of separately-authored sections, individually competent, but badly integrated. The theoretical background of the study is brilliantly traced by Francesco Alberoni and Antonio Tosi in a comprehensive and insightful review of the European and American literature on parties, social movements, and political participation. Vittorio Capecchi's advanced statistical treatment of the data is skillful and in many ways innovative. (An English language version of his novel use of causal modelling in typology-construction is available in his "Linear Causal Models and Typologies," *Quality and Quantity,* vol. I, nos. 1-2 (Jan., 1967) pp. 116-152. This is a new European journal of methodology published by Marsilio Editori in Padova, Italy.) The theoretical and the statistical aspects of the work are, however, virtually independent, so that Capecchi's contributions tend to be essentially *tours de force,* illustrating methodological tricks, while Alberoni's and Tosi's theoretical questions go unanswered. A short concluding summary by Agopik Manoukian is helpful, but does not succeed in overcoming this gap.

This study like the others in the Carlo Cattaneo series restricts its attention to the two largest Italian parties on the assumption that the Italian system is essentially, as Giorgio Galli claims, *"bipartitismo imperfetto,"* an imperfect two-party system. This reviewer remains unconvinced that one can comprehend Italian politics by looking at only these two parties. Samuel Barnes' recent study of Italian Socialist Party workers provides some of the missing information, but important lacunae remain.

The authors' use of unstructed interviews, disciplined by attempts at categorizing and counting, is the right road for studying political belief systems, but we need to be aware of the possible pitfalls. In particular, we need to consider the objectivity and reliability of the coding operation. The ideal would be "blind" coding, in which ratings of individual dimensions were uncontaminated by knowledge of the respondent's other characteristics. This is prohibitively expensive in most cases, but we must then take the correlations among various traits with some caution. How much of the "stereotyped thinking" of the Communist respondents, for example, was "read into" the interviews by the coders? (This problem also plays havoc with the "uncorrelated error terms" assumption of causal modelling.) Minimally, we could have wished for some specification of inter-coder reliability, especially since many of the dimensions involved are quite vague (e.g., "stereotyped thinking" or "dichotomous thinking").

Even taking into account these weaknesses, however, *L'Attivista di Partito* is one of the most important contributions to comparative political science to appear in recent years.—ROBERT D. PUTNAM, *University of Michigan.*

Africa: The Politics of Unity. BY IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN. (New York: Random House. 1967. Pp. 274. $4.95.)

Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems. ED. BY COLIN LEYS AND PETER ROBSON. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. 244. $3.95.)

Professor Wallerstein's *Africa: The Politics of Unity,* written (as he himself puts it) as a sequel to his *Africa: The Politics of Independence,* proposes the thesis that the "movement for African unity . . . was, in fact, the most important indigenous political force on the African continent." (228) He examines the main thrust of this movement between 1957 and 1965, and suggests that it lay with an African "revolutionary core" composed of four separate but interlinked segments: (a) the "radical-nationalist states," including Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Congo (B), the U.A.R., and Algeria; (b) the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF), which Wallerstein characterizes as a "key popular organization in the avant-garde" of the movement; (c) the "radical opposition parties in independent states," such as the Sawaba of Niger, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), and the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) of Morocco; and finally (d) "certain liberation movements" from Portuguese Africa, Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, and the Republic of South Africa. The movement itself, according to Wallerstein, found its guiding principles in the goal of modernization through self-discipline and isolation. Isolation does not, of course, mean withdrawal from the world or a refusal to interact with other states; it is the symbol for resistance to neo-colonialism, that new stage of imperialism that seeks domination through means other than outright occupation: alliances, economic dependence, market and investment manipulation, control through the more subtle forms of political, economic, and even cultural conquest. Self-discipline, then, to the "revolutionary core," requires ideological and state structures appropriate to the defense of "isolation," forms that can effectively mobilize human and physical resources toward self-generating and self-sustaining modernization. The means require, therefore, among other things, a radicalization of the political atmosphere throughout Africa, and a commitment to organizational forms—on as wide a scale as possible—that further the aims of the movement.

The above summary does, I hope, as little violence as possible to what is a most carefully and well-developed argument. There is little question that Wallerstein's sympathies lie with the "movement"; he makes the case for it most persuasively, and it would not be impertinent to suggest that its proponents could read his arguments with considerable profit.

Wallerstein suggests that the movement has been impeded, if not stymied by the resistance on the part of various African governments, by those who see "unity as alliance" (Wallerstein's phrase). Concrete manifestations of this approach has been, among others, the creation of various regional and functional organizations. The creation of such organizations by French-speaking African states he interprets as moves to counter the insistent pressure and demands of the "revolutionary core." It is the reaction of the so-called moderates and conservatives. Wallerstein implies that the movement toward African unity is both desirable and perhaps inevitable; the African states, given the triumph of the "movement," will somehow find their way to both political union and political understanding. In the future, perhaps. For the present, I am not so sanguine.

One of the problems raised, and perhaps even caused by the "revolutionary core" of states is that their attempts to create a satisfactory climate for the success of the "movement" has been accompanied by support for various and sundry political organizations whose stated purpose it was to overthrow the governments of the states whence they came. It is no longer a secret that during the Nkrumah period Ghana was a base for many so-called "national liberation movements," that trained in Ghanaian camps for the violent overthrow of the governments of such countries as Niger, Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Cameroon. Such groups found ready support in Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Egypt, and Sudan, all of which governments at one time or another provided both sanctuary and logistical aid. It is irrelevant whether one approved or disapproved of these groups' aims; what is crucial is that the "movement to unity" was expressed, at least one aspect, by concrete attempts to undermine and overthrow other African regimes. The target regimes, it seems, were those with which the "revolutionary core" had the most deeply-felt ideological disagreements. It would be reasonable to suggest that the target governments felt threatened by the "revolutionary core," and that part of their reaction was to reject its leadership in the movement for unity. Regional and functional, organizations were perhaps one way of expressing their suspicion of the revolutionary message. What Wallerstein appears to have overlooked is that it was the tactics, perhaps as much as the ambiguous rhetoric, of the "revolutionary core" that contributed largely to the stultification of the drive to unity on the African continent.

Nor is it entirely clear that the "movement for unity" has been impeded by the more recent organizational and political developments on the continent. What is entirely clear is that whatever the choice of means by this or that state or group, "African unity" remains one of the most potent political symbols on the continent. No leader, no government (be it military or civilian) can afford to disregard its emotive force. The political education of most African leaders has included acceptance of the symbol, and "attentive" African political publics have made it part of the common political language. The current trend—despite "revolutionary core" rhetoric to the contrary—is toward cooperation along pragmatic lines devoted to the solution of common problems. It should, perhaps, be added that the example of political unification provided by the "revolutionary core" —the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union—hardly provided support for its theses. The UAS foundered, unhappily, on the rocks of national political expediency; save for some token moves, none of the partners were willing to commit the resources, political skills, or effort to make the so-called "federation" a reality. Perhaps the "revolutionary core" found the consequences of its rhetoric unpalatable.

The volume edited by Leys and Robson is a happy complement to Wallerstein's discussion. Though published in 1965 (most of the papers were written in 1963) it is immediately relevant to an understanding of the latest attempt at east African unification, the East African Economic Community, inaugurated on December 1, 1967.

The several papers include contributions by Arthur Hazelwood, who edited a volume on African case studies in economic and political union, and Joseph S. Nye, the author of an excellent book on the implications of east African integration. (Arthur Hazelwood (ed.) *African Integration and Disintegration* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Joseph S. Nye, *Panafricanism and East African Integration*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966). A. H. Birch, Jane Banfield, Dharam Ghai, D. G. R. Belshaw, Tom Mboya, B. Van Arkadie, Peter Newman, S. A. de Smith, Yash Ghai, and the Editors complete the list of contributors. In particular point is the Editors' concluding chapter, which examines the two related questions of "what form of political union is best?'" and "what are the prospects for political union?" Given what appears to be at least a temporary abandonment of the goal of East African political organization in favor of a functional union, the Editors' comments are in fact pertinent to the implicit goals of the new Community. The

Editors and Contributors would, I venture to guess, endorse the new east African Economic Community as representing a step in the direction of creation the *conditions* that would favor the emergence of an East African Federation. As the Editors put it, "It appears that the real issue in East African is not so much the possibility of creating a federal government as of creating an East African political system." (189) The Editors, reflecting their own and their contributors' standpoints, suggest that "Federation" can be seen as *one* constitutional means of entering into the *process* of creating a common political system." (190) There is, consequently, no one form that is 'best,' but in fact a variety of possible forms of which federation appears as the most feasible, given the satisfaction of various preconditions discussed by the Contributors and Editors. The prospects for federal union would, therefore, be a function of the extent to which political and economic integration can in fact be achieved during the next few years. There are reasonable and not unexpected conclusions, but worth restating in the context of the excellent discussions found in the volume.

Most of the contributions deal with economic and legal matters, and one misses a fuller discussion of the political variable at which the Editors hint so tantalizingly. But that was not their "bag," and the book is not to be faulted for the omission. The book is, perhaps, most useful as a counterpoise to Wallerstein volume; Wallerstein argues a "movement," something difficult to define and even more difficult to observe; the Leys and Robson volume considers the more concrete, and perhaps less exciting pragmatic realities on the road to African unity. Both are worth reading; both make useful contributions to the continuing discussion of Africa's political and economic future.—VICTOR T. LE VINE, *Washington University (St. Louis).*

The Politics of Exile: Paraguay's Febrerista Party. BY PAUL H. LEWIS. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968. Pp. 197. $6.00.)

Paraguay's *febrerista* movement derived its name from a short-lived regime which came to power in February, 1936, and was overthrown by an army *coup* the next year. Despite its modest governmental success, the regime symbolized an important break with traditional Paraguayan politics. As disparate as their ideological origins were, the *febreristas* were united by their dislike of weak, ineffective government, and their advocacy of an intensely nationalistic, interventionist regime committed to social and economic reform. The movement drew inspiration from the regime of José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, Paraguay's first political leader and dictator, who ruled from independence until his death in 1840. Francia's regime was a precocious experiment in autarchy, international isolationism, and totalitarianism. He initiated a collectivised land system, with state-owned farms managed by the military and leased under a system of emphyteusis to peasants who worked them. The farms prospered, but attempts to make Paraguay self-sufficient met little success. Within the boundaries of Francia's will, the system evolved elements of social and economic egalitarianism. The *febreristas* romanticized the 19th century socialist experiment, but updated their ideology with more modern symbols and European influences. Like the *apristas* in Peru, the *febreristas* for all their borrowed symbolism were an indigenous product of their national history and culture.

After 1937 many *febrerista* leaders left Paraguay for neighboring Argentina and Uruguay. United by common ideological sympathies, hostility to post-1937 regimes, and a desire to return to power, the *febreristas* maintained an international organization and channels for communication. The persistent divisive and cohesive pressures within the movement form the basic theme of the present book.

Studies of Latin American political parties, not to mention Paraguayan politics, are rare, and this book is a necessary addition to the literature. Drawing upon secondary sources and interviews with exiled leaders, Lewis provides a useful political history of the *febrerista* movement. Particularly informative is the discussion of the factionalization and rivalries within the movement.

In view of the contribution the author makes, an apparent conceptual dilemma may be less important. The dilemma is whether to stress the historical particularism of the *febreristas*, or the more general theme of a "politics of exile." As an example of the latter, the *febreristas* may not be the most obvious case since their's is a politics "in and out of exile." A significant faction of the leadership remained in Paraguay, and participated in national elections. The present regime extended a general amnesty to the *febreristas* in 1964. As Lewis correctly observes, ". . . most of the exiles have left Paraguay voluntarily, and in many cases it is lack of work and a low standard of living rather than government action which influenced their decision." The author's evidence clearly reveals that the majority of *febrerista* leaders are by occupation lawyers-solicitors, doctors, economists —in other words, upper middle-class. Migration of middle-class, educated Paraguayans to Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and Northern Argentina for personal and economic reasons has never been an uncommon phenomena, and may partly explain their political hostility and affiliation with *febrerismo*.

The author's prefatory suggestion that the politics of exile is "abnormal politics" which "may help to clarify our concept of what is normal" and "lead to a clearer understanding of the functional prerequisites for the existence of legalized parties" hardly simplifies his conceptual framework. Since much of the analysis anticipates the actual period of exile, one wonders whether the author has inadvertently overstressed either the historical antecedents or, more probably, the concept of exile. The conclusions reached about the "difficulties and problems" of the *febreristas* in exile do not seem to justify the ambitious but ambiguous concept imposed on the analysis.

The conceptual conflict obscures the more vital internal analysis generated by the author's research. Despite assurances that exile has been accepted as "part of the rules of the game in Latin America," the author fails to relate his analysis to other instances in Latin America for comparison. Instead he draws analogies and theory from somewhat alien contexts. Eldersveld's analysis of North American parties (*Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis*) seems an awkward model for comparison, no matter how one asserts that both are "party contexts." The resulting comparisons are neither surprising nor particularly revealing.

Despite these reservations, the book presents useful information unobtainable elsewhere, and on a more modest plane is an interesting case study of a Paraguayan political movement. On balance it must be considered an important addition to the literature on Latin American parties.—RONALD H. MCDONALD, *Syracuse University.*

Veto-Group Politics: The Case of Health-Insurance Reform in West Germany. BY WILLIAM SAFRAN. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967. Pp. 261. $5.00.)

In many areas of domestic policy, *immobilisme* characterizes German government as it once characterized the Fourth French Republic. Cabinet stability, the dominant personality of Adenauer, and then the huge parliamentary majority enjoyed by the Great Coalition have obscured the inability of successive German Governments to enact major social and economic reforms. Professor Safran's book illuminates this relatively unexplored theme of stalemate in German politics. It is a case study of legislative failure: the inability of the Adenauer Government, at the height of its power between 1957 and 1961, to obtain passage of a major reform of the system of public health insurance.

Safran explains the intricacies of statutory health insurance in Germany, which by 1960 covered 80 percent of the population and provided free medical care, drugs, and hospitalization, as well as compensation for wages and salaries lost due to illness. Administered by local "sickness funds," the system was financed by compulsory contributions from employers and employees. Demands for extension and equalization of benefits, government subsidies for the "funds," centralization of administration, and a differentiated scale of compensation for physicians according to services rendered, raised fundamental issues which the Government sought to resolve in an omnibus reform bill.

But the very comprehensiveness of the bill was its undoing. It called forth a wide range of conflicting public attitudes, mobilized by a great variety of interest groups. Safran describes the activity of the labor unions, employers' organizations, medical profession, and public health administration in impressive detail, with thorough references to the fugitive source material on these groups. He recounts the bargaining which took place through six years of bill drafting at the ministerial level, and relates the abandonment of the bill after fifteen months of deliberation in a parliamentary committee in which the Government enjoyed a clear majority.

The complexity of the issues which Safran describes, and the multiplicity of the contending groups whose tactics he traces, threaten at times to overwhelm the main lines of his analysis. In the introductory chapter, Safran identifies his chief variables: the formal framework of decision-making in German government, the traditional public attitudes toward health insurance, the established patterns of bargaining, and the aims, cohesion, and resources of the major groups. The data is not, however, presented in these analytical categories. There are successive descriptions of each of the main groups, and extensive stretches of chronological narrative describing the sequence of legislation. The facts are set out clearly, often with the aid of effective tables and diagrams, but only rarely are they used to demonstrate the relationships among the chief variables.

In his conclusion, Safran explains that each of the major groups was able to block the others, but none was able to prevail. Each was weakened by internal divisions, particularly between rank-and-file members and professional leaders who enjoyed institutionalized access to government. The decision-makers in the government, for their part, were unable to strike an effective bargain among the groups. The parliamentary parties could not arrive at coherent positions; the Minister of Labor was unable to justify his bill in terms of the traditionally accepted attitudes toward public health insurance; and the Chancellor operated at such a lofty level of authority that he never reached the members of his parliamentary majority whose support was critical.

The evidence on the interest groups is particularly solid. Their organization and objectives are well set out, and their negotiations at the ministerial and parliamentary committe levels are fully described. But ultimately the bill failed because of the inability of the majority party in Parliament to arrive at an agreed position. On this crucial phase of the legislative process, the author unfortunately offers insufficient information. Despite his excellent account of the treatment of the bill in committee, Safran fails to distinguish among parliamentary sub-systems. This leads him to associate himself with the view that Parliament, regarded as a collectivity, "was ill-prepared to assert itself as a decision maker" (p. 221). A more precise look at the performance of interest aggregation by the CDU/CSU, regarding it as a parliamentary sub-system, might have been more helpful in explaining the failure of the bill in Parliament.

There is some carelessness in the presentation. The names of organizations are not always translated consistently. The DGB is sometimes the German Federation of Trade Unions (p. 16) and sometimes the German Confederation (p. 19); the DII is the Institute of German Industry in the Glossary, but it is presumably the same as the Joint Committee of German Trade and Industry referred to in the text (p. 89); the BDI is both the Federal Association of German Industry (p. 46) and the Federation of German Industries (p. 88). Since the reader must keep many similar-sounding organizations distinct, this inconsistency in rendering names in English adds to his difficulty. There are also some factual errors. The Ahlener program of the CDU was written in 1947 as a platform of the CDU in the British zone of occupation, not in 1949, and it cannot be regarded as the program of "a Christian Democratic government" (p. 67). Erich Peter Neumann was not yet a CDU Member of Parliament in 1958 when the public opinion institute of which he was a director made a study of workers' opinions on health insurance (p. 56). But these are minor shortcomings in a highly informative and generally reliable account.

More problematic is the author's occasional lack of detachment. Although he rightly emphasizes at the outset that "with their stress on objectivity and their acceptance of Hegel's definition of the state as reason incarnate," Germans "have tended to regard interest groups with suspicion" (p. 5), Safran himself employs the concept of "objectivity" normatively. He finds parliamentary committees capable of "an objective examination" of bills (p. 170), asserts that civil servants should have drafted the bill "according to the objective necessities" (pp. 218-219), and concludes that "the parliamentarians had failed to protect the government officials—the only group capable of making convincing (if not always totally objective) technical decisions—against the interest groups" (p. 221).

The book was apparently completed in 1964, although a postscript traces events in German health insurance policy through 1966. But since the case of health insurance legislation is only the instrument for illustrating interest group behavior in Germany, it is regrettable that the author has not taken account of the important literature in this field which has appeared in the last several years, notably Gerard Braunthal's study of *The Federation of German Industry in Politics*.

If case studies are to contribute incrementally to political science, they must be done within a common theoretical framework, and they must relate their findings to each other. Although Safran refers to the works of Eckstein, Finer, Key, LaPalombara, and Truman, he largely leaves it to the reader to determine the significance of his findings for interest group theory generally. But there is no doubt that his book possesses such significance. It is a valuable addition to our understanding of interest group behavior, and of the role of interest groups in blocking policy change in postwar Germany.—GERHARD LOEWENBERG, *Mount Holyoke College.*

The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period. BY HERSCHEL WEBB. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 296. $8.50.)

Prof. Webb has written a useful book on the imperial institution in Tokugawa Japan. The study basically deals with three aspects of the Japanese imperial institution: its origin and development up to the year 1600, its major institutional characteristics during the 1600-1867 (or Tokugawa) period, and political theories re-evaluating the imperial institution in this period along with major political events leading up to the Meiji Restoration of 1868.

After introducing the Shinto mythology in which the emperor is considered a direct descendant of the principal deity, the Sun Goddess, the book discusses the early clan system in which various households competed for secular power under the emperor, and the Taika Reform of 645 A.D which indisputably established the imperial family's political primacy. The book also explains the compilation of the Taihō *ritsuryō* code in 701 A.D. which not only formalized those governmental institutions which had already evolved in Japan but also created many new institutions imitating those of more advanced Sui and T'ang China.

However, the standardization of the governmental structure hardly prevented its modifications or the creation of additional apparatuses. Despite the fact that in theory the *ritsuryō* system continued to exist up until the Meiji Restoration, the apex of this system, the emperor, was generally divorced from political power for most of this period, and as power shifted from one group to another, legal and extra-legal arrangements were improvised to authenticate the change that had already taken place.

In the ninth century, for instance, the rise of the Fujiwara family inevitably led to a modification of the system, primarily resulting in the upgrading of the Regent (*Sesshō*) and the Civil Dictator (*Kampaku*) to positions of prime political importance. In the eleventh century, as power was briefly returned to the imperial family, the Ex-Sovereign's Private Secretariat (*In-no-kurōdo-dokoro*) was converted more or less into a central government itself; and in the twelfth century, the supremacy of the samurai led to the elevation of their Commander-in-Chief for Barbarian Subjugation (*Sei-i-Taishōgun*) to the secular ruler of Japan and to the establishment of the feudal system which was to prevail for most of the following seven hundred years. Although it is true that during this period the emperor's symbolic status was never really challenged, his political power continued to dwindle, and the imperial institution reached its lowest point in the Tokugawa period.

The book then turns to a discussion of the imperial institution's major characteristics as it obscurely existed during the Tokugawa period. After describing the outline of the imperial palace compound and its major buildings, some of which still remain in Kyoto today, the book presents a brief profile of each of the emperors who reigned during this period and elaborates on the rules governing the imperial family and the methods by which a successor to the throne was chosen and installed. The book also reviews the court nobility and the grade system by which they were stratified, explains court activities including traditional arts and disciplines, rituals and ceremonies, the wealth and income by which the imperial institution was supported, and describes the Shogunal Deputy (*Shoshidai*) who officially represented the Shogun in the court and also kept close surveillance over political and other activities in and around the court.

Finally Prof. Webb surveys Tokugawa political theories on the imperial institution and some of the political events immediately preceding the Meiji Restoration. One of the major intellectual currents in this period was that of classical studies, which revived scholarly interest in Shintoism and consequently stressed the political role of the imperial institution. Two others, the Hayashi school and the Mito school, were those of Confucianism. Although both of them belonged to the orthodox Chu Hsi branch of Confucianism, the former was the official doctrine at the government academy and remained faithful to the Tokugawa regime. The latter, however, stressed historical studies—especially those clarifying the theoretical basis of the imperial institution—and did much to discredit the rationale of the Tokugawa hegemony. In addition, there were a number of individual scholars such as Yoshida Shōin who not only provided intellectual bases for the Restoration but also trained many of the Restoration and early Meiji leaders.

Against the background of such intellectual development there was a growing recognition that the Tokugawa government was no longer capable of dealing with mounting domestic and external difficulties. On the one hand, the development of the money economy undercut the economic foundation of the feudal rule, and as the Tokugawa failed to defeat one of its subordinate lords, its political authority over other feudal lords declined rapidly. On the other hand, the arrival of Commodore Perry and America's demand to open the country diametrically challenged the Tokukawa seclusion policy, which was the then cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy, and furthermore it was painfully obvious for the Tokugawa that there was no choice but to acquiesce to the American demand. Apparently this is the most important part of the book, and Prof. Webb presents a brilliant account of both the intellectual development and the political chronology—especially those of the Mito school and the Mito domain—of the period immediately preceding the Meiji Restoration.

There is little question that the imperial institution is one of the major topics in the study of Japanese political history. Yet for one reason or another this has been largely ignored by native as well as foreign scholars. Prof. Webb must be congratulated for his contribution in filling much of this important gap in our knowledge. Also the book is highly readable. Despite the fact that the book provides a host of facts and details, its presentation is remarkably lucid, and its coverage admirably objective. In many ways, this seems to represent one of the finest studies carried along the lines of the "institutional" approach in history.

Nevertheless, it is also true that many questions are yet to be answered. One of these is the evaluation of the exact role of the imperial institution in the Japanese political process. Traditionally, two extreme interpretations prevailed. On the one hand, political theorists tended to attribute every political force to the emperor, but on the other hand, historians tended to minimize or ignore the political role of the institution. Although it is admittedly difficult to be precise in a measurement of this sort, it seems probable that the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes. Also a key seems to be a distinction between the emperor and the imperial institution. Thus, even if one readily rejects the proposition that the emperor influenced the making of specific political decisions (although it appears that there were a few rare exceptions to this), one may find it difficult to deny some generalized political role for the imperial institution.

The Meiji Restoration itself is a case in point. Although it is true that the feudal political system rapidly deteriorated, the Tokugawa government nevertheless commanded large well-equipped armed forces and could have opted for a course which would have plunged Japan into a civil war of an extended duration. Instead, the feudal regime capitulated practically without any bloodshed. Is it likely that without the imperial institution and its symbolic status, the transition would have been as dramatic as it in fact was? How about the series of reforms following the Restoration by which samurai themselves quickly dismantled the very system of which they were part and began building a new Japan? Is it probable that Japan could have maintained both a rapid rate of change and a stable political order—which are some of the keys in modernization—without its superstructure of the imperial institution? Questions such as these are clearly beyond the scope of *The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period,* which is by and large descriptive in nature, but the book provides a significant step toward a dynamic and functional analysis of the Japanese imperial institution.—AKIRA KUBOTA, *University of Michigan.*

Political Institutions and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century. BY EUGENE N. ANDERSON AND PAULINE R. ANDERSON. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Pp. 451. $10.00.)

Social scientists have turned increasingly to history as a source of study in the last few years. The nineteenth century especially is a good one for hypothesis testing in the theories of political and social change. The application of new methodologies and new perspectives gained from current research to studies of rapid change in historical context holds promise for enhancing our understanding of conditions in the contemporary world.

Political Institutions and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century proceeds, however, not from the interest of "a political scientist with a penchant for history" but from that of "a social historian interested in perceiving how change in governmental and political institutions affects and expresses social change." This appears to mean that hypotheses and explicit theory have been abandoned in order to let the facts speak for themselves. Indeed in a few chapters one has the impression of reading essentially unordered note cards from a file. The notes do contain an impressive amount of information gathered painstakingly from a wide range of English, German and French sources although heavy reliance is placed on the views of contemporary thinkers rather than upon an independent assessment of the institutions themselves.

Under such headings as central government, local government, intermediate government, bureaucracy, civil rights, suffrage, political parties and representation, the authors describe the institutions of government in France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, Hungary, Spain and Italy at various times during the nineteenth century. These descriptions are not of the dry formal structure of written constitutions but are of the living procedures and mechanisms of political life. The authors' interest is in the interplay of political forces and their focus is upon the legitimate structures of government which contain and support this interplay. They stress the "close relationship between governmental institutions and practices and social structure" although in a self-imposed limitation only one chapter of eleven is devoted to social composition of the population. Moreover, the close causal relationship between institutional change and "cultural advance"—which seems to consist of "the emergence of individualism, social mobility and means of political education"—is not hypothesized but assumed. Exactly why or how or even whether cultural advance brings about institutional change is left to the reader's imagination.

The cascade of facts first about Prussia, then France, now Russia, first in 1801, then 1906, now 1870 leaves one with the impression that nineteenth century Europe was somehow homogeneous over time and space. To be sure, there are isolated comparisons of one country and another and there are references to changes in institutions but these are not gathered into an intellectual framework that makes sense of the ferment characteristic of European institutions between the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War. The authors share the view that the movement from absolute monarchy towards democracy was in fact political development or growth. They might, therefore, have sought patterns of political development within countries and compared these to examine the extent of a common pattern. In many ways, the experience of the British was repeated by the French and later by the Prussians and Austrians and finally by the Russians only to be cut short by the revolutions of 1917. In many other ways, of course, the polities were unique. One suspects that the authors think in terms of patterns since every so often they insert such phrases as "the normal practices of an absolutistic government in the first stage of acquiescence in the existence of elections and representative assemblies," but to explicit comparisons they do not commit themselves.

If hypotheses are avoided, causality is not. Longer life expectancy is credited with increased interest in politics. If public services could prolong life, people would demand participation in political affairs to gain these services. Censorship caused public mistrust of all published materials since no one could know whether the work expressed an author's view or only those agreeable to an official. These and several other bald assertions would be worthy of testing.

It is unfortunate that the authors content themselves with these assertions and leave the facts to speak for themselves. The facts refuse to do so, but there is just enough in the book to indicate that the authors could be very good advocates.—CHARLES LEWIS TAYLOR, *Yale University.*

The French Parliament: Politics in the Fifth Republic. BY PHILIP M. WILLIAMS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 136.)

In his latest book, Philip Williams ably contrasts the first and second parliaments of the Fifth Republic to show the evolution of constitutional and political conditions and practice. He uses a number of sound, recent French secondary sources to good advantage. He relieves the necessarily lengthy descriptions of the legal framework and operations under it with many pertinent and pungent quotations and observations. This is a short and thoughtful study, essentially limited to the effects of "constitutional engineering" and concentrates on Parliament.

The constitution of the Fifth Republic established a rationalized parliament with limited powers. From its former status as one of the world's most powerful, the legislature was reduced to subservience to a strong Presidnet, who was not even responsible to it. Indeed the founders of the new regime overreacted to the dangers of a strong legislature and resisted making concessions to parliamentary power and prestige, even though the Assembly had majorities loyal to the Government.

In the first parliament the UNR and the old style conservative parties that had won were strongly Gaullist and much of their leadership was most articulate in support of "Algérie française." It soon became evident that their election was due to their support of deGaulle and not of French Algeria. As Algerian policy shifted in a liberal direction, the Government, loyally supported by the UNR, faced a right-wing opposition much stronger in the Assembly than in the country as a whole and a left-wing opposition underrepresented among the deputies and unwilling to increase parliamentary power for fear it might undermine an Algerian settlement. The first parliament operated in a crisis atmosphere. Algerian policy was administered by deGaulle and the parliament simmered. Many still believed then that the parliamentary aspect of the new constitution would normally prevail over its presidential aspects. This was the period when much was being written of the President's role as an umpire (arbitre). The *coup de grace* to this concept was administered with the replacement of Debré by Pompidou and the direct election of the President.

The parliamentary elections in 1962 resulted in heavy gains for the UNR and in the decimation of the Right, which lost half of its votes and three quarters of its seats. The Left, while losing votes, won sixty more seats through disciplined second ballot alliances.

By the autumn of 1965 the old opposition parties were in disarray and could not muster a coherent alternative government. The failure of deGaulle to be elected in the first round of the presidential elections gave them new heart and sharpened their efforts to federate and cooperate and to work for victory in the next election. While they did not win control of the third parliament in 1967, the gained a further 40 seats and forced the Gaullists to lose seats, even though they made impressive voting gains.

Under the new constitution the Government controlled the parliamentary timetable and could get its business through in reasonable time and the form it desired, for committees could no longer mutilate a bill. In practice the ministers have tended to use their wide discretion in the control of the parliamentary timetable almost as ineptly as had the deputies previously.

Williams cites René Pleven's bitter complaint in 1963 of "empty trough periods followed by weeks of overwork." He suggests that the oral question day on Fridays, conceived by Debré as an effective means to criticize the Government, has not matched expectations. Both opposition and majority members have tended to air only minor constituency grievances, and absenteeism has proved very heavy. Most deputies prefer to "cultivate" their municipal and regional responsibilities.

While, under the first parliament, opposition members had as good a chance as the majority members of seeing their proposals debated and even adopted by the Government, it is suggested that in the second parliament the Cabinet tended to favor the bills introduced by the majority.

Bills are still seriously examined in the committee stage, according to Williams, but the importance of committees has been sharply reduced. No longer can a committee emasculate or reshape a bill. Committees are larger and less cohesive. In practice, however, absenteeism has lead to the attendance of only those members interested in the bill to be discussed and, in this way, unexpectedly has enhanced committee effectiveness.

The Government now employs a useful procedural weapon, the "blocked vote," to be taken on a whole bill. This obliges members to pronounce on a given clause or amendment in the context of the bill as a whole. In his Chapter 4, "Streamlined

Legislation," Williams interestingly relates how this procedure tends to penalize the moderates and not the extremists, whose destructive criticism could be beaten off without it. He cites André Colin, chairman of the MRP senators in 1963, deploring Article 44 as "introducing between Government and Parliament the methods and style of the referendum."

The vote of confidence procedure which passes the Assembly automatically, unless a motion of censure is carried, is a drastic weapon which, in combination with conference machinery (Senate-Assembly), can pass into law a bill for which neither house has voted.

In addition, the more publicized weapons employed by the President, by which legislation can acquire legal force without going through Parliament, are the emergency powers under Article 16 and the famous referendum procedure under Article 11.

In spite of this array of procedures reducing the area of legislative self-determination, Mr. Williams says that Parliament, in essence, now has even a better chance to work more effectively in the broad sphere in which it is still competent.

In his opinion, budget debates still provide the most useful occasions for questioning and scrutinizing the Government policies. In the first parliament, with its right-wing majority and predisposition to industry and commerce, half of the amendments and two-thirds of those proposed by the *rapporteur general* were passed and even the Communists managed to have 28 percent of their amendments accepted.

The second parliament was apparently no less effective, but its pressure was more discreetly exercised behind the scenes. The heavy UNR gains and the increase in the number of ministers chosen from Parliament brought the UNR backbencher to greater prominence. The UNR subject groups have facilitated ministerial consultations within the party in advance of legislation.

The Government is criticized by many for its over emphasis on speedily passing the budget and in the usurpation of the limited debating time available by its majority members, and for abusing the use of the rider on budget measures.

In his overview of the system, Williams suggests that France today has a political executive and an administration strongly autonomous in decision-making. There is an overconcentration of policy-making at the Elysée. Few ministers have been backbenchers and fewer have attained office through their parliamentary performance. The Cabinet does not have to represent the leaders and factions of the parliamentary majority and the various opposition parties are deeply divided among themselves. Pompidou is apparently willing to play a subordinate role as long as deGaulle is President, but a dual-headed executive still poses problems, for the system can only work if the President and the Premier agree.

Recent events confirm Williams' observations. Parliament is not an effective forum for popular grievances, or an effective check on administration, or a meaningful political sounding board for the opposition.

The author, in his last chapter, lightly but thoughtfully touches upon the changing social bases, forces and attitudes, and the impact of economic modernization, which, in essence, have a greater bearing on the new France than does a rationalized parliament. The old parties and ideological conflicts seem hopelessly outmoded and the younger voters, now more numerous than ever and ranging across the political spectrum, respond far less than their elders to historical memories and show far more interest and eagerness for specific reforms and in better living conditions.

At this moment French institutional arrangements are fluid. France has undergone a phase of strong executive leadership which, too, has been found lacking. It is doubtful if it has offered more than the preceding strong legislative phase in integrating interests and legitimizing policy decisions.—Henry C. Galant, *Skidmore College*.

A Short History of Chinese Communism. By Franklin W. Houn. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967. Pp. 237. $2.45.)

The author of this modest book maintains that he is neither a critic nor an apologist for the Chinese Communists but simply a describer and interpreter of their actions. It is to his credit that he achieves a high degee of objectivity and avoids the moralism which infects so many popular works on China.

While the book could not be accused of being an important contribution to the field of Chinese studies, it does offer a reasonably thorough and comprehensive introduction to the history of the Chinese Communist movement (chapters 1-5) and the Chinese Communist regime (chapters 6-13). As such the book is one of a small number of works appropriate for undergraduate courses on modern China.

Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of this valuable survey is that the author relies heavily on primary sources except in his chapters on the development of the Chinese Communist revolutionary movement. While his erudite commentary certainly reflects the author's familiarity with major secondary works, this survey would have been strengthened if the author had introduced his reader to the contrasting interpretations and insights of other China specialists. A reader without an extensive background in Chinese studies must rely on Houn's synthesis of conflicting interpretations. For instance, Houn fails to alert his reader to the fact that Professors Cohen and Schram offer interpretations of Mao Tse-tung's thought which are far from identical. While Houn's approach holds the footnotes to a minimum, there is something to be said for introducing students to the pluralism of China scholarship. A good textbook ought to reflect the insights of recent scholarship and not merely describe the latest episodes and crises.

The book also seems to place more emphasis on description than on analysis and interpretation. While this is consistent with the author's desire for impartiality, it does not allow him to stimulate his prospective readers to seek out the "whys" behind events. Moreover, literal description can indeed become misleading especially when one writes of Communist China. For instance, Houn generally seeks to explain the events of the great cultural revolution in terms of the same "conspiracy theory" that Mao himself used to discredit his former colleagues. Houn observes (p. 98) that Liu Shao-ch'i's "infidelities to Mao and his 'revolutionary line' must have most disturbing to Mao and his followers." (See also pages 119 and 126.) Can we in fact rely on Maoist accusations to provide a truthful picture of the actions of P'eng Chen or Liu Shao-ch'i? At best these accusations can only be a starting point for analysis.

The least descriptive and probably the most interesting chapter in this book deals with China's foreign policy. Houn suggests that the Party's major goals are to safeguard the territorial integrity and political independence of the Chinese nation. Houn seems to reject, as well he might, the official American interpretation of Communist China as a yellowish red peril about to engulf Asia and the world. He sees China as a relatively weak nation, conscious of the limits upon its capabilities and seeking to maintain its independence and heighten its prestige in a hostile world.

Outside of the chapter on foreign policy, this is the kind of book which will elicit little emotion from the reader while providing him with a wealth of information. When the author occasionally paraphrases *NCNA* dispatches too closely (as on p. 193) the book becomes very dull, but the reader's interest and attention is sustained by the author's facility for introducing most paragraphs with an incisive topical sentence. Despite its weaknesses, this is the kind of book that might well be assigned to students beginning their study of modern China.—DENNIS M. RAY, *California State College at Los Angeles.*

Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939-1946. BY BA MAW. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. 460, $8.75.)

Burma From Kingdom to Republic: A Historical and Political Analysis. BY FRANK N. TRAGER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 455. $10.00.)

Burma Through Alien Eyes. BY HELEN G. TRAGER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 239. $6.50.)

Helen Trager's book is entitled *Burma Through Alien Eyes*, but all three books under review display different ways in which a single country can be assessed dependent upon the observers own perspective. Mrs. Trager (part of the husband-wife team) provides us with the views of missionaries serving in Burma during the 19th century. This fascinating little book portrays the often ill-informed, jaundiced and despairing, yet committed and self-sacrificing views of those seeking to convert a people less than anxious to "see the light." It beautifully displays how these deeply motivated individuals were often inhibited by their own cultural socialization to the point where they could not really understand those whom they are asking to make perhaps the most fundamental change in their lives. Professor Frank Trager's political history of Burma shows a major effort to understand the forces which have influenced Burmese political actions and in several chapters has provided penetrating insights into factors responsible for both domestic and foreign policy decisions made by various political actors. However, even he finds himself too heavily dependent upon European sources, particularly in his description of pre-independence history. Finally, the memoirs of Dr. Ba Maw give us quite a different perspective as that wartime ruler of Burma attempts to explain Burmese nationalist attitudes and his role in the immediate prewar and wartime period. Here we get the views of an extremely articulate, highly political Burmese with strong feelings on western wrongs (including American and British academics), Burmese political personalities and the Japanese occupation. All three books enhance our understanding of both one another and Burmese history. An effort will be made here to concentrate on the contributions of Frank Trager and Dr. Ba Maw. These two authors provide interesting points of contrast on the periods which they mutually cover. Particularly with regard to political personalities, Trager reflects the more standard assessments of individuals such as Aung San while Ba Maw provides fascinating if highly personal sketches. While Trager's book is well documented with western and Burmese source material, Ba Maw presents his own recollections only using western sources as a take-off point for his own views. It is regrettable that both men are weakest in describing the pre-1940 period, Trager primarily relying on traditional western sources and Ba

Maw inexplicably passing over all too lightly events in which he was deeply involved, such as the trial of Saya San and his own premiership.

Professor Trager's book is divided into three sections although its two primary divisions are between the first two sections which are given over to the political history of Burma and a third which reviews Burma's foreign policy. If at times the book tends to be too descriptive as in the chapters dealing with pre-independence period and on the relations of Burma with her neighbors, other sections provide us with very challenging and interesting analytic passages, most particularly those assessing the early insurrections, the beginnings of Burmese foreign policy and United States-Burmese relations. Of particular interest is his position that "Burma did not begin as a neutralist nation, she became one," (228) arguing that neutralism was not necessarily a first choice. Finally, it is regrettable that the manuscript was finished in 1965 and does not sufficiently take into account the severe economic difficulties of General Ne Win's regime and later Sino-Burmese tensions. The treatment of the post 1962 coup era at times provides a more optimistic picture than even General Ne Win has been prepared to present. The book is complemented by almost 80 pages of bibliographical notes which will be extremely useful to the specialist in the field.

Dr. Ba Maw's memoirs are primarily concerned with the war years and are an attempt to present that period in the perspective of Burmese nationalism and Dr. Ba Maw—at times it is difficult to assess when the one begins and the other leaves off. Be that as it may, this is the only personal rendition of the war years by one of the wartime leaders such as Sukarno and Aurel who were termed "puppets" by the allies and "patriots" by their following. As such it gives characterizations of the Japanese military and civil leaders far less sweeping than those too often appearing in western history and paeans of praise for fellow wartime cooperators with the Japanese such as Subhas Chandra Bose. As a primarily personal account of characters and events these memoirs need to be read with care, but as a highly articulate apologia for the wartime nationalists it is both fascinating reading and necessary source material. In writing his memoirs Dr. Ba Maw presents personal assessments of individuals active in the nationalist cause and strong indictments of western authors who he feels have maligned him in his wartime activities, particularly John Cady, who he characterizes as "typical of wartime mentality" (367). Those who have had the opportunity of discussing the wartime era with Ba Maw know how strongly he feels about the manner in which his rule has been characterized and this attitude is strenuously presented in a number of pages. Aside from some of his personal views of history Ba Maw himself can be criticized for too often entering into generalities which may give the flavor of nationalist views but are reminiscent of campaign speeches. Yet, one would wish that other wartime leaders, and particularly Sukarno, could provide us with his own views of this period, for like Ba Maw, Sukarno was politician, nationalist, cooperator in the Greater East Asian Prosperity Sphere and a most eloquent spokesman for his beliefs. The volume also includes a useful chronology and a Who's who.

As a three dimensional view of Burma's history these three books add to our all too superficial knowledge of intercultural relations in general and the Burmese political and cultural system in particular.—FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN, *Rice University*.

Régime Interne et Politique Extérieure dans les Pays d'Asie. BY GEORGES FISCHER and others. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1966. Pp. 295.)

This volume is composed of five essays, more or less related, focusing on the theme of the influence of environment on foreign policy in the new states of Asia. Chapter 1 ("Etude géneralé"), constituting almost one-third of the book, by Georges Fischer, Director of the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, was written especially for this volume and draws both on the work of the other authors and most of the basic scholarly studies in English and French. The remaining four chapters are in the nature of case studies, which were originally presented at a colloquium of the Centre d'étude des relations internationale in late 1963. Of these, Fistié's first essay, "The New States of South and Southwest Asia," is a rather superficial series of case-study summaries dealing with India, Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines (only Malaysia is treated in any real depth, and even this must be rather hurried). Fistié's "Thailand" (Chap. 3) is more detailed and useful but it suffers from an overemphasis on the Phibun regime. Bernard Fall's "Les deux Vietnam" (Chap. 4), which is not a rehash of his famous book despite the unfortunate choice of title, provides a good summary of the development of the two foreign policies, though the essay itself departs considerably from the intended thrust of the colloquium. Finally, Claude Cadart's very brief "Note on China from 1949 to 1954" is interesting but seems curiously out of place in a collection that deals almost exclusively with the former colonies of South and Southeast Asia.

The goal of the colloquium, to examine the domestic factors affecting the policy-making process, was an admirable one, given the fact that foreign policy studies have too often ignored this side of the coin. However, it must be noted that, as usually happens when several scholars are brought together in a symposium, very seldom do the various authors feel restricted by the ground rules. Moreover, even in Fischer's introduction, which adheres most closely to the guidelines, one can quibble with several aspects of the study. First, despite his criticisms of a number of scholarly attempts to create more systematic comparative frameworks, his own threefold classification of regimes based on the degree of disruption of traditional social and economic institutions (from China and North Vietnam to Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand) adds little to existing theory or to his own essay. Secondly, not all will agree with the weight he assigns to the various domestic factors considered here. To treat history in five pages and dismiss geography in one paragraph while discoursing at such length (30 pages) on the economy and class structure may fit into his own framework but it strikes this reviewer as something of an imbalance.

Despite these and other reservations, this volume has performed a useful service in providing a compendium of valuable information and in calling our attention again to the need to consider the nexus between foreign and domestic politics in all states, Asian and Western, old and new.—Robert O. Tilman, *Yale University.*

Influencing Voters: A Study of Campaign Rationality. By Richard Rose. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Pp. 288. $5.95.)

Compared to the wealth of information concerning other factors which influence voting behavior, political scientists know little about how the campaign affects the vote, or in fact whether it influences the vote at all. Unfortunately *Influencing Voters: A Study of Campaign Rationality* does not address itself to this gap in our knowledge. Instead the author, Richard Rose, evaluates the rationality of campaign advertising in recent British elections by the three political parties and by industrial associations and firms opposed to nationalization.

Campaign advertising is broken into categories of activities according to a "paradigm" which parallels Lasswell's communications categories, "Who says What in Which Channel to Whom with What Effect," except for the last category. Simply stated, Rose's outline follows "clients" (politicians, etc.) who engage "media men" to prepare advertising copy, etc. to influence various "audiences" (categories of voters). All this takes place within an "environment" (the "givens" of the campaign situation). If the activities connecting these categories are carried out so as to maximize the vote, then they are evaluated as being rational. Rose's conclusion is ". . . the rational, vote-maximizing politician, acting with consistency and empirical justification in pursuit of a single electoral goal, is a myth. Campaigners are only imperfectly and intermittently rational." (p. 195).

The book is divided into two major sections. The first section is preceded by an introductory chapter which contains a brief history of campaigning in Britain and the "model." The historical discussion includes an interesting analysis of "political lag" between the development of campaign technology, like the use of surveys, and the willingness of British politicians to fully utilize it.

The first section of the body of the book consists of five chapters devoted to case studies of campaigns waged by various groups in recent elections. Through interviews with many of the activists involved in campaign decisions, Rose retraces the steps taken in these propaganda efforts. He seems unable to rise above a traditional hallmark of the case study in these chapters—excessive detail. The identification of the *personnae* of the drama will seem especially beside the point to American readers. For example, on pages 88 and 89 we learn that in 1959 and 1962 the following individuals were appointed to publicity positions in the Liberal party, Frank Byers, Rev. Timothy Beaumont, "a publisher," Dominic LeFoe, and "Following the retirement of Miss Phyllis Preston, Pratap Chitnis was named press officer." Of these only Dominic LeFoe, and to a lesser extent, Pratap Chitnis figure importantly in the concerns of the book.

The second section contains five chapters each of which is comparative in some sense. One compares the activities of the industrial groupings included, three compare phenomena across all units of analysis, and the last focuses upon the differences and similarities between American and British campaigning. Although the chapters in this section are more analytical in their orientation, they necessarily repeat many of the details already set out in the narrative chapters. The book also contains an appendix on the rationality of the management of campaign finance and a postscript on the 1966 election.

Several of the points developed in this book are related to points of controversy either within the discipline or within the attentive public. To the argument that there is a unity of action between business interests and the Conservative party, Rose replies in pluralist terms—the immediate goals of these groups so differ that there seems to be minimal coordination and consistency between their propaganda efforts. To the criticism that modern campaign technology will lead to a politics of public relations rather than a politics of principles, he charges that the extent to which Britain ever had a politics of principle is overstated, that, in fact, the motives of British politicians have been mixed historically, and that on balance the morality of campaigning has improved over the past century because of electoral reform. To the related argument that specialists like market research experts have become dominate in British campaigning, he counters that his findings suggest that for the most part the opposite is true—their efforts are largely ignored in favor of the intuitions of the politicians.

Two points concerning the goal of this book should be reviewed in detail. First if I am right that we know little about the influences of campaigns, how do we know if campaigns are being manipulated efficiently to give the desired outcomes. Although Rose indicates that he is evaluating propaganda in terms of our findings in the field of voting behavior, many of his criticisms are based upon common sense models of how to influence voters—models that most of us would have little trouble agreeing with. Thus it is probably effective to use brief slogans and attractive pictures to tell voters what they like to hear, to use surveys to find out what they like to hear, and to try to appeal most to strategically located segments of the electorate.

The reason that Rose is able to make his evaluations is that apparently many campaigns in Britain are so inept or disorganized that they fail to do even the conspicuous. For criticisms on somewhat more narrow grounds we need more information. For example, Rose's discussion of the timing of campaigns is his most solid usage of voting behavior evidence. He says that the findings indicating that most voters make up their minds before the formal campaign starts means that rational propagandists would advertise continuously, not just during the campaign. But it is quite possible that the early deciders are more intensely committed to their party while the late deciders tend to be the less strongly identified. If so, among the latter group the last stimulus before the election may be decisive. This pattern of relationships would argue strongly for concentrating propaganda just before the election when the non-identifiers may be more immediately influenced and while the partisans can still be reinforced. The point of this is that the evidence is as yet too incomplete to make incontrovertible prescriptive statements that go beyond the obvious.

Second, the use of the rationality concept as an evaluational device causes me some discomfort. We can easily achieve a *post facto* circularity of reasoning with rationality simply by positing a conflicting goal which is more important to the actor than some nominal goal which is not being maximized. My evaluation of your behavior as irrational then often is equivalent to my disagreeing with your ranking of goals, i.e., ranking gentlemanly behavior over winning elections. If so, then it seems preferable to deal with these goals or values explicitly rather than cloaking them in a seemingly objective study of rationality.—CHARLES F. CNUDDE, *University of Wisconsin.*

Southern Africa and the United States. EDITED BY WILLIAM A. HANCE. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 171. $6.50.)

Unlike many compilations of old and often stale journal articles published to prevent someone from perishing, the present volume consists of four original essays and a conclusion all of high quality. The authors—William Hance, Leo Kuper, Vernon McKay, and Edwin Munger—are thus able to combine both the most recent research and the most recent events into their papers. The subject is divided among the four writers according to their special interests, and although differences of viewpoint emerge, as they must, the conclusion does bring them into perspective.

In the first essay Vernon McKay considers the complex relationships between and among the various African countries and the United States in the light of their different policies and demands. He relates internal and external affairs, including a section on pressure groups operating in this country on behalf of the countries of Southern Africa. Indeed McKay is the only one of the four to deal in any detail with *Southern* Africa as a whole. The others, despite the book's title, stick to *South* Africa. Leo Kuper writes of the forces at work among the colored peoples of South Africa and of the vexed problem of race relations. Edwin Munger takes this theme from the other end, discussing the forces of stability and change in the White community in a truly masterly way. Munger's essay is one of the best features of the book and alone makes the book worth reading. William Hance has not only acted as editor and written the conclusion, but has also contributed a lengthy and well-argued section on the feasibility of economic and political disengagement with South Africa. In all any reader will be hard put to it to find any subject of significance not at least touched upon by the authors. Clearly this is a book meriting the attention of students of international affairs and of Africa.

Despite its many virtues the book inevitably has some shortcomings that diminish its usefulness. It is least valuable to South African area specialists to whom most of the material surveyed is familiar ground. There is not sufficient that is new either in insight or in fact to excite such scholars. But then, perhaps, they are not the intended audience. Being strictly policy oriented as it is, the book is doubtless aimed at present and future makers of foreign policy, but even here there are puzzling aspects. The book assumes a fair background in South African history and politics. There is certainly not enough background for the beginner coming fresh to the area after say, a general introduction to international affairs. But it is precisely a person such as this who stands to benefit most from it. The intelligent reader will probably pick up a good deal on the way, and as the unintelligent reader is unlikely to pick this book the defect may not be serious, but an introductory chapter providing background would have been most helpful to an interested newcomer. The bibliography is also weak from this viewpoint, the selection of some books and the omission of others better known being distinctly odd. An annotated bibliography would have been of particular value, or if this were too time-consuming to complete, at least a grouping of the books to indicate the political commitment of the author. For obvious reasons a book such as the late Brian Bunting's "Rise of the South African Reich," has to be read in the knowledge that Bunting was a Tass correspondent, and this is only one instance. The bibliography is also marred by the absence from it of works cited in the text. As a result checking a citation often involves searching through numbers of footnotes for a title buried among others in the tiny print.

A more substantive defect is, perhaps, the unresolved difference between the authors' perceptions as pragmatic social scientists and their hopes as men steeped in a liberal humane tradition. Meaningful discussion of foreign policy involves the setting of priorities. But in the South African case assignment of priorities is complicated by the character of the regime. The authors recognize that a strong and stable South Africa is important to American interests, but cannot stomach the price of strength and stability. So they are faced with the painful problem of what American policy should be. Should it center on enforcement of a moral standard? And if so, is America in a position to preach morality to others? Is the business of America business? Or is the main goal the preservation of national security, however that elusive term is defined? Or is it the extension of American influence in Africa? If all four are wanted, as they probably are, which comes first, which second, and which follow? The authors are unable to decide. As a result all they can do is to recommend the mixture as before, which is an amalgam of normal relations tinctured with endless admonition. As South Africa is too important to be ignored, and too powerful to be bullied or browbeaten, this policy is self-defeating. It does not satisfy the African states, irritates the South Africans, and does not help the Africans in South Africa. Indeed it more often than not achieves the opposite, for South African whites are convined that concessions are not enough and that what is demanded is their abject surrender—a surrender to which they are not resigned. The authors consider alternative policies, but while calling attention to these alternatives do not take them sufficiently seriously. Their hopes as men clashing with their knowledge as scientists, the authors are unable to revalue American policy towards South Africa. Having said this, it is only fair to say that the authors do essay the effort, and for that they deserve respect even where they fall short.

Although it would be pointless to embark on an expedition to find small faults, there are some which knowledgeable readers will find irritating. McKay for instance insists on lumping the South African, Rhodesian, and Portuguese Governments together as "right-wing." While it is questionable if such categorization is meaningful anywhere, it is irrelevant in Africa. According to some definitions all South African political parties, from the Progressives to the Nationalists, would be classed as "right-wing" while others would arrange them on a left-right spectrum. According to other definitions, the Nationalists, with their emphasis on a planned economy, on state participation or ownership of industry, and on radical social experimentation could well be called "socialists" by American "right-wingers." One has the feeling that the term is put in to "double-damn" a regime or regimes McKay dislikes. One can also quarrel with Leo Kuper's description of the Freedom Charter as "mild socialist doctrine." In their program of 1963 the South African Communist Party admit that implementing the Charter would involve the nationalization of all banking and finance, of most industry, and of land. Such a program goes well beyond what most people conceive of as "mild socialism." But these are relatively small defects which, together with others, do not greatly detract from a good book.

In sum, the authors can be congratulated on an interesting collection of essays that will prove useful to those who make or study foreign policy.—Edward Feit, *University of Massachusetts.*

Quebec Confronts Canada. By Edward M. Corbett. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 336. $8.95.)

If you are unfamiliar with the current problems Canada's Confederation is facing, if you are puzzled by what you have read in the newspapers about Quebec's uneasy relations with the rest of the country, and if you would like to get a more thorough introduction to all this from someone who has an articulate view of the situation, read this book. It presents, in a balanced fashion, an overall description of Quebec's unrest and the demands it makes on the rest of Canada, and English Canada's responses to these claims. Though the author may have had some disguised sympathies for those he considers the underdogs in this situation, he has shown an ability not to be swayed by any one side's arguments. But above all, what is most gratifying is the author's familiarity with the multifaceted problems which are a challenge to Canadian unity; the breadth of his information on the political views of representatives from all walks of life in Canadian society is as complete as one would expect from a serious study of this kind.

The author's central idea is that a new self-confidence and a new drive have developed among French Canadians, in political as well as in economic and social matters, in technical as well as in cultural endeavors, and that these people are terribly impatient; the movement cannot be stopped now, and English Canadians will have to make room for the expressions of these aspirations, if they want to keep the Confederation working. The key to the dilemma actually lies in their hands: the question is whether or not they will be willing to satisfy "the new insistence, on the part of French Canadians, on sharing in all the responsibilities and advantages of modern life in all spheres of national existence" (p. 3). According to him, the economic sector will be one of the key spheres, and whether French Canadians get a decent share of economic power will be critical.

These themes gradually develop as the author moves from a short, but precise historical review of the development of Quebec central ideology—nationalism—to the intellectual climate which has grown in the last two decades; he shows how a monolithic conservative and clerical outlook has given way to ideological pluralism, though nationalism remain the dominant force. Then he goes on to examine the problems of various sectors in detail: the language issue, the political forces and their positions on Quebec's relations with the rest of the country, the specific constitutional changes that have been proposed, from cooperative federalism to special status and associate state, finally the problem of Quebec's power in social and economic decisions, and the changes that have occurred in these sectors. Then he turns to an analysis of the English Canadian moods toward Quebec, and concludes with a brief—too brief in my view—outlook on what the future holds.

This short conclusion reveals in fact what appears to me to be a weakness of the book. The author has clearly well succeeded in describing the outward dimensions of the Quebec-Canada confrontation. But from this description of the explicit contentions, the author could have pursued in at least two different directions.

One was to try to develop from his account of recent developments some overall view of what the future holds for Canada. But given the complexity of the reality, this is not an easy task, to say the least. The author, however, seems to have been tempted by this avenue, and given his inability to master the multiplicity of factors involved in one global view, he has been led to a frustrating series of "if . . . , then . . ." statements, which characteristically tend to end many sections and chapters of the book. Too often, the condition is presented as if it were the most important one for Canada's survival.

The other avenue could have been more manageable and, at the same time, intellectually stimulating. It would have consisted in an effort to present a sociological and political inward analysis of the forces which underly Quebec's unrest and give it its full force; ideally this should have been done in comparison with other political movements. But I suppose this was beyond the author's aim. The potential reader should be warned, however, not to expect this kind of analysis. Corbett limits himself to an examination of current political developments and the demands and grievances explicitly expressed by the two groups' representatives; it is journalism, albeit of a very sophisticated kind. This will make the book, incidentally, soon out-dated: in fact, this problem is already apparent, since the author's inquiry seems to have stopped around 1965-66, and many political issues discussed here have since developed far beyond the point at which the author left them.

We unfortunately cannot conclude this review without noting many spelling errors, such as "civil source" for "civil service" (p. 12), "adaption" instead of "adaptation" (twice on p. 186). This is particularly frequent in French references (for instance, p. 33, 115, 239, 312). Finally, the author refers to the National Film Board, as the National Film Office (p. 59), to *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,* as *Canadian Journal of Economics* (p. 273 n.), and to Albert Breton, as André Breton (p. 32). These are inexcusable errors in an otherwise very well written and well presented book.—MAURICE PINARD, *McGill University.*

The Democratic Revolution in West Indies. EDITED BY WENDELL BELL. (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc. 1967. Pp. 232. $8.95.)

This volume is a prelude to a series that springs from the West Indies Studies Program at U.C.L.A. Wendell Bell's *Jamaican Leaders* (1963) and *Decisions of Nationhood* (1964) are lineal antecedents. The Program represents the most ambitious endeavor, to date, to study aspects of social and political behavior in the English speaking West Indies. More than half the studies in this book are excised or distilled from Ph.D. dissertations and the work, in some instances, suffers from an overdose of tabulation. Furthermore, because of the attempt to forge a common conceptual framework, the authors exhibit an irritating tendency to cite each other repeatedly.

Mr. Vernon Arnett of the Jamaican Parliament, in his Foreword, poses a realistic thesis against which the progress oriented contributors pit their ideas and findings. Arnett argues that while the colonial yoke has been shed, the economic yoke remains, controlled by expatriate firms and landowners who, in turn, are reinforced by a small, yet potent, business and professional middle class. The masses, increasing in numbers in the finite territorial environment of the West Indies, do not enjoy the fruits of this structure. Independence, to Arnett, means the positive and autonomous choice to provide a more equitable distribution of resources and greater opportunities for the whole of the population. He is far from sanguine about the prospects. As for the Bell group, he notes that "some may feel that the study has done too well by us . . . in the presentation of an over-optimistic view of the future." Indeed, one of the characteristics of this volume is the optimistic outlook for egalitarian democracy expressed in its theoretical prose and the contrasting data that is found in its tables.

Bell and Oxall establish a theoretical position which will be familiar to those who have read *Decisions of Nationhood.* In the design of the book, they set out empirically to support their longitudinal, normative assumptions. They view "much of the political, economic and social change that is going on, in the world today, and has gone on in the recent past as a continuation of the democratic revolution." They focus on "recruitment, socialization and, above all, the performance of new national elites . . ." The extrapolated approach is based upon ten "decisions of nationhood" which are supposed to provide a holistic framework for the succeeding studies. The studies are elitist oriented for the most part, using a positional-reputational scheme to identify leaders. The paradox in this conceptualization and design is the positing of a global theoretical framework on the one hand and the omission, on the other, of exogenous influences in the decision model.

The eight studies cover a variety of topics and approaches and differ in their proximity to the central theme. Three attitudinal studies by Bell and Charles C. Moskos, Jr. adhere to the decision decalogue and are West Indies-wide in scope. The studies that are limited to individual islands are not as tightly integrated, but are interesting for the data and insights they offer. While the questionnaire-interview technique was most often employed, Ivar Oxaal's historical essay on the intellectual background of Trinidad and Raymond W. Mack, Jr.'s impressionistic analysis of class and race in Barbados are well rendered. Mack's finding that "when class boundaries shift rapidly, the boundaries of races also become fluid" could provide the basis for further empirical work.

The writers repeatedly offer disclaimers about the tentativeness of their theories and are candid about the problems of research in this region. Yet, very little attention is given to the body of theory on West Indian society that preceded this project. There is obviously more to West Indian analysis that Eric Williams and C. L. R. James. Lloyd Braithwaite earns an anecdotal note in the Oxaal article; M. G. Smith is acknowledged in the prefatory pages and a footnote, and other writers such as Vera Rubin, R. T. Smith, Sidney Mintz and C. Wagley go unrecognized. These people have built up a theoretical and empirical literature that should not be rejected out of hand in a seminal volume of this kind.

Obliquely the problem arises of field research in the English speaking Caribbean. When a Jamaican politician expresses a belief in progress, just what does he mean in relation to his actions? Island differentiations are important and are not given sufficient attention by Moskos and Bell. Furthermore, most of the research was done in 1960 to early 1962 when the West Indian Federation was in the process of a still birth. Certainly this traumatic event colored the views of political leaders towards independence and freedom. The Oxaal and Mack studies appear most sound quite possibly because they were devoid of interview schedules that raise questions about the conceptualization of the interview items in the first instance. The fact that English is spoken in the West Indies can, as I am sure the writers in this book are aware, be very deceiving. The contextual base, therefore, requires an internal, theoretical analysis and this is where the Bell group falls short. An external, global analysis has been imposed on a varied and complex society without accepting the existing theories that explain this society or devising a new one. Yet, this is an important book. Within the limitations noted, it is carefully done and may prove a landmark in the development of integrated studies in this fascinating region.—MORTON KROLL, *University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.*

Canadian Labor in Politics. BY GAD HOROWITZ. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968. Pp. 273. $7.50.)

Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, Canadian politics continue to be portrayed as a minor variant of the American: while more than two parties compete in a plurality, single-member constituency voting system, the multi-party situation is often regarded as little more than a temporary aberration; the Liberals are the dominant party—they have been in power for 51 of the last 72 years—so they are often considered as the Canadian analogy to the Democrats in this country; another conventional assumption, related to the one about the Liberals, is that the political style of the Canadian labor movement is not much different from that of its American counterpart.

This study helps set the record straight on these and several other points and is a genuine contribution to a developing literature on Canada that is both specific in content and comparative in orientation.

Horowitz traces the history of the political involvement of Canadian labor from the early organization efforts, through the schism between the politically quietistic AFL-affiliated craft unions (TLC) and the activistic CIO-associated industrial unions (CCL), the struggle with the Communists in the 1940's, the association with the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), the merger between the TLC and the CCL to form the Canadian Labor Congress (CLC) in 1956 and the formation of the New Democratic party (NDP) in 1961. Employing party and union correspondence, minutes and other documents as well as personal interviews across the country, the author analyzes the social composition of the various conventions, the membership of the politically-involved unions and the motivations of the unionists and the leaders of the CCF and NDP. Even had he stopped at this, he would have successfully filled large gaps in knowledge about recent Canadian politics.

Of greater interest, however, is Horowitz' lengthy introduction which makes up one-fifth of the entire book. In it he resorts to a Hartzian approach to try to account for the fact that while "in the United States, organized socialism is dead, in Canada, socialism, though far from national power, is a significant political force and the official 'political arm' of the labour movement" (p. 3). He accepts Louis Hartz' argument in *The Liberal Tradition in America* that American political values originate with the bearers of liberal individualism who left the Tory end of the spectrum behind them. But he claims that the Canadian value structure is different in that it is not wholly individualistic and liberal. Rather it has a Tory tinge to it—not only a function of the migration north resulting from the American Revolution as Hartz believes but also a product of successive waves of immigration from Great Britain.

A variety of subsidiary factors are listed as being part of the Tory tradition in Canada: the failure of Jacksonian democracy to take root; the ambivalent and centrist character of left-wing liberalism in Canada; and the failure of English-Canada to develop a nationalist cult and the legitimacy of ideological diversity.

Accordingly, Horowitz points out, the Canadian environment is relatively congenial to concepts of community and class while the American, suffused with the ideology of individualism is not. He continues that this Toryism in Canada has been crucial to the development of a socialist movement and notes that Canadian Conservatism is quite unlike its American facsimile and is very close to Canadian socialism in that its underlying assumptions about class and community are similar.

These ideas make a very useful essay in political culture. But then the author, attempting to link these notions with the problem of the continued existence of the CCF and now NDP in the face of the major parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, falls back on the left-right continuum. He characterizes the NDP as a left-wing party, the Liberals as a center group with the Conservatives on the right. Unfortunately, while such a construct may be applicable on some issues, it has no general empirical justification and is meaningless in reference to the behavior of mass publics who, after all, participate in the process if only at election time. Moreover, it is unnecessary. The CCF-NDP has not been swallowed up by the Liberals not so much because of programmatic intransigence on both sides but because the Liberals have responded to the ethnic and religious diversity of the country by emphasizing ethnic and religious issues that give third party interlopers exploitable openings while the Liberals retain power.

Finally, this reviewer differs with the author in his labelling of the NDP as a "socialist" party. At the founding of the CCF in the dark days of the Depression of the 1930's, such an adjective was probably appropriate. However, in the middle 1960's, the NDP has been consistently down-playing ideology in favor of a bread-and-butter issue-orientation and face-to-face canvassing in the urban areas in English Canada. The electorate has responded rather favorably and today, the working class identification with the NDP is based on the party's success at projecting this style rather than deep-seated commitment to its long-term programmatic ideas.—PETER REGENSTREIF, *University of Rochester*.

Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat. BY JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. 435. $10.00.)

Marshal Jozef Pilsudski assuredly belongs to the most important statesmen of the inter-war period. There are two criteria by which he and his acts can be judged—that of the contemporary European political scene from which he cannot be divorced, and that of Polish history of which he was the foremost actor. In his preface to *Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat* Professor Rothschild emphasized the difficulty of comparing Pilsudski's "guided democracy" with the autocratic regimes of the "new states" which emerged after the Second World War. One might add that it would be equally pointless to judge Pilsudski only in the terms of post-1918 politics. The Polish leader did not fit into the era of the League of Nations. Rather than a world citizen or a European, he was above all a Pole reared in the nineteenth century romanticism which in Poland gave rise to a desperate struggle for national independence.

Professor Rothschild's excellent treatment of the May 1926 "political demonstration" which "degenerated into a military battle" is no doubt a valuable contribution to the study of the technique of a military *coup d' etat* resulting in the destruction of parliamentary government. It is to the credit of the author that he realized that his "case study," however useful from the more general point of view, was determined by Polish political experience. The events of the May 1926 seizure of power, so masterfully described by the author, would have stood in clearer relief, had he dealt more elaborately with the key position of Pilsudski before and during the First World War, as well as his role of Chief of State in the formative years of modern Poland. Such an inquiry would have revealed that the internal political split stemmed not only from the obvious inadequacies of Polish parliamentarianism or the impatience of its opponents; this clash to a large degree was the continuation of two political orientations—one represented by the impetuous and conspiratorial "socialist," Pilsudski, and the other by the more rationalistic representative of the Right, Roman Dmowski.

Discussion of these two orientations would have greatly enhanced the otherwise well documented analysis of the policies and aims of the May 1926 antagonists. In particular, it would have helped to explain the behavior of the socialists whose support decided the struggle in favor of the Marshal. In fact, the conflict between the Right and the Left in postwar Poland was unusual and bizarre. The authoritarian goals and tactics, which in other European states were pursued by the communists and later by the parties of the extreme Right, in Poland were embraced and put into effect by the socialists. It took them over almost ten years to realize that after November, 1918 Pilsudski—far from being prepared to solve Poland's problems in a "Socialist-Bonapartist" manner—ceased to be a socialist and decided to base his May 1926 regime on the army and the more conservative elements.

Unlike the majority of writers, who regarded Pilsudski either as a savior of Poland, or as a power-seeking autocrat, Professor Rothschild allowed the facts to speak for themselves, thus providing an insight into the complex mind of the Polish leader. Of special interest is the author's discussion of the uncertainties and internal torment of Pilsudski when he ran into conflict with some of his old comrades, such as President Wojciechowski and later Ignacy Daszynski.

It was this curious mixture of ruthlessness and moderation which explained Pilsudski's initial attempt to make peace with his opponents. He tried to reap the rewards of his illegal action without having to bear the burden of its revolutionary character. That he failed to create an atmosphere of conciliation was due to a number of factors—the inferior qualities of most of his military associates, his erroneous belief that the opposition parties of the *Sejm* would do his bidding, and his inability to provide—apart from the action-related slogans of the *Sanacja* (moral sanitation)—a meaningful program for his regime. Despite his awareness of the "demoralizing and pattern-setting consequences of an illegal recourse to force for the solution of domestic political crises," Pilsudski proved unable to stop the tragic escalation of his feud with the opposition. In this sense there was a direct and logical relationship between the May seizure of power and the outrages of "Brzesc." Pilsudski himself was overwhelmed by the consequences of this ill-advised and hasty action which was to haunt him until the end of his life. Accompanied as it was by the electoral victory of the "government bloc," largely caused by the intimidation of the opposition, the brutal treatment of its leaders was a milestone in Polish political history which—to use the words of the author—"severed the moral tie between Pilsudski and his nation."

Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat is a scholarly study based on sound research and impressive evidence. The author is unbiased, despite his obvious sympathy for Pilsudski's May coup, with which not everyone would agree. Postwar democracy in Europe—both East and West—suffered from serious weaknesses. But is it necessary to brand Poland or any other European country as being "ripe for dictatorship?" Nor would every one agree with the clearly hostile approach of the writer to Wincenty Witos, the reasons of which are not sufficiently explained. Is it not true that in the last three years of prewar Poland Witos living in exile was regarded as one of the symbols of Polish freedom? To doubt the greatness and patriotism of Pilsudski would be patently wrong. But is it necessary to "give him primary credit for the fact that today the notion of Europe without a Polish state is no longer conceivable?"

Yet Professor Rothschild is to be congratulated for having admirably filled an important gap in our knowledge of East Central European political development.—Vaclav L. Benes, *Indiana University.*

Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China. By Chun-hsi Wu. (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967. Pp. 231. $7.00.)

Unlike many studies of Communist China that can best be described as long on generalized speculations but short on substantiating facts, *Dollars,* *Dependents and Dogma* by Professor Chun-hsi Wu is a thoroughly researched and carefully documented book.

Primarily of interest to China-watching economists, this book purports to analyze the nature and channels of overseas Chinese remittances to the mainland (Chapters I & II); to estimate the volume of such remittances from 1903 to 1964 (Chapters IV & V); to examine the policies and regulations of Communist China toward this supply of foreign exchange (Chapter III; and, finally, to forecast its prospects for the future (Chapter VI).

Because of Communist China's persistent reluctance to release official statistics on many crucial aspects of its governmental operations, this study, typical of studies on Communist China in general, is handicapped by the lack of hard, reliable data. Further complications, as Professor Wu points out, arise from the wide geographical distribution of the overseas Chinese, the diversity of currencies which they remit, and the numerous channels of remittance, some covert, often necessitated by the rigid restrictions imposed by various national governments.

Yet, Wu has succeeded in carrying out his research as scrupulously as can be expected under these circumstances and presents his findings in a most convincing manner. The persuasiveness of the book is strengthened considerably by data which Wu has uncovered from a variety of original sources. In addition to materials in Japanese and Thai, he has exploited several publications in Chinese, not available in English, such as *Tsu-kuo* (China Monthly), *Chin-jih Ta-lu* (Mainland Today), *Hai-wai Yueh-k'an* (Overseas Affairs Monthly), *Fei-ching Yen-chiu* (Research on Communist China), *Ching-chi Tao-pao* (Economic Bulletin), and *Wen-ti yu Yen-chiu* (Issues and Studies). This book demonstrates well the argument that much valuable information on China in Chinese is often overlooked by many Western scholars relying heavily upon translations of government agencies and research institutions which are selective due to the overwhelming volume of Chinese materials available.

Among his major theses, Wu maintains that overseas remittances have decreased since the Chinese Communists' take-over; that despite periodic encouragement by the Communist regime, overseas Chinese only remit between US$25 to $30 million to the mainland out of US$90 to $100 million which is remitted to Hong Kong annually; and that "the present prospects for any significant increase in overseas remittances to mainland China are, without a doubt, not encouraging. Nor do the long term prospects appear to hold much greater promise (p. 148)."

Although of considerable value to economists, this book fails to dwell sufficiently upon several questions of interest to political scientists. During the period of "squeezing," what were Communist China's instruments of coercion in forcing overseas Chinese to remit and how were they actually carried out? What are the Communists' rationalization and attempted solution of the "contradiction" whereby a high percentage of overseas Chinese dependents in Communist China, by virtue of their treasured remittances in foreign exchange, can live more comfortably than ordinary people, or can retain their "capitalistic" possessions while industry and business owned by Chinese receiving no remittance are being "socialized," or can be exempted from work in the communes?

Another weakness of this book is the repetitious and monotonous "Summary and Conclusions" (Chapter VIII) which can be discarded without serious damage to the organization of the book. The "Introduction" by C. F. Remer is flawed by his erroneous view that this book attempts to answer a much broader question—"How is Communist China to make peace with economic interdependence (p. 1)?"—and by his misleading oversimplifications such as his description of Chinese Communist's policy toward remittance in terms of "Grandmother Wong's Hundred Dollars (p. 5)."

This book is produced by lithography and the original typing of the manuscript, from which final copies are photographed, is careless. Words or even sentences are missing. (The sentence which begins with "Ch'en Sung-k'uang . . ." and ends with "has provided us with" on p. 88 is followed, after three tables, on p. 92 by "according to their purposes.") Indentations are used inconsistently. (The subtitle, *Remittances from the Philippines,* is not indented on p. 112, but other similar subtitles, such as *Remittances from Malaysia* on p. 106 and *Overseas Remittances from Indonesia* on p. 116, are indented nine and eight spaces respectively.) Furthermore, words which should be capitalized are not. (The beginning word of a sentence on p. 162 appears in small letter.)

Despite its shortcomings *Dollars, Dependents and Dogma* is definitely a valuable contribution to the growing, though still inadequate, research on Communist China, a country consistently neglected in courses on comparative government which are culturally oriented toward European political institutions.—YI-CHUN CHANG, *University of Delaware.*

Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence 1808–1833. BY SIMON COLLIER. (Cambridge. England: The University Press, 1967. Pp. 396, $12.50.)

This is a careful, competent, thoroughly researched study of the interaction of ideology and events during the formative years of the Chilean nation. The author, a British historian who views ideas as "the lifeblood of political history" (p. xv), intends the book as a contribution to the historiography of the Chilean revolution for independence. But he also offers it as a case study of the political ideas of Latin American independence—"indeed, of Latin American political ideas in general," a subject which, Mr. Collier rightly notes, has been manifestly understudied.

The important political facts of the period of Chilean independence are here, dating from the Spanish imperial crisis induced by the Napoleonic invasion of 1808 and ending with tthe consolidation of a new "autocratic republicanism" in the Chilean constitution of 1833. The author's objective, however, is not to write the definitive history of Chile's struggle for independence. For example, minimum attention is given the military aspects of that struggle. The emphasis is rather on ideas: their sources, especially in French, British, and North American writings and public documents; and how these came to be embodied in Chilean political institutions. At this Mr. Collier is very successful.

The book is also of interest for its analysis of the gradual emergence of the very idea of independence and of a distinct Chilean identity, at least on the part of the small upper stratum that led the process of separation from Spain. The author's analysis shows very clearly the importance in this regard of the nature of the reaction of the Spanish government and its New World agents to initial demands for more autonomy within the framework of the empire.

One or two of the author's judgments may be questioned. Thus he laments the establishment of the Conservative Republic under Diego Portales after 1830 on the ground that further experiments along liberal lines during the first decades of the nineteenth century would have produced an increased measure of freedom or democracy in the long run. The histories of the other Latin American republics during the nineteenth century, however, as well as the social and political realities of the time, cast serious doubt on any such proposition. If the author also provides a more detailed examination of some points than is perhaps necessary, he has nevertheless achieved his goal of giving us an excellent analysis of the interaction of the ideas, events, and institutions during a crucial period in one country's early development.

Mr. Collier's book may also serve as a case study in the adaptation of imported ideas to the problems of constitutional engineering in a new nation, as he intended it to be. Unfortunately, though, in the eyes of a political scientist, the study is not placed within a conceptual framework—the reader must largely extrapolate his own comparative inferences from the material presented. The book remains essentially a history of ideas. Yet other studies will hopefully be forthcoming of the interweaving of ideology and political institutions, both in other Latin American countries and in more recent phases of their development, on the basis of which comparisons can indeed be made. In such a context, this book is at any rate a beginning.

Moreover, for a political scientist, Mr. Collier's book indirectly raises other possibilities for comparative analysis. Thus the Latin struggles of the early nineteenth century may be viewed as the first continent-wide movement for independence, embracing what shortly became 18 separate polities (Cuba and Panama won their independence only much later). Comparisons of the causes, processes, outcomes, and ideologies of those struggles with the anti-colonial movements of the twentieth century should certainly widen the empirical base upon which rests our present understanding of independence movements generally.

A comparative analysis of the revolutions for independence throughout the various parts of the Spanish Empire (and including those places like Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines that did not at the time sever their ties) might also provide new material for the burgeoning analysis of internal wars and their causes. Again, studies of nation-forming in Latin America along the lines of Richard Merritt's *Symbols of American Community, 1735-1775*, or of early party systems in the mold of William Chambers' recent work on the United States, might be fruitful.

In short, it seems high time that students of comparative politics, as well as students of political thought, expand their perspectives to encompass the long trajectory of Latin American political experience, thus broadening the base on which theory may be constructed. So-called Latin Americanists likewise need to integrate the concerns of systematic comparison more effectively into their own work. With regard to the specific topic of Latin American independence, the historians—and most recently Mr. Collier—have been first in the field. Political scientists, with somewhat different and hopefully explicity comparative concerns, should follow.—ROBERT H. DIX, *Harvard University.*

Latin America. Social Structures and Political Institutions. BY JACQUES LAMBERT. Translated by Helen Katel. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. Pp. 413. $10.00.)

This is a skillful English translation of one of the most interesting broad studies of Latin America published in recent years. The author, a specialist on Brazil, is a professor at the University of Lyon, France, and the book first appeared in French in 1963. A note on the jacket states that "the author has added material on developments through 1965," but the bibliography lists several items published in 1966 and one in 1967.

Except for updating of text and bibliography, the new material leaves the original work substantially unchanged. It is essentially a political study. This is clearly apparent in the titles of the last three of the book's four main parts: "Contradictions in Political Life," "Political Forces and Political Parties," and "Political Institutions." And although Part I is entitled "General Features of Latin American Social Structure," and deals chiefly with the *latifundio* or large estate, its responsibility for lags in social development, and the survival of motivations peculiar to an aristocratic colonial society, the culmination of this analysis is reached in the statement that "Since the 1930's Latin America has tried to make her culture democratic and national," which is surely a political proposition. Moreover, if the book has a central theme, it is that of "presidential dominance," which is announced in the opening chapter and developed at length in Part IV. In both places the subordination of social to political interest is made explicit: in the former, by the assertion (p. 19) that "the chief executive must be given very broad powers because developing countries need this form of government"; in the latter, by the title of the final chapter, "Social Causes of Presidential Dominance: The Crisis of Democracy."

The author is at his best when dealing with politics, though less so with political parties (e.g., Mexico's P.R.I., Colombia's Liberal and Conservatives, and Argentina's Radicals) than with political institutions. His account of these in Part IV is fresh, highly informative and persuasive. His carefully defined concept of presidential dominance is a valuable contribution, and he shows clearly and at considerable length how this dominance has impinged upon the courts, local administration, and the national legislatures—all leading up to the present "crisis of democracy," which he attributes to the contradiction in most of Latin America between a genuine devotion to political democracy and the persistence of archaic and completely undemocratic societies. Unless the latter are transformed "fairly soon" for the benefit of "the backward masses," he sees no hope for political democracy in Latin America.

The other parts of the book are excellent in many respects and the whole gains added value by constantly taking account of the great diversity of Latin America and frequently comparing it with other areas of the world, both developing and advanced. Yet, as a study focused on the present state and future prospects of Latin America, the book suffers from an excessive concern with the dead hand of the past, to the neglect of relatively new dynamic forces of change. Thus, it has much to say about the old latifundio and archaic social survivals, but makes only a very few brief and rather incidental references to industrialization, entrepreneurship, urbanism, communications, and international organizations whose activities are highly relevant to the problems discussed in these pages. The almost complete neglect of radio and television is particularly regrettable, for, as other writers have pointed out, by reaching even the illiterate half of Latin America's population these have done much to stimulate rising aspirations and grave unrest among the area's "backward masses."

In addition, two important topics that are by no means neglected need more searching examination. Agrarian reform is treated too narrowly as a matter of breaking up large estates, whereas there is much more to it than that, as has been pointed out by various specialists, including T. Lynn Smith in a book listed in this one's bibliography (p. 387). Nationalism, too, is treated too narrowly, as a rather simple middle-class phenomenon, whereas in fact it is a complex of several different varieties which find support in one or another of all the principal sectors of Latin American society. Not a single book or article on nationalism is listed in the bibliography.

There are a surprisingly large number of slips of one kind or another, some in the text and more in the bibliography. These include matters of fact, the spelling and accenting of foreign (particularly Spanish) words, and the erroneous attribution of Lyle N. McAlister's important article, "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America," to two other writers (p. 391). Also, the *Latin American Research Review*, in which his article appeared, though cited at this point, is omitted from the list of periodicals on p. 368. The index leaves much to be desired. A university press, especially one so long and favorably known for its publications dealing with Latin America, ought to do much better in the revised and corrected edition of this important book which it is to be hoped will be forthcoming soon.—ARTHUR P. WHITAKER, *Riverside, California*.

Governing the Commune of Veyrier: Politics in Swiss Local Government. BY GEORGE A. CODDING, JR. (Bureau of Governmental Research: Boulder, University of Colorado, 1967. Pp. 98.)

It is one of the ironies of comparative political analysis that Switzerland—rich in the problems of federalism, modernization, nationalism, democracy, and religious, linguistic and geographical diversity which most interest social scientists—has been thoroughly neglected by Americans throughout this century. Episodic attention has been paid it by a few Europe oriented political sicentists (e.g., Carl Friedrich, Hans Kohn and Karl Deutsch), but there has been no sustained or cumulative interest. For this reason alone the profession owes its gratitude to Professor George A. Codding, Jr. for this, his second book on Switzerland. Like the first (*The Federal Gvernment of Switzerland,* 1961), *Politics in Swiss Local Government* is a completely descriptive study; its focus is the commune of Veyrier—a French-speaking settlement in the canton of Geneva.

Because the commune is the basic building block of government throughout Switzerland, Professor Codding apparently hopes through his detailed treatment of local political parties, civic organizations, communal finances, and the structure and functioning of the communal legislature and executive to shed some comparative light on local government in other parts of Switzerland and the world.

Yet despite its accuracy and thoroughness, the book fails in two decisive ways to rise to the level of stimulating comparative analysis. It fails first because Professor Codding simply does not exploit the vital themes to which his data again and again point. Commentary, criticism and analysis are persistently—even obstinately—eschewed. The decline of farming and the increasing exodus of the young to the cities are noted, but the problems of rural depopulation and communal decline indicated by such demographic statistics remain unexamined. The fact of female suffrage (introduced only recently in Geneva, Lausanne and Neuchâtel), the customary reelection of officials for what often amount to life terms, and the use of the referendum are mentioned in passing, but nowhere are they elaborated in terms of the peculiarly patriarchical, collectivistic and participatory character of Swiss democracy. The five-fold increase in the communal budget since 1945 is dutifully charted, but its significance in conjunction with increasing bureacratization and growing strains on communal resources is left unexplored.

It would be impossible, from Professor Codding's often parochial account, to know that Swiss politics are today dominated at every level by a concern with the maintenance of precarious religious, linguistic and political equilibria in the face of burgeoning Catholic birth rates and immigration by foreign workers; or that the struggle to restrain overemployment and a land boom coupled with the increasingly depressed character of the rural mountain cantons have precipitated an on-going economic crisis which touches every aspect of Swiss life.

This points to the second major difficulty of Professor Codding's work: many of the critical issues noted above fail to find their way into Codding's study because the commune he has chosen as a "political microcosm" of Switzerland (p. 23) is in many ways completely untypical—a weakness which renders the generalizations that can be drawn from his analysis suspect and sometimes erroneous.

Veyrier is, after all, French, while Switzerland is predominantly Germanic—historically as well as constitutionally in its characteristic institutions. The referendum, the initiative, the *Landsgemeinde,* the separation of the commune into two bodies differentiating residents with federal voting rights from communal citizens with special communal privileges, and the pervading spirit of regionalism and local autonomy (summed up in the notion of *Kantönligeist*) are exclusively Germanic in origin and spirit. Second, Veyrier is in Codding's own phrase a "bedroom town" of Geneva (p. 16) giving it a population (c. 3000) well above the average, immunity from the economic problems which have plagued many smaller, rural communes, and a broad urban orientation which deemphasizes such traditional communal values as administrative autonomy and limited economic autarky; (most residents work in Geneva and were born outside of Veyrier).

The misleading character of Codding's French-Swiss, urban perspective on Swiss politics are exemplified in his understanding of the referendum as an instrument of public veto (p. 7) rather than of creative public participation, or in his dubious reading of Swiss federalism as more centralist than its American counterpart (p. 2). One wonders whether Professor Codding, in his legalistically justified but unrealistic insistence on the omnipotence of cantonal authority, knows the story of the commune in Graubuenden which when challenged by the canton on its jurisdiction over water power proclaimed "the commune existed long before there was a canton of Graubuenden and denies the canton any right whatsoever to decide questions concerning its existence or justification."

Ultimately, Professor Codding's book justifies only half of its title: it does provide some excellent if painstakingly (almost painfully) detailed material on "Governing the Commune of Veyrier," including reports on the location of fire extinguishers, the schedule for garbage collections, and vacation arrangements for town employees. But it does not effectively illuminate "Politics in Swiss Local Government," and what vision it does offer suffers from an urban, centralist astigmatism caused by overexposure to French-Swiss sources.

One cannot, however, lay on Professor Codding's shoulders the responsibility for decades of neglect. No single study can begin to deal with the rich and diversified political experience of Switzerland. Professor Codding has at least shown the way; let us hope that others will follow.—BENJAMIN R. BARBER, *University of Pennsylvania.*

Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957. By P. J. VATIKIOTIS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1967. Pp. 169. $7.50.)

One of the unpleasant prospects facing the writer on Middle Eastern politics, is the almost unfailing necessity for revising or updating his manuscript upon its completion. Because of the region's uncertainties and instability, the great onrush of events often leaves the scholar in a state of apprehension about the validity of his judgements and hypotheses. This dilemma is clearly illustrated in Prof. Vatikiotis' work on the Arab Legion of Jordan, which contains a 2-part Epilogue, followed by a "trailer" analyzing the consequences of the recent Arab-Israeli confrontation, that culminated in the June 1967 war. None of these occurrences, however, have invalidated the author's conclusions or detracted from the value of the book. A thoroughly documented piece of research, it is based on the published memoires of British officers and Arab leaders, regimental log books, as well as on interviews with various commanders and other participants. As a Greek, born and raised in Jerusalem, with the experience of a decade of distinguished scholarship on the Middle East, no one would be more qualified to write on Jordan's military than Dr. Vatikiotis. The end product is a generally competent and cogent analysis of the Legion's role in the creation and perpetuation of the manifestly unviable Hashemite state. It satisfies the needs of the area specialist in terms of depth and originality, and at the same time provides those pursuing cross-national type of studies with valuable data.

By casting his subject in a comparative framework, the author challenges the Western view of regarding military rulership as deviant from the norms set by the nation-state. Yet in the context of the universalistic Islamic *Umma,* until recent times the Western concept of the nation-state was alien; and in the case of Jordan the army preceeded the state and was instrumental in its creation.

One may analyze the process of nation-building in terms of the interrelated concepts of control and legitimacy—themes that are central to Vatikiotis' thinking. As Dahl asserts, leaders in a political system usually move to acquire legitimacy through various means, thereby reducing their reliance upon naked force. Interestingly, in the case of Jordan the initial reliance on coercive means through the Legion to create the state has become virtually routinized, since the crisis in legitimacy surrounding Hashemite dynastic rule from the outset has never been fully resolved. Indeed, the manner in which Amir Abdullah went about carving out for himself a desert kingdom through British (Churchill) help against Arab nationalist aspirations, provided the bases on which Hashemite legitimacy was repeatedly challenged until recent times. Abdullah's suppression of local Arab nationalists, his alignment with Britain during World War II, followed by his accommodating attitude toward Israel, had the effect of deepening the crisis in legitimacy in the Arab context leading to his assassination in 1951. It was no mere coincidence that whatever legitimacy the throne possessed came from the tribal-beduin component of society—precisely the group from which the elite ground forces of the British-led Legion were mainly recruited; the group that was least affected by nationalist ideology. The absorbtion of the West Bank after 1948 brought into the realm 750,000 Palestinian Arabs, a new anti-Hashemite component whose integration has become Jordan's central problem. The first steps toward integration and therefore the broadening of the base of legitimacy were taken by King Abdullah and pursued by King Husayn with new vigor and determination. Increasing numbers of Palestinians were brought into newly expanded structures such as the Cabinet, the Assembly, the Senate, the bureaucracy and more significantly into the Legion's expanding technical services, where they now predominate. In terms of loyalty to the throne, the new source of recuitment introduced a relatively more educated, and politically susceptible group into the Legion, which along with the townsmen troups (*Hadari*) of the East Bank, constituted a real threat to the system and to the supremacy of its tribal element. Under these circumstances Husayn's dual strategy has been to maintain control against recalcitrant elements through the use of the Legion's tribal ground forces, while pursuing policies engendering legitimacy.

In contrast to the many detractors and enemies of Husayn, Vatikiotis' attitude is one of admiration for the king's political performance. He attributes the young monarch's success, neither to "courage," nor to "luck," but to his political instincts and shrewdness in recruiting Palestinian political elites and deliberately integrating them into the governmental structure. With the full realization that "Uneasy Lies the Head," the king has skillfully proceeded from an initial traditional (tribal-religious) authority base, toward a limited rational-legal one, which is in turn reinforced by a policy of integration domestically, and the espousal of Arab nationalism externally.

What next for Jordan and King Husayn after such a virtuoso performance? The answer to a large extent, and ironically, will depend on the Israelis, the Legion and the amorphous Arab nationalist movement headed by president Abd al-Nasir. One finds it difficult to understand Israel's insistence on direct negotiations with a king whose consent would almost certainly mean his downfall. On the other hand, with Palestinian fedayeen forces operating freely from the East Bank against Israeli occupation forces, his position is equally untenable. While opposing these raids is politically impossible, each Israeli retaliation is bound to undermine the king's position, especially with respect to the Legionnaires. And finally, had the June war never happened or assuming a near-total Israeli withdrawal, is this type of rule feasible over the long-range in Jordan or anywhere else? Admittedly, the choices are limited for a king, however intelligent and skillful; the Iranian or the Sau'di models are hardly practicable and abdication in favor of a greater Arab unity at present unacceptable to Israel. But then again, Husayn might surprise everyone by opting for a constitutional monarchy or even go the way of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia.

It is indeed difficult to find serious shortcomings in this opus. One would have hoped for more information on the content of the Legion's educational programs and more quantitative and systematic data on recruitment into the Army and the government, although the usual difficulties facing the researcher in the Middle East would impede such an effort. Systematic studies of elite "circulation" and backgrounds with regard to a large number of Legion commanders and Cabinet-members may constitute an ambitious next step for research. Meanwhile the present volume will remain the definitive work on the military in Jordan.—Richard H. Dekmejian, *Suny at Binghamton.*

The Latin American Tradition. By Charles Wagley. (New York; Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 225, $6.75.)

This book by a noted anthropologist consists of previously published papers and essays written by the author between 1951 and 1964 which for the most part are not easily come by today. Some of them have been slightly modified for presentation in book form. Through the exposition and examination of shared cultural ties in what he assumes to be a Latin American culture, and of regional and subcultural valuations, the author seeks to explain Latin America to Anglo-Americans and to remind Latin Americans of aspects of their own societies that they often overlook. He also offers a frame of reference to aid further research. In so doing Wagley emphasizes that it is the social anthropologists who will find his suggestions the most congenial.

The introductory chapter, "A Framework for Latin American Culture," specially written for the volume presents the two main elements of the common themes with which all of the papers are concerned i.e., the basic differences between the Latin American culture and that of Anglo-America, and the classification of differences and variations within that culture and society. Admitting that the regional and sub-cultural frame of reference has its shortcomings for social science research and is not the only way of ordering the data Wagley asserts that "a sub-cultural frame of reference combined with a regional division of Latin America provides us with a most useful instrument for thinking about Latin America, although qualitative data may be unavailable within these categories."

This "traditionalist" political scientist ("political philosopher" would be a better identification) found three concerns of the book of the greatest personal interest: the model of behavior for the whole society created by the Iberian gentry in the colonial era which remains to this day; the discussion of "The Dilemma of the Latin American Middle Class," which closes the book, and the explanation of the different views of race that exist in Latin America and in the United States. These subjects have been treated by others, particularly in the past decade or so, including political scientists Stokes and Silvert to name but two but the social anthropologists were most frequently the pioneers. Wagley's second chapter, "An Introduction to Latin American Culture" was originally written for the Foreign Service of the Department of State and issued in 1953.

The culturally elite behavioral model is defined as including "familism, ceremonial and fictive kinship—the compadrazo system—double standards of sexual morals, emphasis upon social class, a disdain for manual labor, high regard for formal etiquette, and emphasis upon the saints and love of display in religion." Wagley notes how this model has persisted throughout history adapting itself to the great variety of historical and physical conditions in the New World so that it influences all sectors of the population with the possible exception of the most isolated Indian communities.

For the student of politics an appreciation of the significance of this aristocratic model affords an entree to the understanding of the distinctiveness of the Latin American political system. It makes him more fully aware of the reasons why the traditionally important social orders, the landed gentry (and their business successors), the church, the military, continue to be accepted as legitimate participants in the political process. It helps explain why those who base their claims to power upon democratic practices have had slow going and why in Latin America the existence of democracy does not by any means obviate the continuing importance of the authoritarian contenders for power within the political system. It suggests, moreover, why Latin America is basically a stable society—one in which there have been few genuine social revolutions and in which reforms develop slowly. The all-pervading cultural elite model was formed in the colonial era when there was no middle class. The bourgeoning of that class has come about in Latin America particularly in the years since the second world war.

Wagley notes the disagreement among scholars as to the existence of a class in Latin America reasonably similar to that which developed in Europe and the United States. He himself accepts the existence of a Latin American middle class and treats extensively of its dilemma which he believes lies in the fact that the realities of Latin America run counter to the ideals and needs of the new class. "This sector of the Latin American population is caught up in a dilemma between its liberal ideals and the realities involved in the extension of liberal democracy . . ." and he lists in detail the material, economic, political and social elements in the big problem of ideals versus realities.

Space permits only the spelling out of the political aspects of the dilemma as he sees them. The middle class is, he believes, energetically interested in politics. It adheres to statism and to honesty and morality in government and politics. Yet it is, with few exceptions, unrepresented by political parties, fearful of both the statist masses and the upper classes. He concludes that "there is no guarantee at all that the development of a strong middle class in Latin America will lead to the strengthening of democratic institutions." As a case study he presents the Brazilian military coup of 1964 which was supported by the middle class. Victims of inflation, fearful of the pro-labor Goulart government, the middle class permitted constitutionalism to be replaced by military rule.

There is no doubt that Wagley is correct in his warning not to expect that the middle class will necessarily aid in the development of Latin American democracy. His examination of the dilemma of this new class is also helpful to an understanding of why it may not aid in developing a progressive society. What this reviewer missed, however, was a failure to enunciate the importance of the middle class desire to emulate the upper classes to an understanding of the middle class action. The European and North American middle classes in the days of their geneses were not as strongly limited by such a tradition. This reviewer has greater doubts than the author concerning the strength of the new middle class democratic ideals. The anti-democratic cultural model that Wagley has explained plays a crucial role in the political attitude and actions of its followers. It predisposes the middle class in Latin America to opt for the Right, the traditionally upper class, than for the Left. (Indeed this all-pervading model also influences the leaders of the workers and the peasantry and is a recognized means of defence by the upper classes of their claims to power.) Wagley surely must beware of this but for some reason he does not underscore the conservative bent of the elite model when he discusses the political action of the middle class when facing their dilemma.

The author's discussion of the priority given to social caste over race, and his note of the milder forms which prejudice and discrimination take in Latin America from those we experience in our own country must be at least called attention to by a reviewer during these days of race consciousness in the United States. And his expressed hope that in the process of "modernization" (his quotes) much of the humanistic tradition of Latin America can be preserved will be seconded by all who are sensitive to the dangers of the all-embracing, all consuming scientific and technological society.—Carroll Hawkins, *Michigan State University.*

1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The Passing of the Second Reform Bill. By Maurice Cowling. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967. Pp. 451. $13.50.)

The Making of the Second Reform Bill. By F. B. Smith. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966. Pp. 297. $10.50.)

In a recent review Bernard Crick opined that "There can be a genuine text book on 'British government' the day we have a single natural history of a bill." This, like many of Crick's strictures on the profession, combines exaggeration with insight. But we do sometimes forget that the assumptions of macroanalysis depend upon, and are kept honest by, micro studies. And while the analysis of aggregative data can do more and different things than singular case studies, it cannot entirely replace them as rich sources of generalizations or as chastening reminders of the continuing complexities of political decisions. It may well be that the resurgence of interest in history and biography by political scientists derives in part from this awareness.

The two books considered here demonstrate amply the uses and limits of the case approach. Each was written to celebrate the centenary of the passage of the Second Reform Bill, not by praising it but by unsimplifying and demythologizing the process by which it came to be adopted. As Cowling points out, while sociologists and psephologists have known for some time that mid-Victorian political society was more aristocratic and socially conservative than earlier historians had been unwilling to admit, such knowledge has left little mark on those who have given us our ideas of how political decisions were made at the time. Both he and Smith attempt to show, by focusing on the events of 1866 and 1867, how misleading has been the dominant Liberal historiography as it dealt with the movement for parliamentary reform. In somewhat different ways each author scrutinizes in great detail, and throws into disrepute, the older assumptions that the Second Reform Bill was the natural and inevitable extension of the First; that it was a response by the political elite to mass uprising and the threat of revolution; that in the tangled course of its passage the lines of conflict were chiefly between democrats and anti-democrats; that, in fact, there was much coherence at all to the plans and actions of the principals.

What emerges from both chronicles is a picture of Byzantine maneuvering by party leaders and notables to the virtual exclusion of ideological concern or even of policy in the substantive sense. Overarching the counterpoint and confusion of the innumerable franchise, reapportionment and redistribution measures introduced in these years was the simple fact that both Disraeli and Gladstone believed that *any* successful reform bill would enhance the position of their party and themselves in the political climate of that day. Thus Smith's conclusion (p. 229) that the bill "survived because a majority of the members of both Houses of Parliament dared not throw it out. They did not want it, they did not like it, they feared what it might do." In the circumstances of the 1860s, before modern British parties had really come into being and when splinters and independent-minded factions abounded, the prize of party advantage went to him most successful in carrying along his own natural supporters and detaching or neutralizing the opposition's presumed supporters. It was, in a day of low party cohesion, a difficult feat. After countless struggles, Gladstone tried and failed in 1866. After more struggles, more intrigue and floods of ambiguity, Disraeli succeeded in welding together enough support to pass a bill more liberal in its electoral provisions than the Liberals were prepared to introduce a year earlier. The full story shows that it was almost as much a matter of chance as of shrewd political calculation.

Neither author is willing to credit the principal actors with essentially democratic intent. Disraeli, whose values were consistently conservative but whose strategy was bound by no fixed guidelines, was quick to rationalize the new act as the flowering of Tory democracy. Thus his words to the Merchant Taylors' banquet:

> It is said we are on the verge of a great democratic change. My lords and gentlemen, believe me the elements of democracy do not exist in England (cheers). England is a country of classes, and the change impending in the country will only make those classes more united, more content, more complete and more cordial (cheers).

Gladstone and the Liberal leaders were scarcely more enamoured of mass democracy at the time. Like Key's southern Democrats, the British political class in the 1860s was in implicit agreement that the lower orders should not come to power; similarly, its politics took the form of fluctuating coalitions based largely on personal power and partisan interests rather than on issues and programs. Yet paradoxically, the substance of the Second Reform Bill—the sudden expansion of the electorate that it brought—was in large measure responsible for the unmaking of the mid-Victorian party system and the rise of mass politics in Britain.

Both of these books are thoroughly researched, well written, and overpriced. Neither makes many concessions to the lay reader who lacks prior knowledge of the intricate history of the period. Of the two, Smith's is easily the more straightforward, judicious and succinct. It has a less hammered-at thesis than Cowling's, and unlike the latter extends backwards and forwards from the years 1866-67 and draws in social as well as political materials. Smith also is less airy than Cowling in dismissing the influence of events outside Parliament and the inner circle, and he makes more of the activities of extraparliamentary figures like Bright and of groups like the Reform League. Cowling's book is a highly detailed interpretation of the two critical years leading to the passage of the bill. It is more difficult to follow, but it is superior to Smith's account in several ways. While he does little to relate the proceedings in Westminster to outside social movements—and in fact denies vehemently that there was a direct connection—Cowling shows in revealing detail how Disraeli was able to piece together his majority by playing on the needs of MPs for other legislative largesse and for patronage and honors. Cowling is also willing to let his speculative powers go, tossing out several competing but plausible explanations for the same conundrum and then showing how the historian, using primary materials and certain sets of assumptions, reaches a probabilistic conclusion. This results in a less lucid narrative and a more eccentric style, but for the social scientist a more enlightening book, than Smith's. As those who know Cowling's *Nature and Limits of Political Science* will surmise, it is also a book you can argue with.—James B. Christoph, *Indiana University.*

Huaylas: An Andean District in Search of Progress. By Paul L. Doughty. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968. Pp. 284. $12.50.)

In recent decades, Peruvian politics have gradually changed from control by an oligarchy of traditional values to a system of multiple forces in which military guardianship of the peace appears to be a dominant influence. More socio-economic adjustments have occurred during the past twenty years than during a century and a quarter preceding the late 1940's.

When elected municipal governments were revived in 1963, after forty years of appointed councils, students of the Peruvian political system began to note efforts of municipal councils in carrying out reforms of President Fernando Belaúnde. The grass roots level of government took on a meaningful function as another set of calipers in measuring changes in this republic. Councils on the coast were examined by at least some social scientists not limited to Lima for field work. However, dozens of towns in the Andes have been ignored in terms of public affairs, even by ministries of the Peruvian government. Yet the Andes are a vital part of the nation.

This unitary republic is divided for administration into twenty-four departments, each in turn subdivided into provinces, which in turn are subdivided into districts. Professor Doughty, an anthropologist, chose for his field work the Department of Ancash, and finally narrowed his area to the District of Huaylas in the north-central part of Peru.

He gives social scientists a close look at a modern, changing peasant community, the town of Huaylas, and other towns in the district of the same name. He deals with social customs and other facets of society of concern to anthropologists, economists, and geographers. He also devotes considerable emphasis to public works projects, municipal administrators, and the problems of raising municipal funds.

The author presents much information that is missing in the usual ethnographic accounts: extensive data on local government and politics, put into social perspective with tables, maps, and photographs.

Doughty went into Huaylas during 1960-61, again during 1963-64, and briefly in 1966. Much of his data and general references are current, making this volume a handy reference for the Andean region of Peru.

In choosing Huaylas, Doughty found a district and town with excellent municipal records, extensive archives going back to 1889. The author conducted his own census and various surveys. Behavioralists will be pleased to learn that the census forms were printed on IBM cards and analyzed in Lima. The data collected on his questionnaires were transferred to Unisort 5-by-8 marginal punch cards and classified according to the system developed for the Human Relations Area files.

Aside from good local records, Huaylas also proved to be a fertile field to probe in terms of human relationships. The mayor and municipal council and the governor of the district were each eager to have surveys of their human and physical resources. In-depth interviews are only as valid as the rapport between interviewer and interviewee.

As a further vindication of the choice of the site for studying an Andean peasant community, an award should be noted. While this book was in press in 1967, the District of Huaylas was named winner of the silver award given each year by the President of the Republic to a community, district, or province in national recognition for what it has accomplished in its own behalf.

The District of Huaylas has accomplished much, in terms of road construction and civic projects ranging from a free public library to new school buildings.

In the chapter dealing with public works, the *faena* or public collective work force is described in detail. Back in the era of dictator Augusto Leguía, in 1921 the Conscription Law obliged all able-bodied men from twenty-one to fifty years of age to work twelve days a year on road construction, except for the exempted upper classes. The 1930 *coup d'etat* which ousted Leguía ended that law. The current Constitution, enacted in 1933, in Article 55 prohibits forced labor. Yet Article 135 of the Organic Law of Municipalities states: "In case of a lack of special funds for the maintenance of roads, all capable inhabitants will contribute . . . with personal work . . . or with their funds." Doughty found the *faena* persisting as one of the most viable of local institutions in the Andes.

In Lima, the Supreme Court has found no conflict between Article 135 of the Municipal Law and Article 55 of the Constitution, but in the coastal cities, community work parties since 1963 have usually been part of the Popular Cooperation Program, Peru's version of VISTA. In the Andes, however, when a road needs completing, the men of the community legally can be put to work. The author explains how it is done.

If Doughty had expanded his notes on the regional aspects of nationalism, political analysts would have been grateful. The book's flaws are minor, such as finding British translations: for example, the Ministry of *Hacienda* is called the Exchequer instead of Finance or Treasury. But undoubtedly here is a book of marked value to students of Andean Community public life.—MARVIN ALISKY, *Arizona State University*.

Disraeli. By ROBERT BLAKE. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, pp. 819. $12.50.)

This is a biography in the grand style. Learned, well-written, and exhaustive, it has justly been received with critical acclaim. Blake's approach may seem to modern behavioral scientists old-fashioned and his subject matter far removed from their own interests. However his book should not be dismissed as irrelevant for the student of contemporary politics. The author is careful to avoid the pitfalls of projecting present patterns into the past but he tells us a great deal about the nature of political leadership and politics in an industrializing society.

Like his subject as prime minister in the House of Commons, Blake speaks in the cool and sometimes cynical tones of a man of the world address-ing a sophisticated audience. Far from taking a condescending attitude towards his readers, he assumes that they are thoroughly familiar with British politics in the Nineteenth Century and can appreciate his frequent literary allusions. But even those who may not know anything about the "Bedchamber Crisis" and have never read the novels of Max Beerbohm will find this book a fascinating study that judiciously combines careful research with imaginative speculation.

Disraeli's contemporaries and most of his previous biographers found it difficult to comprehend this complex man. It is one of the great accomplishments of this new study that we come to understand him so much better than from the biographies of Monypenny and Buckle or Maurois. Blake is unsurpassed in his astute probing of Disraeli's motives and personality development, though one wishes he had not sought to link them to traits attributed to the "Mediterranean character" and "Jewish race" of his subject. A little less disdain for psychological analysis might have been more rewarding. For instance, what we are told about Disraeli's relationship with his mother and Queen Victoria—his "Faery Queen"—and about his life-long attachment to older women raises some fascinating questions which Blake prefers to leave unanswered. However, one should not take an author to task for refusing to delve into matters which he considers beyond his interest or competence. The same applies to Blake's dictum that the biography of a prime minister does not call for a history of the times, though he might have been well advised to have given greater attention to the broader socio-economic and political conditions under which Disraeli had to operate. The world beyond the governing "Establishment" remains obscure and the stage setting for the leading actor reveals little of the England outside Westminster, the clubs and salons of London Society, and the manor houses of the ruling few.

Disraeli was not a heroic leader and Blake does not indulge in panegyrics. He shows us a brilliant and charming man, but also one who was vain and ruthless in his determination to overcome immense obstacles in his drive for power. When he finally made it to the top of the greasy pole Disraeli was too exhausted to savor it to the fullest. "Power!" he said at the apogee of his success. "It has come to me too late." He was a passionate man, but he lacked the moral fervor of his great rival Gladstone. He had great intellect, but he was no intellectual and considered the Victorian intelligentsia enemies. He was a man of strong conviction, but also an opportunist who used wile and flattery to advance his financial and political fortunes. He played a leading role in the extension of the Franchise in 1867 and as Prime Minister was responsible for a number of important social reform measures, but he was no egalitarian. Queen Victoria referred to her favorite Prime Minister as "a man risen from the people," by which she meant the middle class. But Disraeli thought of himself as an aristocratic defender of Crown, Lords, and Church against the lower classes.

The Disraeli who emerges from this book was above all a superb politician who stood head and shoulders above most of his contemporaries and more than held his own in the company of a Bismark, so different and yet also in some ways so like him. Blake calls him an extraordinary man of genius who, "like most men of genius operating in a parliamentary democracy, . . . inspired a great deal of dislike and no small degree of distrust among the bustling mediocrities who form the majority of mankind"—a judgement which perhaps tells us as much about Disraeli as about his latest biographer.—LEWIS J. EDINGER, *Columbia University.*

Mauritania. BY ALFRED G. GERTEINY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 243. $6.00.)

This book is, as noted by the author, the first in English about a "totally neglected and little known country," and is, therefore, a general survey of the geography, people, history, government, and economy of Mauritania, rather than being an analysis in depth of its political system. Professor Gerteiny is a historian who devotes only a small portion of the book to political institutions. His best chapters are neither those on history nor political science, but the ones which deal with the geography of the country and its people, the Moors, and black minorities, the Fulbe, the Halphoolaren, the Sarakoles, the Wolofs, and the Bambara.

No doubt the chapters dealing with the Moors, who constitute 73 percent of the Mauritania population of an estimated 850,000, are better because of the greater availability of resource material and because Professor Gerteiny was a perceptive visitor while living among them. It is obvious that hard data in other subject-matter areas is lacking in a country that is 73 percent nomadic, extremely traditional (even slaving is common outside the urban areas), and poorly educated (only eight high school graduated in 1962). Professor Gerteiny has done well with what was available in data. Most of this, as he notes, is in France or Dakar. There is no institution of higher learning in Mauritania or library worthy of the name. There are no Mauritanian scholars; when Mauritania gained independence in 1960, there was only one trained lawyer, Moktar Ould Daddah, who came home from France to rule the country.

Mauritania's future, according to Gerteiny, is hopeful, even if her past and present have not been. The hope, so it seems, stems from two principal sources. One is the prospect for exploitation of mineral resources, primarily iron, in the north and the development of fishing around Port Etienne. The other is the one-party, benevolent dictatorship of the government under the leadership of Moktar Ould Daddah. Moktar is described as a man who realized the need for "balance" in the country; that is, between the basically hostile blacks and whites; between agricultural development near the Senegal River and mineral exploitation in the north; and between East and West by use of "positive neutralism." We are told that the President learned the value of one-party rule from Sekou Touré in Guinea, but that, unlike Touré, Moktar Ould Daddah knows the value of France. He should; Gerteiny estimates that until 1968, when the French-dominated MiFerMa company reaches an annual rate of iron ore production of six million tons, France will have subsidized the country annually, up to as much as 75 per cent of the national income.

The problems are many. As Gerteiny writes, "Sixty per cent of Mauritania is in The Sahara Zone, and half of that conforms with the classical description of the cruel desert. . . ." Four-fifths of the country has less than four inches of rainfall annually; only in a narrow band of 10 to 20 miles in width running along the Senegal River does the rainfall average from 12 to 26 inches. Sand dunes of varying types cover four-fifths of the country.

Of a population of 850,000, only 12,000 earn a regular wage. Eight thousand of these few derive their income as government bureaucrats. Average income in 1965 was approximately $75 a year. Aside from mineral extraction the economy is based upon subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry. Scrawny cattle are pushed from one water hole to another, and when they are marketed, it is usually after a long drive in which they have lost an average of 30 pounds from an already meager frame. Save for some of the more progressive blacks living near the southern border of the country, the average Moor is caught up in a traditional feudal society in which role playing is rather rigidly prescribed, and work is distasteful. The Moor mixes Islam with African mysticism, and fears the black Africans; normal African tribalism is confounded with racism.

One cannot help but draw certain parallels between Ould Daddah and Kwame Nkrumah. Both were educated outside their own countries, only to return near the time of independence. Both saw tribalism as potentially disruptive, and both converted their republics in 1961 to presidential dictatorships to form "guided" democracies. Indeed, as Gerteiny points out, Mauritania differed from other French-speaking colonies of West Africa; it was governed by "indirect rule," more in the British fashion, and contrary to the more direct rule of other French colonies. It, therefore, undoubtedly is true that both saw the problem of nation building in somewhat the same terms. Nkrumah cut off his British ties and was deposed; Ould Daddah has kept Mauritania in the Gaullist sphere so far, and has had the support of French military, political and economic aid. The future, in Gerteiny's terms, is hopeful; in mine, it is very uncertain.—BRUCE B. MASON, *Arizona State University*.

Justice in Communist China. By SHAO-CHUAN LENG. (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1967. Pp. 196. $6.50.)

Despite its untiring chanting of creative application of Dialectic Materialism to the Chinese situation, the Marxist-Leninist teaching of law as a coercive machinery of class struggle remains a constant article of faith for the Chinese Communists. As Mao Tse-tung stated in 1949, laws and courts, among other apparatus, are all weapons with which one class oppresses another. They are instruments through which the dominating class consolidates its control, suppresses its enemy and protects its social order. Consequently, for a Communist State existing in a stage when "imperialism still exists, domestic reactionaries still exist, and classes within the country still exist," it is necessary to strengthen such apparatus in order to eliminate other classes and further the cause of communistic harmony. A view which unmistakably echoes the famous Leninist dictum that "Law is a political instrument. It is politics."

Viewing from this perspective, any discussion of the judicial system of Communistic China will at first appear to be a self-contradiction. For if the system is run solely by terror and violence backed up by the coercive apparatus, then the term justice is a meaningless word. The system could, at best, be regarded as a worthless window-dressing showing the hypocritical concern for legal niceties by the Communist leadership. It could never be a safe subject, however, for a disinterested scholarly study in view of the constant meddling exerted by the political dictates of the state.

Such inferences, though seemingly sound, are nevertheless dangerous delusions which could only blind our real understanding of the system and weaken us in the long run. For despite its alleged progressiveness, Communist China, like other polities, must come to realize that justice is not a nicety or luxury but a necessity. Socialist legality undoubtedly must deal effectively with the "anti-people reactionaries" and their political crimes. But, on the other hand, it must also address itself to the daily maintainance of domestic tranquility and satisfy a basic need for some outlet for the feelings of order, of rightness, of reciprocity, or reward and punishment, which exist in all people.

Small wonder that seven years after he came to power, Mao Tse-tung took pains to make the distinction between antagonistic contradictions (contradictions between Communists and their enemies) and non-antagonistic contradictions (contradictions among the people) and spent hours defining the meaning of "enemy" and "people." Although the former contradictions must be dealt with cruelly, violently and summarily, the latter, as he belatedly conceded and advised, must be treated in a "democratic and benevolent" way.

Conceivably, the difficulty involved in studying such a judicial system lies in finding out, among other things, the proper bailiwick of the two contradictions, the apparatus through which political and non-political crimes are prosecuted, and the ways by which decisions are reached in both areas. To be sure, these are not legal questions per se. They are political questions which can be grasped only by employing broader frameworks and fresher approaches. It is here that Mr. Leng's book can be regarded as a significant step.

The book addresses itself primarily to the institutional aspects of the judicial system of Communist China. It is organizationally divided into two parts. The first part deals, chronologically, with the evolution of the system from the 1920's to the present (the most recent data cited in this book dated June, 1966.) The second part analyzes the structural and procedural aspects of the present system. While the first part is inherently informative, the second part is the more interesting and substantial portion of the book. Unhampered by the narrow legalistic concern, the author rightly focused on a broader judicial pattern as the basis of his discussion and avoided a rigid construction of the legal rules. He therefore provides his readers with informations on a variety of organizations through which justice is either ordinarily meted out or frequently sacrificed. Not only familiar organs such as the court, the procuracy and the system of legal counsel are all succinctly treated, extra-legal organs such as the police and other control structures like schools, factories, enterprises, mass organizations as well as mass trials and on-the-spot trials are also included and dealt with in varying degrees of penetration. Reading through it will inevitably lead one to the impression that justice in Communist China, to the extent it exists, is indeed at the mercy of the state. Lacking what is known as judicial independence, extra-legal organs may easily intervene into the merits of a case. The result, needless to say, would more often than not be an application of force rather than an administration of justice.

Confining itself, however, to the institutional aspects alone, the book undoubtedly leaves certain questions to be answered. By treating Communist China as a country in a fluid state of transition, the author did not attempt to draw a line between the two contradictions and understandably refrained from telling us where justice may end and force begin in this system. There is no reason, however, to be equally acquiescent on this issue as it manifested itself during the period covered by this study. For without such a distinction, the study of judicial institutions, however broadly conceived, will appear to be formalistic. The reader is not clearly told about the informal and unwritten practices that govern the intervention of these extra-legal organs. Nor is the reader told about the process through which these organs bring their power to bear. Although party intervention is frequently implied, not a single case, for example, has been fully cited to illustrate the point. As such, the book may be said to have failed to exhaust the utility of the broader framework adopted by the author. It has avoided the most complicated issue in the judicial system of Communist China.

As a relatively slim volume, the number of misprints in this book has reached atrocious proportions. Some of them even obscure or distort the content of the book. An errata will definitely be needed to redress this clerical damage. Also, the citation, translation and transliteration of the Chinese titles need to be standarized. Perhaps an abbreviation in the beginning may well serve this purpose. In any event, obvious shortcomings notwithstanding, Mr. Leng has blazed the trail in a relatively new area. For those who are interested in Chinese Communist affairs in general and its judicial system in particular, this is undoubtedly a vital book.—CHAN LIEN, *The University of Connecticut.*

Nationalists Without Nations: The Oligarchy Versus the People in Latin America. BY VICTOR ALBA. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 248. $7.00.)

Another effort has now been made to demonstrate the deficiencies of the Latin American political system by centering upon one set of actors and then censuring them for the societal malaise. Alba's book, however, is distinguished from many others in that it is written with a pervasive understanding of basic Latin American values and of the attitudes that shape Latin American political culture. Alba has had years of experience in Latin America which have allowed him to observe and analyze the varieties of Latin American nationalists and to offer some very telling insights.

The author is trying to answer the question: "Why have Latin American countries fallen so far behind in the race for prosperity and well-being?" The answer is given very early in the study—the oligarchy has encouraged a special type of ersatz nationalism which serves as a substitute for real nationhood—and is discussed for the remainder of the book. The point is made that nationalist stances are taken by landowners, the middle class, various members of the socialist fraternity, professors, students and many others who wish to ease their consciences for being members of an advantaged sector of society. In many instances they take the same position as the anti-imperialist Communists. The upshot of these de facto alliances between the landowners, the middle class and left-wingers, the author maintains, is the tendency to deal with the effects rather than the causes of underdevelopment, while leaving the masses submerged and unassimilated.

The future appears somewhat dim, for any of these groups might turn to the military for support against another group and the armed forces are increasingly available to such overtures. Alba warns that the alternative to a new style of technocratic-militarism, in which, as the author calls them, "Leninist military men" would ultimately ask for Communist collaboration, is the new industrial middle class, interested in economic planning and social reform. The younger elements of the middle class must choose between the oligarchy and its allies and the people.

Though it is not explicity stated, the reader is made aware of Alba's ideational debt to the Aprista program and to its leader, Haya de la Torre. In the prescriptive parts of the book (especially chapter 8) Alba calls for the political unification of the Latin American states, planned industrialization, and agrarian reform in a fashion very reminiscent of proposals espoused in the past by the Aprista movement in Peru. Alba's views also closely coincide with the 1960 Declaration of Lima, (a conference attended by representatives of the Bolivian MNR, the Costa Rican National Liberation Party, the Paraguayan Febreristas, the Peruvian Apristas and the Venezuelan Acción Democrática) from which he quotes:

> ". . . national and revolutionary movements, formed as a front of the exploited classes, with a genuinely Latin American doctrine and program and with roots in civic majorities, are the most efficacious instruments with which to consummate economic independence and establish social justice in our countries. . . .
>
> (they asserted their) unalterable rejection of Communist totalitarian penetration of Latin America, against which our parties have always fought, as much because of an insurmountable difference in social and political philosophy as because of the deviationist and prejudicial activity and frequent complicity with dictatorships and reactionary forces that have been typical of Communism in Latin America"

The book's best chapters are 6 and 7 which discuss Communist policy in Latin America as it cohabitates with equal alacrity under dictatorial, populist and conservative regimes. The author demonstrates that the Communist Party had little stomach for land reform when in positions of responsibility, as in Chile after World War II. He observes that the espousal of anti-imperialism enhances the credentials of any self-respecting nationalist very much the way anti-clericalism sustained liberalism a century ago. Thus the more moderate an intellectual is on domestic questions the more pro-Russian or pro-Chinese he must be on international affairs. Particularly worth reading are Alba's ironic interpretations of the Latin American artist as intellectual (pp. 152-156) and Latin American professors and students (pp. 159-160).

There are, however, several shortcomings in the book as a contribution to the political science literature on Latin America. There is an overabundant use of polemical sources, categorical and unsubstantiated statements are made and some major concepts are left undefined. The book reads as a personal indictment of the Latin American political system by an advocate of inter-American political union. Given his initial advocacy, he procedes to find little but cynical and self-interested political leadership and major opposition groups. This gives his account, in several places, an air of unreality and makes it susceptible to the charges of being quite similar to some of the Marxist tracts which Alba himself admittedly shuns.

In several other respects it falls short of giving a balanced analysis of the problems and obstacles to national development. Nationalism is made to appear as some kind of identifiable quotient arrived at by the will of truly responsible leadership yet he has an understandably difficult time defining it in the 1st chapter. Nor is the reader given an explanation of how a nation achieves a sense of nationality, or through what stages it might pass. This makes it difficult to enter into any concerted dialogue with the author. The term "oligarchy," which appears as the single most crucial subject of the book, is not clearly defined. Sometimes the term is used to include only the largest landowners while elsewhere it implies everyone but the unskilled laborers and the peasants. As the "oligarchy" emerges as the *bête noire* (in this case the landowner) so the author also provides us with the key problem in the scenario-agrarian reform. The "oligarchy" is attributed with an excessive amount of cynicism and an extraordinary amount of omniscience as it wheels and deals in the political process. At the same time, agrarian reform is perceived as the Gordian knot.

Alba's basic thesis that the pseudo-nationalists and oligarchies are responsible for the Latin American countries falling behind in "the race for prosperity and well-being" is premised on the notion that "Spanish America was richer and better organized in 1810 than the poorer and more backward United States." Certainly in terms of entrepreneurial skills, technological knowhow, interchange of goods and services, exploited resources, communications, social mobility and parliamentary experience this view is difficult to substantiate. One is tempted to reflect on the importance of seeing Latin America in historical and comparative perspective.—PETER RANIS, *York College, City University of New York.*

Prospects for Soviet Society. ED. BY ALLEN KASSOF, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 586. $10.00.)

Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev. ED. BY ALEXANDER DALLIN AND THOMAS B. LARSON. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968. Pp. 181. $4.95.)

These two volumes provide a Horn and Hardart-like glimpse of recent trends in the USSR. They are a welcome supplement to the literature, much of which concludes with the Khrushchev era. Both the interdisciplinary nature of the volumes and the limitations of space prevent us from doing more than indicating the issues raised in these 25 essays and rendering some critical judgments as to the general nature of the enterprise.

The collection edited by Princeton sociologist, Allen Kassof, grew out of a series of conferences sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and is considerably broader in scope than its title indicates. Most of the eighteen essays are expert summaries of developments in a particular field over the whole Soviet experience. In this respect, one is tempted to number the volume among the best of the several collections published to mark the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution—except that the thrust of the latter portion of each essay is directed towards predicting future trends rather than evaluating past deeds.

With the exception of John Campbell's essay on the "International Environment," the editor has kept the focus on the USSR domestic scene. Economists Arcadius Kahan and Herbert Levine write on agriculture and industry respectively. Jeremy Azrael contributes a chapter on the CPSU and Princeton historian, James Billington, writing poetically on a subject dear to his heart—Soviet Intellectuals—will provide political scientists a short course in his *Icon and the Axe.* One must be impressed here as elsewhere in the volume by editor Kassof's ability to marshal indisputable experts in various sub-fields of Soviet Studies: Sidney Ploss on Interest Groups, Thomas Wolfe on the Military, William Medlin on Education, Alexander Vucinich on Science, and Mark Field on the Family. In the latter treatment is a moving section on the effects of the *Detskie Doma* on orphans, with the author concluding that "the Engelsian dream of freeing the family from its socialization function may be chimerical." Of interest too are significant essays in areas usually neglected: Population, Leisure, and Stratification by, respectively, Warren Eason, Paul Hollander, and Dartmouth sociologist Robert Feldmesser.

Especially noteworthy is Cyril Black's comparative view of Soviet and Western development:

> In the perspective of fifty years, the comparative ranking of the USSR in composite economic and social indices per capita has probably not changed significantly. So far as the rather limited available evidence permits a judgment, the USSR has not overtaken any country on a per capita basis since 1917 with the possible exception of Italy, and the nineteen or twenty countries that rank higher than Russia today in this regard also ranked higher in 1900 and 1917.

The *chef d'oeuvre* in this volume is Vernon Aspaturian's essay on the Non-Russian Nationalities. Twice the average length of the other contributions, it is a significant and well-argued—though not uncritical—apologia for Soviet nationality policy. The author's distinction between "russianization" (as in "hellenization") and "russification" is carefully delineated. Even those who will not agree with critics of Professor Aspaturian's views must regret his failure to give the reader a clearer idea of the political problems confronting the Soviet regime because of continued non-Russian nationalism.

By way of general comment, one is astonished that Leon Lipson's too brief essay on Law is the only concerted attention paid to civil liberties, a domestic concern that would seem to be the fundamental issue when discussing the "Prospects for Soviet Society." A lengthy volume might have been considerably shortened by avoiding background information in many of the essays; e.g., "The Ukrainians constitute a compact unit in the southwestern region of the Soviet Union." Finally, the markedly high quality of the collection and its copious documentation are made less useful by an inadequate index.

The Dallin-Larson series of seven essays is narrower in scope, presenting detailed summaries of events in key areas of Soviet politics since Khrushchev's fall from grace. It is interesting to sense here as in the Kassof volume how well Nikita Khrushchev wears with the passing of time—much like our own Harry Truman. Alec Nove writes on Economic Policy, Jerry Hough presents an excellent and thorough study of reforms in government and administration, Thomas Wolfe again writes on military policy. There is considerably more attention paid to foreign affairs in this work with William Zimmerman contributing an essay on "Soviet Perceptions of the United States" and Aspaturian on foreign policy. Regrettably, here as in the other volume, there was not time to assess Soviet aims in the wake of the Middle East crisis. Both Wolfgang Leonhard and Richard Lowenthal present insightful interpretations of the domestic political scene in broad strokes. The editors are to be congratulated for successfully avoiding what might have been a highly repetitious series of essays. The publishers deserve thanks for leaving footnotes where they belong.—WILLIAM PARENTE, *Antioch College.*

The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism. BY FREDERICK C. TURNER. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968. Pp. 350. $8.50.)

Starting just about a hundred years ago, Mexico began in earnest the slow process of nation building, constructing the railroads, opening up the mines, and developing the commercial agriculture which in time would permit the evolution of an internally oriented economy and growing interdependence among all of the regions of the republic. Only about fifty years ago did this material development result in a definitive break with past social-political patterns during the decade-long period of disruption known as the Revolution of 1910. Even so, writers of the thirties and forties could still speak of "Many Mexicos," or of the continuing process of forging a fatherland (*forjando patria*), for Mexico still was not fully unified into a single nation. To some extent the integration process is not complete today, but a sense of the Mexican nation is deeply enough felt and widely enough held to permit consideration of the factors which helped to implant nationalism in a majority of the country's citizens. Professor Turner's *The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism* provides such a discussion.

Using a combined historical-analytical approach, the author shows how a mixture of xenophobia brought on by difficulties with Spain, France, and the United States and gradual physical-economic development provided a base of common attitudes which could relate to some of the shared values growing out of four centuries of Spanish-Roman Catholic influence to spark a national revolutionary movement after 1910. If in the beginning by no means all sectors of the population supported the Revolution, or even knew it had occurred, a large enough nucleus of citizens shared its integrating goals to permit the spread of a sense of national purpose. The bulk of this study describes the historical events and social mechanisms used to involve the greatest part of the populace in a generally shared, nationally oriented value system. Considering the nature of the study, not much emphasis is placed upon the important contribution to consensus made incidentally by mass communications and transportation as a by-product of technology. Instead, the book stresses the conscious efforts of the Revolutionary governments and of individual Mexicans to use the new conditions affecting the masses to instill more shared norms in the citizenry. Improved economic performance and more flexible social relations, coupled with breaking down of some of the divisive aspects of church and intellectual activities, are shown to reduce the gulf between the masses and the elites. Marked expansion of the educational system does the same, though far too few persons receive sufficient formal training to make them really effective participants in national life. Instead, the study suggests, most Mexicans are socialized into an awareness of the wider world and given a feeling of belonging to single social-political entity through less formal devices, particularly literature, drama, and the popular arts—music, films, and more recently radio and television.

Mr. Turner's findings are slightly more optimistic than my own. My experience indicates that Mexico still has a way to go before the majority of its citizens acquire that sense of near absolute assurance of personal and national worth and identity which permits easy acceptance of divergence from generally approved norms. Similarly, despite greater willingness on the part of many citizens to accept critical discussion of specific conditions in their country, whether from other Mexicans or foreigners, a majority of the population continues to react negatively to such analysis. This kind of chauvinistic nationalism is perfectly understandable in a people still striving to consolidate their sense of national identity, but it is symptomatic of unresolved integration problems. Mexico has accomplished much in forging the bonds of constructive nationalism, as Mr. Turner so ably demonstrates, but the process is not yet complete. If some Mexicans find this judgment from a foreigner unpalatable, especially from a *gringo,* let me suggest that some of their brethren in our own southwest or the many inhabitants involved in the crisis of the cities could tell them that the process of national integration is not yet complete in the United States either.—ROBERT E. SCOTT, *University of Illinois.*

Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa. BY ROBERT F. STEVENSON. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 306, $10.00.)

For the most part, Mr. Stevenson's book is nothing other than a critique of Fortes' and Evans-Pritchard's *African Political Systems.* Right from the outset, one is confronted with a temptation which is often difficult to resist; the urge to admire the courage of a man who dares to attack a sacred cow. *African Political Systems* is regarded as a classic in social anthropology, and its authors have acquired the status of the founding fathers in the area of political anthropology. To the extent that *Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa* takes issue with the classic, it demands careful attention.

Admittedly, the purpose of the author is to show that there is a demonstrable relationship between the density of a population and the complexity of a political system. He writes: "In short, I am solely and exclusively interested in discussing their (Fortes' and Evans-Pritchard's) assertion that African data indicate that in Africa, at least, there is no relationship at all between population density and state" p. 17.

He does not argue that there is any direct causal or invariant connection between the two variables. Nor is he contending that in all state societies there will always be population densities higher than those in non-state societies. He merely attempts to show that ". . . there is a highly probable though indirect relationship between population density and state organization" p. 18.

According to Stevenson, two propositions, with regard to the two variables of population density and complexity of political systems, can be deduced from *African Political Systems:*

> I. States are correlated with high population densities; stateless societies with low population densities.
> II. States are correlated with low population densities; stateless societies with high population densities p. 14.

The authors of *African Political Systems* denied the validity of both propositions, but an examination of the six cases presented in their book will suggest that the second proposition is valid. This tends to obfuscate the authors' stand and invalidate their contention. Robert Stevenson challenges the no-relationship stand of Evans-Pritchard and Fortes. In addition, he vigorously contests the relationship which their data seem to imply.

The methodology of the authors is criticised and the accuracy of some of their data questioned. Stevenson thinks it is unfortunate that food-gathering bands were omitted from their sample by definition. He is skeptical about the fact that all the states cited were in the southeastern part of Africa and questions their judgment for not including any of the recognized major African states in the sample. Perhaps his more serious criticisms are threefold:

1) that the sample of the authors was not truly representative of the studies included in the book;
2) that, in many cases, population estimates were grossly incorrect;
3) that the authors used, in a strictly synchronic context, data from the colonial period in order to test generalizations concerning the formation process of indigenous states.

Broadly speaking, Stevenson's investigation can be divided into several parts. First is the comprehensive analysis of the cases presented in *African Political Systems.* Then, there is the demographic inquiry where he looks at contemporary population patterns in Africa and tries to interpret what they show regarding the relationship between density of population and indigenous state formation. Finally, there is a concentration on a special case, the Ibos of southeastern Nigeria, which he considers to be an apparent, but not real, major exception.

His critical analysis of the cases in *African Political Systems* indicates that there is a general pattern of a positive relationship between state formation and high population density. In most of the cases, however, there is no cause-effect relationship between the two variables. The relationship seems more complex, and it involves commercial communication, political and economic organization, and population density in a threeway nexus of complex but reciprocal interactions.

The author's contribution to the understanding of traditional African political systems lies in his reconsideration of the Ibo traditional political system. To say this is not to give him undue primacy; nor should it be construed as a denial of appropriate honor to Professor Dike. Stevenson's uniqueness is in his articulation of the case. He spells out Fried's criteria for statehood and applies the criteria to the Ibo case. In his opinion, the Aro satisfied Fried's primary and secondary functions. He concludes:

> In terms of Fried's criteria, then, the Aro organization would seem to constitute a state. The major distinction between the Aro and a state like Dahomey would seem to be in the Aro concentration on crucial nerve centers, trade routes, and markets rather than on a circumscribed and bounded region as such pp. 210-11.

Perhaps not every reader will grant the status of statehood to Aro, but it will be difficult to dispute that a process of state formation was well underway in Iboland. Personally, I do sympathize with the author's position; it is not gratuitous to regard the Aro as a state. One important point must not go unnoticed; states need not come only in one structural form. Indigenous African states are no exception. While we must accept the Sudanic states with their "conventional, centralized, monarchical model" as a type most common to indigenous African states, we must also be cognizant of the probablity of other structural models. Robert Stevenson seems to argue that the Aro represents a model, different from the classic structural model.

In balance, I feel that the author has achieved his stated objective and he has done so painstakingly. He has drawn upon almost all available resources relevant to his subject (Evans-Pritchard's *Essays in Social Anthropology* is conspicuously absent from Stevenson's bibliography) and articulated his argument rather meticulously, perhaps, sometimes, too meticulously. This is not a book for a casual reader. A serious student of African history, politics, political anthropology, anthropology, and even geography will find it rewarding. It is a happy example of the fruitfulness of the inter-disciplinary approach.

However, there were times when I wondered if Stevenson had not been too harsh on the authors of *African Political Systems*. After all, Evans-Pritchard in the 1950's was among the first to admonish his colleagues to shift away from the static and synchronic analysis and move towards the diachronic study of societies. In fact, he specifically wanted them to consider the histories of the societies they study. I find this passage from his *Essays in Social Anthropology* most redeeming.

> But with the bath water of presumptive history, the functionalists have also thrown out the baby of valid history. They say . . . that even when the history of a society is recorded it is irrelevant to a functional study of it. I find this point of view unacceptable. The claim that one can understand the functioning of institution, at a certain point of time without knowing how they have come to be what they are, or what they were later to become, as well as a person who, in addition to having studied their constitution at that point of time, has also studied their past and future is to me an absurdity. Moreover, so it seems to me, neglect of the history of institution prevents the functionalist anthropologist not only from studying diachronic problems but also from testing the very functional constructions to which he attaches most importance, for it is precisely history which provides him with an experimental situation p. 21.

Perhaps the fact that the book was originally written as a dissertation may be partly responsible for the unusually sharp tone of the author. Incidentally, it may also explain the somewhat dry style. Of course, this may also be the case of the subject matter dictating the style of its writer.—VICTOR A. OLORUNSOLA, *Iowa State University*.

Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography. BY MOHAMMAD AYUB KHAN. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. 275. $7.50.)

Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives. BY GUSTAV F. PAPANEK. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. 354. $8.95.)

These two books complement each other in an admirable fashion. *Friends Not Masters* may be described as the memoirs of a man in power who has tried to justify his seizure of political power in terms of the political stability and national unity that his country gained following his intervention. But he has not told us anything about how Pakistan achieved phenomenal economic progress under his regime. It is to the credit of Dr. Papanek that he has described in such a lucid and graphic manner the story of Pakistan's impressive economic development.

There are two dominant themes in President Ayub's political autobiography—political stability and foreign policy. The theme of political stability is familiar in the sense that Pakistan had to be saved from incessant squabbles among politicians and regional strife by the intervention of General Ayub and the imposition of martial law. President Ayub has defended the new political system consisting of a dominant President, a docile legislature, and a controlled electroate that he has ushered in under the Constitution of 1962. In his defense, he can point out that the former political process under the parliamentary system, given the existing social structure and regional cleavages of the country, could not and did not generate enough political power in the executive for purposes of maintaining national unity and promoting economic growth. Therefore, under the new system the primary need is to mobilize and consolidate considerable political power in the hands of the executive. But the crucial question from the point of view of long-term political stability is has the President been successful in using this power for creating national and regional consensus and in mobilizing adequate economic resources for purposes of economic growth? The President has been successful in the latter objective and not in the former. In spite of economic growth and the ostensible political support that he has gathered through the system of Basic Democracies, the President has bitterly recorded: "On a number of occasions I have been accused, abused, and vilified, subjected to all kinds of rumours and slanders, all thoroughly unjustified and untrue, by some of the biggest blackguards in the country, and I have swallowed it." The President is justified in complaining about the acerbity in the attacks of the opposition. However, the failure of the regime in the art of skillful manipulation and minimization of its coercive machinery and above all the sense of political alienation that exists in East Pakistan and some of the urban areas of West Pakistan are factors which cannot be brushed aside as inconsequential.

It is in articulating the emerging trends of the foreign policy of his country that President Ayub displays a level of skill and sophistication which has seldom been equalled by an Asian statesman. He explains why and how Pakistan had to give a new orientation to its foreign policy after the American decision to give military aid to India when that country was faced with Chinese incursion in 1962. He conceives of Pakistan's relations with each of the big powers, the U. S., the U.S.S.R. and China, in terms of bilateral equations and how each such equation would be determined by the limits of tolerance of third parties. In other words, Pakistan would align itself with a power like the United States or China, but the extent of cordiality and the support that Pakistan would give to the major objectives of each of these powers would have to be so skillfully manipulated that each power would give maximum assistance to Pakistan. Ayub by no means is the first or the original expositor of such a policy. However, President Ayub can claim credit for the new course that has been charted for Pakistan's foreign policy and for the sense of pragmatism and shrewd assessment of the geopolitical interests of the big powers on which this foreign policy rests.

Papanek's book not only provides a fascinating account of Pakistan's economic development, but also the role played by the main actors, namely, the administrators and the businessmen, in this drama of development. Dr. Papanek describes in an illuminating manner how Pakistan, having inherited the authoritarian traditions of the British bureaucratic system and a hard core of competent administrators, first decided in favor of direct controls and how these controls on the whole turned out to be deterrent rather than stimulating for economic growth. Direct controls resulted in incorrect decisions, delays, excessive stocks, errors in the direction of investment, and in composition of imports.

The United States when faced with the problem of acute depression adopted certain economic measures under the New Deal legislation which, drawing on the ideas and policy proposals of Keynesian economics, avoided the alternative approach of drastic direct administrative controls of a totalitarian variety. Papanek's book suggests that a developing country like Pakistan, faced with the problem of scarce resources and mounting population, can also adopt indirect controls exercised through the price mechanism and fiscal measures and progressively dismantle a number of direct controls. What is more, he has tried to demonstrate that Pakistan by embarking on a policy of indirect controls in 1959 and at the same time discarding a number of direct administrative controls has been able to forge ahead economically in an impressive manner. Dr. Papanek, while recommending a system of indirect controls, does not suggest that Pakistan should adopt a pure type of capitalist or free enterprise system. He assigns a prominent place to government intervention and innovative economic policies. The system that he advocates is one where the machinery of government will be used to harness self-interest of the individual and particularly the entrepreneur to social goals. However, it may be added that Pakistan's rapid economic growth since 1959 cannot be attributed only to the dismantling of several direct controls because the latter action was facilitated largely by the generous grants of economic aid that Pakistan received from the United States during the early 1960's.—Khalid B. Sayeed, *Queen's University, Canada.*

The Administration of the White Australia Policy. By A. C. Palfreeman. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1967. Pp. 184.)

From the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 until 1958, and in effect until 1966, it was the policy of all Australian governments to prevent the entry of non-whites as permanent residents, subject only to specified exceptions on family and business grounds. This was the White Australia policy, probably the most widely-known product of the Australian polity. Though it had economic as well as racialist origins and justifications, the policy and its title were all too clearly the product of a time when racial pride was both blatant and narrow. 'We are more British than the people of Great Britain,' said Prime Minister W. M. Hughes in 1919, adding gnomicly, 'and we are held firmly to the great principle of the White Australia because we know what we know.' The last twenty years have seen the abandonment by all parties of the belief that Australia should remain overwhelmingly British in ethnic origin, and there can be no doubt that that change is real and permanent. The last ten years have also seen some modification of the policy of excluding non-white immigrants on principle, but no-one, not even the men who drafted the changes, can know whether they are sheer window-dressing or the beginning of a process which will produce if not a multi-racial society then at least a significant proportion of Asian-Australians.

Mr. Palfreeman's book thus comes at a convenient time, though it is plain that the policy changes of 1966 were highly inconvenient for him and necessitated some insertions and revisions. The content of his quite short book is very much what its title declares. The larger and better part of it is a study of the principal administrative rules and their application from 1901 to 1966, together with a necessary summary of the statutes which gave them validity. The book does not pretend to be a history of the policy in any other sense than this, still less to be a critique or an apology, though elements of all these things are to be found in it.

Though great issues were involved in the policy of exclusion, as we need no reminding now, the administration of the laws by which it was expressed inevitably was a matter of day-to-day decisions which in themselves were usually trivial and often had an element of burlesque. In 1901, Australia had a Chinese population of about 30,000, and the subsequent history of non-white immigration was predominantly concerned with enabling Chinese-Australian restauranteurs, market gardeners and other small business men to bring into the country a sufficient number of assistants to maintain their distinctively Chinese businesses in the manner to which they and their customers were accustomed. The result, as Mr. Palfreeman's account shows, was a rich growth of bureaucratic distinctions and a jargon in which to implement them. The most memorable example of the latter is 'Liberal Attitude Status,' meaning not, of course, the status of people who held a liberal attitude but that bundle of rights possessed by a favoured group of non-white immigrants towards whom the Department of Immigration, in its own opinion, adopted a liberal attitude. Mr. Palfreeman himself sometimes falls victim to the stylistic contagion of his materials, referring in one place to 'the traditional policy of optimum exclusion of non-Europeans,' but on the whole he gives a lucid and illuminating account of how a series of little consistencies and little anomalies become a formidable, if distinctly creaking, body of rules. No one need puzzle further over such problems as how large a Chinese restaurant had to be before the Department of Immigration would agree to the admission of three cooks from China to work in it. The answer to this question, and to dozens of others of the same order, are carefully set out in this book. Mr. Palfreeman acknowledges the assistance of the Department in his research, and it is certainly not his purpose to condemn its officers, past or present. Nor does it appear from his account that they should be condemned. Nevertheless, when viewed from the present time, the record has an air of shabby complexity and misplaced ingenuity, while sometimes, especially those past instances which involved the deportation of the non-white husbands and wives of Australians, it has a more painful and shameful quality. Sometimes Mr. Palfreeman permits himself a subdued irony. For example:

> Clearly, the administration of the White Australia policy by this time had become quite elaborate and sophisticated, and no doubt was founded upon carefully considered, albeit obscure, *desiderata* about who should enter for temporary residence.

The broader aspects of the policy and its critics, which do not really come within the scope of the title, are handled summarily and even uncertainly. Mr. Palfreeman summarizes the possibily portentous statement of the Minister for Immigration in February 1966, which opened the way to some non-white immigration, and quotes it in full in an appendix. One can sympathize with his uncertainty as to what this change really portends, but he also appears to take both sides of the argument to which it gives rise. He refers in one place to 'the existing policy of exclusion,' appearing to discount the significance of the change altogether, but in another place says that the administration of the policy as it now exists 'could well be the deciding factor in finally sealing the coffin of the White Australia policy,' implying that the policy is already dead or at least moribund. Political attitudes to White Australia, and particularly the abandonment of at least the phrase itself by nearly all the political parties, are handled too briefly and in some respects misleadingly. But Mr. Palfreeman has very helpfully illuminated what was previously the most obscure aspect of the very debatable subject of non-white immigration to Australia, and that is a considerable task and a considerable service.—D. W. RAWSON, *Australian National University, Canberra.*

Thailand: The War That Is, The War That Will Be. BY LOUIS E. LOMAX. (New York: Random House, 1967. Pp. 175, $4.95.)

Louis E. Lomax is a man with a deep, admirable, and completely understandable emotional involvement in the quest for social justice in the United States. His previous three books have all dealt with various aspects of this problem, and his new book on Thailand is closely related to this theme despite its subject matter and, perhaps, despite the intent of its author. There is little in *Thailand* for the area specialist or for layman inquisitive about the area. In fact, this volume abounds in overstatements, understatements, and misstatements about Thailand, and the uninformed reader should be warned of this in advance. Yet this is not a book without its rewards. Before turning to these, however, let me briefly describe the plot.

Louis Lomax had proceeded as far as Cambodia enroute to Hanoi when his invitation was unexpectedly rescinded. Rather than waste his trip he diverted himself to Thailand, and for this detour he reports that he will always remain grateful to Ho Chi Minh because "Thailand . . . is where the action is (p. x)." In Thailand Lomax interviewed numerous officials (including a lengthy session with the powerful American Ambassador, who did not emerge as one of the author's favorite personalities), intellectuals, peasants, surrendered guerrillas, and practicing communists in serene Bangkok and in the troubled Northeastern and Southern provinces. His thesis (so far as one can say that this book has a thesis) is that an undeclared and unacknowledged war is in progress in Thailand, that in this stage it is strikingly similar to the beginnings of the Vietnamese conflict, and that once the United States has lost in Vietnam it will shift its full-scale operations to Thailand. Thus, Lomax is reporting "the war that is" and prophesying "the war that will be." It is a thesis that is intended to needle both Thais and Americans, and, indeed, reactions on both sides indicate that Lomax has been very successful in this.

The really interesting aspects of this book stem from neither the author's reportage nor his prophesies. The book is far more fascinating for the insights it provides into the dilemmas facing many perceptive, inquiring, and responsible American critics of a liberal bent. Lomax is innately anticommunist enough that he is frightened by the thought of a communist regime in power in Thailand, but he is constantly troubled by the unarticulated suspicion that of all the persons he interviewed only two groups—the Peace Corps and the communists—seemed seriously concerned about the physical and psychic well being of the Thai masses. And, despite his conditioned reflex against communism, Louis Lomax is equally and more consciously concerned about the exploitation of the underprivileged by the establishment, whether he finds it among Negro sharecroppers in Mississippi or among the Phu-Thai of Northeast Thailand. Moreover, while Lomax apparently looks forward with some misgivings to the day when the liberals shall have become the isolationists and the conservatives the "globalists," he nevertheless seems to presume that there is little the United States can or should do in Thailand. He seems to be trying to tell us that the fatal flaw in this tragedy is that in the end the tyranny of the establishment will bring about the destruction of the system. And Thailand is not alone in being victimized by an establishment. In answer to his implied question, "what can change American military policy toward Thailand?," Lomax replies:

> if the Congress and the people rise as one and cry "Halt!" to the military-industrial complex, those men of war Dwight Eisenhower so passionately warned us against, then American men will no longer die in the wrong place, for the *wrong reasons, and at the wrong time* (p. 161).

Louis Lomax is caught up in a whole series of contemporary American dilemmas, and his book on Thailand's internal problems is more illuminating for its *obiter dicta* on America than for its major theme.—Robert O. Tilman, *Yale University.*

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions. By Karl W. Deutsch. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967. Pp. 167. $5.95.)

As a factual report on the attitudes of French and West German elites toward arms control and related areas in 1964, this study is excellent. My criticism of it stems not from its methods of data collection or what it reports at a descriptive level but from (1) its almost complete failure to give any theoretical interpretation to its content, (2- the form in which this content is communicated, and (3) the validity of some inferences made from the data.

The study involved interviews with 147 elite respondents in France, and 163 in West Germany, from several different occupational categories.[1] France and West Germany were singled out for detailed study because of the decisive influence their leaders certainly will have on the success or failure of arms control and disarmament, and political integration, in Western Europe. In fact, at the end of the study Deutsch proposes to institutionalize the pre-eminent position of these two major continental powers in a Four-Power NATO Executive Committee that would also include Britain and the United States, with each country sharing more or less equally in the direction and control of the future Atlantic Alliance.

For such a short book, it provides some pretty ponderous reading. The book's appendices, giving a large summary table, the interview schedule, and a statistical breakdown of the responses to most of the questions in the schedule, comprise 60 of the book's 147 pages. When the tables in the main body of the book are added to the appendices, only about half the book is left over to text.

The bulk of this "text" is a summary of the statistics given in the tables and appendices. (As if the statements in the text are not to be believed or really must be checked, many are cross-referenced to the questions and response breakdowns in the appendices.) In page after page chock full of figures, Deutsch presents the survey results on the general attitudes of the French and West German elites toward aims control and disarmament and their specific attitudes toward each other, other countries, European integration, NATO, German reunification, the French *force de frappe*, and the MLF (multilateral nuclear force) proposal. He finds widespread support from both the French and German elites for disarmament and arms control on a worldwide scale, though the two elites differ to some extent on such questions as the desirability of MLF and an independent nuclear force.

The topics explored are clearly important, and the responses of each elite by age, occupation, etc. are revealing in the sense of not always being "obvious." Deutsch argues that this kind of quantitative research can yield information about changes in political conditions before they are manifest even to astute observers, citing a correspondent's report of strong French support for President de Gaulle's attack on NATO over a year after the quantitative data were in.

---

[1] Methodological details of the sampling and interviewing are given in the companion volume to the book under review, Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1967).

Yet even after the condensation of "several thousand pages of typescript, tables, and computer printout" (p. ix), the study more resembles a code and data book than an interpretative analysis. There is little doubt about Deutsch's ability to digest prodigious amounts of data. When presented serially and in such overwhelming detail, however, the task of culling the most important findings from even these predigested data, and grasping their broader significance, becomes a task of heroic proportions. The quantitative responses to question after question leave one with a sense of bewilderment and finally loss in trying to relate back the figures to those given in the previous paragraphs and the preceding chapters.

This is not a criticism that the details shouldn't be filled in but rather that they should be developed within a theoretical framework that makes them interpretable at a higher level of analysis. Because no model of the process of attitude and opinion formation is offered—or even a set of hypotheses that relate responses in different substantive areas to the processes of consensus formation or political integration—the question of how things got the way they are and what their cumulative impact is tend to go unanswered.

This failure to anchor the study theoretically by making the assumptions of the analysis explicit and tracing out their logical implications has repercussions on the validity of some inferences drawn from the data. In one of the few statistical tests reported—that age accounts for less than 10 percent of the variance observed (p. 68)—the inference drawn that present attitudes are likely to persist for some time is simply not a logical consequence in the absence of a model that relates cross-sectional variance explained to longitudinal fluctuations. The conclusion that "the development of . . . a French-German consensus is likely to require far more than ten years, even under favorable conditions" (p. 15) is another unsupported inference from the data; to make such a projection (why not five or twenty years?), what is needed is not only the "broadly based evidence" that Deutsch calls for but a specification of the empirical indicators used to define operationally "consensus" and an analysis of their differential rates of change over time. Finally, the conclusion that the French Fifth Republic is not "a surface phenomenon that will vanish after President de Gaulle" (p. 73) may or may not turn out to be true; the important point is, however, that this inference presupposes a theoretical perspective which is not made explicit: that the influence of the intellectuals and nonbusiness interest groups, who were least willing to give the Republic after de Gaulle a long lease on life, will not turn out to be significant.

Deutsch is at his best when he steps back somewhat from his data and speculates on the future of the Atlantic Alliance. His plea for a loosened alliance unbridled by United States assertions of hegemony does seem to touch the contours of favorable elite opinion. It is unfortunate that these recommendations spring more from an attempt to surface "trends" in the data than from a theory which Deutsch might have given us and used his data to test (as he has superbly done in earlier studies).—STEVEN J. BRAMS, *Syracuse University.*

Propaganda and World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion. BY B. S. MURTY. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. 310. $10.00.)

The encomia with which this book comes readily equipped and packaged are enough to propagandize a timid reviewer before he gets a chance to object. On the front jacket flap Professor Richard Falk says the book is "undoubtedly the most profound and comprehensive study of this important subject yet available," while the back flap echoes in the words of Professor J. B. Whitton that "the present work is superior to anything I have read on the subject." In a glowing foreword Professor Lasswell declares "it is as sure as any prognosis can be that his work will be accepted as the landmark treatise on an elusive topic."

I found it instead an elusive treatise on a landmark topic. Some day, perhaps, a great book might be written on the legal and political questions involved in attempting to regulate the use of propaganda—what Professor Murty calls (throughout the book and rather ponderously) the "ideological instrument of coercion." Even as purely normative political theory, the question of whether, and if so what types of, propaganda should be regulated offers fascinating potential. Although Professor Murty does not shrink from offering prescriptions, his book suffers not only from a basic lack of psychological realism but also from a lack of concrete examples of propaganda that he would allow or disallow in his repeated goal of securing "minimum" world public order.

In the first place, what *is* propaganda? Professor Murty talks extensively about it in 294 tightly printed pages, but for a central organizing concept the best he can offer is that it is an "ideological instrument of coercion," while the latter term is defined—straight out of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*—as "moral or physical compulsion by which a person is forced to do or to refrain from doing some act apart from his own voluntary action." Leaving out physical compulsion as irrelevant, this leaves us with moral compulsion. That, says Professor Murty, occurs when a person is "subjected to a high degree of constraint in the choice of alternatives in shaping his conduct." How many alternatives? A "few," says Professor Murty, and those are "attended with expectations of high cost and low gains." (p. 28).

But in what sense are alternatives restricted by propaganda? Are they physically removed? Morally deflected? Are we talking about a recipient of propaganda whose visual horizons become clouded as a result of the insistent message, who sees fewer alternatives than are really there? The housewife who homes in on a particular brand of soup without "seeing" all the others on the supermarket shelves? Or has someone, working with the propagandist, actually removed all the other brands?

And how about conflicting messages? Professor Murty has a large blind spot for the informative effects of conflicting propaganda. Busy with the task of trying to regulate one stream of propaganda, his schemata would probably become too complex if he had to acknowledge that a second stream could neutralize the first. (It's hard for anyone looking at "law" with the evident awe that Professor Murty evinces to say that two wrongs can make a right.)

Clearly a basic problem with the book is lack of specificity—despite the numerous sources and even examples that are cited. Just what image or concept bothers the author? I got the impression that cases such as the Japanese warmongering machine that was in full force in the 1930's is something that the author would like, somehow, to suppress under international law. But there is no detailed study—as might, for example, be undertaken by factor analysis—of the relation between internal propaganda and external aggressive behavior, or even more important, of whether one may infer a causal relationship between propaganda and aggressiveness. Propaganda might be a result rather than a cause, and as such could be useful in alerting other nations to the propagandizing state's intentions.

The author alludes in passing to several studies of the content analysis of propaganda, as he also alludes to gestalt psychology and "Pavlov's conditioning theory" (no mention of Skinner). Content analysis, of course, is not directly relevant to the author's purpose, which is to indicate how propaganda can and should be legally regulated. But an awareness of the numerous levels of commitment, motivation, and cognitive dissonance that research in content analysis demonstrates would have served the author well in his attempt to lay down rules for legal regulation. Rather than simply stating that many of the questions are matters of degree, he would have seen that *the* question is whether any lines can be drawn at all. If Japanese propaganda brought on the second world war, should the United States immediately silence the John Birch society? From an international law standpoint, how can the other nations force the United States to silence the Birchites? Would such an attempt to force a country to take steps against the freedom of speech of its own citizens itself lead to world war three? Or is propaganda bad only if its emanates (is controlled by?) official sources? What should we have done with Hitler, who constantly preached peace? The author has considerable trouble with the results of the Nuremberg trials which did not hold as criminal any propaganda *per se.* He writes that if Goebbels had been one of the defendants he would not have been acquitted, but the evidence he cites from the trials indicates that a Goebbels conviction would have been based on participation in a conspiracy to initiate a war of aggression and not on his radio broadcasts. Although the author does a commendable job of summarizing the history of propaganda as a concept of international law, his analysis progressively falters as matters are brought up to date.

Professor Murty's heavy reliance throughout on organizing categories derived from the writings of Professor Lasswell gives the book a sense of organization that is not really there. Some chapter headings, for instance, are: "clarification of policy," "audience," "objectives," "situation and capability," "strategies," "outcome," "decision process." These umbrella words overlap all over the place, with the result that matters brought up in "objectives" are repeated in a later chapter called "outcome" and again in the chapter called "decision process." We read the chapter on "audience" only to find that audience has little if anything to do with the analysis. Chapter headings become titles of index-card boxes in which the cards are reshuffled indiscriminately. This is not to blame Professor Lasswell, whose brilliance and acuity if anything transcended his cumbersome terminology in his pioneering works on propaganda and related subjects. Rather, it seems to be a by-product of the main stream of behavioralism these days, which finds in outlying tributaries jargon-infested studies which to the nondiscerning reader cast disrepute on the main stream itself. Professor Murty simply made use of the wrong types of methodology.—ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, *Northwestern University.*

The Common Aid Effort. BY MILTON J. ESMAN AND DANIEL S. CHEEVER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967. Pp. 421. $7.50.)

This book addresses itself to the manner in which Western industrialized countries can more rapidly reduce the well-being gap between themselves and the poverty-ridden nations of the Third World. The authors' main hypothesis is that the North-South "confrontation between the rich and the poor is likely to be the most important and enduring problem in international affairs." (p. ix) Contending that cooperation among the donor nations can significantly increase the effectiveness of help given to the poorer countries, this study centers on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The member nations of the OECD include the fourteen members of NATO, the three European neutral states of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, and Spain and Japan. The United States, France, Great Britain and Western Germany have played the leading role in the evolution of DAC. DAC assists "the donors by enabling them to perceive their national interests in terms of larger objectives and wider perspectives than would be the case if there were no common aid forum." (p. 6).

The first chapter in *The Common Aid Effort* reviews the evolution of aid from UNRRA to the Marshall Plan in the aftermath of the Second World War, and in the context of the Cold War which followed. During the fifties, many newly independent, impoverished nations became recipients of foreign aid. Despite this assistance the average per capita income in the developed countries is more than seven-times that of the backward nations, or, to put it differently, "30.2 percent of the world's population receives 75.5 percent of its goods and services." (p. 21) Since the Soviet Union and Communist China have also entered the arena of developmental competition, the income gap between industrialized countries, whether they be market or centrally planned economies, and the poorer nations continues to widen. Almost all of the developing countries' economic performance falls short of their aspirations, "thus increasing their frustrations and the probability of violence." (p. 23) During the period 1954-63, OECD member countries contributed over eight-times the amount of aid furnished by the communist countries. The communist aid program, however, helped to stimulate the OECD countries to begin to think about a common aid effort. The Western industrialized nations have moved in that direction despite the uncertainty that "economic aid will promote democratic societies, economic stability, international cooperation, or improved commercial relations." (p. 25)

The authors frequently refer to the concept of foreign aid strategy and seem to believe that DAC could provide the forum for such a strategy. Strategy implies the selection of a common goal, the choosing of intermediate-phased objectives, and allocation of adequate resources with which to achieve them. Chapter 4, "The Development Assistance Committee," negates the possibility of a foreign aid strategy being developed within that mechanism. "The DAC was conceived and remains essentially as a framework or a forum for governmental representatives to discuss, rationalize, and, where possible, cooperate, coordinate, and harmonize national aid policies and operations." (p. 144) In fact, "there is little public evidence that development policies are considered in the DAC in terms of a coordinated free world political strategy." (p. 145)

The various member nations of DAC regard the value of their membership in this committee from differing perspectives. Some members of the U. S. Congress believe that DAC can be used to induce its members "to accept a larger and more equitable proportion of the common aid and defense burden, of which they believe the United States is now shouldering too large a share." (p. 182) Yet the American contribution to foreign aid has been dropping so rapidly that we may no longer have the leverage to induce contributions from other countries. In 1951, foreign aid appropriations represented 2.2 percent of the U. S. national GNP, whereas in 1967 it represented .29 percent of a GNP that was well over twice as large.

France, which frequently sees advantage in acting individually, values information gained from the exchange of ideas within the DAC working parties. West Germany, anxious to achieve acceptability in world affairs, values participation in a common aid effort which also helps to promote export opportunities. "The United Kingdom has become increasingly convinced of the DAC's utility." Informed Britishers believe "the common strategy and even coordinated action may be required. . . ." (p. 185)

In the concluding chapter, the authors reassert that "one of the major international tensions for the next half-century at least will be the confrontation between the rich nations and the poor." (p. 323) A different point of view was presented by George W. Ball in an article entitled, "3½ Super Powers," which appeared in LIFE Magazine on March 29, 1968. Ball urged that the creation of a stable and prosperous Europe should be our highest policy goal. This reviewer agrees with Ball that "at least for the next several decades, the discontent of poorer nations does not threaten world destruction."

Esman and Cheever contend to the contrary—that the North-South problem "cannot be ignored because modern technology has created a web of interdependencies that interlinks the fates of all nations. Neither distances nor traditional systems of control nor overwhelming military power can shield the industrialized nation from events that take place in the emerging countries." (p. 324-325) The developing countries' tactic of pressuring the industrialized nations to help them is abetted by the "growing current opinion in most of the industrialized countries that favor foreign aid for a combination of humanitarian, commerical, and political reasons." (p. 325) This statement is too optimistic. The United States has stressed the Alliance for Progress as the key to development in Latin America. Yet, during the last year, there has been a decline in living standards as the population explosion in Latin America far outpaces advances in industrial and agricultural productivity.

U. S. leadership and greater commitment to foreign aid is absolutely essential for more effective development in the Third World. "Since leadership belongs to the United States, the slackening of American performance will result at best in stabilization and at worst in a reduction in the European efforts." (p. 359-360) The retrenchment program initiated by Trudeau in Canada, the inward turning of most European countries, and the disenchantment which many Americans hold toward their country's involvement in world problems, make it unlikely that the pressing needs of the developing countries will be satisfied.

The authors of this book have made an objective and low-key appraisal of one of the most important problems facing mankind. If the aid which is desirable, or even necessary, will not be given, one can only hope that George Ball's assessment of the poorer nations proves to be correct: "They can create local situations of instability and they can appeal to the conscience or cupidity of the industrialized nations, but they do not, given reasonable prudence on our part, have the capacity to precipitate major world conflict." (LIFE Magazine, March 29, 1968, p. 83.)—WILLIAM R. KINTNER, *University of Pennsylvania.*

Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch. BY R. N. ROSECRANCE. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 308. $7.50.)

This book presents a careful analysis of the evolution of British military strategy from 1946 to 1966 with particular emphasis on the formative years from the end of World War II to the Suez disaster. The story of British defense policies is told largely in chronological historical narrative. American strategy is a constant reference point. The author takes particular care to demonstrate that far from being a mirror image on a smaller scale, or worse still an impotent dependency of the United States, Great Britain initially showed greater vision and realism and experienced unrivaled successes in strategy and diplomacy. Rosecrance believes that British postwar influence reached its "zenith" in 1954-55: "All of her military adventures, with the possible exception of the retention of the Suez base, were successful. The atomic bomb had been developed independently; the hydrogen bomb was well on the way. . . . In Europe and overseas, Britain maximized her influence" (pp. 192-3). And then came Suez and the awful revelation of weakness, incapacity and dependence upon the United States.

Indeed, how the mighty had fallen! If, before Suez "British courses in world affairs were often not much less ambitious than those of the United States" (p. 216), after that debacle "Britain could no longer be regarded as a major world power; she could scarcely be viewed as a major regional power" (p. 233). Rosecrance briefly and skillfully traverses the period since Suez, ending his narrative with a series of recommendations designed to enhance British power in the future. Summarized, these are: reduce British overseas commitments to the bone; turn vigorously to Europe; join the Common Market; establish special ties with Germany; and—the most interesting and provocative suggestion—arrange, with American concurrence, a British nuclear "trusteeship" that would make it possible for the British to commit an American-assisted nuclear deterrent for Europe in the form of British Polaris submarines (modified for Poseidon missiles), a deterrent system in which the Europeans alone would participate (details of the scheme are found on pp. 278 ff.). In short, Britain's future lies with Europe and strategic initiatives on her part can make her an influential partner.

There is much to commend the reader to this work. It is strong on analysis of British nuclear strategy. Of special interest is Rosecrance's detailed account of a key "global strategy paper of 1952," which is alleged to have been of lasting influence on British, American and NATO strategies. The author pays particular attention to the linkage between British and American strategy, evaluating the interrelationship from one period to the next. It provides under one cover a comprehensive analysis of America's most important postwar ally.

Rosecrance argues persuasively, if not uniquely, that Britain skillfully enhanced her power by operating as broker between Europe and the United States while at the same time building her own nuclear forces and sustaining numerous far-flung commitments in the Middle East and Asia. It was by any account a remarkable achievement, even if in subsequent years things have not turned out so well on any of these accounts.

On the other hand, the book is marred by a tendency toward hyperbole and anglophilia. The author exaggerates the heights and depths of British power, perhaps for dramatic effect, as he also overstates British influence upon American strategy. In particular, he seizes upon the global strategy paper of 1952, proclaiming its historic significance and pervasive influence, but then admits that Churchill rejected its implications (p. 176) and, indeed in the end, that "the global strategy paper was not really carried out" (pp. 178-9). No doubt the paper was very important in terms of doctrine even if not carried into operational policy, but in this matter, as in too many others, the author simply overstates his case. Likewise Rosecrance claims that NATO "was virtually" Ernest Bevin's "personal creation" (p. 259); that in Korea and Indo-China "it was British influence which prevented a redirection of American energies toward the Far East and maintained NATO resolve" (p. 233). According to Rosecrance, the British first enunciated a strategy of nuclear deterrence, were first to recognize the deficiencies in the Lisbon agreements, were first to build a nuclear force without a putative foe in mind, and unlike the Americans, succumbed neither to the excesses of massive retaliation nor to over-reliance upon conventional forces.

These are all matters of slight exaggeration and/or disputable propositions. They are more in the nature of annoyances, however, than they are serious factual or analytical defects. Most of them appear to arise out of an implicit admiration for the plucky British, an admiration which this reviewer shares. But the constant comparison, often invidious, with American policies has hardly ever really got any point to it. Thus, we are treated at the very outset to the following statement: "Britain has certainly made her mistakes in her postwar military policy, but they do not, on balance, seem greater than those made by the United States" (p. vii). Perhaps Rosecrance is urging us to give the British more credit than we do. There is no other apparent motive.

I do not mean to suggest that Rosecrance applied only praise to the British. He is not only incisive in his analysis of British policies in general, but he lays bare their major deficiencies over time. And whether or not it is germane to argue that the British developed a nuclear strategy "first," he clearly sees its defects, especially when the British after Suez refuse to face up to the deficiencies revealed by and caused by that event. I have yet to see a more lucid account of the factors contributing to British influence prior to the Suez crisis nor a more accurate assessment of the reasons why subsequently Great Britain, in spite of its position as third most powerful nuclear nation, has experienced a waning influence in Europe and in Washington.

For those who have read Rosecrance's other major book, *Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), I owe at least this passing comment: *Defense of the Realm* bears virtually no relationship to the theoretical framework and general conclusions of the earlier work. Indeed, where in 1963 Rosecrance concluded that internal (domestic) factors were the most important variables contributing to foreign policy behavior, in the book under review one has the impression that British strategy evolved in response to external pressures (the international system). But then, Rosecrance did not apply that framework to this analysis.—David W. Tarr, *University of Wisconsin.*

Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense. By Joel Larus. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967. Pp. 171. $6.50.)

Thirteen days before this book was published, President Johnson invited additional outside inspection of U. S. nuclear facilities, thus restressing the relativity of hitherto secret information when world goals are at stake. Thirty-eight days after publication, a SAC B-52 carrying four hydrogen bombs crashed in North Star Bay near Thule. Almost immediately, former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara ordered SAC B-52 alert training flights disarmed of their nuclear weapons. Rarely do events so aptly frame a book.

The growth in both numbers and kinds of nuclear weapons implies the possibility of nuclear accidents—particularly, unintended nuclear detonation and contamination. The chances of accidents some time, somewhere may be 1 in a million, 1 in 100, or as the author accepts Sydney Hook's laconic estimate, just high or low. Purely and simply, Professor Larus argues that civilization has a common interest in sharing information about nuclear weapons safety. "Pure and simple" doesn't describe the job he took on, however. Separating the single interest objective of nuclear weapons safety from all other questions of nuclear weapons management takes a lawyer's rhetoric and a political scientist's diorism. Fortunately the author is both lawyer and skilled political scientist. *Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense* makes its case eminently readably, conservatively, and remarkably freely of the polemics and tortuous calculations of owning nuclear weapons.

Professor Larus finds two main kinds of radioactivity accidents, along with the conventional two reasons why they happen—human and mechanical. One kind of accident is an "unauthorized, unintentional, or inadvertent" nuclear explosion. The second kind, of somewhat higher probability, is a nuclear mishap, *e.g.*, a weapon rupture that contaminates the environment with fissionable radioactive material without setting off the fissionable material. He weaves a briefing on administrative, economic, and technical nuclear weapons management and safeguards into the fabric of his case without sacrificing scholarship or punch.

The worst kind of accident has not happened at this writing, but nuclear weapons accidents are hardly unique. The United States admits a dozen so-called "Broken Arrow" incidents since Hiroshima. Professor Larus, working entirely from unclassified data, searches out hard indications of at least another nine. Thus the average is about one U. S. accident a year since World War II. How many more there have been, no one knows. Possessors have been even less willing to talk about arms safety than about arms proliferation.

For many persons, and not just lay observers, the most dangerous consequence of nuclear weapons accidents is nuclear war. And so it doubtless is. But there is an important difference between "most dangerous" and "most likely." Herman Kahn and others concluded that the world was most accident prone during the late 1950s and into the 1960s, *i.e.,* there existed the least manageable combination of political trust and mechanical controls on nuclear weapons. Since then, the superpowers have devoted time, money and experience to reduce to a "very slim possibility" the chances that a "faulty communications signal, a mentally deranged airman, or any other unfortunate mishap could trigger a Russo-American nuclear exchange." But as one likelihood subsided, others arose: the threat that France, China, and would-be possessors have not spent and will not allocate the money and know-how to play it safe with multi-kiloton weapons. One might add that tactical subkiloton weapons, by whomever possessed, are equally risky though the author barely mentions battlefield nuclear devices.

A fourth of the book deals with nuclear weapons proliferation—the "spreading fires of Prometheus." The length of this section leaves some question as to whether a much more concise statement about arms spread would not better have supported his critical variable of multiple possessors in calculating accident probabilities. It is not that Professor Larus' discussion is not consistent with most published research and thinking in nuclear arms proliferation, *i.e.,* that arms spread is a matter of politics, not cosmic pathology, and can be studied even as other political behavior is studied. It is consistent, and precisely because it is, this part of the book seems to undermine the author's main point that nuclear weapons safety is a separable area for negotiation and that nuclear weapons safety "involves all states without exception."

Not all states, however, would be directly involved in Professor Larus' proposal for internationalizing nuclear weapons safeguards. His program rests on an assumption that *all* nations must take part in talks about safeguards relevant to their respective levels of nuclear military capability—an assumption that the anti-proliferation pact talks didn't validate. He offers three procedural rules for international safety talks, all three of which have been observed in the past, though infrequently all on the same topic at the same time: talks would progress from least sensitive to most sensitive information; participant states would have to qualify by demonstrating nuclear military capability relevant to safety information being exchanged; and all resulting information would be shared. His four-stage exchange of information begins with relatively inocuous discussion, politically, about safe storage and basic weapons transport. It progresses finally to mobile, solid fuel dilivery systems. Thoughtful prescriptions and their details should not be summarized, as is done here. But Professor Larus' program itself resembles an unclassified summary of a classified technical-diplomatic agenda that one devoutly hopes someone is working on. Considering that the plan comes from the editor of *From Collective Security to Preventive Diplomacy,* one concludes that Professor Larus deliberately sketched the program broad brush in the knowledge that is more important now to recognize the problem than detail its resolution. National decisions to opt for nuclear weapons safety must, at some point, pass political tests.

Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense is not only a book about a fresh, hard, real problem of science and politics. It is at once a model of unclassified digging into an area shrouded by classification, and a pedagogically valuable example of excruciating discrimination, by and large, between more political and less political functions of international intercourse.—TIMOTHY ALDEN WILLIAMS, *Kansas State University.*

The Insecurity of Nations: International Relations in the Twentieth Century. BY CHARLES YOST. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968. Pp. 276. $6.50.)

This book is of interest both to the general public and to specialists, but for different reasons. The theme of interest to the concerned public is that contemporary views of national security are outmoded; the present quest for security can produce only insecurity. If chaos caused by new weapons is to be prevented, a new international system based on nations that are not nations in the old sense of the term must be constituted. Certainly this message, coming as it does, from a distinguished American diplomat, is important. However, for the specialist, neither the analysis of international politics nor the prescription for the future is as interesting as the insight the book provides into the author himself. As a reflection of the assumptions and perceptions of one important member of the diplomatic establishment, and as a record of his views of American policy, it is a fascinating and sometimes frightening volume.

Throughout the book the perceptions and misperceptions, the preconceptions and indoctrination of leaders is stressed. The opening chapters, although cursory and conventional in their survey of twentieth century international history and the forces alleged to underlie our present insecure condition, lay bare the author's assumptions and preconceptions. From these chapters it is apparent that the author is the apotheosis of the humane, liberal, cultivated gentleman whose values and views are challenged by contemporary events. Modern developments, whether scientific, technological or cultural, seem to have been mainly disastrous. The net effect of the twentieth century has been to undermine the old faiths. Science has given a "secular option between heaven and hell" but has disavowed the responsibility for choice; intellectuals have recorded the confusion of mind and soul but have not offered any constructive alternatives; the technological means for solving major problems of production exist, yet the potential is unrealized. Moreover, these advances have created far greater public problems: complex bureaucracies limit flexibility and make problem solving difficult; new developments in weaponry constantly escalate the arms race and inhibit control. All of these developments are disturbing, but for Ambassador Yost they have shattered an orderly world that once existed, the world congruent with the values and goals acquired in another era.

After setting out the underlying causes of international insecurity, the author proceeds to examine the major East-West confrontations in the post-war period. It is frightening to find that in nearly every major confrontation or policy choice, the conflict with the USSR over Japan at the end of the war, the problem of nuclear controls, the assessment of Communist China, the German problem, the posting of the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Straits, as well as in Laos and Vietnam, the policy chosen was based on misread intentions, faulty intelligence, misplaced confidence and above all, on a failure to take the long view of "what the total society needs." Reality was misread because perceptions and judgments were based on irrelevant past experiences. Further, modernity in the form of research institutes, bureaucracies, and the pressures of an uninformed public, also contributed to failure. Added to these factors was the frantic pace of modern life itself which inhibited diplomatic reflection.

In the third section of the book entitled "Reflections and Conclusions," Ambassador Yost suggests an alternative to anarchy. This section while expressing hope, is hardly optimistic. The alternatives posed require an extraordinary vision and great good will on the part of individual leaders. Essentially he argues that "realpolitik" is now utopian and thus formerly utopian solutions are now realistic. The quest for security by individual nations through the arms race has failed; now a new interpretation of national security and interest based not in terms of glory and prestige but in terms of the welfare needs of the individual is necessary. The United Nations, and its peace keeping arm especially, must be strengthened. Once again the notion of national interest is elusive. A national interest conceived in terms of individual welfare need not be as uniform as he implies; furthermore, individual needs may well be fulfilled by policies of prestige and glory. Ultimately, the solution, if there is one, is to be found in the pressures of an "enlightened public opinion." Unfortunately, if information is already too abundant, and mistaken pre-conceptions as well as mis-perceptions rife among leaders, it is difficult to see how pressures from a public only incidentally concerned could be of assistance. Beyond this, the fundamental problem, the fact that we have not "learned to adapt our inherited emotional drives to the new environment" does not seem to be solved. Perhaps this volume can serve to enlighten public opinion. Most certainly the foreign policy making process it describes does not inspire confidence even though the goals of Ambassador Yost himself are commendable.—KEITH R. LEGG, *University of Florida*.

Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway. BY PHILIP M. BURGESS. (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1967. Pp. 179. $6.25.)

On the eve of the invasion by Nazi Germany in April, 1940, Norwegian leaders assumed that geographical isolation, non-involvement in the issues that divided the major powers, and a strong "peace tradition" would permit their country to remain neutral in World War II, as it had done during World War I. The decision of the Norwegian government, almost exactly nine years later, to become a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was based on a diametrically opposed set of premises about the nature of and conditions for national security. The linkage between the "strategic images," as revealed by elite pronouncement (the independent variable), and Norwegian foreign policy outcomes (the dependent variable) is the subject of this interesting book. Less attention is devoted to the antecedents of elite images although, as in the case of Glenn Paige's recent *The Korean Decision,* Burgess' study reveals the importance of the analogies—whether valid or not—which decision-makers find in history.

The first chapter, a brief but exhaustively documented survey of Norwegian foreign policy prior to World War II, emphasizes the elements of Norway's historical experience out of which a strategic image supporting neutralist policies developed. Chapter II examines the effects of the Nazi invasion on the thinking of the government in exile in London. To Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht, the military catastrophe of 1940 could be explained by German malice rather than by any basic flaw in the pre-war strategic image. Opposing this view was that of Trygve Lie, who succeeded Koht as Foreign Minister in 1941. The policy outcome of Lie's image was an alliance with Great Britain, the first such military agreement in Norway's history.

The third chapter examines Norway's policy in the immediate post-war period. Historical experience had "proved" to Lie and his successor Halvard Lange, that neutrality was bankrupt, that Norway's geographical position was strategic rather than peripheral in great power rivalries, and that, rather than seeking to isolate themselves from great power conflicts, small nations such as Norway could best serve their security needs by working to make the United Nations an effective "bridge" between the United States and the Soviet Union. Not until 1948 did Norwegian leaders perceive that international tensions had undermined the ability of the United Nations to carry out its security-related functions. The fourth chapter examines how this strategic image initially led to exploration of two policy choices—membership in a Scandinavian bloc attached to the West or direct membership in the Western alliance—and ultimately to the decision to join NATO. This is the most interesting part of Burgess' analysis, in part because he compares the strategic images held by Norwegian, Danish and Swedish leaders to demonstrate convincingly that incompatible images prevented the formation of a Scandinavian alliance.

Among the conclusions presented in the fifth and final chapter, two stand out. First, Burgess concludes that elite images have considerable explanatory power for negative explanation (which policy alternatives were not adopted), as well as for predicting the course of action ultimately selected: "(I)mages and outcomes corresponded very closely, and potential mediating factors were not sufficiently powerful to alter the outcome. Examining only elite images would have left unexplained certain of the tactical domestic and diplomatic maneuvers that were reviewed above, but the final outcome, given the alternatives, was predictable from the images structure itself" (page 160). Second, the finding in other studies that an individual's images are highly resistant to change is supported; thus, modification of authoritative images is most likely to result from change of decision-makers, as in the case of Koht's replacement by Lie.

Among the merits claimed for the concept "strategic image," beyond its apparent ability to explain some important aspects of foreign policy, is its suitability for comparative analysis. This is a valid and important point. In a field that is scarcely overburdened with truly comparative studies, such concepts should be exploited to the fullest extent possible. But those who are induced to replicate this study will find that the absence of an operational definition of "strategic image" makes it difficult to do so. These images appear to include such cognitive components as structure of the international system, nature and source of threat to national security, and the like, as well as an affective or valuational dimension. But nowhere are the rules for coding foreign policy statements made explicit. A more precise distinction between elements of the concept might also stimulate inquiry into some interesting questions of a comparative nature. Which aspects of the strategic image are most important for explaining policy outcomes? Under what circumstances? For what types of nations? In short, Burgess' study suggests that "strategic image" is a concept with considerable potential, but until it is made operational its utility for the comparative or cumulative study of foreign policy will fall short of its promise.—Ole R. Holsti, *University of British Columbia.*

Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958. By Stephen G. Xydis. (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1967. Pp. 704. $15.00.)

This volume, essentially a study of diplomatic effort exerted through the United Nations (the United Nations General Assembly and the Assembly's Political Committee), traces the discussion and action in connection with the Greek Government's five recourses to the world body concerning Cyprus over the period indicated in the title. The author devotes special attention to the positions taken by Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively, but without limiting his account to these states. American readers will find references at various places to the position or views of the United States chief of mission to Greece (as at pp. 83, 137-140, 184, 247, 249); these, as the author explains in his preface (p. xi), are based upon Greek diplomatic sources rather than American archival records.

Particularly instructive are the author's analyses of the views expressed and the positions taken by the representatives of particular members of the United Nations in the long-drawn-out effort looking to the disposition of the Cyprus problem. The very nature of the problem was a subject of some disagreement. As the author suggests (p. 4), the dispute was an "imperfect" one, protagonists and antagonists being allies. The moves concerning Cyprus are described (at p. 23) as "symptoms of irrational behavior in international conflict." While Greece's spokesmen sought self-determination for the island (which their opponents in argument sought to identify with *enosis*), Turkey's representatives advocated partition for the Cypriots (p. 108), or an Anglo-Turkish-Greek condominium (p. 176). In the course of the discussions there was reference to the Cyprus problem as one which was not a "straight-forward colonial problem" (p. 294) and a spokesman for Greece observed that Greece was separated from a friendly and allied country (the United Kingdom) only by the Cyprus question (p. 321). Self determination, a British spokesman observed at one point in the discussions, had to be applied in a manner suitable to each particular case, and it meant self determination for *all*—a description which a Greek spokesman challenged (p. 422).

Viewed from the standpoint of an international system of law and organization, the developments with respect to the ease of Cyprus before the United Nations bodies elicited observations to the effect that there was need for a sense of international responsibility in order for a state to play the role of a member of an international society (p. 552). There was further reference to a "primitive society" which, like the United Nations, has neither courts nor police, and which is "primarily a collection of third parties" (p. 557).

At various places in the volume the author has drawn attention to matters of interest to students of international law. One of these was a suggestion (reported to have been made by an American Secretary of Embassy) to the effect that Cyprus might become a mandate or trusteeship (p. 141). There was reference to "domestic" jurisdiction questions (as at pp. 194, 209, 221, 303), to possible recourse to the European Commission on Human Rights (pp. 194-195, 239-240) and to the Cyprus question from the point of view of NATO and the "cohesion of the West" (p. 259). One speaker pointed out (p. 313) that Cyprus was not an "ethnic personality." There is indication at various places of positions which Commonwealth states took in the voting on issues presented (as at p. 493).

The limitations of a brief review preclude more than an illustrative mention of the processes which were involved in the Cyprus case before the United Nations in the selected period. The subsequent developments pertaining to Cyprus underline (1) the seriousness of the continuing problem, and (2) the difficulty of arriving at a solution which would be consistent with principles of the United Nations Charter and with the responsibility of the major states to cooperate in seeking a solution. That the coming of independence to Cyprus has not solved the problem is underlined by the continued United Nations force (UNFIYP) on the island. The basis for an understanding of the still-existing problem of Cyprus is enriched by the detailed account and analysis which Professor Xydis has provided.—ROBERT R. WILSON, *Duke University.*

U. S. Policy and the Security of Asia. BY FRED GREENE. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968. Pp. 429. $9.95.)

This eighth volume in the Council on Foreign Relations' series on the United States and China in World Affairs concentrates on American security interests and commitments in Asia. The approach is as confusing and as contradictory as the subject itself. Although he is obviously well aware of the broader setting in which security questions must be considered, especially in Asia, the author seldom gives more than passing lip-service to the larger aspects of security problems. Doubtless it is true that "security questions deserve close study in their own right," but it does not follow that they can properly be considered apart from other issues and considerations. Thus this study gives an unbalanced picture of the existing situation in Asia and of the prospects for effective American involvement in Asian defense.

So many of the studies sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, perhaps because of the limits imposed upon them, lack depth and focus, and this one is an extreme example of the defects of such an approach. Professor Greene is a competent and well-informed student of Asian affairs. It is a pity that he forced his study so rigidly into the Council's mold.

The author argues that Communist China's growing nuclear capability enhances the Communist threat in Asia. Although this means, in his view, that "grim confrontations among nuclear states are in the offing" in Asia, he believes that the United States must commit itself to the containment of Chinese power, and that to do this its "vital interest" and "long-range goal" are "the creation of a balance of power" in Asia (note the word "creation"). Presumably this is to be achieved by reshaping its alliance policies and its alliance system ("the United States must broaden, rather than narrow, existing alliances"), and by "extensive American participation in Asian security affairs" and "an ever-deepening involvement in Asia."

Much of the book is a realistic analysis of the existing situation and future prospects in Asia, which provides ample proof of the difficulties, indeed probably of the impossibility, of implementing the proposed balance-of-power, containment, alliance, and involvement policies. The real difficulty lies not in the author's understanding of the situation in Asia but in his compulsive tendency to offer prescriptions which seem to have little chance of implementation, and which indeed seem likely to defeat the stated objectives if they could be implemented.

A concern for the Asian balance of power is logical enough, although it has an old-fashioned ring. A recommendation for reshaping and strengthening the American alliance system in Asia seems rather unrealistic in the light of the many evidences that the period of the maximum effectiveness of such a system has passed and that, with a few exceptions, there is little support for it among Asian nations today. The call for "an ever-deepening American involvement in Asia," presumably still referring to military involvement, seems to fly in the face of recent experience, and of the wishes of most of America's Asian allies—although it is clear, as the author states, that the leaders of some Asian states are more fearful of an American withdrawal than of increasing American involvement in Asian affairs.

A more balanced view was recently expressed by Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in commenting on the views expressed by witnesses during hearings on U. S. policy in Asia and the Pacific: "Witnesses . . . saw the future U. S. role in Asia and the Pacific as being somewhat less visible than today, but no less important. American power, wealth, and influence would be devoted with maximum flexibility to fostering Asian regionalism, promoting Asian economic progress and assisting Asians' ability to resist certain types of threats to their region's peace and stability. Among those threats would be attempts at nuclear blackmail by the Communist Chinese."

In spite of his desire for a tough line on China and for a neutralization of Chinese nuclear power, Professor Greene wants the United States to avoid "a frozen security posture" and to display "both firmness and a willingness to negotiate." In Vietnam he believes that "the iron test . . . is to demonstrate American determination to block Communist expansion—even in the face of a severe setback." He argues that "As a prerequisite for an Asian nation to decide not to produce nuclear weapons, the United States will have to extend broad, credible, and permanent security guarantees. . . . America's moral obligation in this regard will rise in proportion to its efforts to dissuade these states from producing their own weapons." Realizing that credible and effective American guarantees, especially in the Indian subcontinent, are probably out of the question, he considers other alternatives: "joint nuclear forces of some sort," a "collective-defense arrangement" between Japan and India, "some type of nuclear alliance" with the United States, a joint Soviet-American guarantee, separate but parallel U. S.-Soviet assurances, and a British guarantee, which, incredibly, he regards as "the most realistic and attractive of the 'outside guarantee' approaches."

Professor Greene touches upon a multitude of subjects. His coverage of the security picture in Asia, and of America's security interests, and commitments, is comprehensive, if rather confused, and his recommendations have the virtues of boldness, even though their impracticality is often demonstrated in the author's own words. His analysis, in short, is much sounder that his conclusions and recommendations.—NORMAN D. PALMER, *University of Pennsylvania.*

The Art of Diplomacy. BY THOMAS A. BAILEY. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968. Pp. 303. $2.50.)

The preface of this book portends a sense of humor. In it, Professor Bailey states: "I have set forth 267 basic guidelines or maxims" on the art of diplomacy. My first reaction was one of delight. An instructor would have no difficulty in making up exam questions for ten years without repeating himself.

Taken separately, these guidelines or maxims seem routine. The following is a fair sampling: "Study your opponent's strengths and weaknesses"; "tactfulness is the essence of diplomacy"; "flexibility facilitates policy"; "criticism at home weakens policy abroad"; "foreign friendship cannot be bought"; "miscalculation is often the mother of war"; and finally, "armament and disarmament both entail risks." Historical illustrations are provided for each. Taken as a whole they are like quick silver do's and don't's. Should one "keep the diplomatic initiative" always, sometimes, or never? Is it true that "unhappy allies are potential enemies"—and how can we make them happy or should we?

On behalf of Professor Bailey, it must be said that his book is kind of ingenious. It is not easy to ferret out 267 guidelines or maxims, and there may be some point to it. We are not ordinarily aware of all the things that diplomats and decision-makers could do or should think of, and after all 267 is more manageable than say 503.

Does all this mean that we should not be writing policy-oriented books, that *The Prince* should no longer be assigned reading, that Harold Nicolson's importance has diminished with the decline in boudoir diplomacy, that the *Foreign Affairs Quarterly* should turn itself into another *Journal of Conflict Resolution*? I think not. There is still opportunity to whisper in the King's ear, to persuade the powerful, and to bend theory into resipes for action that the harried decision-maker will listen to and use. But, the way to do it is through specific policy proposals about concrete situations.

The difficulty with what we might call Professor Bailey's preceptual approach is that there are contrary precepts for every occasion. Much of Mr. Bailey's advice can provoke the opposite kind of guidance, viz. whereas "the Secretary [of State] should rise above politics," there are times when he would be better advised to immerse himself in their cover. And, it should be added, that when precepts do not admit of their converse, they are simply amusing, viz., "send envoys who are persona grata."

Professor Bailey wants his book to be read by the President, "denizens of Foggy Bottom," and other relevants, and this is a legitimate and important goal for scholars. The goal can best be sought in two ways—by ideas and augmentation and by careful diplomatic history. Scholars have been in the forefront of these suggesting that the USG has not recognized the extent to which Western Europe is now stronger and more desirous of making its own decisions, that power relations in the current international context do not amount to very much, that there is such a thing as "overkill," that the conflict in South Vietnam would involve great cost without a clear or pleasing solution, that our policy priorities were not clear,—and the list is large and impressive. All of these ideas and arguments have found listeners in high places, have given greater depth, subtlety, and incisiveness to the internal governmental debates. The garbage and paper responsibilities of these in government is so great that perspective and freshness are bound to be somewhat lacking. Yet, there are always enough people who count who want ideas to make for an eager audience.

Careful diplomatic history is also relevant and helpful. Despite all the shibboleths about historical analogies, argument by such analogy is commonplace and irreplaceable in discussions of strategy and high policy. By so contrasting and comparing one gets a sense of where things are and what things mean. Of course, this can be a dangerous game, and that is why such histories must be careful to draw attention to their singularity. Moreover, when well done, these historical studies provide insight into ingeniousness and ingenuousness—the former always in need and the latter ever present. One of the big problems of policy-making is simply being able to think of all the alternatives that are both distinct and doable. The familiar policy triangle of one ridiculous extreme, the other ridiculous extreme, and the "middle way" is really not exhaustive, but who is ingenious enough to think of the other choices.

Stressing ideas and history means not trying to be too relevant to actual policy-making. The closer most scholars push toward a time, a place, an act of decision, the more off-base they are likely to be. Invariably, issues arise in the bureaucracy in a special, hard-to-divine way. An agency interest, an Assistant Secretary's disinterest, the absence or presence of felt political pressures give issues enough of a twist so that outside inputs do not quite fit.—LESLIE H. GELB, *Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense.*

Enemies in Politics. BY DAVID J. FINLAY, OLE R. HOLSTI, AND RICHARD R. FAGAN. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1967. Pp. 257. $7.50.)

The notion of focussing attention on the idea of the enemy in politics is intriguing. Here is a fundamental concept involved to a greater or lesser degree in the functioning of virtually every political system extant. Anyone who could make some novel and valid general statements about the relationship between different kinds of political systems and the conceptions of the enemy they employ would be making a very important contribution to the discipline of political science.

The authors of *Enemies in Politics*, to their credit, raise and begin to explore some of the questions which might lead to such general statements. But they do not take us far along the way to formulating and testing the sort of hypotheses we would be interested in.

The book consists mainly of three separate studies begun independently by each of the co-authors. Holsti offers a content analysis of John Foster Dulles' public pronouncements about Soviet Russia. He finds, not surprisingly, that Dulles viewed the Soviet-American conflict as one rooted in ideological and moral differences rather than merely in clashing national interests. Throughout his six years as Secretary of State, he described the Soviet Union and its leaders as materialistic, despotic, aggressive and atheistic, his emphasis on Communist moral shortcomings increasing toward the end of his term in office. He consistently referred to Soviet policy as hostile to the United States, and even when he perceived particular Soviet actions as less hostile, he attributed these not to any change in motives or in the nature of the Communist system, but to Communist weakness and the firmness of American policies. "The obvious conclusion," Holsti notes, "one with which Dulles fully agreed, is that increasing the pressure on one's opponents will make them even less aggressive. Quite apart from the actual issues involved in a conflict, to the extent that both parties adopt this theory of the other's behavior, there is little prospect for its peaceful resolution" (p. 69).

Finlay reviews the evolution of the idea of the enemy in pre- and post-independence Ghana. Under Kwame Nkrumah's direction, the threat posed by the forces of colonialism, and later neo-colonialism, served as an all purpose rallying point—not only against Westerners, but against a multitude of internal enemies as well. In the end, it was used to justify preventive detention, without trial, of suspected political opponents of Nkrumah, suspension of elections, and comprehensive party control of the schools and mass media. The rationale by which these developments were justified involved identifying internal enemies with their external counterparts. Since Nkrumah and his ruling Convention People's Party were Ghana's only effective leaders in the struggle against neo-colonialism, those who opposed them were clearly serving the neo-colonialist enemy.

A similar conceptual fusion of internal and external enemies, Fagan finds, has been a key element in the official ideology of Fidel Castro's "mobilization regime" in Cuba. A content analysis of editorials appearing in the daily newspaper *El Mundo* during 1961 and 1962 reveals that more than 60% dealt with national or international issues, or infused domestic issues with important international overtones. The most frequent themes of these editorials were criticism and defiance of the United States and its allies and praise for the Soviet Union and the Cuban revolution. By transmitting these themes energetically to the masses through the media, the armed forces, mass organizations, schools and the Cuban Communist Party, the new regime has helped to legitimize its programs, spur the masses to action, and provide new (Communist) models for the Cuban nation and people to emulate.

In a short concluding chapter attempting to summarize the significance of these three "case studies," the authors state the limitations of their own book very precisely:

> The cases, organized around a common theme but differing markedly in research style, system level and subject matter, do not provide the sort of data base from which one feels comfortable in launching inductive generalizations not already launched from other platforms. Even less do we feel moved to treat the studies as rigorous tests of the theoretical ideas set forth in Chapter I. There is much in the studies which supports and confirms the generalizations of the first chapter, but the former were not originally designed to test the latter, and they cannot honestly be made to do so *post facto* (p. 232).

Given these limitations, the authors content themselves with identifying some questions which warrant further investigation: to what extent is the choice of enemies determined by individual leaders as opposed to the historical and cultural milieu in which they operate? Under what conditions do national political elites come to organize political life around the fusion of internal and external enemies cited earlier? What kinds of conceptions of enemies are functional, and what kinds of dysfunctional, to various political systems?

These *are* fascinating and important political questions, and we can only join the authors of *Enemies in Politics* in hoping that their preliminary explorations will stimulate some more systematically designed investigation of the nature and functions of political enmity in the near future.—SHELDON APPLETON, *The Charter College of Oakland University.*

The Road to Jerusalem. BY WALTER LAQUEUR. (New York: Macmillan, 1968. Pp. 368. $6.95.)

Given the background of Arab-Israeli strife and the drama of the Six Day War, the 1967 crisis is a legitimate subject for instant history, but given the wealth of passions, it is also full of pitfalls. Two books to take seriously are Theodore Draper's *Israel and World Politics* and the volume here under review. The two bear much comparison, for they go over almost identical ground, share many conclusions, and hold a common pro-Israeli sympathy. Both have done plenty of homework. Laqueur, however, is the victim of his own polemical style. He is eminently readable; he is more clever, erudite, and entertaining than Draper; but his ironies and innuendoes becloud his analysis. His half-hearted acknowledgments of Arab views and interests, hastily rebutted in the same breath, are of little help; his Israelis are real men, his Arabs are newspaper stereotypes, and this gives his book a bit of the flavor of a "Jewish Western." Draper emerges as more lucid and instructive, and, at heart, more serious.

These overtones aside, Laqueur presents a detailed, well-documented account of the road to the 1967 war, plus some interesting interpretations of national policies, particularly those of the Soviet Union and of Israel. He supplies a motive for the Soviets to have deliberately misled the Syrians and Egyptians into believing that large Israeli forces were poised for an attack on Syria in mid-May: to wit, that the Syrian regime was in danger of collapse, that the Soviets were incapable of bolstering it on their own, and that therefore they created a war scare in order to draw Egypt in on Syria's side and bring Nasser's prestige, adroitness, and steadying influence to bear on the madmen in Damascus. The thesis is interesting, though not fully spelled out: why should the Soviets, as Laqueur suggests, have seen this game as free of risks, and why should Nasser have fallen into it so readily? On the other hand, Laqueur shows some ground for doubt that the alleged Israeli buildup was really what moved Nasser, in which case his initial motives, and those of the Soviets, are all the more mysterious. Did Nasser aim only at a limited diplomatic success—the removal of UNEF—and a boost to his sinking prestige, and only later decide to close the Straits of Tiran in a rash moment? Did he want war—"a return to 1948"—or only "a return to 1956"? No one, of course, can give us a definitive answer; perhaps, as Draper puts it, Nasser's problem was that he himself did not know. But Laqueur does not grasp this question clearly, for at some points he gives us one answer, and elsewhere the other. Furthermore, he passes over evidence (cited in detail by Draper) that the Soviets were alarmed to see Nasser close the Straits, and seems surprisingly ready to assume that their policy stemmed from confidence in Egypt's ablity to fight.

On the Israeli side, Laqueur goes into much absorbing detail about Cabinet deliberations, the insistence of the generals that Israel must attack with the least possible delay, and the effects of Abba Eban's efforts to enlist Western diplomatic support. The primary concern, he insists, became Egypt's military buildup in Sinai rather than the closing of the Straits; Israel's very existence was at stake. Meanwhile, Eban's lack of success reinforced the urge for unilateral action. It emerges clearly that the generals were determined on a pre-emptive attack, and the only question was how soon. Yet we also learn that the generals in Tel Aviv—like those in the Pentagon—were certain of an Israeli victory, that they they did not expect an Egyptian attack, and that many soldiers were granted leave as late as June 3. A more sustained analysis of this anomaly, in place of extended accounts of Jewish mothers sending fruitcakes to the front, etc., would be helpful.

The most glaring analytical gap concerns American policy, of which we get only a casual assertion that the Israelis appealed for help in Washington in vain, plus the implication that the June 5 attack had tacit advance approval—points that are clearly contradicted by Draper, who establishes that United States initiatives had by no means played themselves out.

Laqueur's narrative ends on June 5, followed only by a puzzlingly lengthy analysis of world public and official opinion on the crisis. It is curious that he chooses to call his book *The Road to Jerusalem,* for this title can only refer to Israel's subsequent conquest and annexation of the Arab city, an action that had nothing to do with the stated reasons why Israel went to war in the first place. It does, inadvertently, remind us that the significance of the 1967 war lies not only in the narrow-minded opportunism with which the Arabs arranged for their own defeat, but also that with which the Israelis celebrated their victory.—MALCOLM H. KERR, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

The Politics of the Common Market. BY W. HARTLEY CLARK. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. 180. $4.95.)

However muddy the waters of European integration may appear, the institutions of the European Communities have continued to develop, and the political patterns surrounding them have grown in complexity. A number of books and articles are available to provide a background for observing this shifting pattern. To take a few examples, Leon Lindberg's excellent study, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration,* published in 1963, is still highly relevant and has been made more valuable by Lindberg's more recent articles; and the articles in the April-July 1967 number of *Government and Opposition* highlight various aspects of politics and decision making in the Communities.

In addition to works such as these, books of a more basic nature have appeared. These are largely directed toward courses on international relations and European government and are designed to provide a brief descriptive introduction to the structure and politics of the Communities. Although varying greatly in quality, the books in this category face similar problems. Their brevity works against a nuanced and detailed exposition, and they run the risk that certain specific information will be rapidly outdated.

It is in this context that Professor Clark's book is to be considered. Writing before the Treaty fusing the executives of the three Communities was ratified, he attempts to introduce not only the formal structure of the European Economic Community, but the relationships between its component elements as they have developed. He presents a chapter on each of the components—the Council, the Commission, the Commission's growing administration, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. These are complemented by chapters on interest groups and public opinion in the Communities, on relationships between the E.E.C. and other states and on implications for world and European politics. Within the limitations which he has set for himself, Professor Clark has provided a useful introduction; many of the criticisms one could make would be directed more toward the limitations than what was done within them.

Yet there are criticisms to be made. Many statements in the book are too strong or potentially misleading, even when accompanied by qualifications. One is struck by such assertions as, "The Council has done more to unify Europe than any other institution in the history of the Continent." In other places Professor Clark presents good material in such manner as to lessen its effect. The discussion of public opinion provides one example: although it contains valuable information, it could easily confuse students. And in concluding that E.E.C. economic regulations may have broad effects on attitude, Professor Clark makes a meaningful point; but the conclusion is scarcely strengthened by the statement, "Women's fashions and the format of women's magazines is already 'unified' for instance, as is the European taste in toys." There are also statements of questionable relevance to the current situation. For example, in view of the fact that the Parliament has never exercised its power to remove the Commission, and is unlikely to do so in the near future, Professor Clark is not directing students toward central political problems when he says, "There is a crying need for at least some provision for the dissolution of Parliament by the Commission if the removal power is used too often."

More seriously, discussions of certain points are less complete than they need be, even in a brief book. Disproportionate attention is given relatively unimportant subjects to the detriment of more important matters. By drastically reducing such sections as the four page discussion of the location of a permanent European capital, the author could give more attention to other problems. The book would benefit from a clearer picture of the actual politics of the Communities. One possibility would be a more extensive discussion of the Commission's power base. In this the various references to the 1965-66 crisis could be drawn together to illustrate better the interactions between the Commission and the member states. (And with regard to the crisis one might question Professor Clark's tendency to minimize its effects.) One could make a similar request for more focus in discussions of all the Community components and better integration of the parts.

In conclusion, *The Politics of the Common Market* does not say anything particularly new about the European Communities and does not provide as much information as it could and should. However it is a useful introduction and is better than other attempts of its kind. It serves to illustrate the need for more and better classroom materials dealing with the substance of politics in the European Communities.—ROBERT L. PETERSON, *The University of Iowa.*

Economic Development and American Foreign Policy, 1943-62. BY DAVID A. BALDWIN. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. Pp. 291. $7.95.)

Atlantic Economic Co-operation. The Case of the O.E.C.D. BY HENRY G. AUBREY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. 214. $6.00.)

These two books in a very real sense complement each other. Professor Baldwin has examined from an historical and analytical framework the shift in American official attitudes about foreign aid, while Professor Aubrey has explored in depth the structure and function of the OECD. In the former, Baldwin reveals the extent of the confusion that exists in the discussions of development aid by pointing to the varied uses of the term "soft loan," which can cover financial transactions as varied as those permitting repayment over "a long period" of time but in dollars, to repayment in local currency, including the borrowing nation's, over a shorter period of time. To classify this type of transaction he notes that among business men such loans are generally thought of as "bad," a rather interesting commentary considering that many government officials who are instrumental in shaping and administering the programs involved hold a contrary view.

After this brief introductory chapter the author traces the elements of continuity and change in American aid policy. From the outset, and one might argue to this moment, the view has been widely held in the United States that there is a direct causal relationship between the existence of poverty and the appeal of communism, the existence of mass social and economic distress and danger to the peace. This assumption, plus the shift in Soviet policy from opposition to support of foreign aid, has made it possible for the nation to veer from its traditional view that the flow of trade and finance is almost exclusively a private sector matter to one in which the Government takes a much more active role. This is not to say that during the period under study, 1943-1962, the Government became the major agency for foreign development, for Baldwin reveals that although the amount of public funds varied, the guiding principles were—keep the amount small (relative to private expenditure abroad), maintain American controls over its use, and shape the aid policy in such a way as to minimize competition with private investors (p. 22).

Other shifts in policy also occurred. For example, despite the opposition to soft loans, Congress eventually adopted a soft loan scheme with enthusiasm, the reason being that by 1953 the storage of agricultural commodities under the subsidy program had reached excessively costly proportions. The scheme aided in the disposal of much of the wheat, and since it was sold for local currency it did not create a repayment problem. Eventually, under President Kennedy, the Government adopted a policy in support of long term low interest loans.

Despite these changes the author points out that U. S. economic development policy remained essentially conservative throughout, and this affected its role in the multilateral banking and trade agencies of which it became a member. Thus institutions like the IBRD are very much influenced by American economic philosophy, which is the result of the Bank's voting system and the predominant positions Americans hold in the upper echelons of these organizations. This at least partially explains the accusation that the World Bank and the IFC have, broadly speaking, a conservative social philosophy. Both take into consideration the political and social conditions in the country requesting a loan rather than decide solely on the basis of the merits of the project for which help is sought. Although this may appear to be a normal precaution for any banking institution (contrary to Baldwin's assertions), it would appear that the judgement rendered is strongly influenced by American values regarding these conditions. Furthermore, according to the author, several of those who received important appointments in the Bank had earlier opposed its creation and policies (p. 57).

Because he was interested primarily in revealing the political dimensions of U. S. involvement in multilateral aid programs, he did not provide any description of what these various development agencies are expected to accomplish nor how they function. Baldwin reveals the nature of U. S. influence, that Congress is even more conservative in its thinking than the Administration, and the general sympathy for this position by organizations such as the IBRD. But there is much repetition here arising from the way in which the book is structured. One wonders if a revision of the study to explore certain important questions might not have improved the work. For example, how does U. S. economic philosophy compare with that of other major capitalist states who hold positions of importance in these agencies. Difficult though it might be to get detailed information, it would be of great importance to know what projects have not been acceptable to the Bank, and what national development strategies have had to be employed to make proposals acceptable. Likewise it would be useful to know what differences, if any, are reflected in the views of the banking institutions and industrial firms in the U. S. regarding development policy. One might also ask whether clear-cut differences in party or sectional views exist re development strategy in the Congress. Any additional knowledge along these lines might have been of greater benefit to the reader than the many pages of disagreement with other authors who discussed foreign aid.

But for those interested in increasing their understanding of the many phases of foreign aid legislation and the assumptions which may underlie the positions taken, the Baldwin book will prove quite useful.

The Aubrey study is a more narrowly focused one concerned with the operations and structure of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the working philosophy behind it—in particular the American influence—and the author's views regarding changes which would help to make it more effective. For example, he points to the need to improve its performance by stressing specific kinds of linkages—supply and demand, production and trade, etc. (pp. 128-9), and the need to generate new ideas in the economic policy committee (pp. 149-50). But perhaps even more than urging reforms, the author seems to consider it his mission to explain and seek support for the Organization. That Professor Aubrey sees it as providing great benefit is quite clear. This does not, however, prevent him from recognizing some of its weaknesses and the validity of some of the criticism that has been levelled against it by the lesser developed countries. As a successor to the OEEC it has been concerned primarily with questions of increasing production, with financial stability, with freeing trade, and with other matters pertaining to manpower needs and production. Only after these problems were addressed were the OEEC and the OECD interested in aiding underdeveloped countries. Even the goal of liberalizing the terms of trade does not necessarily work to the advantage of the primary producing countries. As the author points out, there were even splits between the members of OECD, the "seven" wanting an inter-governmental approach to planning and trade, the "six" wanting a gradual movement toward supranationality, at least in economic affairs. The U. S., Aubrey finds, seemed to be in a contradictory position, approving both the views of the "six" and also supporting GATT which stood for ending discrimination in trade.

In this book, as in Baldwin's, evidence is cited of the conservative position the U. S. has taken, particularly in matters of trade liberalization and soft loans—i.e., of the long term, low interest type. The author defines U. S. policy as restrictive and cautious (p. 59), and its desire to establish a closer relationship between the NATO and the OECD has diminished its standing with the non-NATO members. He makes it quite obvious that in his opinion the U. S. sees trade in large measure as a political weapon. In that respect it is in the same camp as the Soviet Union.

Nor, for that matter, has the OECD done much to help the developing states in re their three major problems,—lagging demand for raw materials, instability of their prices in world markets, and inadequate access of their industrial products in the markets of the economically advanced countries. (Even the GATT has not been of major benefit to them because of its general trade objectives.)

There is little doubt that Aubrey sees the benefits of OECD in terms of its ability to educate governments and publics of the need for change in economic policies. In turn, "ability" is translated by the author as "objective." Because he finds that OECD was not established as a supra-national body, he does not urge efforts to re-direct its policy. This may be considered realism, but as so many have noted, in the area of civil liberties such a position tends to accept and extend the influence of the supporters of the status quo. Certainly it does little to build up strong pressure for the very changes which the author himself notes are necessary to face some of the major problems in international economic relations today.—MAURICE WATERS, *University of the West Indies.*

Australia Faces Southeast Asia: The Emergence of a Foreign Policy. BY AMRY AND MARY BELLE VANDENBOSCH. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967. Pp. 175. $5.75.)

Australia Faces Southeast Asia is the collaborative effort of a man and wife team, the senior author being a recognized authority on Southeast Asia. The book is designed as a general review of the postwar setting in which Australia has lived, made appraisals, and devised and conducted her external affairs. It is a book which illustrates the dilemmas faced by a Western "middle power" which has attempted to adapt to and coexist with its volatile Asian environment, while seeking adequate security arrangements. Consistent with Professor Vandenbosch's established interest in the area, considerable attention is devoted to illustrating the governing themes of the book by drawing on the Dutch New Guinea and Malaysian "confrontation" disputes.

The survey character and easy, uncluttered style of the book recommend it to the general reader. It is not, however, a book which says anything particularly new, or says it very differently, or with greater subtlety of argument, than do existing works. Furthermore, it contains a disappointing number of shortcomings which materially detract its scholarly appeal.

First, *Australia Faces Southeast Asia* has some exceptionally curious emphases. For instances, in discussing Labor's foreign policy in the 1940's, the authors expend considerable detail on the wartime ANZAC Pact with New Zealand and the Manus Island dispute with America. The criticism here is that such Labor foreign policy directions as the search for a regional security alliance, and accommodation to a non-European Commonwealth, are hardly mentioned at all—even though they are fundamental subjects and which carried far beyond Labor's removal from office in 1949.

Collaterally, a number of themes which are discussed at length have some of their obvious dimensions omitted. Menzies' Malayan troop commitment announcement in 1955, although characterized as "a very important document of Australian foreign and defense policy," is not connected to America's reluctance to countenance a standing force for the recently evolved SEATO. Commitments under ANZUS are broached, but the construction of the United States naval signal station in Western Australia is in no way related to the Austral-American alliance, toward which it was decidedly designed to contribute.

The book also contains some unfortunate oversimplifications or misconstructions. The authors argue that the Government's near-defeat in the 1961 elections reflected strong public antagonism toward Indonesia's apparent ability to get away with provocative behavior over Dutch New Guinea. In fact, while the public was hostile to Indonesia's behavior, the 1961 election was decided almost entirely on economic and other domestic issues. Foreign policy, as survey research data demonstrate, played almost no part in determining electoral behavior. The authors allude to the size of Australia's "overseas" civil aid contributions. In fact, the scope of such contributions becomes much less impressive when qualified to mean that "overseas" includes aid to Australian Papua and New Guinea. The authors cite a quantum jump in Australian defense spending from $282 million to $1.1 billion. In fact, they confuse dollars and pounds and fail to identify the increase as being spread over a period of years.

The Vandenbosches also have some difficulties with basic facts. They identify Evatt and Calwell as Labor Leader and Deputy Leader, respectively, in a debate staged early in 1950—although these titles were not achieved until more than a year later. They say that an embassy was installed in Taipei in 1956—although the decision to do so was not taken until 1966, after a change of leadership from Menzies to Holt. They cite Churchill's remark that, under Labor in World War Two, "conscription even for home defence was banned," with the clear implication that this was the position throughout the duration of the war. In truth, Labor inherited conscription for domestic service from the preceding Government, and proceeded to legislate conscription for limited overseas duty.

Other, miscellaneous caveats could also be entered. For instance, some introductory comments on domestic politics and foreign policy are not pursued throughout the balance of the book. Remarks by individual Opposition members are often made to appear as if they represented Labor Party policy, which was not necessarily so. Newspaper editorial opinions are often made to appear as if they represented public opinion, which again was not necessarily so.

In the large, then, while *Australia Faces Southeast Asia* has its value, its drawbacks at least outweigh its merits. Perhaps a more sensitive research effort would have helped. A number of important sources, including nearly all Australian periodical literature and survey data, are neglected. When sources are cited, they are not always the most representative. Much of the discussion of Labor's wartime policy, for instance, draws upon Churchill's history of the Second World War. Churchill was not the most reliable observer of Australian conditions, and it is a pity that pertinent Australian sources are here, as elsewhere, mysteriously absent.—HENRY S. ALBINSKI, *The Pennsylvania State University.*

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The sixty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 2–6, 1969, at the Commodore Hotel, New York City.

The Executive Committee of the American Political Science Association has decided that, beginning with the 1968 meetings, the minutes of meetings of the Council and of the annual and special meetings of the Association's membership will be reported in P.S. rather than, as heretofore, in the Review.

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION*

March, 1969

Joel D. Aberbach, University of Michigan, "Alienation and Political Behavior"

David W. Adamany, Wesleyan University, "The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study"

Stephen J. Cimbala, University of Wisconsin, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area: An Exploratory Analysis"

Thomas R. Dye, Florida State University, "Income Inequality and American State Politics"

Arthur S. Goldberg, University of Rochester, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification"

Dean Jaros and Gene L. Mason, University of Kentucky, "Party Choice and Support for Demagogues"

Arthur L. Kalleberg, University of Minnesota, "Concept Formation in Normative and Empirical Studies"

Lawrence B. Mohr, University of Michigan, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations"

Douglas W. Rae, Yale University, "Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Collective Choice"

R. J. Rummel, University of Hawaii, "Indicators of Cross-National and International Patterns"

Peter G. Snow, University of Iowa, "The Class Basis of Argentine Political Parties"

Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University, and Fred I. Greenstein, Wesleyan University, "Comparing Political Regions: The Case of California"

June, 1969

F. M. Barnard, University of Saskatchewan, "Culture and Political Development: Herder's Insights"

Richard W. Boyd, Indiana University, "Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting Defection"

John F. Manley, University of Wisconsin, "Wilbur D. Mills: A Study in Congressional Influence"

Norman H. Nie, University of Chicago, Bingham G. Powell, University of California, Berkeley, and C. Kenneth Prewitt, University of Chicago, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, I"

Richard G. Niemi, University of Rochester, "Majority Decision-making with Imperfect Agreement on Norms"

James H. Oliver, University of Maryland, "Citizen Demands and the Soviet Political System"

Kenneth Prewitt, University of Chicago, and Heinz Eulau, Stanford University, "Political Matrix and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure from an Old Problem"

Howard Rosenthal, Carnegie-Mellon University, "The Electoral Politics of Gaullists in the Fourth Republic: Ideology or Constituency Interest?"

Bruce M. Russett, Yale University, "Who Pays for Defense?"

Giovanni Sartori, University of Florence, "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems"

Robert A. Schoenberger, University of Michigan, "Campaign Strategy and Party Loyalty: The Electoral Relevance of Candidate Decision-making in the 1964 Congressional Elections"

Henri Theil, University of Chicago, "The Desired Political Entropy"

September, 1969

Graham T. Allison, Harvard University, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis"

Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, University of Wisconsin, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States"

Richard M. Merelman, University of California, Los Angeles, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization"

Ira Sharkansky, University of Wisconsin, and Richard I. Hofferbert, Cornell University, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy"

---

* Production exigencies may occasionally necessitate publication of articles in issues other than those given in this listing.

INDEX TO VOLUME LXII

1878: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The Passing of the Second Reform Bill. Maurice Cowling. Noted by James B. Christoph.......... 1378

Abel-Smith, Brian and Robert Stevens. *Lawyers and the Courts: A Sociological Study of the English Legal System, 1750–1965.* Noted by Theodore L. Becker.... 297

Abernethy, David B. Note on Okei Arikpo, *The Development of Modern Nigeria*..... 998

A Body-Incorporate: City-County Separation in Virginia. Chester W. Bain. Noted by Wendell Bedichek.......... 640

Abrams, Philip, ed. *Two Tracts on Government.* John Locke. Noted by Fred H. Willhoite.......... 614

Abshire, David M. Note on Joseph L. Morrison, *W. J. Cash: Southern Prophet: A Biography and Reader*.......... 991

Abuse of Power. Theodore Draper. Noted by Gilbert R. Winham.......... 686

Adler, Jacob. *Claus Spreckles: The Sugar King of Hawaii.* Noted by Robert Horwitz.......... 1346

The Administration of the White Australia Policy. A. C. Palfreeman. Noted by D. W. Rawson.......... 1389

The Admirals' Hobby. Vincent Davis. Noted by J. C. Ries.......... 1344

Adrian, Charles R. and Charles Press. *Decision Costs in Coalition Formation*... 556

Africa: The Politics of Unity. Immanuel Wallerstein. Noted by Victor T. Le Vine 1354

Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures. Ira Sharkansky.......... 1220

Aims and Methods of Soviet Planning. Mikhail Bor. Noted by George R. Feiwel 1010

Ake, Claude. *A Theory of Political Integration.* Noted by Henry Teune.......... 978

Alba, Victor. *Nationalists Without Nations: The Oligarchy Versus the People in Latin America.* Noted by Peter Ranis.......... 1383

Alberoni, Francesco, Vittorio Capecchi, Agopik Manoukian, Franca Olivetti and Antonio Tosi. *L'Attivista di Partito.* Noted by Robert D. Putnam.......... 1352

Albert Ballin: Business and Politics in Imperial Germany, 1888–1918. Lamar Cecil. Noted by Edward L. Pinney..... 270

Albinski, Henry S. Note on Amry and Mary Belle Vandenbosch, *Australia Faces Southeast Asia; The Emergence of a Foreign Policy*.......... 1407

Alexander, Robert J. Note on Romulo, Betancourt. *Hacia America Latina Democratica e Integrada*.......... 685

Alexander, Thomas B. *Sectional Stress and Party Strength: A Study of Roll-Call Voting Patterns in the U. S. House of Representatives, 1836–1860.* Noted by James J. Best.......... 633

Alfange, Dean Jr. Note on Leonard W. Levy, *Origins of the Fifth Amendment*... 1334

Alford, Robert R. and Eugene C. Lee. *Voting Turnout in American Cities*...... 796

Alford, Robert R. and Harry M. Scoble. *Sources of Local Political Involvement*.... 1192

Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad. *The Emergence of Pakistan.* Noted by Ralph Braibanti. 649

Alisky, Marvin. Note on Paul L. Doughty, *Huaylas: An Andean District in Search of Progress*.......... 1379

Allen, William Sheridan. *The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town, 1930–1935.* Noted by G. Bingham Powell, Jr.......... 272

The American Chief Executive: The Presidency and the Governorship. Joseph E. Kallenbach. Noted by Leslie Lipson.... 626

The American Far Right: A Case Study of Billy James Hargis and Christian Crusade. John H. Redekop. Noted by Robert A. Schoenberger.......... 982

American Federalism in Perspective. Aaron Wildavsky, ed. Noted by Roscoe C. Martin.......... 624

American Foreign Policy Beyond Utopianism and Realism. Donald Brandon. Noted by John T. Holden.......... 683

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: COMMUNITY POLITICS

On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power. Richard M. Merelman.......... 451

Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis. Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone...... 124

Sources of Local Political Involvement. Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble 1192

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: CONGRESS

The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll-Call Voting. Michael J. Shapiro.......... 494

The Institutionalization of the U. S. House of Representatives. Nelson W. Polsby.... 144

A Measure of the Population Quality of Legislative Apportionment. Henry F. Kaiser.......... 208

The Minority Party and Policy-Making in the House of Representatives. Charles O. Jones.......... 481

Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics of Congress. Lewis A. Froman, Jr. 518

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: ELECTIONS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting. Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein 753

Voting Turnout in American Cities. Robert R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee 796

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH

A Functional Analysis of Defense Department Decision-Making in the McNamara Administration. Paul Y. Hammond 57

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR

A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior: The Reapportionment Cases. Edward N. Beiser 788

On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice. J. Woodford Howard, Jr. 43

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: POLITICAL PARTIES

Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political Party Organization. M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert 1159

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Image of a President: Some Insights into the Political Views of School Children. Roberta S. Sigel 216

The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture. Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. 564

Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States. Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings 852

The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child. M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi 169

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STATE POLITICS

Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures. Ira Sharkansky 1220

Malapportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures. Allan G. Pulsipher and James L. Weatherby, Jr. 1207

American Legal Realism: Skepticism, Reform, and the Judicial Process. Wilfred E. Rumble, Jr. Noted by Michael A. Weinstein 1336

The American Party Systems. William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, eds. Reviewed by A. E. Kier Nash 1275

Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917–1933: American Attitudes Toward Russia from the February Revolution Until Diplomatic Recognition. Peter G. Filene. Noted by William B. Ballis 301

The American Occupational Structure. Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan. Reviewed by M. Kent Jennings 596

America's Political Dilemma: From Limited to Unlimited Democracy. Gottfried Dietze. Noted by Peter Bachrach 1310

Anderson, Eugene N. and Pauline R. Anderson. *Political Institutions and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century.* Noted by Charles Lewis Taylor 1360

Anderson, Pauline R. and Eugene N. Anderson. *Political Institutions and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century.* Noted by Charles Lewis Taylor 1360

Anti-Politics in America: Reflections on the Anti-Political Temper and its Distortions of the Democratic Process. John H. Bunzel. Noted by Kenneth S. Sherrill 1342

Appleton, Sheldon. Note on David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagan. *Enemies in Politics* 1402

Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions. Karl W. Deutsch. Noted by Steven J. Brams 1391

Aron, Raymond. *The Industrial Society: Three Essays on Ideology and Development.* Noted by Irving Louis Horowitz 1321

The Art of Conjecture. Bertrand de Jouvenal. Reviewed by James A. Robinson 236

The Art of Diplomacy. Thomas A. Bailey. Noted by Leslie H. Gelb 1401

Anatomy of the State Department. Smith Simpson. Noted by L. L. Wade 267

And Promises to Keep: The Southern Conference for Human Welfare, 1938–1948. Thomas A. Krueger. Noted by Emory F. Via 269

Anderson, Charles W., Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, eds. *Issues of Political Development.* Reviewed by Arpad von Lazar 243

Anderson, Olive. *A Liberal State At War: English Politics and Economics During the Crimean War.* Noted by Charles Mark 668

Anderson, Thornton. *Russian Political Thought: An Introduction.* Noted by R. V. Daniels 612

Andrain, Charles F. Note on Herbert J. Spiro, ed., *Patterns of African Development* 284

Andrews, William G. Note on Alfred Grosser, *French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle* 1018

Annuaire Suisse de Science Politique—Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Politische Wissenschaft. Noted by William R. Keech 666
Anton, Thomas J. *Communication* on criticisms of his review of Bernard J. Frieden, "Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism." 1272
Anton, Thomas J. Note on Bernard J. Frieden, *Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism* 623
Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism. John M. Cammett. Noted by Sidney G. Tarrow 253
Arikpo, Okei. *The Development of Modern Nigeria.* Noted by David B. Abernethy 998
Arms Control Arrangements for the Far East. Noted by Dale Pontius 687
Arms Control for the Late Sixties. James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, Jr., eds. Noted by William P. Gerberding 678
Asamoah, Obed Y. *The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations.* Noted by A. R. Headley 693
Ashcraft, Richard. *Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?* 898
Ashford, Douglas E. *Morocco-Tunisia: Politics and Planning.* Reviewed by George Lenczowski 587
Ashford, Douglas E. *National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia and Pakistan.* Reviewed by George Lenczowski 587
Ashford, Douglas E. *Perspectives of a Moroccan Nationalist.* Reviewed by George Lenczowski 587
Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. Gunnar Myrdal. Reviewed by Jean Grossholtz 1278
Aspaturian, Vernon V. *The Soviet Union in the World Communist System.* Noted by Nish Jamgotch, Jr. 690
Atlantic Economic Co-operation. The Case of the O.E.C.D. Henry C. Aubrey. Noted by Maurice Waters 1405
The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals. Harold Van B. Cleveland. Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold 1296
Aubrey, Henry C. *Atlantic Economic Cooperation. The Case of the O.E.C.D.* Noted by Maurice Waters 1405
Auerbach, Jerold S. *Labor and Liberty: The LaFollette Committee and the New Deal.* Noted by Douglas Camp Chaffey 989
Aus Nächster Nähe: Lebenserinnerugen. Vol. I. 1884–1927. Mit der Kraft des Geistes. Vol. II. 1927–1967. Arnold Brecht. Noted by Gordon A. Craig 1304
Australia Faces Southeast Asia: The Emergence of a Foreign Policy. Amry and Mary Belle Vandenbosch. Noted by Henry S. Albinski 1407
Avineri, Shlomo. *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx.* Noted by David M. Ricci 1309

Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz. *Communication* on Richard M. Merelman's "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power." 1268
Bachrach, Peter. Note on Gottfried Dietze, *America's Political Dilemma: From Limited to Unlimited Democracy* 1310
Bachrach, Peter. Note on William E. Connolly, *Political Science and Ideology* 599
Back to Back: The Duel between FDR and the Supreme Court. Leonard Baker, Noted by C. Herman Pritchett 631
Bailey, Thomas A. *The Art of Diplomacy.* Noted by Leslie H. Gelb 1401
Bain, Chester W. *A Body Incorporate: City-County Separation in Virginia.* Noted by Wendell Bedichek 640
Bain, Joe S., Richard E. Caves and Julius Margolis. *Northern California's Water Industry.* Noted by Ashley L. Schiff 634
Baker, Leonard. *Back to Back: The Duel between FDR and the Supreme Court.* Noted by C. Herman Pritchett 631
Balassa, Bela. *Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries: Objectives and Alternatives.* Noted by David S. Ball 692
Baldwin, David A. *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy 1943–1962.* Noted by Maurice Waters 1405
Baldwin, George B. *Planning and Development in Iran.* Noted by Marvin Zonis 645
Balinsky, Alexander, Abram Bergson, John N. Hazard and Peter Wiles. *Planning and the Market in the U.S.S.R.: the 1960's.* Noted by Arthur W. Wright 655
Ball, David S. Note on Bela Balassa, *Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries: Objectives and Alternatives* 692
Ballis, William B. Note on Peter G. Filene. *Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917–1933: American Attitudes Toward Russia From the February Revolution Until Diplomatic Recognition* 301
Bankwitz, Philip C. F. *Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France.* Noted by John N. Colas 1004
Baratz, Morton S. and Peter Bachrach. *Communication* on Richard M. Merelman's "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power." 1268
Barber, Benjamin R., Note on George A.

Codding, Jr., *Governing the Commune of Veyrier: Politics in Swiss Local Government* 1374
Barber, Bernard. Note on Sanford A. Lakoff, ed., *Knowledge and Power: Essays on Science and Government* 985
Barghoorn, Frederick C. Review of Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire 1801–1917* 1276
Barnes, Samuel H. Note on Umberto Melotti, *Cultura e partecipazione sociale nella citta in transformazione* 273
Barnes, Samuel H. *Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation*. Noted by Timothy M. Hennessey 1351
Barnett, A. Doak. *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China*. Reviewed by Bruce D. Larkin 963
Barnett, A. Doak. *China After Mao*. Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin 588
Barry, Donald D. Note on Isaac Deutscher, *The Unfinished Revolution: Russia 1917–1966* 662
Barton, Weldon V. *Interstate Compacts in the Political Process*. Noted by Thad L. Beyle 269
Bauroth, George G. Note on Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi* 686
Bauroth, George G. Note on Edwin O. Reischauer, *Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia* 685
Bay, Christian. Review of Pertti Pesonen, ed., *Scandinavian Political Studies* 237
Baylis, Thomas A. Note on Lewis J. Edinger, ed., *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis* 644
Beals, Alan R. and Bernard J. Siegel. *Divisiveness and Social Conflict*. Noted by Roger D. Masters 618
Beaney, William M., Eugene V. Rostow and Max Freedman. *Perspectives on the Court*. Noted by Bradley C. Canon 265
Beaney, William M. Note on Paul A. Freund. *On Law and Justice* 1335
Beaufre, André. *NATO and Europe*. Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold 1296
Beck, Carl. Note on Kurt London, ed., *Eastern Europe in Transition* 289
Beck, Carl. Note on Vaclav Benes, Andrew Gyorgy and George Stambuk, *Eastern European Government and Politics* 289
Becker, Theodore L. Note on Brian Abel-Smith and Robert Stevens, *Lawyers and the Courts: A Sociological Study of the English Legal System, 1750–1965* 297
Bedichek, Wendell. Note on Chester W. Bain, *A Body Incorporate: City-County Separation in Virginia* 640
Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society. Arthur Niederhoffer. Noted by Neal Milner 625
Beiser, Edward N. *A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior: The Reapportionment Cases* 788
Bell, Wendell, ed. *The Democratic Revolution in West Indies*. Noted by Morton Kroll 1368
Benes, Vaclav, Andrew Gyorgy and George Stambuk. *Eastern European Government and Politics*. Noted by Carl Beck 289
Benes, Vaclav L. Note on Joseph Rothschild, *Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat* 1370
Benjamin, Roger W. and John H. Kautsky. *Communism and Economic Development* 110
Benjamin, Roger W. Review of A. Doak Barnett, *China After Mao* 588
Benjamin, Roger W. Review of Francois Geoffrey-Dechaume, *China Looks at the World* 588
Benjamin, Roger W. Review of Hans Granqvist, *The Red Guard* 588
Benjamin, Roger W. Review of Merle Goldman, *Literary Dissent in Communist China* 588
Bennett, Jeremy. *British Broadcasting and the Danish Resistance Movement, 1940–1945: A Study of the Wartime Broadcasts of the BBC Danish Service*. Noted by Harold Graves 298
Bennigsen, Alexandre and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay. *Islam in the Soviet Union*. Noted by Robert A. Rupen 1002
Bergson, Abram, John N. Hazard, Peter Wiles and Alexander Balinsky. *Planning and the Market in the U.S.S.R.: the 1960's*. Noted by Arthur W. Wright 655
Berlin: The Wall is Not Forever. Eleanor Lansing Dulles. Noted by William E. Wright 295
Bernd, Joseph L., ed. *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, II*. Noted by Alden E. Lind 615
Bernd, Joseph L., ed. *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, III*. Reviewed by Herbert F. Weisberg 1294
Berzins, Alfred. *The Two Faces of Co-Existence*. Noted by W. W. Kulski 312
Best, James J. Note on Thomas B. Alexander. *Sectional Stress and Party Strength: A Study of Roll-Call Voting Patterns in the U. S. House of Representatives, 1836–1860* 633
Betancourt, Romulo. *Hacia America Latina Democratica e Integrada*. Noted by Robert J. Alexander 685
Between Two Worlds. John Hohenberg.

Noted by Marian D. Irish 684
Beyle, Thad L. Note on Weldon V. Barton, *Interstate Compacts in the Political Process* 269
Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political Theory. Dante Germino. Reviewed by Harry Girvetz 958
Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia. Edwin O. Reischauer. Noted by George G. Bauroth 685
Bidault, Georges. *Resistance: The Political Autobiography of Georges Bidault.* Noted by Michael R. Gordon 1003
Bienen, Henry. *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development.* Noted by Paul Saenz 653
Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. Vol. I. Howard L. Boorman, ed. Book note 298
Blake, Robert. *Disraeli.* Noted by Lewis J. Edinger 1380
Blau, Peter and Otis Dudley Duncan. *The American Occupational Structure.* Reviewed by M. Kent Jennings 596
Bliss, Howard. Note on Robert Lemaignen, *L'Europe au berceau: souvenirs d'un technocrate* 304
Bloomfield, Lincoln P. Review of Alf Ross, *The United Nations: Peace and Progress* 586
Bloomfield, Lincoln P. Review of David W. Wainhouse and Associates. *International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast* 586
Blue, Richard N. Note on Edgar A. and Kathryn R. Schuler, *Public Opinion and Constitution Making in Pakistan* 647
Bolingbroke and His Circle: the Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole. Isaac Kramnick. Noted by James V. Elliott 1312
Bombwall, K. R. *The Foundations of Indian Federalism.* Noted by Baljit Singh 1008
Boorman, Howard L., ed. *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China,* Vol. I. Book note 298
Bor, Mikhail. *Aims and Methods of Soviet Planning.* Noted by George R. Feiwel 1010
Boston University Papers on Africa, Transition in African Politics. Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno, eds. Noted by Fred G. Burke and John R. Nellis 283
Bowman, Lewis. Note on Andrew Buni, *The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1902–1965* 638
Bowman, Lewis. Note on Jack D. Fleer, *North Carolina Politics: An Introduction* 1347
Boynton, George R. Note on William C. Mitchell, *Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons* 250
Braibanti, Ralph. Note on Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* 649
Braithwaite, Karl. Note on A. F. Davies, *Private Politics: A Study of Five Political Outlooks* 980
Brakeman, Louis F. Note on Stephen D. Kertesz, *The Quest for Peace Through Diplomacy* 679
Brams, Steven J. *Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems* 461
Brams, Steven J. Note on Karl W. Deutsch, *Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions* 1391
Brandon, Donald. *American Foreign Policy Beyond Utopianism and Realism.* Noted by John T. Holden 683
Brass, Paul R. *Coalition Politics in North India* 1174
Brass, Paul R. Note on Michael Brecher, *Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India* 293
Braunthal, Gerard. Note on Goetz Briefs, ed., *Laissez-faire-Pluralismus: Demokratie und Wirtschaft des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters* 1009
Braunthal, Gerard. *The Federation of German Industry in Politics.* Noted by George K. Romoser 664
Brayman, Harold. *Corporate Management in a World of Politics: The Public, and Governmental Problems of Business.* Noted by Oliver Garceau 625
Brazilian Planning: Development Politics and Administration. Robert T. Daland. Reviewed by John T. Dorsey, Jr. 245
The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the Aftermath. Jordan M. Young. Noted by Robert T. Daland 282
Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939–1946. Ba Maw. Noted by Fred R. von der Mehden 1363
Brecher, Michael. *Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India.* Noted by Paul R. Brass 293
Brecht, Arnold. *Aus Nächster Nähe: Lebenserinnerugen. Vol. I. 1884–1927. Mit der Kraft des Geistes. Vol. II. 1927–1969.* Noted by Gordon A. Craig 1304
Briefs, Goetz, ed. *Laissez-faire-Pluralismus: Demokratie und Wirtschaft des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters.* Noted by Gerard Braunthal 1009
British Broadcasting and the Danish Resistance Movement, 1940–1945: A Study of the Wartime Broadcasts of the BBC Danish Service. Jeremy Bennett. Noted by Harold Graves 298
The British General Election of 1966. D. E. Butler and Anthony King. Noted by

Bernard Hennessy.................... 296
Brodie, Bernard. Note on L. W. Martin, *The Sea in Modern Strategy*............ 1019
Bromall, Irvin H. Note on Kenneth M. Dolbeare, *Trial Courts in Urban Politics: State Court Policy Impact and Functions in a Local Political System*............. 983
Bromke, Adam and Philip E. Uren, eds. *The Communist States and the West.* Noted by Jonathan Harris............. 311
Brown, Bernard E. Note on James M. Clark. *Teachers and Politics in France: A Pressure Group Study of the Federation de l'Education Nationale*.............. 275
Brown, D. MacKenzie. Note on Bimanbehari Majumdar, *History of Indian Social and Political Ideas—From Rammohun to Dayananda*................. 611
Budd, Richard W., Robert K. Thorp and Lewis Donohew. *Content Analysis of Communications.* Noted by Ellen B. Pirro............................ 607
Buni, Andrew. *The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1902–1965.* Noted by Lewis Bowman........................... 638
Bunzel, John H. *Anti-Politics in America: Reflections on the Anti-Political Temper and its Distortions of the Democratic Process.* Noted by Kenneth S. Sherrill.. 1342
Burgess, Philip M. *Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway.* Noted by Ole R. Holsti............... 1398
Burke, Fred G. and John R. Nellis. Note on Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno, eds., *Boston University Papers on Africa, Transition in African Politics*.......... 283
Burks, Ardath W. Note on Allan B. Cole, George O. Totten, and Cecil H. Uyehara, *Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan*...... 277
Burks, Ardath W. Note on George Oakley Totten, III, *The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan*................. 277
Burma from Kingdom to Republic: A Historical and Political Analysis. Frank N. Trager. Noted by Fred R. vonder Mehden............................ 1363
Burma through Alien Eyes. Helen G. Trager. Noted by Fred R. von der Mehden..... 1363
Burner, David. *The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 1918–1932.* Noted by Jay S. Goodman.. 987
Burnham, Walter Dean and William Nisbet Chambers, eds. *The American Party Systems.* Reviewed by A. E. Keir Nash 1275
Burns, E. Bradford, ed. *Perspectives of Brazilian History.* Noted by Jordan M. Young............................. 281
Butler, D. E. and Anthony King. *The British General Election of 1966.* Noted by Bernard Hennessy................. 296
Butler, Jeffrey and A. A. Castagno, eds. *Boston University Papers on Africa, Transition in African Politics.* Noted by Fred G. Burke and John R. Nellis..... 283
Butterfield, Herbert and Wight, Martin, eds. *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics.* Noted by Don C. Piper............... 679
Butwell, Richard and Amry Vandenbosch. *The Changing Face of Southeast Asia.* Noted by Frank C. Darling............ 313

Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China. A. Doak Barnett. Reviewed by Bruce D. Larkin......... 963
Caiden, Gerald E. *The Commonwealth Bureaucracy.* Noted by Henry J. Steck.. 1000
Cammett, John M. *Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism.* Noted by Sidney G. Tarrow................. 253
Campbell, Alan K. and Seymour Sacks. *Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems.* Noted by Robert L. Lineberry................. 621
Campbell, Robert. Note on Eugene Zaleski, *Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union, 1962–1966*......................... 656
Canada and "Imperial Defense" I. A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organization, 1867–1919. Richard A. Preston. Noted by Hiram M. Stout............................. 306
The Canadian Economy and Disarmament. Gideon Rosenbluth. Reviewed by Gilbert R. Winham......................... 965
Canadian Labor in Politics. Gad Horowitz. Noted by Peter Regenstreif............ 1369
Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957–1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance. Jon B. McLin. Reviewed by Gilbert R. Winham.................. 965
Canadian Legislative Behavior: A Study of the 25th Parliament. Allan Kornberg. Noted by Dean L. Yarwood........... 997
Canon, Bradley C. Note on Max Freedman, William M. Beaney and Eugene Rostow, *Perspectives on the Court*............... 265
Cantril, Hadley and Lloyd A. Free. *The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion.* Noted by Aage Clausen 1345
Capecchi, Vittorio, Francesco Alberoni, Agopik Manoukian, Franca Olivetti, and Antonio Tosi. *L'Attivista di Partito.* Noted by Robert D. Putnam.......... 1352
Carey, George W. and Willmoore Kendall. *The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic Theory*............................ 5
Carey, George W. Note on Neal Riemer,

The Democratic Experiment: American Political Theory 1316

Carey, George W. Note on Neal Riemer, *The Revival of Democratic Theory* 1316

Carmen, Ira H. *Movies, Censorship and the Law.* Noted by Robert S. Gerstein 266

Caroe, Olaf. *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism.* Noted by Richard F. Rosser 661

The Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre. Noted by Stephen F. Cohen 659

The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre. Noted by Stephen F. Cohen 659

Casstevens, Thomas W. *A Theorem about Voting* 205

Castagno, A. A. and Jeffrey Butler, eds. *Boston University Papers on Africa, Transition in African Politics.* Noted by Fred G. Burke and John R. Nellis 283

Catholic Action in Italy: The Sociology of a Sponsored Organization. Gianfranco Poggi. Noted by Joseph Lopreato 255

A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices. Ted Gurr 1104

Caves, Richard E., Joe S. Bain and Julius Margolis. *Northern California's Water Industry.* Noted by Ashley L. Schiff 634

Cecil, Lamar. *Albert Ballin: Business and Politics in Imperial Germany, 1888–1918.* Noted by Edward L. Pinney 270

Censorship of the Movies: The Social and Political Control of a Mass Medium. Richard S. Randall. Noted by Robert J. Steamer 1332

Chaffey, Douglas Camp. Note on Jerold S. Auerbach, *Labor and Liberty: The LaFollette Committee and the New Deal* 989

Chambers, William Nisbet and Walter Dean Burnham, eds. *The American Party Systems.* Reviewed by A. E. Keir Nash 1275

Chambers, William Nisbet. Note on Richard P. McCormick, *The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era* 1330

Chang, Yi-chun. Note on Chun-hsi Wu. *Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China* 1371

The Changing Face of Southeast Asia. Amry Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell. Noted by Frank C. Darling 313

Chapman, John W. and J. Roland Pennock. *Nomos X: Representation.* Reviewed by James A. Steintrager 1289

Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party. Joseph Nyomarkay. Reviewed by H. P. Secher 590

Charles Evans Hughes: Politics and Reform in New York, 1905–1910. Robert F. Wesser. Noted by Frederick H. Schapsmeier 630

Charlot, Jean. *L'Union pour la Nouvelle République: Etude du pouvoir au sein d'un parti politique.* Noted by John E. Schwarz 294

Chapsal, Jacques. *La Vie Politique en France Depuis 1940.* Noted by James M. Clark 294

Cheever, Daniel S. and Milton J. Esman. *The Common Aid Effort.* Noted by William B. Kintner 1393

Chen, Lung-Chu and Harold Lasswell. *Formosa, China, and the United Nations —Formosa in the World Community.* Noted by Douglas Mendel, Jr. 673

China After Mao. A. Doak Barnett. Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin 588

China Looks at the World. François Geoffrey-Dechaume. Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin 588

Christoph, James B. Note on F. B. Smith, *The Making of the Second Reform Bill* 1378

Christoph, James B. Note on Maurice Cowling, *1878: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The Passing of the Second Reform Bill* 1378

Cities in a Race With Time: Progress and Poverty in America's Renewing Cities. Jeanne R. Lowe. Noted by Vincent L. Marando 619

Clark, James M. Note on Jacques Chapsal, *La Vie Politique en France Depuis 1940* 294

Clark, James M. *Teachers and Politics in France: A Pressure Group Study of the Fédération de l'Education Nationale.* Noted by Bernard E. Brown 275

Clark, W. Hartley. *The Politics of the Common Market.* Noted by Robert L. Peterson 677

Claude, Richard. Note on Samuel Krislov, *The Negro in Federal Employment* 637

Claus Spreckles: The Sugar King of Hawaii. Jacob Adler. Noted by Robert Norwitz 1346

Clausen, Aage. Note on Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, *The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion* 1345

Clem, Alan L. *Prairie State Politics: Popular Democracy in South Dakota.* Noted by John H. Fenton 1333

Cleveland, Harold Van B. *The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals.* Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold 1296

Cnudde, Charles F. and Donald J. McCrone. *Communication* on Forbes and Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling" 1269

Cnudde, Charles F. Note on Richard Rose,

Influencing Voters: A Study of Campaign Rationality 1365
Coalition Politics in North India. Paul R. Brass 1174
Codding, George A., Jr. *Governing the Commune of Veyrier: Politics in Swiss Local Government.* Noted by Benjamin R. Barber 1374
Cohen, Stephen F. Note on *The Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre* 659
Cohen, Stephen F. Note on *The Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre* 659
Colas, John N. Note on Philip C. F. Bankwitz, *Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France* 1004
Cole, Allan B., George O. Totten and Cecil H. Uyehara. *Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan.* Noted by Ardath W. Burks 277
Collier, Simon. *Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence 1808–1833.* Noted by Robert H. Dix 1372
Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change. Robert H. Dix. Noted by Kenneth F. Johnson 996
The Common Aid Effort. Milton J. Esman and Daniel S. Cheever. Noted by William R. Kintner 1393
The Commonwealth Bureaucracy. Gerald E. Caiden. Noted by Henry J. Steck 1000
Communication by Anton, Thomas J. on criticisms of his review of Bernard J. Frieden's "Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism" 1272
Communication by Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz on Richard M. Merelman's "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power" 1268
Communication by Cnudde, Charles F. and Donald J. McCrone on Forbes and Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling" 1269
Communication by Cutright, Phillips on Deane E. Neubauer's "Some Conditions of Democracy" 578
Communication by Forbes, Hugh and Edward R. Tufte on criticisms of their article "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling" 1270
Communication by Frieden, Bernard J. on Thomas J. Anton's review of his book "Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism" 1271
Communication by Friedman, Edward on the December 1967 issue of the REVIEW 231
Communication by Haas, Michael on Russet et al., "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List" 952
Communication by Ionescu, Ghita on Robert A. Rupen's review of his book "The Politics of the European States" . . 1271
Communication by Kramer, Gerald H. on Thomas Casstevens' "A Theorem About Voting" 955
Communication by Lindsay, David on the "myth" that communist governments have never been voted into power in a free election 1272
Communication by Lineberry, Robert L. and Edmund P. Fowler on Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government" 230
Communication by Lipsitz, Lewis on criticisms of his article "If, As Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do Then to Save Our Souls?" 577
Communication by Merelman, Richard M. on criticisms of his article "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power . . . 1269
Communication by Modelski, George and Jean-Luc Vellut on Russett, et al., "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List" 952
Communication by Neubauer, Deane E. on criticisms of his article "Some Conditions of Democracy" 581
Communication by Powell, Sandra on Soares and Hamblin, "Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952" 578
Communication by Russett, Bruce M., J. David Singer and Melvin Small, on criticisms of their article "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List" 955
Communication by Spiro, Herbert J. on Kaplan's review of his book "World Politics: The Global System" 1268
Communication by Verba, Sidney on Louis Lipsitz' "If, As Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do Then to Save Our Souls?" 576
Communication by Wolfinger, Raymond E. and John Osgood Field on criticisms of their article "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government" 227
Communism and Economic Development. Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky 110
The Communist Movement in Iran. Sepehr Zabih. Noted by Marvin Zonis 645
The Communist States and the West. Adam Bromke and Philip E. Uren, eds. Noted by Jonathan Harris 311
A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior: The Reapportionment Cases. Edward N. Beiser 788
COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT
Coalition Politics in North India. Paul R.

Brass 1174
Communism and Economic Development. Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky 110
Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach. Paul Shoup 185
Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games. Michael Leiserson 770
Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union. Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech 840
Majority vs. Opposition in the French National Assembly, 1956–1965: A Guttman Scale Analysis. David M. Wood . . . 88
Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America. Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant 1125
Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America. Martin C. Needler 889
The Recruitment of Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons. Allan Kornberg and Hal H. Winsborough 1242
The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis. Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride 1232
Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent. Jerome M. Gillison 814
Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period. Milton Lodge 827
The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa. Aristide R. Zolberg 70
Comparative Political Development: The Precedent of the West. G. Lowell Field. Noted by Warren L. Mason 280
Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach. Paul Shoup 185
Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy. Richard W. Cottam. Noted by Andrew Scott 304
The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays. George Lichtheim. Noted by George Kateb 600
The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Theodore Geiger. Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield 242
Congress and the Citizen-Soldier. William F. Levantrosser. Noted by Lewis A. Froman, Jr. 263
Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility. Donald G. Morgan. Noted by Dale Vinyard 986
Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939. James T. Patterson. Reviewed by David R. Mayhew 1298
Congressional Ethics: The Conflict of Interest Issue. Robert S. Getz. Noted by Irwin N. Gertzog 990
Congressional Insurgents and the Party System, 1909–1916. James Holt. Noted by Delmer Dunn 988
The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules and Procedures. Lewis A. Froman, Jr. Noted by Eugene Eidenberg 263
Connolly, William E. *Political Science and Ideology.* Noted by Peter Bachrach 599
Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism. Robert A. Schoenberger 868
Contemporary Radical Ideologies: Totalitarian Thought in the Twentieth Century. A. James Gregor. Noted by James H. Meisel 1307
Content Analysis of Communications. Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp and Lewis Donohew. Noted by Ellen B. Pirro 607
Contracting for Atoms. Harold Orlans. Noted by Don E. Kash 981
Conway, M. Margaret and Frank B. Feigert. *Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political Party Organization* 1159
Cooper, Joseph. Note on Jackson Turner Main, *The Upper House in Revolutionary America, 1763–1788* 1331
Corbett, Edward M. *Quebec Confronts Canada.* Noted by Maurice Pinard 1367
Corporate Management in a world of Politics: The Public, Political and Governmental Problems of Business. Harold Brayman. Noted by Oliver Garceau 625
Correspondance d'Alexis de Tocqueville et de Gustave de Beaumont. Texte Établi, Annoté et Préfacé par André Jardin. Reviewed by Melvin Richter 234
Cottam, Richard W. *Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy.* Noted by Andrew Scott 304
Couloumbis, Theodore A. *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences.* Noted by Stephen G. Xydis 302
Cowling, Maurice. *1878: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The Passing of the Second Reform Bill.* Noted by James B. Christoph 1378
Cox, Archibald. *The Warren Court: Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform.* Noted by J. Woodford Howard, Jr. 1329
Cox, Arthur M. *Prospects for Peacekeeping.* Reviewed by Lawrence S. Kaplan 961
Cox, James L. Note on Harold Kaplan, *Urban Political Systems: A Functional*

Analysis of Metro Toronto 643

Craig, Gordon A. Note on Arnold Brecht, *Aus Nächster Nähe: Lebenserinnerungen. Vol. I. 1884–1927. Mit der Kraft des Geistes. Vol. II. 1927–1967* 1304

Cuba and the United States: Long-Range Perspectives. John Plank, ed. Reviewed by Richard R. Fagen 1291

Cultura e partecipazione sociale nella città in transformazione. Umberto Melotti. Noted by Samuel H. Barnes 273

Cutright, Phillips. *Commmunication* on Deane E. Neubauer's "Some Conditions of Democracy" 578

Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954–1958. Stephen C. Xydis. Noted by Robert R. Wilson 1399

Czempiel, Ernst-Otto. *Das amerikanische Sicherheitssystem 1945–1949—Studie zur Aussenpolitik der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft.* Noted by John H. Herz 300

Czudnowski, Moshe M. *A Salience Dimension of Politics for the Study of Political Culture* 878

Daland, Robert T. *Brazilian Planning: Development Politics and Administration.* Reviewed by John T. Dorsey, Jr. 245

Daland, Robert T. Note on Jordan M. Young, *The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the Aftermath* 282

Dallin, Alexander and Thomas B. Larson, eds. *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev.* Noted by William Parente 1385

D'Amato, Anthony A. Note on B. S. Murty, *Propaganda and World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of the Instrument of Coercion* 1392

Daniels, R. V. Note on Thornton Anderson, *Russian Political Thought: An Introduction* 612

Danilevsky: A Russian Totalitarian Philosopher. Robert E. MacMaster, Note by Rolf H. W. Theen 256

Darling, Frank C. Note on Amry Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell, *The Changing Face of Southeast Asia* 313

Das amerikanische Sicherheitssystem 1945–1949—Studie zur Aussenpolitik der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Noted by John H. Herz 300

Dauer, Manning J. Review of Alfred F. Young. *The Democratic Republicans of New York: The Origins, 1763–1797* 594

Dauer, Manning J. Review of Carl F. Prince, *New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans: The Genesis of an Early Party Machine* 595

Davidson, Eugene. *The Trial of the Germans.* Noted by Elke Frank 1013

Davidson, Roger H. Note on Charles O. Jones, *Every Second Year: Congressional Behavior and the Two-Year Term* 980

Davies, A. F. *Private Politics: A Study of Five Political Outlooks.* Noted by Karl Braithwaite 980

Davis, James D. *Springboard to the White House: Presidential Primaries: How They Are Fought and Won.* Noted by Douglas W. Rae 261

Davis, Vincent. *The Admiral's Hobby* Noted by J. C. Ries 1344

Davis, Vincent. Note on Michael Kent O'Leary, *The Politics of American Foreign Aid* 680

Davison, W. Phillips. *International Political Communication.* Reviewed by Karl W. Deutsch 969

Deane, Herbert A. *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine.* Noted by David G. Smith 979

Debuyst, Frederic. *La Fonction Parlementaire en Belgique: Mecanismes D'Acces et Images.* Noted by Jeffrey L. Obler 274

Decision Costs in Coalition Formation. Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press 556

Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch. R. N. Rosecrance. Noted by David W. Tarr 1395

Dekmejian, Richard H. Note on P. J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921–1957* 1375

Democracy's Dilemma: The Totalitarian Party in a Free Society. Benjamin E. Lippincott. Noted by Kurt P. Tauber . . 1315

The Democratic Experiment: American Political Theory. Vol. I. Neal Riemer. Noted by George W. Carey 1316

The Democratic Republicans of New York: The Origins, 1763–1797. Alfred F. Young. Reviewed by Manning J. Dauer 594

The Democratic Revolution in West Indies. Wendell Bell, ed. Noted by Morton Kroll 1368

The Democrats and Labor in Rhode Island, 1952–1962: Changes in the Old Alliance. Jay S. Goodman. Noted by Vernon M. Goetcheus 984

Dennis, Jack. Note on Harmon Zeigler, *The Political Life of American Teachers*. 1339

Dennis, Jack. Note on Harmon Zeigler, *The Political World of the High School Teacher* 1339

Denson, Lee. Note on Herbert Druks. *Harry S. Truman and the Russians 1945–1953* 688

d'Entrèves, Alexander Passerin. *The Notion* *of the State: An Introduction to Political Theory.* Noted by Maynard Smith...... 1319

Deutsch, Karl W. *Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions.* Noted by Steven J. Brams.............................. 1391

Deutsch, Karl W., Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis and Richard L. Merritt. *France, Germany and the Western Alliance; A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics.* Reviewed by Donald D. Searing.................. 240

Deutsch, Karl W. Review of W. Phillips Davison, *International Political Communcation*.......................... 969

Deutscher, Isaac. *The Unfinished Revolution: Russia 1917–1967.* Noted by Donald D. Barry.......................... 662

Deutschlands Araberpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg. Heinz Tillman. Noted by Gerhard von Glahn......................... 305

Deutschlands Beziehungen zu Frankreich, Grossbritannien, Belgien sowie deutsche Entwaffung Reparationen, Völkerbund und internationale Abrüstung, Dezember 1925 bis Juli 1926, Akten zur deutschen auswartigen Politik, 1918–1945. Vol. I. Hans Rothfels et al., eds. Noted by Stanley Suval................................ 675

The Development of Modern Nigeria. Okei Arikpo. Noted by David B. Abernethy 998

The Development of Political Attitudes in Children. Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney. Noted by Lester W. Milbrath.. 1348

Dexter, Anthony Lewis. Note on Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations*........... 1306

Dexter, Byron. *The Years of Opportunity: The League of Nations, 1920–1926.* Noted by Whitney T. Perkins................ 1014

Dietze, Gottfried. *America's Political Dilemma: From Limited to Unlimited Democracy.* Noted by Peter Bachrach... 1310

Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds. Noted by Don C. Piper...................... 679

Disraeli. Robert Blake. Noted by Lewis J. Edinger.......................... 1380

Divisiveness and Social Conflict. Alan R. Beals and Bernard J. Siegel. Noted by Roger D. Masters................... 618

Dix, Robert H. *Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change.* Noted by Kenneth F. Johnson......................... 996

Dix, Robert H. Note on Simon Collier, *Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence 1808–1833*.......................... 1372

Dolbeare, Kenneth M. *Trial Courts in Urban Politics: State Court Policy Impact and Functions in a Local Political System.* Noted by Irvin H. Bromall............ 983

Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China. Chun-hsi Wu. Noted by Yi-chun Chang 1371

Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. James N. Rosenau. Noted by Paul Y. Hammond.............................. 299

Donald, Aida DiPace. Note on Theodore Sorenson, *Kennedy*.................... 260

Donohew, Lewis, Richard W. Budd and Robert K. Thorp. *Content Analysis of Communications.* Noted by Ellen B. Pirro................................ 607

Donovan, John C. *The Politics of Poverty.* Noted by John H. Strange............ 636

Dorpalen, Andreas. Note on Ferdinand A. Hermens and Theodor Schieder, *Staat, Wirtschaft und Politik in der Weimarer Republik, Festschrift für Heinrich Brüning* 665

Dorsett, Lyle W. *The Pendergast Machines.* Noted by Douglas Fox................ 1337

Dorsey, John T., Jr. Review of Robert T. Daland. *Brazilian Planning: Development Politics and Administration*........ 245

Dougherty, James E. and J. F. Lehman, Jr., eds. *Arms Control for the Late Sixties.* Noted by William P. Gerberding....... 678

Doughty, Paul L. *Huaylas: An Andean District in Search of Progress.* Noted by Marvin Alisky...................... 1379

Draper, Theodore. *Abuse of Power.* Noted by Gilbert R. Winham................ 686

Droz, Jacques. *Le Socialisme Democratique, 1864–1960.* Noted by William Ebenstein 257

Druks, Herbert. *Harry S. Truman and the Russians, 1945–1953.* Noted by Lee Denson............................. 688

Duff, Ernest and John F. McCamant. *Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America*........................... 1125

Dulles, Eleanor Lansing. *Berlin: The Wall Is Not Forever.* Noted by William E. Wright.............................. 295

Dumhoff, G. William. *Who Rules America?* Noted by Andrew Hacker.............. 1301

Duncan, Otis Dudley and Peter Blau. *The American Occupational Structure.* Reviewed by M. Kent Jennings.......... 596

Dunn, Delmer. Note on James Holt, *Congressional Insurgents and the Party System, 1909–1916*...................... 988

Dunner, Joseph. Note on Bernard K. Johnpoll, *The Politics of Futility: The General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland, 1917–1943*.......................... 667

The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism.

Frederick C. Turner. Noted by Robert E. Scott.............................. 1386

The Dynamics of Compliance: Supreme Court Decision-Making from a New Perspective. Richard M. Johnson. Reviewed by Sheldon Goldman........... 1285

Earl, Donald. *The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome.* Noted by Deane E. Neubauer.......................... 609

Earl Warren: A Political Biography. Leo Katcher. Noted by Clifford M. Lytle... 631

Eastern Europe in Transition. Kurt London, ed. Noted by Carl Beck............... 289

Eastern European Government and Politics. Vaclar Benes, Andrew Gyorgy and George Stambuk. Noted by Carl Beck.. 289

Ebenstein, William. Note on Jacques Droz. *Le Socialisme Democratique, 1864–1960*.............................. 257

Economic Development and American Foreign Policy, 1943–1962. David A. Baldwin. Noted by Maurice Waters......... 1405

Economic Evaluation of Urban Renewal: Conceptual Foundation of Benefit-Cost Analysis. Jerome Rothenberg. Noted by David J. Olson....................... 993

Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries. Harry G. Johnson. Noted by George M. Platt..................... 682

Edinger, Lewis J., ed. *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis.* Noted by Thomas A. Baylis........................... 644

Edinger, Lewis J. Note on Robert Blake, *Disraeli*.............................. 1380

Edinger, Lewis J., Roy C. Macridis, Richard L. Merritt and Karl W. Deutsch. *France, Germany and the Western Alliance; A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics.* Reviewed by Donald D. Searing.......... 240

Eidenberg, Eugene. Note on Lewis A. Froman, Jr. *The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules and Procedures*........ 263

Eidenberg, Eugene. Note on Randall B. Ripley, *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives*...................... 1325

Eisenberg, Ralph. Note on Malcolm E. Jewell, *Legislative Representative in the Contemporary South*.................. 1341

Eisenstein, Louis and Elliot Rosenberg. *A Stripe of Tammany's Tiger.* Noted by Theodore J. Lowi................... 642

Electronic Journalism. William A. Wood. Noted by David L. Paletz............. 639

Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway. Philip M. Burgess. Noted by Ole R. Holsti............... 1398

The Elite in the Welfare State. Piet Thoenes, ed. Noted by Dwaine Marvick......... 603

Elliott, James V. Note on Isaac Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia*......................... 1312

Ellul, Jacques. *The Technological Society.* Noted by William R. Nelson........... 603

The Emergence of Pakistan. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali. Noted by Ralph Braibanti.............................. 649

The Emergent American Society. Lloyd Warner et al. Noted by Andrew Hacker 1301

Enemies in Politics. David J. Finley, Ole R. Holsti and Richard R. Fagan. Noted by Sheldon Appleton................. 1402

Engelman, F. C. and M. A. Schwartz. *Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure.* Noted by Bernard K. Johnpoll.............................. 278

Epstein, Fritz T. Note on Gabor Erdelyi, prep. *German Periodical Publications*.... 660

Epstein, Fritz, T. Note on Karol Maichel, *Soviet and Russian Newspapers at the Hoover Institution*................... 660

Epstein, Klaus. *The Genesis of German Conservatism.* Noted by John Rodman.. 1007

Erdelyi, Gabor, prep. *German Periodical Publications.* Noted by Fritz T. Epstein 660

Erdman, Howard L. *The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism.* Reviewed by Susanne Hoeber Rudolph.............. 1293

Esman, Milton J. and Daniel S. Cheever. *The Common Aid Effort.* Noted by William R. Kintner..................... 1393

An Essay on Marxian Economics. Joan Robinson. Noted by George R. Feiwel.. 1010

Eulau, Heinz and Robert Eyestone. *Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis*....... 124

The Eurocrats. Altiero Spinelli. Reviewed by Ronald Inglehart................. 593

The European Common Market and the World. Werner Feld. Noted by Vernon C. Warren, Jr....................... 1020

Every Second Year: Congressional Behavior and the Two-Year Term. Charles O. Jones. Noted by Roger H. Davidson.... 980

Eyestone, Robert and Heinz Eulau. *Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis*....... 124

Factions and Coalitions in a One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games. Michael Leiserson..... 770

Fagen, Richard R., David J. Finlay, and Ole R. Holsti. *Enemies in Politics.* Noted by Sheldon Appleton................ 1402

Fagen, Richard R. *Politics and Communication.* Noted by Ellen B. Pirro.......... 607

Fagen, Richard R. Review of John Plank, ed., *Cuba and the United States: Long-Range Perspectives* 1291

Fagen, Richard R. Review of Maurice Zeitlin, *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class* 1291

Fagin, Henry and Leo F. Schnore. *Urban Research and Policy Planning.* Noted by Frank Smallwood 620

Fainsod, Merle. *Some Reflections on Soviet-American Relations* 1093

The Fall of Sukarno. Tarzie Vittachi. Noted by William Liddle 670

Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems. Colin Leys and Peter Robson, eds. Noted by Victor T. Le Vine 1354

The Federation of German Industry in Politics. Gerard Braunthal. Noted by George K. Romoser 664

Feigert, Frank B. and M. Margaret Conway. *Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political Party Organization* 1159

Feit, Edward. Note on William A. Hance, ed., *Southern Africa and the United States* 1366

Feiwel, George R. Note on Joan Robinson, *An Essay on Marxian Economics* 1010

Feiwel, George R. Note on Mikhail Bor, *Aims and Methods of Soviet Planning* 1010

Feld, Werner. *The European Common Market and the World.* Noted by Vernon C. Warren, Jr. 1020

Fenton, John H. Note on Alan L. Clem, *Prairie State Politics: Popular Democracy in South Dakota* 1333

Ferguson, Yale H. Note on Jerome Slater, *The OAS and United States Foreign Policy* 308

Field, G. Lowell. *Comparative Political Development: The Precedent of the West.* Noted by Warren L. Mason 280

Field, John Osgood and Raymond E. Wolfinger. *Communication* on criticisms of their article "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government" 227

Filene, Peter G. *Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917–1933: American Attitudes Toward Russia From the February Revolution Until Diplomatic Recognition.* Noted by William B. Ballis 301

Finer, S. E. *Pareto and Pluto-Democracy: The Retreat to Galapagos* 440

Finlay, David J., Ole R. Holsti and Richard R. Fagan. *Enemies in Politics.* Noted by Sheldon Appleton 1402

Fischer, Georges et al. *Régime Interne et Politique Extérieure Dans les Pays d'Asie.* Noted by Robert O. Tilman 1364

Fisher, Paul L. and Ralph L. Lowenstein, eds. *Race and the News Media.* Noted by David L. Paletz 639

Fitzgibbon, Russell H. Note on Edward J. Williams, *Latin American Christian Democratic Parties* 279

Fleer, Jack D. *North Carolina Politics: An Introduction.* Noted by Lewis Bowman 1347

Fleron, Frederic J., Jr., Dean Jaros and Herbert Hirsch. *The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture* 564

Fogelman, Edwin. Note on Fred M. Frohock, *The Nature of Political Inquiry* 973

Food and Fiber in the Nation's Politics. Charles M. Hardin. Noted by H. George Frederickson 994

Forbes, Hugh and Edward R. Tufte. *Communication* on criticisms of their article "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling" 1270

Forbes, Hugh Donald and Edward R. Tufte. *A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling* 1258

Force, Order and Justice. Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker. Noted by Philip Green 1012

The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China: An Analysis. Kurt Muller. Noted by Marshall I. Goldman 1021

Formosa, China, and the United Nations—Formosa in the World Community. Lung-Chu Chen and Harold Lasswell. Noted by Douglas Mendel, Jr. 673

The Foundations of Indian Federalism. K. R. Bombwall. Noted by Baljit Singh 1008

Fowler, Edmund P. and Robert L. Lineberry. *Communication* on Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government" 230

Fox, Annette Baker and William T. R. Fox. *NATO and the Range of American Choice.* Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold 1296

Fox, Douglas. Note on Lyle W. Dorsett, *The Pendergast Machine* 1337

Fox, William T. R. and Annette Baker Fox. *NATO and the Range of American Choice.* Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold 1296

France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics. Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis Edinger, Roy C. Macridis and Richard L. Merritt. Reviewed by Donald D. Searing 240

Fank, Elke. Note on Eugene Davidson, *The Trial of the Germans* 1013

Frederickson, H. George. Note on Charles M. Hardin, *Food and Fiber in the Nation's Politics* 994

Free, Lloyd A. and Hadley Cantril. *The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion.* Noted by Aage Clausen 1345

Freedman, Max, William M. Beaney and Eugene V. Rostow. *Perspectives on the Court.* Noted by Bradley C. Canon 265

French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle. Alfred Grosser. Noted by William G. Andrews 1018

The French Parliament: Politics in the Fifth Republic. Philip M. Williams. Noted by Henry C. Galant 1361

Freud: Political and Social Thought. Paul Roazen. Noted by William Leiss 1314

Freund, Paul A. *On Law and Justice.* Noted by William M. Beaney 1335

Fried, Robert C. Review of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* 960

Frieden, Bernard J. *Communication* on Thomas J. Anton's review of his book "Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism" 1271

Frieden, Bernard J. *Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism.* Noted by Thomas J. Anton 623

Friedlander, Saul. *Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States, 1939–1941.* Reviewed by H. P. Secher 590

Friedman, Edward. *Communication* on the December, 1967 issue of the REVIEW 231

Friedrich, Carl J. *Some Thoughts on the Relation of Political Theory to Anthropology* 536

Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography. Mohammad Ayub Khan. Noted by Khalid B. Sayeed 1388

Frohock, Fred M. Note on Johan Galtung. *Theory and Methods of Social Research* . . . 617

Frohock, Fred M. *The Nature of Political Inquiry.* Noted by Edwin Fogelman 973

Froman, Lewis A., Jr. Note on William F. Levantrosser, *Congress and the Citizen-Soldier* 263

Froman, Lewis A., Jr. *Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics of Congress* 518

Froman, Lewis A., Jr. *The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules and Procedures.* Noted by Eugene Eidenberg 263

The Function of "China" in Marx, Lenin, and Mao. Donald M. Lowe. Noted by Mostafa Rejai 1310

A Functional Analysis of Defense Department Decision-Making in the McNamara Administration. Paul Y. Hammond 57

The Functioning of the International Political System. Andrew M. Scott. Noted by Frederic Wurzburg 1016

Furniss, Edgar S., Jr., ed. *The Western Alliance: Its Status and Prospects.* Reviewed by Frederick H. Hartmann 239

Galtung, Johan. *Theory and Methods of Social Research.* Noted by Fred M. Frohock 617

Galant, Henry C. Note on Philip M. Williams, *The French Parliament: Politics in the Fifth Republic* 1361

Garceau, Oliver. Note on Harold Brayman. *Corporate Management in a World of Politics: The Public, Political and Governmental Problems of Business* 625

The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History. Mark DeWolfe Howe. Reviewed by Thomas S. Schrock 597

Gehlen, Michael P. and Michael McBride. *The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis* 1232

Geiger, Theodore. *The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa and Latin America.* Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield 242

Gelb, Leslie H. Note on Thomas A. Bailey. *The Art of Diplomacy* 1401

The Genesis of German Conservatism. Klaus Epstein. Noted by John Rodman 1007

Geoffrey-Dechaume, François. *China Looks at the World.* Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin 588

Gerbroding, William P. Note on James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, Jr., eds., *Arms Control for the Late Sixties* 678

The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–39. Robert O'Neill. Reviewed by H. P. Secher 590

German Periodical Publications. Gabor Erdelyi, prep. Noted by Fritz T. Epstein 660

Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Integration of Strategy and Politics. James L. Richardson. Noted by Charles B. Robson 676

Germino, Dante. *Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political Theory.* Reviewed by Harry Girvetz 958

Gerstein, Robert S. Noted on Ira H. Carmen. *Movies, Censorship and the Law* 266

Gerteiny, Alfred G. *Mauritania.* Noted by Bruce B. Mason 1381

Gertzog, Irwin N. Note on Robert S. Getz, *Congressional Ethics: The Conflict of Interest Issue* 990

Getz, Robert S. *Congressional Ethics: The Conflict of Interest Issue.* Noted by Irwin N. Gertzog 990

Gil, Frederico G. Note on John Bartlow Martin. *Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War*.......... 310

Gilison, Jerome M. *Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent*.......... 814

Gillin, Donald G. Note on John E. Rue, *Mao Tse-tung in Opposition 1927–1935*.. 669

Gillin, Donald G. *Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911–1949*. Noted by by Chi Hsi-sheng.......... 292

Ginsburgs, George. Note on George G. S. Murphy, *Soviet Mongolia. A Study of the Oldest Political Satellite*.......... 291

Girvetz, Harry. Review of Dante Germino, *Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political Theory*.......... 958

Glock, Charles Y., ed. *Survey Research in the Social Sciences*. Noted by Betty H. Zisk 251

Goerner, E. A. *Peter and Caesar: The Catholic Church and Political Authority*. Noted by Glenn Tinder.......... 610

Goetcheus, Vernon M. Note on Jay S. Goodman. *The Democrats and Labor in Rhode Island, 1952–1962: Changes in the Old Alliance*.......... 984

Goldman, Marshall I. Note on Kurt Muller, *The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China: An Analysis* 1021

Goldman, Marshall I. *Soviet Foreign Aid*. Noted by Leon M. Herman.......... 689

Goldman, Merle. *Literary Dissent in Communist China*. Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin.......... 588

Goldman, Sheldon. Review of Richard M. Johnson, *The Dynamics of Compliance: Supreme Court Decision-Making from a New Perspective*.......... 1285

Goldman, Sheldon. Review of William K. Muir, Jr., *Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change*.......... 1285

Goodman, Jay S. Note on David Burner, *The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 1918–1932*.... 987

Goodman, Jay S. *The Democrats and Labor in Rhode Island, 1952–1962: Changes in the Old Alliance*. Noted by Vernon M Goetcheus.......... 984

Gordon, Michael R. Note on Georges Bidault. *Resistance: The Political Autobiography of Georges Bidault*.......... 1003

Gosnell, Harold F. Note on J. R. Pole, *Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic*..... 608

Gottlieb, Gidon. *The Logic of Choice: An Investigation of Rule and Rationality*. Noted by Stuart S. Nagel.......... 1308

Governing the Commune of Veyrier: Politics in Swiss Local Government. George A. Codding, Jr. Noted by Benjamin R. Barber.......... 1374

Granqvist, Hans. *The Red Guard*. Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin.......... 588

Grant, Bruce. *Indonesia*. Noted by William R. Liddle.......... 670

Graves, Harold. Note on Jeremy Bennett, *British Broadcasting and the Danish Resistance Movement, 1940–1945: A Study of the Wartime Broadcasts of the BBC Danish Service*.......... 298

Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences. Theodore A. Couloumbis. Noted by Stephen G. Xydis... 302

Green, Philip. Note on Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, *Force, Order and Justice*.......... 1012

Greene, Fred. *U. S. Policy and the Security of Asia*. Noted by Normal D. Palmer... 1400

Greenstein, Fred I. and Raymond E. Wolfinger. *The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting*.......... 753

Gregor, A. James. *Contemporary Radical Ideologies: Totalitarian Thought in the Twentieth Century*. Noted by James H. Meisel.......... 1307

Gregor, James A. *Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis*.......... 425

Grosser, Alfred. *French Foreign Policy Under de Gaulle*. Noted by William G. Andrews.......... 1018

Grossholtz, Jean. Review of Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*.......... 1278

Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union. Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech.......... 840

Gugin, David. Note on Ralph Horwitz, *The Political Economy of South Africa*... 652

Gunnell, John G. *Political Philosophy and Time*. Noted by George Kateb.......... 1303

Gurr, Ted. *A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices*.......... 1104

Guyot, James F. Note on William R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*...... 648

Gyorgy, Andrew, George Stambuk and Vaclav Benes. *Eastern European Government and Politics*. Noted by Carl Beck.. 289

Haas, Michael. *Communication* on Russett et al., "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List".......... 952

Hacia America Latina Democratica e Integrada. Romulo Betancourt. Noted by Robert J. Alexander.......... 685

Hacker, Andrew. Note on Arnold M. Rose, *The Power Structure: Political Process in American Society* 1301
Hacker, Andrew. Note on G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* 1301
Hacker, Andrew. Noted on Lloyd Warner et al., *The Emergent American Society* 1301
Hammond, Paul Y. *A Functional Analysis of Defense Department Decision-Making in the McNamara Administration* 57
Hammond, Paul Y. Note on James N. Rosenau, *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* 299
Hance, William A., ed. *Southern Africa and the United States*. Noted by Edward Feit 1366
Hardgrave, Robert L., Jr. Review of Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* 1280
Hardin, Charles M. *Food and Fiber in the Nation's Politics*. Noted by H. George Frederickson 994
Harris, Jonathan. Note on Adam Bromke and Philip E. Uren, eds., *The Communist States and the West* 311
Harris, Jonathan. Note on Rodger Swearingen, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communist Power in the World Today* 311
Harris, Joseph P. Note on Marie Seton, *Panditji: A Portrait of Jawaharlal Nehru* 651
Harry S. Truman and the Russians 1945–1953. Herbert Druks. Noted by Lee Denson 688
Hartmann, Frederick H. Review of Charles O. Lerche, *Last Chance in Europe: Bases for a New American Policy* 239
Hartmann, Frederick H. Review of Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., ed., *The Western Alliance: Its Status and Prospects* 239
Hawkins, Carroll. Note on Charles Wagley. *The Latin American Tradition* 1377
Hayek, Friederich A. *Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics*. Reviewed by William C. Mitchell 968
Hayward, Fred M. Note on Robert W. July, *The Origins of Modern African Thought: Its Development in West Africa During the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* 1313
Hazard, John N., Peter Wiles, Alexander Balinsky and Abram Bergson. *Planning and the Market in the U.S.S.R.: the 1960's*. Noted by Arthur W. Wright 655
Headley, A. R. Note on Obed Y. Asamoah, *The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations* 693
Heller, Walter W. *New Dimensions of Political Economy*. Reviewed by Harvey C. Mansfield 248
Hendel, Samuel. Note on Irving M. Zeitlin, *Marxism: A Re-Examination* 974
Hennessey, Timothy M. Note on Samuel H. Barnes, *Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation* 1351
Hennessy, Bernard. Note on D. E. Butler and Anthony King, *The British General Election of 1966* 296
Hennessy, Mary L. and Kenneth O. Warner. *Public Management at the Bargaining Table*. Noted by Donald P. Sprengel 992
Herman, Leon M. Note on Marshall I. Goldman, *Soviet Foreign Aid* 689
Hermens, Ferdinand A. and Theodor Schieder, eds., *Staat, Wirtschaft und Politik in der Weimarer Republik, Festschrift für Heinrich Brüning*. Noted by Andreas Dorpalen 665
Herz, John H. Note on Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Das amerikanische Sicherheitssystem 1945–1949—Studie zur Aussenpolitik der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* 300
Hess, Robert D. and Judith V. Torney. *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children*. Noted by Lester W. Milbrath 1348
Hindus, Maurice. *The Kremlin's Human Dilemma: Russia After Half a Century of Revolution*. Noted by Peter Juviler 286
Hirsch, Herbert, Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. and Dean Jaros. *The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture* 564
History of Indian Social and Political Ideas —From Rammohun to Dayananda. Bimanbehari Majumdar. Noted by D. MacKenzie Brown 611
Hohenberg, John. *Between Two Worlds*. Noted by Marian D. Irish 684
Holden, John T. Note on Donald Brandon. *American Foreign Policy Beyond Utopianism and Realism* 683
Holsti, Ole R., David J. Finlay and Richard R. Fagan. *Enemies in Politics*. Noted by Sheldon Appleton 1402
Holsti, Ole R. Note on Philip M. Burgess, *Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway* 1398
Hollander, Paul. Note on Alex Simirenko, ed., *Soviet Sociology: Historical Antecedents and Current Appraisals* 252
Holmes, Jack E. *Politics in New Mexico*. Noted by Roy D. Morey 641
Holt, James. *Congressional Insurgents and the Party System, 1909–1916*. Noted by Delmer Dunn 988
Holt, Robert T. and John E. Turner. *The Political Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration in Comparative Political Analysis*. Reviewed by Gerald A. Weiner 583
Hoogerwerf, Andries. Note on Arend

Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*.......... 1349
Horowitz, Gad. *Canadian Labor in Politics.* Noted by Peter Regenstreif.......... 1369
Horowitz, Irving Louis. Note on Raymond Aron, *The Industrial Society: Three Essays on Ideology and Development*.......... 1321
Horwitz, Ralph. *The Political Economy of South Africa.* Noted by David Gugin... 652
Horwitz, Robert. Note on Jacob Adler, *Claus Spreckles: The Sugar King of Hawaii*.......... 1346
Houn, Franklin W. *A Short History of Chinese Communism.* Noted by Dennis M. Ray.......... 1362
The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll-Call Voting. Michael J. Shapiro.......... 494
Hovet, Thomas, Jr. Note on David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System*.......... 303
Howard, J. Woodford, Jr. Note on Archibald Cox, *The Warren Court: Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform*.......... 1329
Howard, J. Woodford, Jr. *On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice*.......... 43
Howe, Mark DeWolfe. *The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History.* Reviewed by Thomas S. Schrock.......... 597
Hsi-sheng, Chi. Note on Donald G. Gillin, *Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911–1949*.......... 292
Huaylas: An Andean District in Search of Progress. Paul L. Doughty. Noted by Marvin Alisky.......... 1379
Hughes, Colin A. and John S. Western. *The Prime Minister's Policy Speech: A Case Study in Televised Politics.* Noted by Kenneth H. Thompson.......... 999
Hulicka, Irene M. and Karel Hulicka. *Soviet Institutions, The Individual and Society.* Noted by Ellen Mickiewicz..... 658
Hulicka, Karel and Irene M. Hulicka. *Soviet Institutions, The Individual and Society.* Noted by Ellen Mickiewicz..... 658
Hutchins, Francis G. *The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India.* Noted by Jorgen Rasmussen.......... 307
Hyneman, Charles S. *Popular Government in America: Foundations and Principles.* Reviewed by Neal Riemer.......... 1284

Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence 1808–1833. Simon Collier. Noted by Robert H. Dix.......... 1372
Ideology and Electoral Action: A Comparative Case Study of the National Committee for an Effective Congress. Harry M. Scoble. Noted by John H. Kessel.......... 1326
"If, As Lipsitz Thinks, Political Science Is To Save Our Souls, God Help Us!" *Communication* by Sidney Verba....... 576
If, As Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We To Do Then To Save Our Souls? Lewis Lipsitz.......... 527
The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India. Francis G. Hutchins. Noted by Jorgen Rasmussen.......... 307
Image of a President: Some Insights into the Political Views of School Children. Roberta S. Sigel.......... 216
Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy. George Liska. Noted by Clifton E. Wilson.......... 681
Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations. Robert M. Spaulding, Jr. Reviewed by Edwin O. Reischauer..... 966
Indonesia. Bruce Grant. Noted by William R. Liddle.......... 670
The Industrial Society: Three Essays on Ideology and Development. Raymond Aron. Noted by Irving Louis Horowitz.. 1321
Influencing Voters: A Study of Campaign Rationality. Richard Rose. Noted by Charles F. Cnudde.......... 1365
Inglehart, Ronald. Review of Altiero Spinelli, *The Eurocrats*.......... 593
The Insecurity of Nations: International Relations in the Twentieth Century. Charles Yost. Noted by Keith R. Legg.. 1397
The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives. Nelson W. Polsby... 144
The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic Theory. Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey.......... 5
The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises. Oran R. Young. Noted by David W. Wainhouse.......... 1018
International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast. David W. Wainhouse, and Associates. Reviewed by Lincoln P. Bloomfield.......... 586
International Political Communication. W. Phillips Davison. Reviewed by Karl W. Deutsch.......... 969
International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology. Bruce M. Russett. Reviewed by Michael K. O'Leary.......... 970
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations. Jack E. Vincent.......... 916
Some Reflections on Soviet-American Relations. Merle Fainsod.......... 1093
Interstate Compacts in the Political Process.

Weldon V. Barton. Noted by Thad L. Beyle 269

Insurgent Era: New Patterns of Political, Economic and Social Revolution. Richard H. Sanger. Noted by Paul F. Power 1023

The Invention of the American Political Parties. Roy F. Nichols. Noted by James S. Young 268

Ionescu, Ghita. *Communication* on Robert A. Rupen's review of his book "The Politics of the European States" 1271

Ionescu, Ghita. *The Politics of the European Communist States.* Noted by Robert A. Rupen 663

Irish, Marian D. Note on John Hohenberg, *Between Two Worlds* 684

Islam in the Soviet Union. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay. Noted by Robert A. Rupen 1002

The Islamic Law of Nations. Shaybani Siyar. Noted by Moshe Perlmann 671

Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. Malcolm H. Kerb. Reviewed by Fauzi M. Najjar 972

Israel on the Road to Sinai, 1949–1956. Ernest Stock. Noted by George Kirk 691

Issues of Political Development. Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, eds. Reviewed by Arpad von Lazar 243

Jackson, Carlton. *Presidential Vetoes: 1792–1945.* Noted by Robert J. Kulishek 628

Jamgotch, Nish, Jr. Note on Vernon V. Aspaturian, *The Soviet Union in the World Communist System* 690

The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966. Robert A. Scalapino. Reviewed by Solomon B. Levine 1300

The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period. Herschel Webb. Noted by Akira Kubata 1358

Jardin, André (texte établi, annoté et préfacé par). *Correspondance d'Alexis de Tocqueville et de Gustave de Beaumont.* Reviewed by Melvin Richter 234

Jaros, Dean, Herbert Hirsch and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. *The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture* 564

Jennings, M. Kent, and Kenneth P. Langton. *Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States* 852

Jennings, M. Kent and Richard G. Niemi. *The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child* 169

Jennings, M. Kent. Review of Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* 596

Jewell, Malcolm E. *Legislative Representative in the Contemporary South.* Noted by Ralph Eisenberg 1341

Johnpoll, Bernard K. Note on F. C. Engelmann and M. A. Schwartz, *Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure* 278

Johnpoll, Bernard K. *The Politics of Futility. The General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland, 1917–1943.* Noted by Joseph Dunner 667

Johns, David H. Note on Carl H. Rosberg and John Nottingham, *The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya* 285

Johnson, Harry G. *Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries.* Noted by George M. Platt 682

Johnson, Kenneth F. Note on Robert H. Dix, *Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change* 996

Johnson, Richard M. *The Dynamics of Compliance: Supreme Court Decision-Making from a New Perspective.* Reviewed by Sheldon Goldman 1285

Johnston, J. Paul. Note on Donald Atwell Zoll, *The Twentieth Century Mind* 259

Jones, Charles O. *Every Second Year: Congressional Behavior and the Two-Year Term.* Noted by Roger H. Davidson 980

Jones, Charles O. *The Minority Party and Policy-Making in the House of Representatives* 481

Jouvenal, Bertrand de. *The Art of Conjecture.* Reviewed by James A. Robinson 236

Juggernaut: The Russian Forces, 1918–1966. Malcolm Mackintosh. Noted by Roman Kolkowicz 658

July, Robert W. *The Origins of Modern African Thought: Its Development in West Africa During the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.* Noted by Fred M. Hayward 1313

Jung, Hwa Yol. Note on Alfred Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World* .. 614

Justice in Communist China. Shao-Chuan Leng. Noted by Chan Lien 1382

Juviler, Peter H. and Henry W. Morton, eds. *Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition.* Noted by Carl A. Linden 288

Juviler, Peter. Note on Maurice Hindus, *The Kremlin's Human Dilemma: Russia After Half a Century of Revolution* 286

Kahn, Robert L. and Daniel Katz. *The Social Psychology of Organizations.* Noted by Anthony Lewis Dexter 1306

Kaiser, Henry F. *A Measure of the Popula-*

tion Quality of Legislative Apportionment 208
Kallenbach, Joseph E. *The American Chief Executive: The Presidency and the Governorship.* Noted by Leslie Lipson 626
Kaplan, Harold. *Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto.* Noted by James L. Cox 643
Kaplan, Lawrence S. Review of Arthur M. Cox, *Prospects for Peacekeeping* 961
Kaplan, Lawrence S. Review of Jeremy J. Stone, *Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitations through Dialogue* 961
Kaplan, Lawrence S. Review of Linda B. Miller, *World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts* 961
Kaplan, Morton A. Note on Herbert J. Spiro, *World Politics: The Global System* 694
Kash, Don E. Note on Harold Orlans, *Contracting for Atoms* 981
Kassof, Allen, ed. *Prospects for Soviet Society.* Noted by William Parente 1385
Katcher, Leo. *Earl Warren: A Political Biography.* Noted by Clifford M. Lytle 631
Kateb, George. Note on George Lichtheim, *The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays* 600
Kateb, George. Note on John G. Gunnell, *Political Philosophy and Time* 1303
Katz, Daniel and Robert L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations.* Noted by Lewis Anthony Dexter 1306
Kautsky, John H. and Roger W. Benjamin. *Communism and Economic Development.* 110
Keech, William R. and Joel J. Schwartz. *Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union* 840
Keech, William R. Note on *Annuaire Suisse de Science Politique—Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Politische Wissenschaft* 666
Kendall, Willmoore and George W. Carey. *The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic Theory* 5
Kennedy. Theodore C. Sorenson. Noted by Aida DiPace Donald 260
Kerb, Malcolm. *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida.* Reviewed by Fauzi M. Najjar 972
Kercz, Jerzy F., ed. *Soviet and East European Agriculture.* Noted by Roy D. Laird 290
Kerr, Malcolm H. Note on Walter Laqueur, *The Road to Jerusalem* 1403
Kertesz, Stephen D. *The Quest for Peace Through Diplomacy.* Noted by Louis F. Brakeman 679
Kessel, John H. Note on Harry M. Scoble, *Ideology and Electoral Action: A Comparative Case Study of the National Committee for an Effective Congress* 1326
Kessel, John H. Note on Leroy N. Rieselbach, *The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy* 632
Khan, Mohammad Ayub. *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobigoraphy.* Noted by Khalid B. Sayeed 1388
King, Anthony and D. E. Butler. *The British General Eelection of 1966.* Noted by Bernard Hennessy 296
The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century. John Leddy Phelan. Noted by Robert G. Wesson 1006
Kintner, William R. Note on Milton J. Esman and Daniel S. Cheever, *The Common Aid Effort* 1393
Kirk, George. Note on Manfred W. Wenner, *Modern Yemen, 1918–1966* 647
Kirk, George. Note on Ernest Stock, *Israel on the Road to Sinai, 1949–1956* 691
Klausner, Samuel Z., ed. *The Study of Total Societies.* Noted by C. P. Wolf 601
Kneese, Allen V. and Stephen C. Smith, eds. *Water Research.* Noted by Ashley L. Schiff 634
Knowledge and Power: Essays on Science and Government. Sanford A. Lakoff, ed. Noted by Bernard Barber 985
Kofmehl, Kenneth. Note on Lee Metcalf and Vic Reinemer, *Overcharge* 264
Kogan, Norman. Review of Sidney G. Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* 1282
Kolkowicz, Roman. Note on Malcolm Mackintosh, *Juggernaut: The Russian Forces, 1918–1966* 658
Kornberg, Allan and Hal H. Winsborough. *The Recruitment of Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons* 1242
Kornberg, Allan. *Canadian Legislative Behavior: A Study of the 25th Parliament.* Noted by Dean L. Yarwood 997
Kort, Fred. *A Nonlinear Model for the Analysis of Judicial Decisions* 546
Kramer, Gerald H. *Communication* on Thomas Casstevens' "A Theorem About Voting" 955
Kramnick, Isaac. *Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia.* Noted by James V. Elliott 1312
The Kremlin's Human Dilemma: Russia After Half a Century of Revolution. Maurice Hindus. Noted by Peter Juviler 286
Krislov, Samuel. *The Negro in Federal Employment.* Noted by Richard Claude 637
Kroll, Morton. Note on Wendell Bell, ed.,

The Democratic Revolution in West Indies 1368
Krueger, Thomas A. *And Promises to Keep: The Southern Conference for Human Welfare.* Noted by Emory F. Via....... 269
Kubata, Akira. Note on Herschel Webb, *The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period*.................... 1358
Kulishek, Robert. Note on Carlton Jackson, *Presidential Vetoes: 1792–1945*......... 628
Kulski, W. W. Note on Alfred Berzins, *The Two Faces of Co-Existence*......... 312
Kulski, W. W. Note on Bernard A. Ramundo, *Peaceful Coexistence: International Law in the Building of Communism* 312

Labor and Liberty: The LaFollette Committee and the New Deal. Jerold S. Auerbach. Noted by Douglas Camp Chaffey. 989
La Fonction Parlementaire en Belgique: Mecanismes D'Acces et Images. Frederic Debuyst. Noted by Jeffrey L. Obler.... 274
Laird, Roy D. Note on Jerzy F. Kercz, ed., *Soviet and East European Agriculture*.... 290
Laissez-faire-Pluralismus: Demokratie und Wirtschaft des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters. Goetz Briefs, ed. Noted by Gerard Braunthal......................... 1009
Lakoff, Sanford A., ed. *Knowledge and Power: Essays on Science and Government.* Noted by Bernard Barber........ 985
Lambert, Jacques. *Latin America: Social Structures and Political Institutions.* Noted by Arthur P. Whitaker......... 1373
Lang, Gladys Engel and Kurt. *Politics and Television.* Noted by Bradbury Seasholes 1327
Lang, Kurt and Gladys Engel. *Politics and Television.* Noted by Bradbury Seasholes 1327
Langton, Kenneth P. and M. Kent Jennings. *Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States*............................. 852
La Porte, Todd. Review of James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action*..... 246
La Porte, Todd. Review of Victor H. Vroom, ed., *Methods of Organizational Research*.......................... 246
Laqueur, Walter. *The Road to Jerusalem.* Noted by Malcolm H. Kerr............ 1403
Larkin, Bruce D. Review of A. Doak Barnett, *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China*........... 963
Larson, Thomas B. and Alexander Dallin. *Soviet Politics Since Krushchev.* Noted by William Parente.................. 1385
Larus, Joel. *Nucleur Weapons Safety and the Common Defense.* Noted by Timothy Alden Williams........................ 1396
Lasswell, Harold and Lung-Chu Chen. *Formosa, China, and the United Nations—Formosa and the World Community.* Noted by Douglas Mendel, Jr.......... 673
Lasswell, Harold D. Review of *Psychiatry and Public Affairs*, Reports and Symposia of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry....................... 249
Last Chance in Europe: Bases for a New American Policy. Charles O. Lerche. Reviewed by Frederick H. Hartmann..... 239
Latin America: Social Structures and Political Institutions. Jacques Lambert. Noted by Arthur P. Whitaker......... 1373
Latin American Christian Democratic Parties. Edward J. Williams. Noted by Russell H. Fitzgibbon.................... 279
The Latin American Tradition. Charles Wagley. Noted by Carroll Hawkins..... 1377
L'Attivista di Partito. Francesco Alberoni, Vittorio Capecchi, Agopik Manoukian, Franca Olivetti, and Antonio Tosi. Noted by Robert D. Putnam................ 1352
Laumann, Edward O. *Prestige and Association in an Urban Community: An Analysis of an Urban Stratification System.* Noted by Vincent L. Marando......... 619
La Vie Politique en France Depuis 1940. Jacques Chapsal. Noted by James M. Clark............................ 294
Lawyers and the Courts: A Sociological Study of the English Legal System, 1750–1965. Brian Abel-Smith and Robert Stevens. Noted by Theodore L. Becker......... 297
Lee, Eugene C. and Robert R. Alford. *Voting Turnout in American Cities*...... 796
Lefever, Ernest W. *Uncertain Mandate.* Reviewed by Crawford Young......... 1287
The Legal Significance of the Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Obed Y. Asamoah. Noted by A. R. Headley.......................... 693
Legg, Keith R. Note on Charles Yost, *The Insecurity of Nations: International Relations in the Twentieth Century*......... 1397
Legislative Representative in the Contemporary South. Malcolm E. Jewell. Noted by Ralph Eisenburg................. 1341
Lehman, J. F., Jr. and James E. Dougherty, eds. *Arms Control for the Late Sixties.* Noted by William P. Geberding........ 678
Leiserson, Avery. Review of Myron Weiner, *Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress*............. 584
Leiserson, Michael. *Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games*.......... 770
Leiss, William. Note on Paul Roazen, *Freud: Political and Social Thought*..... 1314
Lemaignen, Robert. *L'Europe au berceau: souvenirs d'un technocrate.* Noted by

Howard Bliss........................ 304
Lemercier-Quelquejay, Chantal and Alexandre Bennigsen. *Islam in the Soviet Union*. Noted by Robert A. Rupen..... 1002
Lenczowski, George. Review of Douglas E. Ashford, *Morocco-Tunisia: Politics and Planning*.......................... 587
Lenczowski, George. Review of Douglas E. Ashford, *National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia and Pakistan*............. 587
Lenczowski, George. Review of Douglas E. Ashford, *Perspectives of a Moroccan Nationalist*.......................... 587
Leng, Shao-chuan. *Justice in Communist China*. Noted by Chan Lien........... 1382
Lenin: The Man, The Theorist, The Leader: A Reappraisal. Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway, eds. Noted by Alfred G. Meyer.......................... 1001
Lerche, Charles O. *Last Chance in Europe: Bases for a New American Policy*. Reviewed by Frederick H. Hartmann..... 239
Le Socialisme Democratique, 1864–1960. Jacques Droz. Noted by William Ebenstein.............................. 257
L'Europe au berceau: souvenirs d'un technocrate. Robert Lemaignen. Noted by Howard Bliss...................... 304
Levantrosser, William F. *Congress and the Citizen-Soldier*. Noted by Lewis A. Froman, Jr........................... 263
Le Vine, Victor T. Note on Colin Leys and Peter Robson, eds., *Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems*...... 1354
Le Vine, Victor T. Note on Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Unity* 1354
Levine, Solomon B. Review of Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966*................ 1300
Levy, Leonard W. *Origins of the Fifth Amendment*. Noted by Dean Alfange, Jr. 1334
Lewis, Paul H. *The Politics of Exile: Paraguay's Febrerista Party*. Noted by Ronald H. McDonald...................... 1356
Leys, Colin and Peter Robson, eds. *Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems*. Noted by Victor T. Le Vine.. 1354
A Liberal State At War: English Politics and Economics During the Crimean War. Olive Anderson. Noted by Charles Mark 668
Lichtheim, George. *The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays*. Noted by George Kateb............................ 600
Liddle, William. Note on Tarzie Vittachi, *The Fall of Sukarno*................. 670
Liddle, William R. Note on Bruce Grant, *Indonesia*.......................... 670
Lidtke, Vernon L. *The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878–1890.* Noted by Edward L. Pinney.......... 270
Lien, Chan. Note on Shao-chuan Leng, *Justice in Communist China*............ 1382
Lijphart, Arend. *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands*. Noted by Andries Hoogerwerf......................... 1349
Lijphart, Arend. *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea.* Noted by James C. Scott............. 314
Lind, Alden E. Note on Joseph L. Bernd, ed., *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, II*...................... 615
Linden, Carl A. Note on Henry W. Morton and Peter H. Juviler, eds., *Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition*............................. 288
Lindsay, David. *Communication* on the "myth" that communist governments have never been voted into power in a free election........................ 1272
Lineberry, Robert L. and Edmund P. Fowler. *Communication* on Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government"............ 230
Lineberry, Robert L. Note on Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks, *Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems*................. 621
Lippincott, Benjamin E. *Democracy's Dilemma: The Totalitarian Party in a Free Society*. Noted by Kurt P. Tauber...... 1315
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan, eds. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. Reviewed by Robert C. Fried..................... 960
Lipsitz, Lewis. *Communication* on criticisms of his article "If, As Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do Then to Save Our Souls?".... 577
Lipsitz, Lewis. *If as Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do Then to Save Our Souls?*........... 527
Lipsky, Michael. *Protest as a Political Resource*.......................... 1144
Lipson, Leslie. Note on Joseph E. Kallenbach, *The American Chief Executive: The Presidency and the Governorship*.... 626
Liska, George. *Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy*. Noted by Clifton E. Wilson................ 681
Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism. Maurice Meisner. Noted by Mostafa Rejai...................... 1310
Literary Dissent in Communist China. Merle Goldman. Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin......................... 588
Locke, John. *Two Tracts on Government.*

Philip Abrams, ed. Noted by Fred H. Willhoite 614
Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction? Richard Ashcraft 898
Lodge, Milton. *Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period* 827
Loewenberg, Gerhard. Note on William Safran, *Veto-Group Politics: The Case of Health-Insurance Reform in West Germany* 1357
The Logic of Choice: An Investigation of the Concepts of Rule and Rationality. Gidon Gottlieb. Noted by Stuart S. Nagel 1308
Loman, Louis E. *Thailand: The War That Is, The War That Will Be.* Noted by Robert O. Tilman 1390
London, Kurt, ed. *Eastern Europe in Transition.* Noted by Carl Beck 289
Lopreato, Joseph. Note on Gianfranco Poggi, *Catholic Action in Italy: The Sociology of a Sponsored Organization* . . . 255
Loveday, P. and A. W. Martin. *Parliament Factions and Parties: The First 30 Years of Responsible Government in New South Wales, 1856–1889.* Noted by John Orbell 1000
Lowe, Donald M. *The Function of "China" in Marx, Lenin and Mao.* Noted by Mostafa Rejai 1310
Lowe, Jeanne R. *Cities in a Race With Time: Progress and Poverty in America's Renewing Cities.* Noted by Vincent L. Marando 619
Lowenstein, Ralph L. and Paul L. Fisher. eds. *Race and the News Media.* Noted by David L. Paletz 639
Lowi, Theodore J. Note on Louis Eisenstein and Elliot Rosenberg, *A Stripe of Tammany's Tiger* 642
L'Union pour la Nouvelle République: Etude du pouvoir au sein d'un parti politique. Jean Charlot. Noted by John E. Schwarz 294
Lytle, Clifford M. Note on Leo Katcher, *Earl Warren: A Political Biography* 631

Mackenzie, W. J. M. *Politics and Social Science.* Noted by Thomas Wm. Madron 975
Mackintosh, Malcolm. *Juggernaut: The Russian Forces, 1918–1966.* Noted by Roman Kolkowicz 658
MacMaster, Robert E. *Danilevsky, A Russian Totalitarian Philosopher.* Noted by Rolf H. W. Theen 256
Macridis, Roy C., Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger and Richard L. Merritt. *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance; A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics.* Reviewed by Donald D. Searing 240
Madron, Thomas Wm. Note on W. J. M. Mackenzie, *Politics and Social Science* . . 975
Magid, Alvin. Note on Wolfgang R. Stolper, *Planning Without Facts: Lessons in Resource Allocation from Nigeria's Development* 654
Maichel, Karol, comp. *Soviet and Russian Newspapers at the Hoover Institution: A Catalog.* Noted by Fritz T. Epstein 660
Main, Jackson Turner. *The Upper House in Revolutionary America, 1763–1788.* Noted by Joseph Cooper 1331
Majority vs. Opposition in the French National Assembly, 1956–1965: A Guttman Scale Analysis. David M. Wood 88
Majumdar, Bimanbehari. *History of Indian Social and Political Ideas—From Rammohun to Dayananda.* Noted by D. MacKenzie Brown 611
The Making of the Second Reform Bill. F. B. Smith. Noted by James B. Christoph . . 1378
Malapportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures. Allan G. Pulsipher and James L. Weatherby, Jr. 1207
The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture. Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. 564
Manoukian, Agopik, Francesco Alberoni, Vittorio Capecchi, Franca Olivetti, and Antonio Tosi. *L'Attivista di Partito.* Noted by Robert D. Putnam 1352
Mansfield, Harvey C. Review of Walter W. Heller, *New Dimensions of Political Economy* 248
Mao Tse-tung in Opposition 1927–1935. John E. Rue. Noted by Donald G. Gillin 669
Marando, Vincent L. Note on Derek Senior, ed., *The Regional City: An Anglo-American Discussion of Metropolitan Planning* 619
Marando, Vincent. Note on Edward O. Laumann, *Prestige and Association in an Urban Community: An Analysis of an Urban Stratification System* 619
Marando, Vincent L. Note on Jeanne R. Lowe, *Cities in a Race With Time: Progress and Poverty in America's Renewing Cities* 619
Margolis, Julius, Richard E. Caves and Joe S. Bain. *Northern California's Water Industry.* Noted by Ashley L. Schiff 634
Mark, Charles. Note on Olive Anderson, *A Liberal State at War: English Politics and Economics During the Crimean War* 668
Martin, A. W. and P. Loveday. *Parliament Factions and Parties: The First 30 Years of Responsible Government in New South*

Wales, 1856–1889. Noted by John Orbell 1000
Martin, John Bartlow. *Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War.* Noted by Frederico G. Gil.......................... 310
Martin, L. W. *The Sea in Modern Strategy.* Noted by Bernard Brodie............. 1019
Martin, Roscoe C. Note on Aaron Wildavsky, ed., *American Federalism in Perspective*.......................... 624
Marvick, Dwaine. Note on Piet Thoenes, ed., *The Elite in the Welfare State*...... 603
Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century: A Yugoslav Philosopher Reconsiders Karl Marx's Writings. Gajo Petrovic. Noted by Edward D. Wilde................. 613
Marxism: A Re-Examination. Irving M. Zeitlin. Noted by Samuel Hendel....... 974
Mason, Bruce B. Note on Alfred G. Gerteiny, *Mauritania*................... 1381
Mason, Warren L. Note on G. Lowell Field, *Comparative Political Development: The Precedent of the West*.............. 280
Masters, Roger D. Note on Alan R. Beals and Bernard J. Siegel, *Divisiveness and Social Conflict*....................... 618
Mathematical Applications in Political Science, II. Bernd, Joseph L., ed. Noted by Alden E. Lind..................... 615
Mathematical Applications in Political Science, III. Joseph L. Bernd, ed. Reviewed by Herbert F. Weisberg........ 1294
Mauritania. Alfred G. Gerteiny. Noted by Bruce B. Mason..................... 1381
Maw, Ba. *Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939–1946.* Noted by Fred R. von der Mehden.............. 1363
Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France. Philip C. F. Bankwitz. Noted by John N. Colas..... 1004
Meyer, Arno J. *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919.* Noted by Whitney T. Perkins................ 1014
Mayhew, David R. Review of James T. Patterson. *Congressional Conservatism and and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939*.............................. 1298
Mazrui, Ali A. *Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition.* Noted by Herbert J. Spiro.................... 258
McBride, Michael and Michael P. Gehlen. *The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis*............................ 1232
McCamant, John F. and Ernest A. Duff. *Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America*................................ 1125
McCormick, Richard P. *The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era.* Noted by William Nisbet Chambers.......................... 1330
McCrone, Donald and Charles F. Cnudde. *Communication* on Forbes and Tufte, "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling".. 1269
McDonald, Ronald H. Note on Paul H. Lewis, *The Politics of Exile: Paraguay's Febrerista Party*..................... 1356
McLin, Jon B. *Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957–1963: The Problems of a Middle Power In Alliance.* Reviewed by Gilbert R. Winham.................. 965
McShea, Robert J. *The Political Philosophy of Spinoza.* Noted by Stanley Rosen.... 1323
A Measure of the Population Quality of Legislative Apportionments. Henry F. Kaiser................................ 208
Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems. Steven J. Brams...... 461
Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America. Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant. 1125
Meehan, Eugene J. Note on Oran R. Young, *Systems of Political Science*............ 1322
Meisel, James H. Note on A. James Gregor, *Contemporary Radical Ideologies: Totalitarian Thought in the Twentieth Century* 1307
Meisner, Maurice. *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism.* Noted by Mostafa Rejai...................... 1310
Merelman, Richard M. *Communication* on criticisms of his article "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power".. 1269
METHODOLOGY
Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems. Steven J. Brams...... 461
National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List. Bruce M. Russett, J. David Singer and Melvin Small............................... 932
A Nonlinear Model for the Analysis of Judicial Decisions. Fred Kort.......... 546
A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling. Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte............................... 1258
Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis. A. James Gregor............ 425
Probabilism and the Number of Units Affected Measuring Influence Concentration. Bruce M. Russett................ 476
A Salience Dimension of Politics for the Study of Political Culture. Moshe M. Czudnowski.......................... 878
A Theorem about Voting. Thomas W. Casstevens.......................... 205

Milbrath, Lester W. Note on Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children*... 1348
Melotti, Umberto. *Cultura e partecipazione sociale nella citta in transformazione.* Noted by Samuel H. Barnes........... 273
Mendel, Douglas, Jr. Note on Lung-Chu Chen, and Harold Lasswell, *Formosa, China and the United Nations—Formosa in the World Community*.............. 673
Meranto, Philip. *The Politics of Federal Aid to Education in 1965: A Study in Political Innovation.* Noted by Lawrence K. Pettit............................. 635
Merelman, Richard M. *On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power*........... 451
Merritt, Richard L., Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, and Roy C. Macridis. *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance; A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics.* Reviewed by Donald D. Searing....... 240
Metcalf, Lee and Vic Reinemer. *Overcharge.* Noted by Kenneth Kofmehl..... 264
Methods of Organizational Research. Victor H. Vroom, ed. Reviewed by Todd La Porte............................... 246
Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism. Bernard J. Frieden. Noted by Thomas J. Anton.................... 623
Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems. Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks. Noted by Robert L. Lineberry......................... 621
Meyer, Alfred G. Note on Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway, eds., *Lenin: The Man, The Theorist, The Leader: A Reappraisal*............................ 1001
Mickiewicz, Ellen. Note on Karel Hulicka, and Irene M. Hulicka, *Soviet Institutions, The Individual and Society*............ 658
Mickiewicz, Ellen Propper. *Soviet Political Schools: The Communist Party Adult Instruction System.* Noted by Joel J. Schwartz.......................... 276
Miller, J. D. B. *The Politics of the Third World.* Noted by Jack C. Planodile.... 1017
Miller, Linda B. *World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts.* Reviewed by Lawrence S. Kaplan............................ 961
Milner, Neal. Note on Arthur Niederhoffer, *Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society*............................ 625
The Minority Party and Policy-Making in the House of Representatives. Charles O. Jones.............................. 481
Minority Politics in the Punjab. Baldev Raj Nayar. Noted by Theodore P. Wright, Jr................................ 650
Mitchell, William C. Review of Friedrich A. Hayek, *Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics*...................... 968
Mitchell, William C. *Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons.* Noted by George R. Boynton.. 250
Mitrany, David. *A Working Peace System.* Noted by Thomas Hovet, Jr.......... 303
Modelski, George and Jean-Luc Vellut. *Communication* on Russett et al, "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List"........ 952
Modern Yemen, 1918–1966. Manfred W. Wenner. Noted by George Kirk........ 647
The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph. Reviewed by Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr.............. 1280
The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome. Donald Earl. Noted by Deane E. Neubauer............................. 609
Morey, Roy D. Note on Jack E. Holmes, *Politics in New Mexico*................ 641
Morgan, Donald G. *Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility.* Noted by Dale Vinyard.................... 986
Morocco-Tunisia: Politics and Planning. Douglas E. Ashford. Reviewed by George Lenczowski......................... 587
Morrison, Joseph L. *W. J. Cash: Southern Prophet: A Biography and Reader.* Noted by David M. Abshire................. 991
Morton, Henry W. and Peter H. Juviler, eds. *Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition.* Noted by Carl A. Linden.......................... 288
Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political Party Organization. M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert......... 1159
Movies, Censorship and the Law. Ira H. Carmen. Noted by Robert S. Gerstein.. 266
Muir, William K. Jr. *Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change.* Reviewed by Sheldon Goldman.......... 1285
Muller, Kurt. *The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China: An Analysis.* Noted by Marshall I. Goldman.............................. 1021
Murphy, George G. S. *Soviet Mongolia. A Study of the Oldest Political Satellite.* Noted by George Ginsburgs........... 291
Murty, B. S. *Propaganda and World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion.* Noted by Anthony A. D'amato................. 1392
Myrdal, Gunnar. *Asian Drama: An Inquiry*

into the Poverty of Nations. Reviewed by Jean Grossholtz 1278
The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya. Carl H. Rosberg, Jr. and John Nottingham. Noted by David H. Johns . 285

Nagel, Stuart S. Note on Gidon Nottlieb, *The Logic of Choice: An Investigation of the Concepts of Rule and Rationality* 1308
Najjar, Fauzi M. Review of Malcolm Kerb, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida* 972
Nash, A. E. Keir. Review of William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, *The American Party Systems* 1275
National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations. Jack E. Vincent 916
National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia and Pakistan. Douglas E. Ashford. Reviewed by George Lenczowski . . . 587
National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List. Bruce M. Russett, J. David Singer and Melvin Small 932
"National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List," Russett et al. *Communication* by George Modelski and Jean-Luc Vellut 952
"National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List," Russett et al. *Communication* by Michael Haas . . 952
Nationalists Without Nations: The Oligarchy Versus the People in Latin America. Victor Alba. Noted by Peter Ranis 1383
NATO and Europe. André Beaufre. Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold 1296
NATO and the Range of American Choice. William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox. Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold . 1296
The Nature of Political Inquiry. Fred M. Frohock. Noted by Edwin Fogelman . . . 973
Nayar, Baldev Raj. *Minority Politics in the Punjab.* Noted by Theodore P. Wright, Jr 650
The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town 1930–1935. William Sheridan Allen. Noted by G. Bingham Powell, Jr. 272
Needler, Martin C. *Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America* 889
The Negro in Federal Employment. Samuel Krislov. Noted by Richard Claude 637
The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1902–1965. Andrew Buni. Noted by Lewis Bowman . 638
Nehru's Mantle: The Politics of Succession in India. Michael Brecher. Noted by Paul R. Brass 293
Nellis, John R. and Fred G. Burke. Note on Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno, eds., *Boston University Papers on Africa, Transition in African Politics* 283
Nelson, William R. Note on Jacques Ellul, *The Technological Society* 603
Neubauer, Deane E. *Communication* on criticisms of his article "Some Conditions of Democracy" 581
Neubauer, Deane E. Note on Donald Earl, *The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome* 609
New Dimensions of Political Economy. Walter W. Heller. Reviewed by Harvey C. Mansfield 248
New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans: The Genesis of an Early Party Machine. Carl F. Prince. Reviewed by Manning J. Dauer 595
Newman, Dale A. Note on James L. Price, *Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory of Propositions* 1320
Nichols, Roy F. *The Invention of the American Political Parties.* Noted by James S. Young 268
Niederhoffer, Arthur. *Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society.* Noted by Neal Milner 625
Niemi, Richard G. and M. Kent Jennings. *The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child* 169
Nomos X: Representation. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds. Reviewed by James A. Steintrager 1289
A Nonlinear Model for the Analysis of Judicial Decisions. Fred Kort 546
North Carolina Politics: An Introduction. Jack D. Fleer. Noted by Lewis Bowman 1347
Northern California's Water Industry. Joe S. Bain, Richard E. Caves and Julius Margolis. Noted by Ashley L. Schiff 634
A Note on Censorship. Gordon Tullock 1265
A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling. Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte 1258
The Notion of the State: An Introduction to Political Theory. Alexander Passerin d'Entrèves. Noted by Maynard Smith . . 1319
Nottingham, John and Carl H. Rosberg, Jr. *The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya.* Noted by David H. Johns 285
Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense. Joel Larus. Noted by Timothy Alden Williams 1396
Nyomarkay, Joseph. *Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party.* Reviewed by H. P. Secher 590

The OAS and United States Foreign Policy. Jerome Slater. Noted by Yale H. Ferguson . . . 308
Obler, Jeffrey L. Note on Frederic Debuyst, *La Fonction Parlementaire en Belgique: Mecanismes D'Access et Images* . . . 274
O'Leary, Michael K. Review of Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* . . . 970
O'Leary, Michael Kent. *The Politics of American Foreign Aid.* Noted by Vincent Davis . . . 680
Olivetti, Franca, Francesco Alberoni, Vittorio Capecchi, Agopik Manoukian, and Antonio Tosi. *L'Attivista di Partito.* Noted by Robert D. Putnam . . . 1352
Olorunsola, Victor A. Note on Robert F. Stevenson, *Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa* . . . 1386
Olson, David J. Note on Jerome Rothenberg, *Economic Evaluation of Urban Renewal: Conceptual Foundation of Benefit-Cost Analysis* . . . 993
On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice. J. Woodford Howard, Jr. . . . 43
On Law and Justice. Paul A. Freund. Noted by William N. Beaney . . . 1335
On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power. Richard M. Merelman . . . 451
O'Neill, Robert. *The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–39.* Reviewed by H. P. Secher . . . 590
Orbell, John. Note on P. Loveday and A. W. Martin, *Parliament Factions and Parties: The First 30 Years of Responsible Government in New South Wales, 1856–1889* . . . 1000
Ordeshook, Peter C. and William H. Riker. *A Theory of the Calculus of Voting* . . . 25
Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory of Propositions. James L. Price. Noted by Dale A. Newman . . . 1320
Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics of Congress. Lewis A. Froman, Jr. . . . 518
Organizations in Action. James D. Thompson. Reviewed by Todd La Porte . . . 246
The Origins of Malay Nationalism. William R. Roff. Noted by James F. Guyot . . . 648
The Origins of Modern African Thought: Its Development in West Africa During the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Robert W. July. Noted by Fred M. Hayward 1313
Origins of the Fifth Amendment. Leonard W. Levy. Noted by Dean Alfange, Jr. . . 1334
Orlans, Harold. *Contracting for Atoms.* Noted by Don E. Kash . . . 981
Osgood, Robert E. and Robert W. Tucker. *Force, Order and Justice.* Noted by Philip Green . . . 1012
The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878–1890. Vernon L. Lidtke. Noted by Edward L. Pinney . . . 270
Overcharge. Lee Metcalf and Vic Reinemer. Noted by Kenneth Kofmehl . . . 264
Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War. John Bartlow Martin. Noted by Frederico G. Gil . . . 310

Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives. Gustav F. Papanek. Noted by Khalid B. Sayeed . . . 1388
Paletz, David L. Note on Paul L. Fisher and Ralph L. Lowenstein, *Race and the News Media* . . . 639
Paletz, David L. Note on William A. Wood, *Electronic Journalism* . . . 639
Palfreeman, A. C. *The Administration of the White Australia Policy.* Noted by D. W. Rawson . . . 1389
Palmer, Norman D. Note on Fred Greene, *U. S. Policy and the Security of Asia* . . . 1400
Panditji: A Portrait of Jawaharlal Nehru. Marie Seton. Noted by Joseph P. Harris 651
Papanek, Gustav F. *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives.* Noted by Khalid B. Sayeed . . . 1388
Parente, William. Note on Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson, eds., *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev* . . . 1385
Parente, William. Note on Allen Kassof, ed., *Prospects for Soviet Society* . . . 1385
Pareto and Pluto-Democracy: The Retreat to Galapagos. S. E. Finer . . . 440
Parliament Factions and Parties: The First 30 Years of Responsible Government in New South Wales, 1856–1889. P. Loveday and A. W. Martin. Noted by John Orbell 1000
Parsons, Malcolm B. Note on Richard Polenberg, *Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government: The Controversy Over Executive Reorganization 1936–1939* . . . 627
Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress. Myron Weiner. Reviewed by Avery Leiserson . . . 584
Party Democracy: Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation. Samuel H. Barnes. Noted by Timothy M. Hennessey . . . 1351
Party Leaders in the House of Representatives. Randall B. Ripley. Noted by Eugene Eidenberg . . . 1325
Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds. Reviewed by Robert C. Fried . . . 960
Patterns of African Development. Spiro,

Herbert J., ed. Noted by Charles F. Andrain 284
Patterson, James T. *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Consevative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939*. Reviewed by David R. Mayhew 1298
Peaceful Coexistence: International Law in the Building of Communism. Bernard A. Ramundo. Noted by W. W. Kulski 312
Peasant Communism in Southern Italy. Sidney G. Tarrow. Reviewed by Norman Kogan 1282
The Pendergast Machine. Lyle W. Dorsett. Noted by Douglas Fox 1337
Pennock, J. Roland and John W. Chapman, eds. *Nomos X: Representation*. Reviewed by James A. Steintrager 1289
Perkins, Whitney T. Note on Arno J. Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking; Containment and Counterrevolution of Versailles, 1918–1919* 1014
Perkins, Whitney T. Note on Byron Dexter, *The Years of Opportunity: The League of Nations, 1920–1926* 1014
Perlmann, Moshe. Note on Shaybani, Siyar. *The Islamic Law of Nations* 671
Perspectives of a Moroccan Nationalist. Douglas E. Ashford. Reviewed by George Lenczowski 587
Perspectives of Brazilian History. E. Bradford Burns, ed. Noted by Jordan M. Young 281
Perspectives on the Court. Max Freedman, William M. Beaney and Eugene V. Rostow. Noted by Bradley C. Canon . . . 265
Pesonen, Pertti, ed. *Scandinavian Political Studies*. Reviewed by Christian Bay 237
Peter and Caesar: The Catholic Church and Political Authority. E. A. Goerner. Noted by Glenn Tinder 610
Peterson, Robert L. Note on W. Hartley, Clark, *The Politics of the Common Market* 677
Petrovic, Gajo. *Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century: A Yugoslav Philosopher Reconsiders Karl Marx's Writings*. Noted by Edward D. Wilde 613
Pettit, Lawrence K. Note on Philip Meranto, *The Politics of Federal Aid to Education in 1965: A Study in Political Innovation* 635
Phelan, John Leddy. *The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century*. Noted by Robert G. Wesson 1006
The Phenomenology of the Social World. Alfred Schutz. Noted by Hwa Yol Jung . 614
Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat. Joseph Rothschild. Noted by Vaclav L. Benes 1370
Pinard, Maurice. Note on Edward M. Corbett, *Quebec Confronts Canada* 1367
Pincus, John. *Trade, Aid and Development*. Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield . . 242
Pinney, Edward L. Note on Vernon L. Lidtke., *The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany, 1878–1890* 270
Piper, Don C. Note on Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* 679
Pirro, Ellen B. Note on Richard R. Fagen, *Politics and Communication* 607
Pirro, Ellen B. Note on Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp, and Lewis Donohew, *Content Analysis of Communications* 607
Plank, John, ed. *Cuba and the United States: Long-Range Perspectives*. Reviewed by Richard R. Fagen 1291
Planning and Development in Iran. George B. Baldwin. Noted by Marvin Zonis 645
Planning and the Market in the U.S.S.R.: the 1960's. Alexander Balinsky, Abram Bergson, John N. Hazard, and Peter Wiles. Noted by Arthur W. Wright 655
Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union, 1962–1966. Eugene Zaleski. Noted by Robert Campbell 656
Planning Without Facts: Lessons in Resource Allocation from Nigeria's Development. Wolfgang F. Stolper. Noted by Alvin Magid 654
Plano, Jack C. Note on J. D. B. Miller, *The Politics of the Third World* 1017
Platt, George M. Note on Harry G. Johnson, *Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries* 682
Poggi, Gianfranco. *Catholic Action in Italy: The Sociology of a Sponsored Organization*. Noted by Joseph Lopreato 255
Pole, J. R. *Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic*. Noted by Harold F. Gosnell . . . 608
Polenberg, Richard. *Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government: The Controversy Over Executive Reorganization 1936–1939*. Noted by Malcolm B. Parsons 627
Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis. Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone 124
The Political Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration In Comparative Political Analysis. Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner. Reviewed by Gerald A. Weiner 583
The Political Beliefs of Americans. A Study of Public Opinion. Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril. Noted by Aage Clausen 1345
The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. Douglas W. Rae. Noted by John Sprague 606

The Political Creature. Peter Zollinger. Noted by Sidney Waldman 1318
Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America. Martin C. Needler 889
The Political Economy of South Africa. Ralph Horwitz. Noted by David Gugin 652
Political Institutions and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century. Eugene N. Anderson and Pauline R. Anderson. Noted by Charles Lewis Taylor 1360
Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis. Lewis J. Edinger, ed. Noted by Thomas A. Baylis 644
The Political Life of American Teachers. Harmon Zeigler. Noted by Jack Dennis 1339
Political Participation in Communist China. James R. Townsend. Noted by John E. Rue 995
Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure. F. C. Engelmann and M. A. Schwartz. Noted by Bernard K. Johnpoll 278
Political Philosophy and Time. John G. Gunnell. Noted by George Kateb 1303
The Political Philosophy of Spinoza. Robert J. McShea. Noted by Stanley Rosen 1323
Political Protest in the Congo. Herbert Weiss. Reviewed by Crawford Young 1287
Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic. J. R. Pole. Noted by Harold F. Gosnell 608
Political Science and Ideology. William E. Connolly. Noted by Peter Bachrach 599
The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine. Herbert A. Deane. Noted by David G. Smith 979
Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis. A. James Gregor 425
Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States. Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings 852
Political Television. Bernard Rubin. Noted by Bradbury Seasholes 1327
POLITICAL THEORY
A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices. Ted Gurr 1104
Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism. Robert A. Schoenberger 868
Decision Costs in Coalition Formation. Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press 556
If, as Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do Then to Save Our Souls? Lewis Lipsitz 527
The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic Theory. Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey 5
Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction? Richard Ashcraft 898
A Note on Censorship. Gordon Tullock 1265
Pareto and Pluto-Democracy: The Retreat to Galapagos. S. E. Finer 440
Protest as a Political Resource. Michael Lipsky 1144
Some Thoughts on the Relation of Political Theory to Anthropology. Carl J. Friedrich 536
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook 25
Political Theory and the Rights of Man. D. Raphael, ed. Noted by John Rawls 977
The Political World of the High School Teacher. Harmon Zeigler. Noted by Jack Dennis 1339
Politics and Communication. Richard R. Fagen. Noted by Ellen B. Pirro 607
Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment at Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918–1919. Arno J. Mayer. Noted by Whitney T. Perkins 1014
Politics and Social Science. W. J. M. Mackenzie. Noted by Thomas Wm. Madron 975
Politics and Television. Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang. Noted by Bradbury Seasholes 1327
Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921–1957. P. J. Vatikiotis. Noted by Richard H. Dekmejian 1375
Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964. Thomas E. Skidmore. Noted by Jordan M. Young 281
Politics in New Mexico. Jack E. Holmes. Noted by Roy D. Morey 641
The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. Arend Lijphart. Noted by Andries Hoogerwerf 1349
The Politics of American Foreign Aid. Michael Kent O'Leary. Noted by Vincent Davis 680
The Politics of the Common Market. W. Hartley Clark. Noted by Robert L. Peterson 677
The Politics of Conformity in Latin America. Claudio Veliz, ed. Noted by Kenneth N. Walker 1011
The Politics of Exile: Paraguay's Febrerista Party. Paul H. Lewis. Noted by Ronald H. McDonald 1356
The Politics of Federal Aid to Education in 1965: A Study in Political Innovation. Philip Meranto. Noted by Lawrence K. Pettit 635
The Politics of Food For Peace: Executive-Legislative Interaction. Peter A. Toma. Noted by John M. Richardson, Jr. 1340
The Politics of Futility: The General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland, 1917–1943.

Bernard K. Johnpoll. Noted by Joseph Dunner . . . 667
The Politics of Poverty. John C. Donovan. Noted by John H. Strange . . . 636
The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 1918–1932. David Burner. Noted by Jay S. Goodman 987
The Politics of the European Communism States. Ghita Ionescu. Noted by Robert A. Rupen . . . 663
The Politics of the Third World. J. D. B. Miller. Noted by Jack C. Plano . . . 1017
Polsby, Nelson W. *The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives* . 144
Pontius, Dale. Note on *Arms Control Arrangements for the Far East* . . . 687
Popular Government in America: Foundations and Principles. Charles S. Hyneman. Reviewed by Neal Riemer . . . 1284
Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa. Robert F. Stevenson. Noted by Victor A. Olorunsola . . . 1386
Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. Note on William Sheridan Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town. 1930–1935* . . . 272
Powell, Sandra. *Communication* on "Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952." . . . 578
Power, Paul F. Note on Richard H. Sanger, *Insurgent Era: New Patterns of Political Economic and Social Revolution* . . . 1023
The Power Structure: Political Process in American Society. Arnold M. Rose. Noted by Andrew Hacker . . . 1301
Prairie State Politics: Popular Democracy in South Dakota. Alan L. Clem. Noted by John H. Fenton . . . 1333
Prayer in the Public Schools: Law and Attitude Change. William K. Muir, Jr. Reviewed by Sheldon Goldman . . . 1285
Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States, 1939–1941. Saul Friedlander. Reviewed by H. P. Secher . . . 590
The President as Chief Administrator. A. J. Wann. Noted by Peter Woll . . . 1338
Presidential Vetoes: 1792–1945. Carlton Jackson. Noted by Robert J. Kulisheck . 628
Press, Charles and Charles R. Adrian. *Decision Costs in Coalition Formation* . . . 556
Prestige and Association in an Urban Community: An Analysis of an Urban Stratification System. Edward O. Laumann. Noted by Vincent L. Marando . . . 619
Preston, Richard A. *Canada and "Imperial Defense": A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organization, 1867–1919.* Noted by Hiram M. Stout . . . 306
Price, James L. *Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory of Propositions.* Noted by Dale A. Newman . . . 1320
The Prime Minister's Policy Speech: A Case Study in Televised Politics. Colin A. Hughes and John S. Western. Noted by Kenneth H. Thompson . . . 999
Prince, Carl F. *New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans: The Genesis of an Early Party Machine.* Reviewed by Manning J. Dauer . . . 595
Pritchett, C. Herman. Note on Leonard Baker, *Back to Back: The Duel between FDR and the Supreme Court* . . . 631
Private Politics: A Study of Five Political Outlooks. A. F. Davies. Noted by Karl Braithwaite . . . 980
Probabilism and the Number of Units Affected: Measuring Influence Concentration. Bruce M. Russett . . . 476
Propaganda and World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion. B. S. Murty. Noted by Anthony A. D'amato . . . 1392
Prospects for Peacekeeping. Arthur M. Cox. Reviewed by Lawrence S. Kaplan . . . 961
Prospects for Soviet Society. Allen Kassof, ed. Noted by William Parente . . . 1385
Protest as a Political Resource. Michael Lipsky . . . 1144
Psychiatry and Public Affairs. Reports and Symposia of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. Reviewed by Harold D. Lasswell . . . 249
Public Management at the Bargaining Table. Kenneth O. Warner and Mary L. Hennessy. Noted by Donald P. Sprengel . . . 992
Public Opinion and Constitution Making in Pakistan, 1958-1962. Edgar A. and Kathryn R. Schuler. Noted by Richard N. Blue . . . 647
Pulsipher, Allan G. and James L. Weatherby, Jr. *Malapportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures* . . . 1207
Putnam, Robert D. Note on Francesco Alberoni, Vittorio Capecchi, Agopik Manoukian, Franca Olivetti, and Antonio Tosi, *L'Attivista di Partito* . . . 1352

Quebec Confronts Canada. Edward M. Corbett. Noted by Maurice Pinard . . . 1367
The Quest for a United Germany. Ferenc A. Váli. Noted by James H. Wolfe . . . 674
The Quest for Peace Through Diplomacy. Stephen D. Kertesz. Noted by Louis F. Brakeman . . . 679

Race and the News Media. Paul L. Fisher

and Ralph L. Lowenstein, eds. Noted by David L. Paletz 639
Rackow, Felix. Note on John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean Ear* 629
Rae, Douglas W. Note on James D. Davis, *Springboard to the White House: Presidential Primaries: How They Are Fought and Won* 261
Rae, Douglas W. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws.* Noted by John Sprague 606
Ramundo, Bernard A. *Peaceful Coexistence: International Law in the Building of Communism.* Noted by W. W. Kulski 312
Randall, Richard S. *Censorship of the Movies: The Social and Political Control of a Mass Medium.* Noted by Robert J. Steamer 1332
Ranis, Peter. Note on Victor Alba, *Nationalists Without Nations: The Oligarchy Versus the People in Latin America* 1383
Raphael, D., ed. *Political Theory and the Rights of Man.* Noted by John Rawls . . . 977
Rasmussen, Jorgen. Note on Francis G. Hutchins, *The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India* 307
Rawls, John. Note on D. Raphael, ed., *Political Theory and The Rights of Man* 977
Rawson, D. W. Note on A. C. Palfreeman. *The Administration of the White Australia Policy* 1389
Ray, Dennis M. Note on Franklin W. Houn, *A Short History of Chinese Communism* 1362
The Recruitment of Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons. Allan Kornberg and Hal H. Winsborough 1242
The Red Guard. Hans Granqvist. Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin 588
Reddaway, Peter and Leonard Schapiro, eds., *Lenin: The Man, The Theorist, The Leader: A Reappraisal.* Noted by Alfred G. Meyer 1001
Redekop, John H. *The American Far Right: A Case Study of Billy James Hargis and Christian Crusade.* Noted by Robert A. Schoenberger 982
Regenstreif, Peter. Note on Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labor in Politics* 1369
Régime Interne et Politique Extérieure Dans les Pays d'Asie. Georges Fischer et al. Noted by Robert O. Tilman 1364
The Regional City: An Anglo-American Discussion of Metropolitan Planning. Derek Senior, ed. Noted by Vincent L. Marando 619
Reinemer, Vic and Lee Metcalf. *Overcharge.* Noted by Kenneth Kofmehl 264
Reischauer, Edwin O. *Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia.* Noted by George G. Bauroth 685
Reischauer, Edwin O. Review of Robert M. Spaulding, Jr., *Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations* 966
Rejai, Mostafa. Note on Donald M. Lowe, *The Function of "China" in Marx, Lenin, and Mao* 1310
Rejai, Mostafa. Note on Maurice Meisner, *Li Tachao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism* 1310
Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government: The Controversy Over Executive Reorganization 1936–1939. Richard Polenberg. Noted by Malcolm B. Parsons 627
The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting. Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein 753
Resistance: The Political Autobiography of Georges Bidault. Georges Bidault. Noted by Michael R. Gordon 1003
The Revival of Democratic Theory. Neal Riemer. Noted by George W. Carey 1316
The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi. Victor E. Wolfenstein. Noted by Arnold A. Rogow 604
Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class. Maurice Zeitlin. Reviewed by Richard R. Fagen 1291
Ricci, David M. Note on Shlomo, Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* 1309
Richardson, James L. *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Integration of Strategy and Politics.* Noted by Charles B. Robson 676
Richardson, John M., Jr. Note on Peter A. Toma, *The Politics of Food for Peace: Executive-Legislative Interaction* 1340
Richter, Melvin. Review of *Correspondance d'Alexis de Tocqueville et de Gustave de Beaumont.* Texte Établi, Annoté et Préfacé Par André Jardin 234
Riemer, Neal. *The Democratic Experiment: American Political Theory. Vol. I.* Noted by George W. Carey 1316
Riemer, Neal. Review of Charles S. Hyneman, *Popular Government in America: Foundations and Principles* 1284
Riemer, Neal. *The Revival of Democratic Theory.* Noted by George W. Carey 1316
Ries, J. C. Note on Vincent Davis, *The Admirals' Hobby* 1344
Rieselbach, Leroy N. *The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy.* Noted by John H. Kessel 632
Riker, William H. and Peter C. Ordeshook. *A Theory of the Calculus of Voting* 25

Ripley, Randall B. *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives.* Noted by Eugene Eidenberg 1325

The Road to Jerusalem. Walter Laqueur. Noted by Malcolm H. Kerr 1403

Roazen, Paul. *Freud: Political and Social Thought.* Noted by William Leiss 1314

Robinson, James A. Review of Bertrand de Jouvenal. *The Art of Conjecture* 236

Robinson, Joan. *An Essay on Marxian Economics.* Noted by George R. Feiwel. 1010

Robson, Charles B. Note on James L. Richardson, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Integration of Strategy and Politics* 676

Robson, Peter and Colin Leys, eds. *Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems.* Noted by Victor T. Le Vine. . 1354

Rodman, John. Note on Klaus Epstein, *The Genesis of German Conservatism* 1007

Roff, William R. *The Origins of Malay Nationalism.* Noted by James F. Guyot 648

Rogow, Arnold A. Note on E. Victor Wolfenstein, *The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi* 604

Rokkan, Stein and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives.* Reviewed by Robert C. Fried 960

Romoser, George K. Note on Gerard Braunthal, *The Federation of German Industry on Politics* 664

The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy. Leroy N. Rieselbach. Noted by John H. Kessel 632

Rosberg, Carl H., Jr. and John Nottingham. *The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya.* Noted by David H. Johns 285

Rose, Arnold M. *The Power Structure: Political Process in American Society.* Noted by Andrew Hacker 1301

Rose, Richard. *Influencing Voters: A Study of Campaign Rationality.* Noted by Charles F. Cnudde 1365

Rosecrance, R. N. *Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch.* Noted by David W. Tarr 1395

Rosen, Stanley. Note on Robert J. McShea, *The Political Philosophy of Spinoza* 1323

Rosenau, James N. *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy.* Noted by Paul Y. Hammond 299

Rosenberg, Elliot and Louis Eisenstein. *A Stripe of Tammany's Tiger.* Noted by Theodore J. Lowi 642

Rosenbluth, Gideon. *The Canadian Economy and Disarmament.* Reviewed by Gilbert R. Winham 965

Rosenthal, Albert H. *The Social Programs of Sweden, A Search for Security in a Free Society.* Noted by Arne J. Stokke 1005

Ross, Alf. *The United Nations: Peace and Progress.* Reviewed by Lincoln P. Bloomfield 586

Rosser, Richard F. Note on Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism* 661

Rostow, Eugene V., Max Freedman and William M. Beaney. *Perspectives on the Court.* Noted by Bradley C. Canon 265

Rothenberg, Jerome. *Economic Evaluation of Urban Renewal: Conceptual Foundation of Benefit-Cost Analysis.* Noted by David J. Olson 993

Rothfels, Hans et al., eds. *Deutschlands Beziehungen zu Frankreich, Grossbritannien, Belgien sowie deutsche Entwaffung Reparationen, Völkerbund und internationale Abrüstung, Dezember 1925 bis Juli 1926, Akten zur deutschen auswartigen Politik, 1918–1945.* Vol. I. Noted by Stanley Suval 675

Rothschild, Joseph. *Pilsudski's Coup d'Etat.* Noted by Vaclav L. Benes 1370

Rubin, Bernard. *Political Television.* Noted by Bradbury Seasholes 1327

Rudolph, Lloyd I. and Susanne H. Rudolph. *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India.* Reviewed by Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. 1280

Rudolph, Susanne H. and Lloyd I. Rudolph. *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India.* Reviewed by Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. 1280

Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber. Review of Howard L. Erdman, *The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism* 1293

Rue, John E. *Mao Tse-tung in Opposition 1927–1935.* Noted by Donald G. Gillin. . 669

Rue, John E. Note on James R. Townsend, *Political Participation in Communist China* 995

Rumble, Wilfred E., Jr. *American Legal Realism: Skepticism, Reform, and the Judicial Process.* Noted by Michael A. Weinstein 1336

Rupen, Robert A. Note on Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* 1002

Rupen, Robert A. Note on Ghita Ionescu, *The Politics of the European Communist States* 663

Russett, Bruce M. *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology.* Reviewed by Michael K. O'Leary 970

Russett, Bruce, M., J. David Singer and

Melvin Small. *Communication* on criticisms of their article "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List." 955
Russett, Bruce M., J. David Singer and Melvin Small. *National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List* 932
Russett, Bruce M. *Probabilism and the Number of Units Affected: Measuring Influence Concentration* 476
The Russian Empire 1800–1917. Hugh Seton-Watson. Reviewed by Frederick C. Barghoorn 1276
Russian Political Thought: An Introduction. Thornton Anderson. Noted by R. V. Daniels 612

Sacks, Seymour and Alan K. Campbell. *Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems.* Noted by Robert L. Lineberry 621
Saenz, Paul. Note on Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* 653
Safran, William. *Veto-Group Politics: The Case of Health-Insurance Reform in West Germany.* Noted by Gerhard Loewenberg 1357
A Salience Dimension of Politics for the Study of Political Culture. Moshe M. Czudnowski 878
Sanger, Richard H. *Insurgent Era: New Patterns of Political, Economic and Social Revolution.* Noted by Paul F. Power 1023
Sayeed, Khalid B. Note on Gustav F. Papanek, *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives* 1388
Sayeed, Khalid B. Note on Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* 1388
Scalapino, Robert A. *The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920–1966.* Reviewed by Solomon B. Levine 1300
Scandinavian Political Studies. Pertti Pesonen, ed. Reviewed by Christian Bay 237
Schapiro, Leonard and Peter Reddaway, eds. *Lenin: The Man, The Theorist, The Leader: A Reappraisal.* Noted by Alfred G. Meyer 1001
Schapsmeier, Frederick H. Note on Robert F. Wesser, *Charles Evans Hughes: Politics and Reform in New York, 1905–1910* 630
Scheingold, Stuart A. Review of André Beaufre, *NATO and Europe* 1296
Scheingold, Stuart A. Review of Harold Van B. Cleveland, *The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals* 1296
Scheingold, Stuart A. Review of William T. R. Fox and Annette Baker Fox, *NATO and the Range of American Choice* 1296
Schieder, Theodor and Ferdinand A. Hermens. *Staat. Wirtschaft und Politik in der Weimarer Republik, Festschrift für Heinrich Brüning.* Noted by Andreas Dorpalen 665
Schiff, Ashley L. Note on Allen V. Kneese and Stephen C. Smith, eds. *Water Research* 634
Schiff, Ashley L. Note on Jor S. Bain, Richard E. Caves, and Julius Margolis, *Northern California's Water Industry* ... 634
Schnore, Leo F. and Henry Fagin. *Urban Research and Policy Planning.* Noted by Frank Smallwood 620
Schoenberger, Robert A. *Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism* 868
Schoenberger, Robert A. Note on John H. Redekop, *The American Far Right: A Case Study of Billy James Hargis and Christian Crusade* 982
Schrock, Thomas S. Review of Mark DeWolfe Howe. *The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History* 597
Schuler, Edgar A. and Kathryn R. *Public Opinion and Constitution Making in Pakistan.* Noted by Richard N. Blue 647
Schuler, Kathryn R. and Edgar A. *Public Opinion and Constitution Making in Pakistan.* Noted by Richard N. Blue ... 647
Schutz, Alfred. *The Phenomenology of the Social World.* Noted by Hwa Yol Jung 614
Schwartz, Joel J. and William R. Keech. *Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union* 840
Schwartz, Joel J. Note on Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, *Soviet Political Schools: The Communist Party Adult Instruction System* 276
Schwartz, M. A. and F. C. Engelmann, *Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure.* Noted by Bernard K. Johnpoll 278
Schwarz, John E. Note on Jean Charlot, *L'Union pour la Nouvelle République: Etude du pouvoir au sein d'un parti politique* 294
Scoble, Harry M. and Robert R. Alford. *Sources of Local Political Involvement* 1192
Scoble, Harry M. *Ideology and Electoral Action: A Comparative Case Study of the National Committee for an Effective Congress.* Noted by John H. Kessel 1326
Scott, Andrew. Note on Richard W. Cottam, *Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy* 304
Scott, Andrew M. *The Functioning of the International Political System.* Noted by Frederic Wurzburg 1016

Scott, James C. Note on Arend Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea* 314

Scott, Robert E. Note on Frederick C. Turner, *The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism* 1386

The Sea in Modern Strategy. L. W. Martin. Noted by Bernard Brodie 1019

Searing, Donald D., Review of Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis and Richard L. Merritt, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance; A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics* 240

Seasholes, Bradbury. Note on Bernard Rubin, *Political Television* 1327

Seasholes, Bradbury. Note on Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang, *Politics and Television* 1327

Secher, H. P. Review of Joseph Nyomarkay, *Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party* 590

Secher, H. P. Review of Robert O'Neill, *The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–39* 590

Secher, H. P. Review of Saul Friedlander, *Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States, 1939–1941* 590

The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era. Richard P. McCormick. Noted by William Nisbet Chambers 1330

Sectional Stress and Party Strength: A Study of Roll-Call Voting Patterns in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1836–1860. Thomas B. Alexander. Noted by James J. Best 633

Senior, Derek, ed. *The Regional City: An Anglo-American Discussion of Metropolitan Planning*. Noted by Vincent L. Marando 619

Seton, Marie. *Panditji: A Portrait of Jawaharlal Nehru*. Noted by Joseph P. Harris 651

Seton-Watson, Hugh. *The Russian Empire 1801–1917*. Reviewed by Frederick C. Barghoorn 1276

Shapiro, Michael J. *The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll-Call Voting* 494

Sharkansky, Ira. *Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures* 1220

Sherrard, Thomas D., ed. *Social Welfare and Urban Problems*. Noted by York Willbern 1348

Sherrill, Kenneth S. Note on John H. Bunzel, *Anti-Politics in America: the Anti-Political Temper and its Distortions of the Democratic Process* 1342

A Short History of Chinese Communism. Franklin W. Houn. Noted by Dennis M. Ray 1362

Shoup, Paul. *Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach* 185

Siegel, Bernard J. and Alan R. Beals. *Divisiveness and Social Conflict*. Noted by Roger D. Masters 618

Sigel, Roberta S. *Image of a President: Some Insights into the Political Views of School Children* 216

Simirenko, Alex, ed. *Soviet Sociology: Historical Antecedents and Current Appraisals*. Noted by Paul Hollander 252

Simpson, Smith. *Anatomy of the State Department*. Noted by L. L. Wade 267

Singer, J. David, Bruce M. Russett and Melvin Small. *Communication* on criticisms of their article "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List" 955

Singer, J. David, Bruce M. Russett and Melvin Small. *National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List* 932

Singh, Baljit. Note on K. R. Bombwall, *The Foundations of Indian Federalism* . . . 1008

Siyar, Shaybani. *The Islamic Law of Nations*. Noted by Moshe Perlmann 671

Skidmore, Thomas E. *Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964*. Noted by Jordan M. Young 281

Slater, Jerome. *The OAS and United States Foreign Policy*. Noted by Yale H. Ferguson 308

Small, Melvin, Bruce M. Russett and J. David Singer. *Communication* on criticisms of their article "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List" 955

Small, Melvin, Bruce M. Russett and J. David Singer. *National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List* 932

Smallwood, Frank. Note on Leo F. Schnore and Henry Fagin, *Urban Research and Policy Planning* 620

Smith, David G. Note on Herbert A. Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* 979

Smith, F. B. *The Making of the Second Reform Bill*. Noted by James B. Christoph 1378

Smith, Maynard. Note on Alexander Passerin d'Entrèves, *The Notion of the State: An Introduction to Political Theory* 1319

Smith, Stephen C. and Allen V. Kneese, eds. *Water Research*. Noted by Ashley L. Schiff 634

The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx. Shlomo Avineri. Noted by David M. Ricci.......... 1309

The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan. Totten, George Oakley, III. Noted by Ardath W. Burks.......... 277

The Social Programs of Sweden, A Search for Security in a Free Society. Albert H. Rosenthal. Noted by Arne J. Stokke.... 1005

The Social Psychology of Organizations. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn. Noted by Lewis Anthony Dexter.......... 1306

Social Welfare and Urban Problems. Thomas D. Sherrard, ed. Noted by York Willbern 1348

Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan. Allan B. Cole, George O. Totten and Cecil H. Uyehara. Noted by Ardath W. Burks... 277

Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons. William C. Mitchell. Noted by George R. Boynton 250

Some Reflections on Soviet-American Relations. Merle Fainsod.......... 1093

Some Thoughts on the Relation of Political Theory to Anthropology. Carl J. Friedrich 536

Sorenson, Theodore C. *Kennedy.* Noted by Aida DiPace Donald.......... 260

Sources of Local Political Involvement. Robert Alford and Harry M. Scoble........ 1192

Southern Africa and the United States. William A. Hance, ed. Noted by Edward Feit.......... 1366

Soviet and Chinese Communist Power in the World Today. Rodger Swearingen, ed. Noted by Jonathan Harris.......... 311

The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis. Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride.......... 1232

Soviet and East European Agriculture. Jerzy F. Karcz, ed. Noted by Roy D. Laird... 290

Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent. Jerome M. Gilison 814

Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period. Milton Lodge....... 827

Soviet and Russian Newspapers at the Hoover Institution: A Catalog. Karol Maichel, comp. Noted by Fritz T. Epstein.......... 660

Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism. Olaf Caroe. Noted by Richard F. Rosser.......... 661

Soviet Foreign Aid. Marshall I. Goldman. Noted by Leon M. Herman.......... 689

Soviet Institutions, The Individual and Society. Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka. Noted by Ellen Michiewicz.... 658

Soviet Mongolia. A Study of the Oldest Political Satellite. George G. S. Murphy. Noted by George Ginsburgs.......... 291

Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition. Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton, eds. Noted by Carl A. Linden.......... 288

Soviet Political Schools: The Communist Party Adult Instruction System. Ellen Propper Mickiewicz. Noted by Joel J. Schwartz.......... 276

Soviet Politics Since Krushchev. Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson, eds. Noted by William Parente.......... 1385

Soviet Sociology: Historical Antecedents and Current Appraisals. Alex Simirenko, ed. Noted by Paul Hollander.......... 252

The Soviet Union in the World Communist System. Vernon V. Aspaturian. Noted by Nish Jamgotch, Jr.......... 690

Spanier, John W. *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean war.* Noted by Felix Rackow.......... 629

Spaulding, Robert M. Jr. *Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations.* Reviewed by Edwin O. Reischauer 966

Spinelli, Altiero. *The Eurocrats.* Reviewed by Ronald Inglehart.......... 593

Spiro, Herbert J. *Communication* on Kaplan's review of his book "World Politics: The Global System".......... 1268

Spiro, Herbert J., ed. *Patterns of African Development.* Noted by Charles F. Andrain.......... 284

Spiro, Herbert J. Note on Ali A. Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition*.......... 258

Spiro, Herbert J. *World Politics: The Global System.* Noted by Morton A. Kaplan... 694

Sprague, John. Note on Douglas W. Rae. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*.......... 606

Sprengel, Donald P. Note on Kenneth O. Warner and Mary L. Hennessy, *Public Management at the Bargaining Table*.... 992

Springboard to the White House: Presidential Primaries: How They are Fought And Won. James D. Davis. Noted by Douglas W. Rae.......... 261

Staat, Wirtschaft und Politik in der Weimarer Republik, Festschrift für Heinrich Brüning. Ferdinand A. Hermens, and Theodor Schieder, eds. Noted by Andreas Dorpalen.......... 665

Stambuk, George, Vaclav Benes and Andrew Gyorgy. *Eastern European Government and Politics.* Noted by Carl Beck 289

Steamer, Robert J. Note on Richard S. Randall, *Censorship of the Movies: The Social and Political Control of a Mass Medium*.......... 1332

Steck, Henry J. Note on Gerald E. Caiden, *The Commonwealth Bureaucracy*........ 1000

Steintrager, James A. Review of J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., *Nomos X: Representation* 1289

Stevens, Robert and Brian Abel-Smith. *Lawyers and the Courts: A Sociological Study of the English Legal System, 1750–1965*. Noted by Theodore L. Becker 297

Stevenson, Robert F. *Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa*. Noted by Victor A. Olorunsola 1386

Stock, Ernest. *Israel on the Road to Sinai. 1949–1956*. Noted by George Kirk 691

Stokke, Arne J. Note on Albert H. Rosenthal, *The Social Programs of Sweden, A Search for Security in a Free Society* 1005

Stolper, Wolfgang R. *Planning Without Facts: Lessons in Resource Allocation from Nigeria's Development*. Noted by Alvin Magid 654

Stone, Jeremy J. *Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitations through Dialogue*. Reviewed by Lawrence S. Kaplan 961

Stout, Hiram M. Note on Richard A. Preston, *Canada and "Imperial Defense": A Study of the Origins of the British Commonwealth's Defense Organization, 1867–1919* 306

Strange, John H. Note on John C. Donovan, *The Politics of Poverty* 636

Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitations through Dialogue. Jeremy J. Stone. Reviewed by Lawrence S. Kaplan 961

A Stripe of Tammany's Tiger. Louis Eisenstein and Elliot Rosenberg. Noted by Theodore J. Lowi 642

The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa. Aristide R. Zolberg 70

Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Friedrich A. Hayek. Reviewed by William C. Mitchell 968

The Study of Total Societies. Samuel Z. Klausner., ed. Noted by C. P. Wolf 601

Survey Research in the Social Sciences. Charles Y. Glock, ed. Noted by Betty H. Zisk 251

Suval, Stanley. Note on Hans Rothfels, *Deutschlands Beziehungen zu Frankreich, Grossbritannien, Belgien sowie deutsche Entwaffung Reparationen, Völkerbund und internationale Abrüstung, Dezember 1925 bis Juli 1926 Akten zur deutschen auswartigen Politik, 1918–1945*. Vol. I 675

The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism. Howard L. Erdman. Reviewed by Susanne Hoeber Rudolph 1293

Swearingen, Rodger, ed. *Soviet and Chinese Communist Power in the World Today*. Noted by Jonathan Harris 311

Systems of Political Science. Oran R. Young. Noted by Eugene J. Meehan 1322

Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development. Henry Bienen. Noted by Paul Saenz 653

Tarr, David W. Note on R. N. Rosecrance, *Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch* 1395

Tarrow, Sidney G. Note on John M. Cammett, *Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism* 253

Tarrow, Sidney G. *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy*. Reviewed by Norman Kogan 1282

Tauber, Kurt P. Note on Benjamin E. Lippincott, *Democracy's Dilemma: The Totalitarian Party in a Free Society* 1315

Taylor, Charles Lewis. Note on Eugene N. Anderson and Pauline R. Anderson, *Political Institutions and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century* 1360

Teachers and Politics in France: A Pressure Group Study of the Federation de l'Education Nationale. James M. Clark. Noted by Bernard E. Brown 275

The Technological Society. Jacques Ellul. Noted by William R. Nelson 603

Teune, Henry. Note on Claude Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration* 978

Thailand: The War That Is, The War That Will Be. Louis E. Loman. Noted by Robert O. Tilman 1390

Theen, Rolf H. W. Note on Robert E. MacMaster, *Danilevsky, A Russian Totalitarian Philosopher* 256

A Theorem About Voting. Thomas W. Casstevens 205

A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook 25

A Theory of Political Integration. Claude Ake. Noted by Henry Teune 978

Thoenes, Piet, ed. *The Elite in the Welfare State*. Noted by Dwaine Marvick 603

Theory and Methods of Social Research. Johan Galtung. Noted by Fred M. Frohock 617

Thompson, James D. *Organizations in Action*. Reviewed by Todd La Porte 246

Thompson, Kenneth H. Note on Colin A. Hughes and John Western, *The Prime Minister's Policy Speech: A Case Study in Televised Politics* 999

Thorp, Robert K., Lewis Donohew and Richard W. Budd. *Content Analysis of Communications*. Noted by Ellen B. Pirro 607

Tillmann, Heinz. *Deutschlands Araber-*

politik im zweiten Weltkrieg. Noted by Gerhard von Glahn.................... 305
Tilman, Robert O. Note on Georges Fischer, et al., *Régime Interne et Politique Extérieure Dans les Pays d'Asie*........... 1364
Tilman, Robert O. Note on Louis E. Loman, *Thailand: The War That Is, The War That Will Be*......................... 1390
Tinder, Glenn. Note on E. A. Goerner, *Peter and Caesar: The Catholic Church and Political Authority*.................... 610
Toma, Peter A. *The Politics of Food for Peace: Executive-Legislative Interaction.* Noted by John M. Richardson, Jr...... 1340
Torney, Judith V. and Robert D. Hess. *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children.* Noted by Lester W. Milbrath 1348
Tosi, Antonio, Francesco Alberoni, Vittorio Capecchi, Agopik Manoukian, Franca Olivetti. *L'Attivista di Partito.* Noted by Robert D. Putnam.................. 1352
Totten, George O., Cecil H. Uyehara and Allan B. Cole. *Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan.* Noted by Ardath W. Burks 277
Totten, George Oakley, III. *The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan.* Noted by Ardath W. Burks............. 277
Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition. Ali A. Mazrui. Noted by Herbert J. Spiro.................. 258
Townsend, James R. *Political Participation in Communist China.* Noted by John E. Rue................................ 995
Trade, Aid and Development: The Rich and Poor Nations. John Pincus. Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield............... 242
Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries: Objectives and Alternatives. Bela Balassa. Noted by David S. Ball.. 692
Trager, Frank N. *Burma from Kingdom to Republic: A Historical and Political Analysis.* Noted by Fred R. von der Mehden............................ 1363
Trager, Helen G. *Burma Through Alien Eyes.* Noted by Fred R. von der Mehden 1363
The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child. M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi.................... 169
The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea. Arend Lijphart. Noted by James C. Scott.............. 314
Trial Courts in Urban Politics: State Court Policy Impact and Functions in a Local Political System. Kenneth M. Dolbeare. Noted by Irvin H. Bromall............ 983
The Trial of the Germans. Eugene Davidson. Noted by Elke Frank................. 1013
The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. John W. Spanier. Noted by Felix Rackow.................... 629
Tucker, Robert W. and Robert E. Osgood. *Force, Order and Justice.* Noted by Philip Green................................ 1012
Tufte, Edward R. and Hugh Donald Forbes. *A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling*........................... 1258
Tufte, Edward R. and Hugh Forbes. *Communication* on criticisms of their article "A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling" 1270
Tullock, Gordon. *A Note on Censorship*.... 1265
Turner, Frederick C. *The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism.* Noted by Robert E. Scott............................ 1386
Turner, John E. and Robert T. Holt. *The Political Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration in Comparative Political Analysis.* Reviewed by Gerald A. Weiner 583
The Twentieth Century Mind. Donald Atwell Zoll. Noted by J. Paul Johnston.... 259
The Two Faces of Co-Existence. Alfred Berzins. Noted by W. W. Kulski....... 312
Two Tracts on Government. John Locke. Philip Abrams, ed. Noted by Fred H. Willhoite.......................... 614

Uncertain Mandate. Ernest W. Lefever. Reviewed by Crawford Young..........1287
The Unfinished Revolution: Russia 1917–1967. Isaac Deutscher. Noted by Donald D. Barry........................... 662
The United Nations: Peace and Progress. Alf Ross. Reviewed by Lincoln Bloomfield............................... 586
United States Policy and the Third World: Problems and Analysis. Charles Wolf. Reviewed by Arpad von Lazar......... 243
The Upper House in Revolutionary America, 1763–1788. Jackson Turner Main. Noted by Joseph Cooper.................. 1331
Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto. Harold Kaplan. Noted by James L. Cox........... 643
Urban Research and Policy Planning. Leo F. Schnore and Henry Fagin. Noted by Frank Smallwood.................... 620
Uren, Philip E., and Adam Bromke, eds. *The Communist States and the West.* Noted by Jonathan Harris................ 311
U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia. Fred Greene. Noted by Norman D. Palmer... 1400
Uyehara, Cecil H., Allan B. Cole and George O. Totten. *Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan.* Noted by Ardath W. Burks..............................277

Váli, Ferenc A. *The Quest for a United Germany.* Noted by James H. Wolfe.... 674
Vandenbosch, Amry and Mary Belle.

Australia Faces Southeast Asia: The Emergence of a Foreign Policy. Noted by Henry S. Albinski 1407
Vandenbosch, Amry and Richard Butwell. *The Changing Face of Southeast Asia.* Noted by Frank C. Darling 313
Vandenbosch, Mary Belle and Amry. *Australia Faces Southeast Asia: The Emergence of a Foreign Policy.* Noted by Henry S. Albinski 1407
Vatikiotis, P. J. *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921–1957.* Noted by Richard H. Dekmejian 1375
Veliz, Claudio, ed. *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America.* Noted by Kenneth N. Walker 1011
Vellut, Jean-Luc and George Modelski. *Communication* on Russett, et al., "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List" 952
Verba, Sidney. *Communication.* "If, As Lipsitz Thinks, Political Science Is To Save Our Souls, God Help Us!" 576
Veto-Group Politics: The Case of Health-Insurance Reform in West Germany. William Safran. Noted by Gerhard Loewenberg 1357
Via, Emory F. Note on Thomas A. Krueger, *And Promises to Keep: The Southern Conference for Human Welfare* 269
Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi. Donald S. Zagoria. Noted by George G. Bauroth 686
Vincent, Jack E. *National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations* 916
Vinyard, Dale. Note on Donald G. Morgan, *Congress and the Constitution: A Study of Responsibility* 986
Vittachi, Tarzie. *The Fall of Sukarno.* Noted by William Liddle 670
von der Mehden, Fred R., Crawford Young and Charles W. Anderson, eds. *Issues of Political Development.* Reviewed by Arpad von Lazar 243
von der Mehden, Fred R. Note on Ba Maw, *Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939–1946* 1363
von der Mehden, Fred R. Note on Frank N. Trager, *Burma from Kingdom to Republic: A Historical and Political Analysis* 1363
von der Mehden, Fred R. Note on Helen G. Trager, *Burma Through Alien Eyes* 1363
von Glahn, Gerhard. Note on Heinz Tillmann, *Deutschlands Araberpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg* 305
von Lazar, Arpad. Review of Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, eds., *Issues of Political Development* 243
von Lazar, Arpad. Review of Charles Wolf, *United States Policy and the Third World: Problems and Analysis* 243
Voting Turnout in American Cities. Robert R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee 796
Vroom, Victor H., ed. *Methods of Organizational Research.* Reviewed by Todd La Porte 246

Wade, L. L. Note on Smith Simpson, *Anatomy of the State Department* 267
Wagley, Charles. *The Latin American Tradition.* Noted by Carroll Hawkins 1377
Wainhouse, David W. and Associates. *International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast.* Reviewed by Lincoln P. Bloomfield 586
Wainhouse, David W. Note on Oran R. Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises* 1018
Waldman, Sidney. Note on Peter Zollinger, *The Political Creature* 1318
Walker, Kenneth N. Note on Claudio Veliz, *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* 1011
Wallerstein, Immanuel. *Africa: The Politics of Unity.* Noted by Victor T. Le Vine 1354
Wann, A. J. *The President as Chief Administrator.* Noted by Peter Woll 1338
Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911–1949. Donald G. Gillin. Noted by Chi Hsi-sheng 292
Warner, Kenneth O. and Mary L. Hennessy. *Public Management at the Bargaining Table.* Noted by Donald P. Sprengel 992
Warner, Lloyd, et al. *The Emergent American Society.* Noted by Andrew Hacker 1301
The Warren Court: Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform. Archibald Cox. Noted by J. Woodford Howard, Jr. 1329
Warren, Vernon C., Jr. Note on Werner Feld, *The European Common Market and the World* 1020
Water Research. Allen V. Kneese and Stephen C. Smith, eds. Noted by Ashley L. Schiff 634
Waters, Maurice. Note on David A. Baldwin, *Economic Development and American Foreign Policy 1943–62* 1405
Waters, Maurice. Note on Henry C. Aubrey. *Atlantic Economic Co-operation. The Case of the O.E.C.D.* 1405
Weatherby, James L., Jr. and Allan G. Pulsipher. *Malapportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures* 1207
Webb, Herschel. *The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period.*

Noted by Akira Kubata 1358
Weiner, Gerald A. Review of Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, *The Political Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration in Comparative Political Analysis* 583
Weiner, Myron. *Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress.* Reviewed by Avery Leiserson 584
Weinstein, Michael A. Note on Wilfred E. Rumble, Jr., *American Legal Realism: Skepticism, Reform, and the Judicial Process* 1336
Weisberg, Herbert F. Review of Joseph L. Bernd, ed., *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, III* 1294
Weiss, Herbert. *Political Protest in the Congo.* Reviewed by Crawford Young . . . 1287
Wenner, Manfred W. *Modern Yemen, 1918–1966.* Noted by George Kirk 647
Wesser, Robert F. *Charles Evans Hughes: Politics and Reform in New York, 1905–1910.* Noted by Frederick H. Schapsmeier 630
Wesson, Robert G. Note on John Leddy Phelan, *The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century* 1006
Westerfield, H. Bradford. Review of John Pincus, *Trade, Aid and Development* 242
Westerfield, H. Bradford. Review of Theodore Geiger, *The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa and Latin America* 242
The Western Alliance: Its Status and Prospects. Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., ed. Reviewed by Frederick H. Hartmann 239
Western, John S. and Colin A. Hughes. *The Prime Minister's Policy Speech: A Case Study in Televised Politics.* Noted by Kenneth H. Thompson 999
Whitaker, Arthur P. Note on Jacques Lambert, *Latin America: Social Structures and Political Institutions* 1373
Who Rules America? B. William Dumhoff. Noted by Andrew Hacker 1301
Wight, Martin and Herbert Butterfield, eds. *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics.* Noted by Don C. Piper 679
Wildavsky, Aaron, ed. *American Federalism in Perspective.* Noted by Roscoe C. Martin 624
Wilde, Edward D. Note on Gajo Petrovic, *Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century: A Yugoslav Philosopher Reconsiders Karl Marx's Writings* 613
Wiles, Peter, Alexander Balinsky, Abram Bergson and John N. Hazard. *Planning and the Market, in the U.S.S.R.: the 1960's.* Noted by Arthur W. Wright 655
Willbern, York. Note on Thomas D. Sherrard, ed., *Social Welfare and Urban Problems* 1348
Willhoite, Fred H. Note on John Locke, *Two Tracts on Government.* Philip Abrams, ed. 614
Williams, Edward J. *Latin American Christian Democratic Parties.* Noted by Russell H. Fitzgibbon 279
Williams, Philip M. *The French Parliament: Politics in the Fifth Republic.* Noted by Henry C. Galant 1361
Williams, Timothy Alden. Note on Joal Larus, *Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense* 1396
Wilson, Clifton E. Note on George Liska, *Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy* 681
Wilson, Robert R. Note on Stephen G. Xydis, *Cyprus: Conflict and Resolution, 1954–1958* 1399
Winham, Gilbert R. Note on Theodore Draper, *Abuse of Power* 686
Winham, Gilbert R. Review of Gideon Rosenbluth, *The Canadian Economy and Disarmament* 965
Winham, Gilbert R. Review of John B. McLin, *Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957–1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance* 965
Winsborough, Hal H. and Allan Kornberg, *The Recruitment of Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons* 1242
W. J. Cash: Southern Prophet: A Biography and Reader. Joseph L. Morrison. Noted by David M. Abshire 991
Wolf, Charles. *United States Policy and the Third World: Problems and Analysis.* Reviewed by Arpad von Lazar 243
Wolf, C. P. Note on Samuel Z. Klausner, ed., *The Study of Total Societies* 601
Wolfe, James H. Note on Ferenc A. Váli, *The Quest for a United Germany* 674
Wolfenstein, E. Victor. *The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi.* Noted by Arnold A. Rogow 604
Wolfinger, Raymond E. and Fred I. Greenstein. *The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting* 753
Wolfinger, Raymond E. and John Osgood Field. *Communication* on criticisms of their article "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government" 227
Woll, Peter. Note on A. J. Wann, *The President as Chief Administrator* 1338
Wood, David M. *Majority vs. Opposition in the French National Assembly, 1956–*

1965: A Guttman Scale Analysis 88
Wood, William A. *Electronic Journalism.* Noted by David L. Paletz 639
A Working Peace System. David Mitrany. Noted by Thomas Hovet, Jr 303
World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts. Linda B. Miller. Reviewed by Lawrence S. Kaplan 961
World Politics: The Global System. Herbert J. Spiro. Noted by Morton A. Kaplan . . . 694
Wright, Arthur W. Note on Alexander Balinsky, Abram Bergson, John N. Hazard, and Peter Wiles, *Planning and the Market in the U.S.S.R.: the 1960's* . . . 655
Wright, Theodore P., Jr. Note on Baldev Raj Nayar, *Minority Politics in the Punjab* 650
Wright, William E. Note on Eleanor Lansing Dulles, *Berlin: The Wall is Not Forever* 295
Wu, Chun-hsi. *Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China.* Noted by Yi-chun Chang 1371
Wurzburg, Frederic. Note on Andrew M. Scott, *The Functioning of the International Political System* 1016

Xydis, Stephen G. *Cyprus: Conflict and Resolution, 1954–1958.* Noted by Robert R. Wilson 1399
Xydis, Stephen G. Note on Theodore A. Couloumbis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences* 302

The Years of Opportunity: The League of Nations, 1920–1926. Byron Dexter. Noted by Whitney T. Perkins 1014
Yost, Charles. *The Insecurity of Nations: International Relations in the Twentieth Century.* Noted by Keith R. Legg 1397
Young, Alfred F. *The Democratic Republicans of New York: The Origins, 1763–1797.* Reviewed by Manning J. Dauer . . . 594
Young, Crawford, Charles W. Anderson, and Fred R. von der Mehden, eds. *Issues of Political Development.* Reviewed by Arpad von Lazar 243
Young, Crawford. Review of Ernest W. Lefever, *Uncertain Mandate* 1287
Young, Crawford. Review of Herbert Weiss, *Political Protest in the Congo* 1287
Young, James S. Note on Roy F. Nichols, *The Invention of the American Political Parties* 268
Young, Jordan M. Note on E. Bradford Burns, ed., *Perspectives of Brazilian History* 287
Young, Jordan M. Note on Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964* . . 281
Young, Jordan M. *The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the Aftermath.* Noted by Robert T. Daland 282
Young, Oran R. *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises.* Noted by David W. Wainhouse 1018
Young, Oran R. *Systems of Political Science.* Noted by Eugene J. Meehan 1322
Yarwood, Dean L. Note on Allan Kornberg, *Canadian Legislative Behavior: A Study of the 25th Parliament* 997

Zabih, Sepehr. *The Communist Movement in Iran.* Noted by Marvin Zonis 645
Zaleski, Eugene. *Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union, 1962–1966.* Noted by Robert Campbell 656
Zagoria, Donald S. *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi.* Noted by George G. Bauroth 686
Zeigler, Harmon. *The Political Life of American Teachers.* Noted by Jack Dennis 1339
Zeigler, Harmon. *The Political World of the High School Teacher.* Noted by Jack Dennis 1339
Zeitlin, Irving M. Marxism: *A Re-Examination.* Noted by Samuel Hendel 974
Zeitlin, Maurice. *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class.* Reviewed by Richard R. Fagen 1291
Zisk, Betty H. Note on Charles Y. Glock, ed., *Survey Research in the Social Sciences* 251
Zolberg, Aristide R. *The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa* 70
Zoll, Donald Atwell. *The Twentieth Century Mind.* Noted by J. Paul Johnston 259
Zollinger, Peter. *The Political Creature.* Noted by Sidney Waldman 1318
Zonis, Marvin. Note on George B. Baldwin, *Planning and Development in Iran* 645
Zonis, Marvin. Note on Sepehr Zabih, *The Communist Movement in Iran* 645

The American Political Science Review

BOARD OF EDITORS

Austin Ranney, Managing Editor, University of Wisconsin
Fred I. Greenstein, Wesleyan University
Harvey C. Mansfield, Columbia University
Warren E. Miller, University of Michigan
Walter F. Murphy, Princeton University
Melvin Richter, City University of New York
John E. Turner, University of Minnesota
Vernon Van Dyke, University of Iowa
Myron Weiner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

VOLUME LXII
1968

Copyright, 1969, by
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

GEORGE BANTA COMPANY, INC.
MENASHA, WISCONSIN

CONTENTS

NUMBER 1—MARCH, 1968

The "Intensity" Problem and Democratic Theory. *Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey* 5
A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. *William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook* 25
On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice. *J. Woodford Howard, Jr.* 43
A Functional Analysis of Defense Department Decision-Making in the McNamara Administration. *Paul Y. Hammond* 57
The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa. *Aristide R. Zolberg* 70
Majority vs. Opposition in the French National Assembly, 1956–1965: A Guttman Scale Analysis. *David M. Wood* 88
Communism and Economic Development. *Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky* 110
Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis. *Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone* 124
The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives. *Nelson W. Polsby* 144
The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child. *M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi* 169

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach. *Paul Shoup* 185

RESEARCH NOTES

A Theorem about Voting. *Thomas W. Casstevens* 205
A Measure of the Population Quality of Legislative Apportionment. *Henry F. Kaiser* 208
Image of a President: Some Insights into the Political Views of School Children. *Roberta S. Sigel* 216
Communications to the Editor 227
Book Reviews and Notes. *James W. Prothro (ed.)* 233
Announcements 316

NUMBER 2—JUNE, 1968

Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis. *A. James Gregor* 425
Pareto and Pluto-Democracy: The Retreat to Galapagos. *S. E. Finer* 440
On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power. *Richard M. Merelman* 451
Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems. *Steven J. Brams* 461
Probabilism and the Number of Units Affected: Measuring Influence Concentration. *Bruce M. Russett* 476
The Minority Party and Policy-Making in the House of Representatives. *Charles O. Jones* 481
The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll-Call Voting. *Michael J. Shapiro* 494
Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics of Congress. *Lewis A. Froman, Jr.* 518
If, as Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do Then to Save Our Souls? *Lewis Lipsitz* 527
Some Thoughts on the Relation of Political Theory to Anthropology. *Carl J. Friedrich* 536
A Nonlinear Model for the Analysis of Judicial Decisions. *Fred Kort* 546
Decision Costs in Coalition Formation. *Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press* 556
The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture. *Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr.* 564
Communications to the Editor 576
Book Reviews and Notes. *James W. Protho (ed.)* 582
Announcements 695

NUMBER 3—SEPTEMBER, 1968

The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting. *Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein* 753
Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games. *Michael Leiserson* 770
A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior: The Reapportionment Cases. *Edward N. Beiser* 788
Voting Turnout in American Cities. *Robert R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee* 796

Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent. *Jerome M. Gilison* 814
Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period. *Milton Lodge* 827
Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union. *Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech* 840
Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States. *Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings* 852
Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism. *Robert A. Schoenberger* 868
A Salience Dimension of Politics for the Study of Political Culture. *Moshe M. Czudnowski* 878
Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America. *Martin C. Needler* 889
Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction? *Richard Ashcraft* 898
National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations. *Jack E. Vincent*. 916
National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List. *Bruce M. Russett, J. David Singer, and Melvin Small* 932
Communications to the Editor 952
Book Reviews and Notes. *Richard F. Fenno (ed.)* 957
Announcements 1024

NUMBER 4—DECEMBER, 1968

Some Reflections on Soviet-American Relations. *Merle Fainsod* 1093
A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices. *Ted Gurr* 1104
Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America. *Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant* 1125
Protest as a Political Resource. *Michael Lipsky* 1144
Motivation, Incentive Systems, and the Political Party Organization. *M. Margaret Conway and Frank B. Feigert* 1159
Coalition Politics in North India. *Paul R. Brass* 1174
Sources of Local Political Involvement. *Robert R. Alford and Harry M. Scoble* 1192
Malapportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures. *Allan G. Pulsipher and James L. Weatherby, Jr.* 1207
Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures. *Ira Sharkansky* 1220
The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis. *Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride* 1232
The Recruitment of Candidates for the Canadian House of Commons. *Allan Kornberg and Hal H. Winsborough* 1242
A Note of Caution in Causal Modelling. *Hugh Donald Forbes and Edward R. Tufte* 1258
A Note on Censorship. *Gordon Tullock* 1265
Communications to the Editor 1268
Book Reviews and Notes. *Richard F. Fenno (ed.)* 1274
Announcements 1408
Index to Volume LXII. *Nancy B. Edgerton and Mary H. Grossman* 1410

OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

President

David Easton*
University of Chicago

President-Elect

Karl W. Deutsch*
Harvard University

Vice Presidents

James W. Fesler
Yale University

Hans J. Morgenthau
University of Chicago

Vernon Van Dyke
University of Iowa

Secretary

Bernard L. Kronick
University of Santa Clara

Treasurer

Francis E. Rourke
Johns Hopkins University

Program Chairman

Robert E. Lane*
Yale University

Executive Director

Evron M. Kirkpatrick*
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Managing Editor, APSR

Austin Ranney*
University of Wisconsin

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officiis*

1968–1969

Holbert N. Carroll
University of Pittsburgh
Charles O. Jones
University of Arizona
Merle Kling
Washington University, St. Louis
Roy C. Macridis
Brandeis University
Paul L. Puryear
Fisk University
Robert A. Scalapino
University of California, Berkeley
Glendon Schubert
York University, Toronto
Daniel Wit
Northern Illinois University

1969–1970

Gordon E. Baker*
University of California, Santa Barbara
Samuel Dubois Cook
Duke University
Josephine E. Milburn
Simmons College
Joseph L. Nogee
University of Houston
A. F. K. Organski
University of Michigan
Frank J. Sorauf*
University of Minnesota
Herbert J. Spiro
University of Pennsylvania
Frederick M. Wirt
Denison University

* Members of the Executive Committee, 1968-1969.

FORMER PRESIDENTS

Frank J. Goodnow
Albert Shaw
Frederic N. Judson
James Bryce
A. Lawrence Lowell
Woodrow Wilson
Simeon E. Baldwin
Albert Bushnell Hart
W. W. Willoughby
John Bassett Moore
Ernst Freund
Jesse Macy
Munroe Smith
Henry Jones Ford
Paul S. Reinsch
Leo S. Rowe
William A. Dunning
Harry A. Garfield
James W. Garner
Charles E. Merriam
Charles A. Beard
William B. Munro
Jesse S. Reeves
John A. Fairlie
Benjamin F. Shambaugh
Edward S. Corwin
William F. Willoughby
Isidor Loeb
Walter J. Shepard
Francis W. Coker
Arthur N. Holcombe
Thomas Reed Powell
Clarence A. Dykstra
Charles Grove Haines
Robert C. Brooks
Frederic A. Ogg
William Anderson
Robert E. Cushman
Leonard D. White
John M. Gaus
Walter F. Dodd
Arthur W. Macmahon
Henry R. Spencer
Quincy Wright
James K. Pollock
Peter H. Odegard
Luther H. Gulick
Pendleton Herring
Ralph J. Bunche
Charles McKinley
Harold D. Lasswell
E. E. Schattschneider
V. O. Key, Jr.
R. Taylor Cole
Carl B. Swisher
Emmette S Redford
Charles S. Hyneman
Carl J. Friedrich
C. Herman Pritchett
David B. Truman
Gabriel A. Almond
Robert A. Dahl
Merle Fainsod

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION 1969 SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPEAN TOUR SEMINAR PROGRAM

ITINERARY:

The Tour-Seminar will leave around the middle of July for a 35 day tour which will include: Budapest, Sophia, Bucharest, Moscow, Leningrad, Warsaw, Prague, and Berlin.

COST:

The cost to Association members under a group plan with a minimum of 25 participants will be under $1,600.00. Included in the fare will be round-trip tourist air transportation, first class hotel accommodations, three meals a day except in Berlin where only breakfast will be included, baggage handling, sightseeing, and airport and meeting transportation. (On the basis of past experience, participants can expect that the cost of this educational activity will be accepted as deductible expense on Federal tax return).

SEMINAR PROGRAM:

In cooperation with the governments of the nations on the itinerary and the relevant U.S. departments, the Association will arrange meetings with leading public officials, members of university faculties, U.S. Foreign Service Personnel, and representatives of the press.

For further information concerning this educational, research, and travel opportunity, please write Director, APSA 1969 Soviet Union and Eastern European Tour Seminar, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036.

APSA SUMMER FLIGHTS TO EUROPE

FLIGHT A—Approximately June 10 to August 26, 1969

FLIGHT B—Approximately August 2 to September 1, 1969

For the tenth successive summer, the Association will provide air service to Europe for its members.

Flights will originate at New York International Airport and arrive on the continent of Europe. The cost per seat will be less than $275.00.

Persons wishing to make reservations now may write directly to the Association, in care of the Director, Summer Flight Programs, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

UNIVERSITY of
PENNSYLVANIA
PRESS

New

CYPRUS: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government

By Stanley Kyriakides with a Foreword by Roy C. Macridis

The political and constitutional questions surrounding the Cyprus problem are thoroughly and objectively examined in this new book. With emphasis on the contemporary period from the second World War to the present, this book will remain, according to Roy Macridis, "the most accurate and scholarly statement of the Cyprus constitutional question for many years to come." 240 pages $6.50

Just reprinted

THE KOREA KNOT, Revised Edition
A Military-Political History

By Carl Berger

"Constitutes one of the most up-to-date, yet brief, accounts available . . . Scholarly and thoroughly readable."—*Choice*
225 pages $6.00

A bestseller

THE RIGHT WING IN FRANCE
From 1815 to de Gaulle, Second Edition

By René Rémond and translated by James M. Laux

"Professor Rémond's lucid and thought-provoking analysis of the French right wing is of particular importance in the era of de Gaulle. American readers, their interest stimulated by French intransigence over NATO and the Common Market, will welcome this excellent translation of a book already internationally known."—*Library Journal.* 425 pages illus. $7.50

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA PRESS
Philadelphia 19104

Harper Texts of Particular Interest

Ready in April

PETER H. ODEGARD'S

THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

Its Government and Politics

Second Edition

With HANS H. BAERWALD and WILLIAM C. HAVARD

Here is a rigorous, comprehensive description and analysis of institutions and political practices at all levels of American government. Without sacrificing the richness of the historical and comparative analysis characteristic of the first edition, the Second Edition has been thoroughly revised and reorganized, incorporating original research, both institutional and behavioral. The book discusses major functions of American government and the way in which policy is developed and executed to fulfill these functions. Theoretical and comparative material is introduced to show why the American system works as it does in the light of social and historical circumstances.

Designed to be the principal text for a full-year course, the text is organized so that certain parts may be selected for use in a one-semester or one-quarter course. Numerous photographs and charts, maps, graphs. To accompany the text: Handbook of American Government (for the student) and Instructor's Manual both by David Barney.

Text: $8.95 (tentative); Handbook: $3.95 (tentative)

Published

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Readings and Documents, Second Edition

PETER H. ODEGARD

An authoritative and wide-ranging collection of readings which may accompany any standard text in American government, including THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (described above). Headnotes give historical, constitutional, and political perspective to the documentary materials. *640 pp.; $5.50; paper*

CHALLENGE AND DECISION

Political Issues of Our Time, Second Edition

REO M. CHRISTENSON

Up to date and forward looking, this presentation of the major domestic political issues facing this generation provides a detailed study of their genesis and legislative experience through the Eighty-ninth Congress. *306 pp.; $3.95; paper*

1817

Harper & Row, Publishers · 49 E. 33d St., New York


Daniel P. Moynihan
Maximum Feasible
Misunderstanding
Community Action in the War on Poverty
Moynihan Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding

FP

Coming in February

**MAXIMUM
FEASIBLE
MISUNDERSTANDING**

Community Action in the War on Poverty

By Daniel P. Moynihan, *Harvard University*

"Not in a long time have I been alternately as excited, moved, fascinated, and impressed—as well as edified—by any book. . . . This book is going to leave heavy impress—on the minds of other scholars, social scientists, civil servants, and a few other groups as well. It is marvellously written—swift but never hurried, meanings of often intricate situations never left murky, and above all a book with plot, that is, beginning, middle, and end."

—Robert A. Nisbet
University of California, Riverside

Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding is a spirited yet serious account of the foundering of the Economic Opportunity Act's programs of community action. Professor Moynihan shows how a plan that called for the "maximum feasible participation" of the community resulted in maximum feasible misunderstanding for those directly concerned and seeks to explain what happened, rather than to blame those responsible.

February, 1969 224 pages $4.50 tent.

THE FREE PRESS
A Division of The Macmillan Company
866 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022

Fp

THE POLITICAL IMAGINATION IN LITERATURE   A Reader

Edited by Philip Green, *Smith College*, and
Michael Walzer, *Harvard University*

This stimulating reader supplements the standard materials of political science education with 61 selections that dramatically express the richness of political life and political thought. Included are the works of Agee, Babel, Blake, Brecht, Dickens, Diderot, Dostoevski, France, Giono, Goodman, Housman, James, Kafka, Kipling, Koestler, Maltz, Mann, Melville, Milton, Shakespeare, Sartre, Swift, Twain, Warren, Williams, Wright, Yeats, Zola, and others.

January, 1969   528 pages   paper, $4.95 tent.

URBAN GOVERNMENT   A Reader in Administration and Politics

Revised Edition
Edited by Edward C. Banfield, *Harvard University*

The revised edition of *Urban Government* reflects the social and political developments that have affected urban government since 1961. With 32 of its 68 selections newly added, the book presents an up-to-date picture of its field. Included are articles on Negro politics, reapportionment of local government, riots, and other areas of current importance.

January, 1969   800 pages $9.95 tent.

SIMSOC (Simulated Society)   Participant's Manual

By William A. Gamson, *University of Michigan*

Simsoc, classroom tested at Indiana, Brandeis, Michigan, and the University of California at Los-Angeles and Santa Barbara, is a unique game developed to make the social science concepts more vivid to students at the college level. Twenty or more players participate as citizens in a simulated society where situations occur in which the student must actively question the nature of the social order and examine the processes of social conflict and control. *Simsoc* is designed to be played *without* a computer.

February, 1969   160 pages (approx.)   paper, $3.95 tent.

SIMSOC (Simulated Society)
Instructor's Manual   96 pages   gratis

BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

An Analysis of Organizational Change
By Louis C. Gawthrop, *State University of New York, Binghamton*

The first theoretical analysis of bureaucratic behavior in the executive branch, this text examines its subject in terms of organizational responses to both internal and external change and systematically compares public and private bureaucracies. The author develops an analytical model which can be used to examine bureaucratic behavior in the executive branch of the federal government and presents a detailed analysis of key behavioral factors affecting organizations.

January, 1969   336 pages (approx.)   paper, $2.95 tent.

THE STUDY OF POLICY FORMATION

Edited by Raymond A. Bauer, *Harvard University*, and
Kenneth J. Gergen, *Swarthmore College*
Foreword by Robert C. Wood

This collection of nine empirically oriented, previously unpublished papers presents a synthesis of past approaches, a reference to contemporary techniques, and fresh ideas on both theoretical and empirical planes. The contributors show how developments in theories of decision-making, power structure, and formal organizations lend themselves to study, pointing out present limitations and signaling areas where additional knowledge is needed.

1968 400 pages $9.95

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Revised Edition
Edited by James N. Rosenau, *Rutgers University*

The revised edition of *International Politics and Foreign Policy* is a current and balanced collection of readings on international relations and is particularly informative regarding the structure of international systems, strategic theory, and the sources of foreign policy behavior. Fifty-five of its sixty-three selections are new to this edition and include five previously unpublished selections.

March, 1969 800 pages (approx.) $9.95 tent.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN ACTION

The Battle of Barons Court
By Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, both, *University of Minnesota*

A unique analysis of a political campaign from inside each competing party, this book is a study of two local parties *as organizations* mobilizing their resources to fight for a marginal parliamentary seat in London. Making use of interviews, photographs, and census, canvassing, and polling data, the authors analyze pre-campaign planning, the contrasting patterns of campaign organization, and party operations on polling day.

Just published 352 pages $7.95

Coming in January—A New Free Press Paperback

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior
By Herbert Hyman
With a new preface by the author

A comprehensive inventory of the psychology of political socialization, this book encompasses past research which treats political behavior as the product of learning and socialization. It includes an account of studies in which the idiosyncracies of political behavior do not fit into the learning-socialization pattern.

188 pages (approx.) paper, $1.95 tent.

THE FREE PRESS
A Division of The Macmillan Company
866 Third Avenue, New York 10022

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

look for these books this spring:

• **INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY** American Society of International Law/*in clothbound and paperback editions* • **STATISTICS IN POLITICAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE** Dennis J. Palumbo, Brooklyn College of The City University of New York/*with separate workbook* • **APPROACHES TO MEASUREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A Non-Evangelical Survey** Edited by John E. Mueller, University of Rochester • **POLICIES, DECISIONS AND ORGANIZATION** Edited by Fremont J. Lyden, George A. Shipman, and Morton Kroll, all of the University of Washington • **OGG AND RAY'S ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, 10th Ed.** and **OGG AND RAY'S ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 10th Ed.** William H. Young, The University of Wisconsin/*with instructor's manual*

---

appleton-century-crofts/div. of meredith corp./440 park av. s., n.y. 10016

Praeger paperbacks on
International Affairs

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE POWERS

Edited by F. S. NORTHEDGE

This ideal text for the student of modern politics provides a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, Britain, France, West Germany, and India. The distinguished contributors, all of the London School of Economics, delineate the forces — political, social, economic, ideological, and strategic — that have made these foreign policies what they are today. *January. 322 pp., bibliog., index.* $2.95

TRENDS OF FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

CARL J. FRIEDRICH

In a definitive reconsideration of a controversial political arrangement, Harvard University's Eaton Professor of the Science of Government emphasizes the *process* of federalism. Following an analysis of the components of federalism, Dr. Friedrich presents eleven case studies that together show the full spectrum of vital federal systems. *208 pp., index.* U-652/$2.50

THE ORIGINS OF SOCIALISM

GEORGE LICHTHEIM

The renowned author of *Marxism* traces socialist thought from its conception in the French revolutionary period, through the influence of the British Utopians and the philosophy of Hegel, to the classic formulation achieved by Karl Marx. "A brilliant analysis of the roots of anarchism, 'economism,' communitarianism, populism, and 'reformism,' to say nothing of Marxism proper . . . Indispensable to serious students."— *Kirkus Service. ca. 310 pp., notes, bibliog., index.* U-661/$2.95

EXPANSION AND COEXISTENCE

The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67

ADAM B. ULAM

Harvard's distinguished political scientist Adam B. Ulam has written "the most comprehensive, balanced, and lucid account of the Soviet Union's relations with the outside world that has yet appeared in English."—EDWARD CRANKSHAW. "I found myself absorbed and fascinated. Not only and obviously is this a book of the first importance, but it is an admirably graceful piece of writing illuminated by flashes of wit and sardonic insight." —JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH. *784 pp., index 6⅛" x 9¼".*

A Praeger Paperbound Text/ $4.95

MIDDLE EAST POLITICS: THE MILITARY DIMENSION

J. C. HUREWITZ

J. C. Hurewitz, Professor of Government at Columbia University, examines the civil-military relationship in each of the eighteen countries stretching from Morocco to Pakistan. In so doing, he provides an informative and well-documented study of the interplay of domestic, regional, and international politics in the postwar Middle East. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. *544 pp., bibliog., index.* U-660/$3.95

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, Publishers, 111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003

Politics and Government in the United States **SECOND EDITION**

EMMETTE S. REDFORD, University of Texas
DAVID B. TRUMAN, Columbia University
ALAN F. WESTIN, Columbia University
ROBERT C. WOOD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

This Second Edition of a highly successful introduction to American government represents a thorough revision in both content and format. While maintaining the consistently high level of analysis and sound scholarship that characterized the earlier edition, the authors have thoroughly revised each chapter to take into account the latest research in political science and recent political events. The text narrative is approximately 30% shorter than in the previous edition, but the scope of the book remains the same; no major substantive topics have been dropped. Instructor's Manual and Test Booklet available.

National, State, and Local Edition: 964 pages. $9.50
National Edition: 835 pages. $8.50

"A superb book! The organization and format, emphasizing political process, are outstanding. The opinions expressed in the boxed quotations give the student a valuable introduction to bases of conflict. The entire unit on the judiciary is excellent, as is the section on voters' decision."

—ALICE LE BEL, Santa Monica City College

The Chief Executive **REVISED EDITION**

LOUIS W. KOENIG, New York University

Widely acclaimed as a vivid, incisive analysis of the American Presidency, *The Chief Executive* is now available in a newly revised paperbound textbook edition. This new edition brings the book up to date with the scholarship and events of the past four years, includes a new chapter on Presidential personality, and provides complete references for each chapter and an expanded bibliography.

Paperbound. 466 pages. $3.95

"Professor Koenig has a way of seeing a theme and illustrating it with just the right anecdote. The combination of sensitivity and sensibleness in his writing is rare among us since V. O. Key."

—JAMES D. BARBER, Yale University

Western Political Theory

FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE PRESENT

LEE CAMERON McDONALD, Pomona College

This distinguished one-volume history of political theory offers a detailed analysis of the major theorists and schools of thought from Plato to the present. Professor McDonald concentrates on major figures, and his explanation of each man's point of view, complemented by substantial quotations from his writings, gives the student a first-hand acquaintance with the man's philosophy, his style, his approach to life, and the age in which he lived. 653 pages. $9.50

"I found Mr. McDonald's text to be all that it purported to be and more. Not only is its comprehensiveness impressive, but it is written in a sprightly and attractive manner, without that air of condescension too common to theory textbooks."

—LARRY PETERMAN, University of California, Davis

Political Patterns in Today's World

SECOND EDITION

D. W. BROGAN, Professor Emeritus, Cambridge University
DOUGLAS V. VERNEY, York University

A brief, comparative introduction to politics and society, this textbook provides the student with an opportunity to evaluate the two basic political patterns in today's world—liberal democracy, as exemplified in the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Sweden, and communism, as practiced in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and China. Paperbound. 278 pages. $2.95

"I like this book very much. It is intelligently written, informative, interesting, and yet comparatively brief—a hard combination to find these days. I think the countries selected are excellent choices, and the authors' treatment of differing political systems is very fair. The tables at the end of the book are quite useful."

—ROBERT W. LANGRAN, Villanova University

HARCOURT, BRACE & WORLD, INC.

New York • Chicago • San Francisco • Atlanta

Polity
a new journal of political science

Published quarterly by the

Northeastern Political Science Associations

Articles in the current issue include:
William T. Bluhm, *Nation Building: The Case of Austria*
Reo M. Christenson, *The Moral Imperative in Politics: Reflections on Auschwitz*
Frank M. Bryan, *The Metamorphosis of a Rural Legislature*
Ronald O. Loveridge, *The City Manager in Legislative Politics: A Collision of Role Conceptions*
James A. Riedel, *An Academic Peanuts Gallery*
Books reviews by Leo Weinstein, Gregor Sebba, Samuel Krislov & Douglas Hodgkin

POLITY
Loren P. Beth, Managing Editor
Thompson Tower, University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts 01002

Please enter my name for a one-year subscription to POLITY

NPSA member: $8 Other U.S.A.: $7 Foreign: $7.50
Student U.S.A.: $4 Foreign: $4.50

My check or money order for $______is enclosed

NAME

ADDRESS

ZIP CODE

try your
students
on a
paperbound problem . . .

FREE SPEECH AND POLITICAL PROTEST
Marvin Summers, *University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee*
1967 • 136 pages • $1.50

THE REPRESENTATIVE: Trustee? Delegate? Partisan? Politico?
Neal Riemer, *University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee*
1967 • 116 pages • $1.50

WESTERN EUROPE: What Path to Integration
Carol E. Baumann, *University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee*
1967 • 156 pages • $1.50

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL EXPERIENCE: What is the Key?
Edward Handler, *Babson Institute*
1968 • 152 pages • $1.75

LIBERALIZATION IN THE USSR: Facade or Reality?
D. Richard Little, *Northern Illinois University*
1968 • 135 pages • $1.75

Problems in Political Science

THE CIA: Problems of Secrecy in a Democracy
Young Hum Kim, *California Western University*
Available November 1968

From the growing list of Problems in Political Science
you can order direct from D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY,
2700 North Richardt Avenue, Indianapolis, Indiana 46219

For further information write ***Box P84***
College Division

D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY
A Division of Raytheon Education Company RAYTHEON
285 Columbus Avenue • Boston, Massachusetts 02116

Announcing

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT:
Readings in American Federalism

Edited by Daniel J. Elazar, Temple University
R. Bruce Carroll, Middlebury College
E. Lester Levine, Florida State University
Douglas St. Angelo, Florida State University

This is a comprehensive anthology of materials dealing with the several aspects of American federalism. Federalism is treated as an element of political conflict. Under this conflict there has been and continues to be extensive intermingling of functioning among government levels. This shared federalism is viewed historically, theoretically, fiscally, administratively and politically.

It is oriented toward delineating empirical realities but in a manner that synthesizes theory and practice in a meaningful way. The book's underlying premise is that federal principles and processes so permeate the American system of government that an understanding of federalism is necessary for the study of American government.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. The American System as a Partnership
2. Basic Patterns of Partnership
3. The Views of the Policy Makers
4. The View from the States
5. The Grass Roots of American Federalism
6. The Dynamics of the Federal System

February 1969 c. 650 pages c. $9.00

The Loyola University Series in Modern Political Theory
OPEN SYSTEMS: Arenas for Political Action

Henry S. Kariel, University of Hawaii

This is Professor Kariel's exciting analysis of the problem of closure in American society and institutions. Professor Kariel's argument is that "politics *at its best* (not *all* politics) is a kind of play, of agonistic exertion, of free and self delighting action."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

Chapter 1. The Personality System
2. The Social System
3. The System of Political Inquiry
4. Political Science as Public Action

May 1969 c. 160 pages c. $3.50 paper

F. E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC.
Itasca, Illinois 60143

Just Published

VIETNAM:
Anatomy of a Conflict

Edited by Wesley R. Fishel, Michigan State University

Useful in courses in Politics of Southeast Asia or American Foreign Policy, this is a cogent, authoritative and balanced presentation of the Vietnam frustration. It contains 81 selections with various points of view. It sets forth background, history and contemporary analyses.

1968 879 pages $5.95 paper

PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC MANAGEMENT:
Cases and Learning Designs

Edited by Robert T. Golembiewski, University of Georgia

This unique approach to Public Administration contains 13 cases selected to illustrate some managerially-relevant process. Each case is preceded by a "learning design," i.e., suggested ways of using the case to highlight what is known about managerial processes and behavior.

1968 263 pages $4.95 paper

PUBLIC BUDGETING AND FINANCE:
Readings in Theory and Practice

Edited by Robert T. Golembiewski

An extraordinarily comprehensive collection of readings (47) emphasizing behavioral materials relevant to budgeting as well as technical and institutional features.

1968 592 pages $9.50

FEDERALISM:
Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice

Edited by Valerie Earle, Georgetown University

In a seven essay presentation, the first three examine American federalism, the next three federalism in Canada and Australia, West Germany and Latin America. The concluding essay discusses the future of federalism. The essay contributors, in addition to Valerie Earle, are Alpheus Mason, George Carey, William S. Livingston, Karl H. Cerny, Harry Kantor and Henry Teune.

1968 241 pages $3.75 paper

METROPOLIS IN CRISIS:
Social and Political Perspectives

Edited by Jeffrey K. Hadden, Case Western Reserve University
Louis H. Masotti, Case Western Reserve University
Calvin J. Larson, Purdue University

The 44 selections in this reader are organized into five parts.

Part I, The Challenge of Metropolis, is a brief introduction to the problems and prospects of urban life. Part II, From Mudhuts to Megalopolis, traces the historical development of cities and elaborates the process and consequences of urbanization.

Part III, Ideological Perspectives, delineates the way man thinks and feels about the city. Part IV, Dimensions of the Crisis, looks at specific urban problems: race, housing, poverty, education, crime, transportation, air pollution and finance.

Finally, Part V, Adaptation, Innovation and Reform, examines the ability of the urban community to organize itself to meet the urban crisis.

1967 521 pages $8.00

F. E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC.
Itasca, Illinois 60143

New from Holt in 1969

AMERICAN POLITICS: A Systems Approach

By Stephen V. Monsma, Calvin College

This brief introduction to American government uses systems analysis to integrate and analyze the key features of American politics. *Instructor's Manual / Study Guide*. March 1969 / 416 pp. / $5.95 (tent.)

AMERICAN POLITICS: Research and Readings

Edited by Stephen V. Monsma and Jack R. Van Der Slik, Southern Illinois University

The organizing concept of this reader is the political system model as it has been developed by a number of contemporary theorists, especially David Easton. A companion volume to Monsma's *American Politics: A Systems Approach* as well as to other introductory texts. May 1969 / 416 pp. / $4.95 paper (tent.)

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: A Simulation With Readings

By Marvin G. Weinbaum and Louis H. Gold, both of the University of Illinois

These exercises are in the form of a competitive game where players act out roles in presidential primaries, bargaining and balloting at national conventions, and in the election of a president. March 1969 / 320 pp. / $3.95 paper (tent.)

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Fourth Edition

By Marshall E. Dimock and Gladys Ogden Dimock

This introduction to aspects of public administration has been completely rewritten and refocused to develop a rounded and unified theory, to reflect current behavioral emphases, utilize comparative analyses, and investigate economic factors and policy-making decisions. April 1969 / 576 pp. / $8.95 (tent.)

CASEBOOK IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By R. Joseph Novogrod, Long Island University, Brooklyn Center, Marshall E. Dimock and Gladys Ogden Dimock

This casebook relates principles of public administration to actual administrative situations at the city, state and federal levels of government by presenting problems and programs with which today's public officials must contend. Accompanies Dimock and Dimock: *Public Administration, Fourth Edition* plus other public administration texts. Spring 1969 / 352 pp. / $4.95 paper (tent.)

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS

By David V. Edwards, The University of Texas

The author uses an open-ended approach to international politics to lead the student through the analysis required to develop and text theory to explain, predict, and recommend policy. *Instructor's Manual / Casebooks*. February 1969 / 416 pp. / $8.50 (tent.)

READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS

Edited by David V. Edwards

Articles by political scientists and scholars in related disciplines focus on the problems and methods of theory-building in international politics. May be used in conjunction with the author's *International Political Analysis* or with other basic books in the field. April 1969 / 512 pp. / $5.95 paper (tent.)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DICTIONARY

By Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, both of Western Michigan University

Drawn together in one convenient source are carefully selected terms, theories, concepts, and facts essential to a basic understanding of the contemporary setting of international politics. March 1969 / 320 pp. / $3.95 paper (tent.)

GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS, Fourth Edition

Edited by William Ebenstein, University of California

Using readings from original sources, the author traces the evolution of political philosophy with an emphasis upon the relevance of the great political problems throughout history to problems of the twentieth century. Revised with rewritten, expanded introductory essays. March 1969 / 1056 pp. / $9.95 (tent.)

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT
Issues in Scope, Value, and Direction

Edited by James A. Gould, University of South Florida, and Vincent V. Thursby, Florida State University

The articles in this book present opposing views on the central controversies in current political thought. February 1969 / 416 pp. / $4.95 paper (tent.)

Public Policy Studies in American Government
Edgar Litt, General Editor

PUBLIC HOUSING: The Politics of Poverty

By Leonard Freedman, University of California, Los Angeles. April 1969 / 224 pp. / $3.95 paper (tent.)

THE NEW POLITICS OF AMERICAN POLICY
A Reader

Edited by Edgar Litt, University of Connecticut. April 1969 / 384 pp. / $4.95 paper (tent.)

THE VOCATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Knowledge and Power in Higher Education

By Edgar Litt. April 1969 / 224 pp. / $3.95 paper (tent.)

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
383 Madison Avenue, New York 10017

Four new publications . . .


RESEARCH RESOURCES
ANNOTATED GUIDE TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
VOL. I
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND RECENT HISTORY
INDEXES, ABSTRACTS AND PERIODICALS

RESEARCH RESOURCES:
Annotated Guide to the Social Sciences
John Brown Mason, Editor

Volume 1—International Relations and Recent History: Indexes, Abstracts and Periodicals

Research Resources contains more than 1,268 titles, authoritatively annotated and cross-referenced, with an author index, an index of titles, and a list of American publishers. xviii, 244 pages. October 1968. L.C. 68-9685. $6.75, clothbound. $3.00, paperbound.

Volume 2—Official Publications: U.S. Government, United Nations, International Organizations, and Statistical Sources. To be published in 1969.

A GUIDE TO BOOKS ON SOUTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY (1961-1966)
Gayle Morrison, editor

A long-needed critically annotated bibliography which up-dates bibliography of this area. Bibliography and Reference Series No. 8. 95 pages. November 1968. L.C. 68-56893. $4.00, paperbound.

LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT: A Selected Bibliography (1950-1967)
Jerry L. Weaver, editor

Cites books, monographs and documents concerned with such problems as agrarian reform, socio-political development and rural development throughout Latin America. Bibliography and Reference Series No. 9. 90 pages. December 1968. L.C. 68-56894. $3.50, paperbound.

AMERICAN POLITICS AND ELECTIONS: Selected Abstracts of Periodical Literature (1964-1968)
Lloyd Garrison, editor

A comprehensive selection of abstracts covering the historical development of the American political system and political parties. Personal names index. 44 pages. October 1968. L.C. 68-58982. $2.25, paperbound.

Twentieth Century Series

No. 1 GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM, 1919-1945. Martin Broszat. viii, 154 pages. 1966. L.C. 66-26137. $5.50, clothbound. $2.75, paperbound.

No. 2 WE SURVIVED. Fourteen Histories of the Hidden and Hunted of Nazi Germany. Eric H. Boehm. xiii, 316 pages. 1966. L.C. 66-29776. $5.85, clothbound. $2.75, paperbound.

No. 3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH. E. Raymond Platig. xiv, 211 pages. 1967. L.C. 67-22191. $6.50, clothbound. $3.75, paperbound.

Department AP
AMERICAN BIBLIOGRAPHICAL CENTER • CLIO PRESS
Riviera Campus, 2010 Alameda Padre Serra
Santa Barbara, California 93103

A B C - CLIO

Publisher of • HISTORICAL ABSTRACTS • AMERICA: HISTORY AND LIFE

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

Second Edition . . .

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE

W. W. KULSKI, Duke University

This thoroughly revised, completely reset edition of Professor Kulski's widely accepted text provides an up-to-date examination of every important aspect of relations between contemporary states—political, military, economic, ideological, legal and diplomatic.

742 Pages **$7.95**

POLITICS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Introductory Readings

Edited by ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, Jr., University of Pennsylvania

The selections in this collection are representative of the thought of leading contemporary and traditional analysts, and reflect their diverse and sometimes conflicting viewpoints on the major problems and areas of concern to the student of international relations.

Paperbound **January 1969**

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION

An Introductory Reader

Edited by RICHARD A. FALK, Princeton University, and
WOLFRAM F. HANRIEDER, University of California, Santa Barbara

Fourteen selections together with the editors' commentaries provide students with an introduction to the important questions that bear on the character of contemporary international order. The distinctive features of a decentralized legal system are stressed.

346 Pages **Paperbound** **$3.95**

THESE LIBERTIES

Case Studies in Civil Rights

ROCCO J. TRESOLINI

Unlike many existing casebooks intended for advanced students and specialized audiences, this brief book—a virtual text in civil liberties—is designed for students at freshman and sophomore levels. Particular stress is placed on recent and emerging problems.

306 Pages **Paperbound** **$2.25**

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY

COLLEGE DEPARTMENT

EAST WASHINGTON SQUARE, PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19105

New for 1969...
from Macmillan

● THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

By C. Peter Magrath, The University of Nebraska, Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Brown University, and Jay S. Goodman, Wheaton College

This excellent textbook has been written for the basic course in American Government. Conveying much of the fascination and excitement of politics, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY approaches intergovernmental politics, participation, and political parties "as they are"—live political processes. The text provides essential facts in combination with a great deal of feeling for how the American system of government and politics operates. It is the first textbook to incorporate case studies, to integrate the study of federal, state, and local governments, and to treat urban politics as a normal part of the political process. By blending the facts with analysis and interpretation, this volume examines the basic workings of the American system of government and politics. Tables and graphs convey the latest empirical data; detailed bibliographies focus on the most recent literature.
1969, approx. 768 pages, prob. $8.95

● POLITICS, U. S. A.

Cases on the American Democratic Process, Third Edition

By Andrew M. Scott and Earle Wallace,
both of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

In this new edition of the "case" approach to American politics almost all of the material is completely new. Many of the cases are vividly controversial, and demonstrate the nature and actual workings of government. A number of timely topics have been included in this new edition: The Urban Crisis, The Politics of Poverty, and The Politics of Violence. This edition incorporates material on the recent presidential campaign and election, as well as information on the Vietnam War and our Military and Foreign Policy. An important new feature is the series of discussion questions at the end of each chapter. As in the past, each chapter begins with a helpful introduction by the authors. 1969, approx. 576 pages, prob. $4.95

Write to the Faculty Service Desk for examination copies.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
866 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022
In Canada, write to Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd.,
1125B Leslie Street, Don Mills, Ontario

World youth . . .
Know the establishment.

CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, Third Edition

Edited by William G. Andrews, Chairman, Department of Political Science, State University College, Brockport, New York. #1 New Perspectives in Political Science, William G. Andrews, General Editor. 1968, 224 pages, about $1.95 (paper).

MODERN GOVERNMENTS
Third Edition

Walter D. Jacobs, University of Maryland; and the late Harold Zink. Van Nostrand Political Science Series. 1966, 768 pages, $10.95.

EUROPEAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
A Comparative Government Reader
Second Edition

William G. Andrews. 1966, 608 pages, $4.95 (paper).

EUROPEAN POLITICS I
A Comparative Government Biennial

William G. Andrews. 1966, 245 pages, $2.50 (paper).

THIRD PARTY MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

William B. Hesseltine, University of Wisconsin. Anvil Book #65, Louis L. Snyder, General Editor. 192 pages, $1.45 (paper).

THE DEMOCRATS
1789-1964
A Short History of a Popular Party

William N. Chambers, Washington University. Anvil Book #76. 192 pages, $1.75 (paper).

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
A Short History

Franklin L. Burdette, University of Maryland. Anvil Book #100. 1968, 192 pages, $1.75 (paper).

Send for your on-approval copies. Write College Department,

Van Nostrand
120 ALEXANDER STREET
PRINCETON, N. J. 08540

Cornell University Press

AGORA PAPERBACK EDITIONS

Classic works in political philosophy, under the general
editorship of Allan Bloom

Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline

By MONTESQUIEU. *Translated with Notes and Introduction by* DAVID LOWENTHAL. "This is a delightful book. David Lowenthal has rendered a service of real value in making available a new translation of Montesquieu's book on the Romans."—*Western Political Quarterly. 225 pages.* CP-74 $1.95

Politics and the Arts

Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre

By JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU. *Translated with Notes and Introduction by* ALLAN BLOOM. "Bloom's systematic and thoughtful analysis of Rousseau's arguments and their intellectual background provides an illuminating way into the essay."—*American Scholar. 158 pages.* CP-71 $1.95

On Tyranny

(Revised and Enlarged)

By LEO STRAUSS. This close textual analysis of Xenophon's *Hiero, or Tyrannicus* includes a dialogue between Strauss and Alexandre Kojève, Europe's leading Hegelian scholar. *240 pages.* CP-73 $1.95

Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle

Translated with an Introduction by MUHSIN MAHDI. This first English translation of the great first-century Arab philosopher contains penetrating commentaries on Aristotle and on the Platonic approach to politics.
158 pages. (Available in January.) CP-72 $1.95

Cornell University Press, ITHACA, NEW YORK 14850

"We believe that students want and deserve an introduction to Political Science that demands a higher level of thinking than is evidenced in present texts. Such an introduction should give them an awareness of current research. It should have a point of view and not be limited to factual summaries, many of which are quickly outdated. It should be frank about matters in which we are ignorant, provide encouragement for students to formulate their own theories, and convey some of the excitement we political scientists experience in our own work. We believe such a text can be written and hope that our book accomplishes these objectives."

Joyce and William Mitchell

Coming January 20

The new introduction to Political Science that is written for today's student . . . and today's professor

'POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY'

An Introduction to Political Science

By Joyce M. & William C. Mitchell
University of Oregon

For more information or examination copy, write:

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY **The College Department**
P.O. BOX 7600 CHICAGO 60680

New Political Non-Fiction From Washington

THE NATIONAL PRESS INC.

128 C Street N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

1. **LET THE SELLER BEWARE!** by James Bishop Jr. and Henry Hubbard. Introduction by Betty Furness. A study of the frauds perpetrated on the American people by the "Business Establishment". NEWSWEEK writers Bishop and Hubbard have written a history and evaluation of American consumer protection. This movement is traced from the simple Jeffersonian ideal of an agrarian society where the buyer and seller were on equal terms, to the present industrial system where consumer control is limited. The recent exposes by Rachel Carson and Ralph Nader are studied in detail. Cloth $6.95.

2. **YOU CAN FIGHT CITY HALL,** by former City Attorney H. Jackson Daniel. A laymen's guide to the local political process. The former City Attorney of Webster Groves, Missouri, explains how city hall functions and the language it uses to communicate. The book gives the details of zoning, garbage collection, street maintenance, schools, permits, dogs, and other municipal headaches. A "primer" on local government. Cloth $4.95.

3. **THE RIPON PAPERS,** edited by Lee W. Huebner and Thomas E. Petri. Taking their inspiration from England's renowned Bow group and its name from Ripon, Wisconsin—the founding place of the Republican Party—this loosely knit association of business, academic, and professional men and women known as the "Ripon Society" represents the liberal wing of the G.O.P. The Ripon Society is a research and policy organization. Although it is not formally affiliated with the Republican party, informally, it seeks to be its conscience. Some of the topics of these papers are: "China 68", "The Negative Income Tax", "The Realities of Vietnam", and "The Myth of Bipartisanship". Cloth $6.95.

4. **AMERICAN-EAST EUROPEAN TRADE**—Controversy, Progress, Prospects. Edited by Phillip D. Grub and Karel Holbik. Professor Grub of George Washington University and Professor Holbik of Boston University are prominent teachers of international trade and have been members of trade missions to Eastern Europe. This book examines the continuing controversy concerning United States trade with the Soviet Bloc Nations from all viewpoints. The existing laws and legislative proposals from the legal, economic, and business areas are summarized. A projection of the future of U.S.-East European trade is stated. A comprehensive bibliography is included. Cloth $6.95. Paper $2.95.

5. **THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF WORLD POWER,** by Senator Gale McGee. Here at last, is an authoritative, scholarly presentation of the Johnson Administration's Vietnam commitment. Senator McGee believes in the "containment policy" and sees the issue as the question of stability and balance in Eastern Asia. His historical perspective is gleaned from his background as a professor of history and chairman of the Institute of International Affairs of the University of Wyoming. "This well-written book should be in all libraries that own books on the other side of the Vietnam question."—Library Journal. Cloth $6.95.

6. **CROSSROADS, U.S.A.,** by Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. A pictorial essay of America's domestic scene. Senator Williams examines such questions as poverty, race, and civil disturbances which have had such a divisive effect on the American civilization and brought us to a "crossroads" in the course of our democratic form of government. Poignant photographs complement the text. Cloth $5.95.

7. **WHERE ARE THE VOTERS?** by Jerry W. Friedheim with research assistance and introduction by Richard Scammon. Proves by statistics and a perceptive text where American voters are located by age, occupation, race, sex, education, religion, and political preference. Gives professional advice on how to get the electorate to vote for your party or candidate. "Vote-finder" charts show how many votes a presidential candidate needs in each state and where he and his partisans can find them and how to get their votes. Cloth $6.95. Paper $2.95.

8. **HOW TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE AND WIN!** by Senator Hugh Scott. Millions of young Americans anticipate public service who, a generation or even a decade ago, might never have entertained such thoughts. Hugh Scott ran for and won election to the U.S. House of Representatives seven times before running for and winning election and reelection to the Senate. His book tells how to do it. Cloth $5.95. Paper $2.95.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

notes and readings

Third Edition by ROY C. MACRIDIS, Brandeis University, and BERNARD E. BROWN, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York. This book introduces comparative political analysis, not the study of individual foreign countries; considers how systems function, how they differ. *676 pages / $6.95 text*

EXPLANATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

a system paradigm

by EUGENE J. MEEHAN, University of Illinois. A new definition of "explanation" for the social scientist which is compatible with scientific practice, avoids conceptual difficulties of the familiar deductive paradigm, and is less constrictive.
139 pages, paperback / $1.95 text

INTERNATIONAL LAW

a text

Revised Edition by H. B. JACOBINI, Southern Illinois University. This text presents a comprehensive, brief, and readable account of the law of nations while emphasizing a political interpretation of law. Includes the law of peace, the law of war, and remnants of the law of neutrality. *471 pages / $8.50 text*

PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY

models of political linkage

by NORMAN R. LUTTBEG, Florida State University. The subject is "political linkage," the mechanism which allows political leaders to act in accordance with the wishes, desires, and demands of their public. Explores the balance between leadership discretion and citizenship participation in modern democracies.
480 pages, paperbound / $4.95 text

POLITICAL THEORY

a conceptual analysis

by JOSEPH S. MURPHY, Director, Peace Corps, Ethiopia. Not a chronological record of political thinkers, events, or institutions, this book is written from the stance of analytic philosophy and construes political theory as an activity whose purpose is the clarification of political concepts. *280 pages / $5.50 text*

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM

by JAY A. SIGLER, Rutgers, The State University. Covering every major aspect of the legal system, this book tries to relate it to the social system in the American context. A simple systems analysis is employed to show the flow of decision-making within the system. *256 pages / $5.50 text*

POWER AND DISCONTENT

by WILLIAM A. GAMSON, University of Michigan. In studying the phenomenon of "power," social scientists have split into two camps, which, this book suggests, are actually dual perspectives on the same relationship and process. After examining the relationship between *authorities* and *potential partisans*, the book tries to link them through the concept of political trust.
220 pages / $5.00 cloth and $3.25 paperbound text

write for your 90-day examination copies

DORSEY
PRESS

***THE
DORSEY
PRESS—homewood, illinois 60430***

UNITED NATIONS / NATIONS UNIES / VEREINTE NATIONEN

Klaus Hüfner / Jens Naumann

Zwanzig Jahre Vereinte Nationen

Internationale Bibliographie 1945—1965

With an Introduction in English, French, and German

LV, 519 pp. 1968. Hardcover, $19.50

(Beiträge zur auswärtigen und internationalen Politik, Band 2)

edited by

Richard Löwenthal and Gilbert Ziebura

Otto-Suhr-Institut of the Freie Universität Berlin

This is the first attempt of a systematic presentation of books and articles on the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. Among others, twenty political science journals from western and eastern countries were surveyed.

This bibliography includes five and a half thousand titles published in English, German and French.

It is divided into 61 sections which follow the outline of the Charta of the United Nations.

Messrs. Hüfner and Naumann have for years been associated with the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen*, Bonn. Presently they are research associates with the *Institut für Bildungsforschung in der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft*, Berlin.

Prospectus sent on request

Walter de Gruyter & Co. · Berlin 30

Coming Spring, 1969 for American Government courses —

American Public Policy: Documents and Essays

480 pages 6x9″ $4.95

by Thomas R. Dye, University of Georgia

Provides students an opportunity to deal first-hand with resource materials on public policy — legislative acts, court decisions, statements and reports from the executive branch of government, and clear statements of alternative policy positions by national figures. Includes the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, the Report of the President's Commission on Civil Disorder, Engle vs. Vitale, the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the Report of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, the Testimony of Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and other primary source materials for public policy. Also provides clear and forceful statements of alternative policies — for example, the Black Power alternative from Stokeley Carmichael, the negative income tax proposal, a plan for federal-state revenue-sharing by Walter Heller, and the "Arrogance of Power" critique of U.S. foreign policy by Senator J. William Fulbright.

Each chapter begins with an introductory essay by the author which describes the development of American public policy and places each document and essay within the context of policy development. Areas covered include segregation in public schools; the Negro in American society; protest and public order; health, welfare, and poverty; housing and urban renewal; taxing and spending; business and labor; military affairs; and foreign policy.

Write Boyd Lane for review copies.

Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company

A Bell & Howell Company

1300 Alum Creek Drive Columbus, Ohio 43216

original essays • relevant readings
a fresh approach • controversial issues
You'll find them all in an important new textbook on

AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

By KENNETH M. DOLBEARE, *University of Wisconsin.*

Part I of this book presents the origins and development of the liberal tradition. Part II, Power and Process in the American Political System: The Empiricists' Views, offers important selections by Andrew Hacker, Herbert McCloskey, V. O. Key, Jr., Robert Lane, Angus Campbell, Robert A. Dahl and others. Part III, Contemporary Prescriptions for America, features selections from controversial political thinkers such as Russell Kirk, Milton Friedman, Michael Harrington, Herbert Marcuse, Tom Hayden, Stokely Carmichael and Bayard Rustin.
Due May 1969 Approx. 700 pages Prob. $9.95

Now—with a new Afterword on JFK

PRESIDENTIAL POWER

By RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, *Harvard University.*

The book that Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in *The New Leader*, has called "the most brilliant and searching essay on the Presidency that we have had for a long time" has now been expanded to include an Afterword by the author on John F. Kennedy and his administration. This new material provides an additional dimension to Professor Neustadt's analysis. It will assure the continuation of *Presidential Power's* reputation as the definitive work on its subject for many years to come.
1968 In press. Paper: $2.95 Cloth: $4.95

Other important Wiley books to use are

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Current and Classic, *by* RICHARD N. SWIFT, *New York University*, about which Richard A. Falk writes, "It is an excellent piece of work, very carefully done, with precision and control." 1968 Approx. 598 pages $10.95

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS: Essays and Readings, *by* NELSON P. GUILD, *Frostburg State College; and* KENNETH T. PALMER, *Franklin and Marshall College.* 1963 341 pages Paper: $4.95 Cloth: $7.95

CITY POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY, *edited by* JAMES Q. WILSON, Harvard University. 1968 300 pages $7.95

JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.
605 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10016
In Canada: John Wiley & Sons Canada Ltd.

Cornell University Press

POLITICAL GERMINATION

Korea

Democracy on Trial

By JOHN KIE-CHIANG OH. In this enlightening study of the politics and government of South Korea, the author evaluates the effect of democracy on the divided peninsula since 1945. He considers the administrations of Syngman Rhee and Chang Myŏn after the Korean War, analyzes the profound readjustments occasioned by the military *coup d'état* in 1961, assesses the present Third Republic under President Chung Hee Park, and appraises the possible future of Korean politics. *264 pages.* $7.95

ELECTORAL EVOLUTION

The British Voter

An Atlas and Survey since 1885

By MICHAEL KINNEAR. Beginning with the first election in which the majority of adult males could vote, the tides of party fortunes and the voting behavior of various segments of the British population are analyzed in visual form in this fresh, comprehensive volume. Professor Kinnear pays special attention to the 1920's when, with the decline of the Liberal Party and the rise of Labor, British politics assumed its present form. *160 pages, 55 maps, 9x12.* $12.50

REPUBLICANISM
—COMMUNIST
STYLE

The New Jacobins

The French Communist Party and the Popular Front

By DANIEL R. BROWER. Putting recent events in France into better perspective, Mr. Brower takes a close look at the only other period in French history when the non-Communist left united with the Communist party. He studies the French Communist party during the 1930's, focusing on the party's role in the Popular Front and in the Communist International. Also discussed are the wave of sit-down strikes, Communist policy toward the Spanish Civil War, and Communist tactics in connection with the Popular Front cabinets. *296 pages, 13 photographs.* $7.95

Cornell University Press
ITHACA, NEW YORK 14850

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR BOOKS

the first name in quality paperback publishing

DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY INC.
Garden City, New York

Our Laidlaw division, River Forest, Illinois, serves the textbook needs of today's schools.

AFRICA AND THE VICTORIANS

The Climax of Imperialism

Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny. Since its original publication in 1961, this book has set the standard of scholarship and style for subsequent histories of Europe's imperial impulse. Covering the period from 1840 to 1900, the authors consider the official mind of Whitehall and Downing Street, the golden hopes of business in Africa, the anti-slavery and missionary movements, and the Kiplingesque ethic of imperial responsibility. Octavo format, $3.95

EQUALITY BY STATUTE

The Revolution in Civil Rights

Morroe Berger. A distinguished sociologist surveys all the major laws that have been passed in the field of civil rights from the Civil War to the present, tracing the relationship between law and prevailing social attitudes in this most sensitive of areas. $1.45

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN

Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney. Based on a study of 17,000 elementary school children in four major U. S. regions, this is the first large-scale analysis of how and when political attitudes are inculcated, and how the influences of family, peer groups, teacher attitudes, and religious membership affect the growth of such attitudes. $1.95

NATIONS BY DESIGN

Institution Building in Africa

Edited by Arnold Rivkin. Scholars from many nations and diverse disciplines discuss how to create and balance the mechanics of a modern government, economy, and a changing society in order to transform vestigial tribal cultures into societies that will survive them. Speaking from personal as well as academic experience, they analyze the roles of the army, the political hero, the economic planner, the traditional chief, and other institutions (old and new) in the evolution of African nations. *An Anchor Original.* $1.75

THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN WORLD

An Introductory Essay .

Keith Buchanan. Topography, climate, soil, agriculture, migration, economics, and disease—all the factors that contribute to a cycle of poverty for Southeast Asians are analyzed by a prominent geographer, who spells out the political implications of these facts and analyzes how they affect the international relations of the region with the developed nations. $1.25

Little, Brown and Company

College Division

JUST PUBLISHED!

for your courses in Public Administration

Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy

Francis E. Rourke, *Johns Hopkins University*

This textbook presents a systematic analysis of the role of bureaucracy in making policy decisions. It traces the influence of executive agencies in the political system to two factors: (1) the ability of administrators to build strong public support for their policy goals and (2) the expertise of administrators which enables them to shape the policies of the public officials whom they serve.

paper 5⅜ x 8¼ 192 pages $2.75

JUST PUBLISHED!

for your courses in Public Law and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

Discrimination and Civil Rights

Cases, Text, and Materials

Norman Dorsen, Editor

"Publication of this book is an event to be welcomed by political scientists, particularly those who teach in the public law area. . . . The complex and emotion-laden problems of racial discrimination . . . are the central domestic ones faced by the United States in this last third of the twentieth century. *Discrimination and Civil Rights* is an ideal vehicle for examining them through the scholarly processes of the classroom."

from the Foreword

College Edition of *Political and Civil Rights in the United States* (Volume II) by Thomas I. Emerson, David Haber, and Norman Dorsen

paper 6 x 9 512 pages $4.95 (tent.)

Little, Brown and Company

College Division

NOW AVAILABLE!

for your courses in Comparative Government

Political Socialization

Richard E. Dawson, *Washington University*

Kenneth Prewitt, *University of Chicago*

This comprehensive introduction to political socialization and its role in political life summarizes and integrates current research concerning the development of citizen values. The book focuses on the age and sequence in which political values and attitudes are acquired; the processes through which political learning takes place; and the agencies that perform political socialization.

paper	5 x 8	240 pages	$2.95

for a complete course in Comparative Politics

Comparative Politics

A Developmental Approach

Gabriel A. Almond and **G. Bingham Powell, Jr.**

Politics in England
Richard Rose

Politics in France
Henry W. Ehrmann

Politics in Germany
Lewis J. Edinger

Politics in the USSR
Frederick C. Barghoorn

other Country Studies and Analytic Studies are available

The United Nations Force in Cyprus

By James A. Stegenga An examination of UNFICYP that assesses its efficiency as a military operation designed to mitigate civil conflict in an area in which communal violence has posed a threat to the peace of the world. $6.25

The Politics of Intervention
The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909

By Allan Reed Millett An account of President Theodore Roosevelt's takeover of the Cuban government that does much to reveal the larger dimensions of a question that continues to exercise our government today: Can temporary stability brought about by force that is not coupled with an intensive effort to bring about reform ever result in lasting peace? $6.50

Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes
A Study of Norway

By Philip M. Burgess A conclusive demonstration that an understanding of the "strategic image" held by any nation's governing elite, by which it selectively defines and evaluates the country's international position as a determinant of its foreign policy, constitutes a remarkably reliable basis for making valid predictions concerning future developments on the international scene. $6.25

Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation

By Telford Taylor Essays on "Search, Seizure, and Surveillance" and "Free Trial and Free Press: First Fruits of the Warren Report" by the former chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. $7.00

The Changing Law of Nations

By Josef L. Kunz A distinguished member of the "Vienna School of International Law" examines the changes in the Law of Nations that have been produced by transformations in world conditions since 1914. $15.00

Ohio State University Press
2070 Neil Avenue
Columbus 43210

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER

A Set of Materials edited by

RICHARD FALK, Princeton University, and **SAUL MENDLOVITZ**, Rutgers Law School

Vol. I: Toward a Theory of War Prevention
Foreword by Harold D. Lasswell

Vol. II: International Law
Foreword by Wolfgang Friedmann

Vol. III: The United Nations
Foreword by Oscar Schachter

Vol. IV: Disarmament and Economic Development
Foreword by J. David Singer

"Professors Falk and Mendlovitz have planned and executed a program designed to shape an academic discipline oriented toward the principal policy question of the epoch. It is entirely appropriate that such a program should spread among professional and graduate schools, and ultimately permeate college and pre-college years.
The tone is sternly professional. It is responsible, scholarly, scientific, predictive, inventive, and critical."
From the Foreword to Volume I by Harold D. Lasswell

Projected for 1968 publication: Volumes V and VI supported by The Carnegie Corporation.

Vol. V: Regionalism and World Order

Vol. VI: The Role of the Individual and World Order

Four volume set, paperbound $10.00; Hardcover $14.00; Volumes I and II, $2.50 each; Volumes III and IV $3.50 each. 2,296 pp.

WORLD LAW FUND 11 West 42nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10036

West Africa under Colonial Rule

by Michael Crowder

This book, essentially a comparative study of the impact of French and British colonial rule on West Africa, traces the origins of European interest in the area, examines the period of conquest and occupation, and delineates the social changes brought about during the seventy-five year period of colonial rule. This study will be the standard work on the rise and fall of colonialism in all the vast areas of the West African coast. 530 pages $10.00

Russian Peasants and Soviet Power

by Moshe Lewin

The years 1928 and 1929 form a particularly significant period in Soviet history, one marked by tremendous forward thrust in industrialization, as well as by the mass collectivization of *the peasantry. This study analyzes the problems of the period from the view of both the poli*tician and the peasant. 556 pages $12.50

The Role of the Lawyer in the European Communities

by André Donner

The author examines the problems posed for the lawyer by the creation of the European Communities—the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and Euratom—and describes the role that the legal profession, especially in its judicial function, continues to play in their solution. 100 pages $3.50

Northwestern University Press

1735 Benson Avenue Evanston, Illinois 60201

CANADIAN PARTY PLATFORMS, 1867-1963

compiled by D. Owen Carrigan

This unique reference source will prove indispensable to the political researcher and student of Canadian history. The first comprehensive collection of Canadian election platforms to be published, it presents the issues and ideas critical to each campaign in the last century of Canadian politics. Prefacing the platforms for each campaign is a concise survey of significant developments preceding the election, plus a rundown of the political situation in Canada at that time. 363 pages. $11.95.

FROM GEOGRAPHY TO GEOTECHNICS

by Benton MacKaye

edited by Paul T. Bryant

Placed by Lewis Mumford in the same tradition with the works of Henry David Thoreau and George Perkins Marsh, the writings of Benton MacKaye—forester, conservationist, planner—need no introduction to those concerned about the effects of our urbanized and deteriorating environment on the quality of our lives. Mr. Bryant here assembles 13 landmark essays which crystallize the essence of MacKaye's thought and work. 192 pages. $5.95.

OUTLAWING THE SPOILS

A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883

by Ari Hoogenboom

"We are indebted to Professor Hoogenboom for extending our understanding of the civil service reform movement and its relation to the political, social, and intellectual events of the time."—*The American Political Science Review.* ". . . an exhaustive and fascinating study . . . the definitive work on the long-term effort which ended in the adoption of the Pendleton Act of 1883."—*Wisconsin Magazine of History.* 306 pages. Paper only, $2.95.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS
URBANA · CHICAGO · LONDON

International Relations: The World Community in Transition

Third Edition

Norman D. Palmer and **Howard C. Perkins**

A thorough revision of a basic undergraduate text, the third edition of *International Relations* takes into account latest developments in world affairs, and new approaches and methodology in the study of international relations. The organization follows that of the earlier edition, providing a comprehensive and balanced treatment of the major themes in international relations. The first half of the text examines the principles of international relations, and the second half focuses on contemporary (post-World War II) world politics, thus making it suitable for either a one-term or two-term course in international relations.

The third edition is profusely illustrated with new maps, charts, and cartoons, and the bibliographies and Appendix are unusually elaborate for a basic text.

About 720 pages *A January 1969 Publication*

South Asia and United States Policy

Norman D. Palmer, *University of Pennsylvania*

332 pages 1966 paper $4.75

A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations

J. Lloyd Mecham, *The University of Texas*

487 pages 1965 $7.95

Communist China in World Politics

Harold C. Hinton, *The George Washington University* and *The Institute for Defense Analyses*

527 pages 1966 $7.75

Houghton Mifflin Company

Boston / Atlanta / Dallas
Geneva, Ill. / New York / Palo Alto

Political Order in Changing Societies

by Samuel P. Huntington

The major causes of violence and instability in the emerging countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, argues Mr. Huntington in this major contribution to modern political analysis, are to be found in the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change. Focusing on ways of creating new, effective bases for political association, he offers valuable insights on age-old problems of political change in both Western and non-Western societies. $12.50

China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913

edited and with an Introduction by Mary Clabaugh Wright

"Great themes run through this book: local differentiation and societal integration, reform and revolution, innovation and renewal, conservatism and radicalism, tradition and modernity. All relate to the fascinating dialectic of Chinese history."—G. William Skinner. $15.00

The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity

by A. W. Singham

The unusual relationships that develop in a colony from the rivalry among the traditional, the charismatic, and the legal domination systems are examined in this study of a political leader—the "hero"—who emerges during the stage of terminal colonial rule. $10.00

Big Business in Japanese Politics

by Chitoshi Yanaga

Focusing on the crucial decade 1951-1960, the author makes the first systematic effort to show how the power of organized big business, unmatched by that of any other interest group in Japan, operates directly and indirectly in the political process. He clearly shows that the Japanese governing process is a joint effort of big business, party government, and administrative bureaucracy. $8.75

YA
LE

Yale University Press New Haven and London

1908-1968

RONALD

A HISTORY OF WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY

GERALD RUNKLE, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville

A basic textbook for courses in political theory and political philosophy. Presents an objective, chronological account of the important political theories from the time of Plato to the present. Each theory is clearly expounded and analyzed, and quotations from original sources are documented and are from editions easily available to students. In order that the student may appreciate the significance of each theory, the author presents the context in which it was developed: political, economic, and social events; the intellectual quality of the period; and the philosophical basis of the theory itself. To encourage the student to make a meaningful evaluation of each theory, the author presents his own critical comment. Both contextual and critical sections are set off from the expository sections. *1968. 668 pp.* *$9.00*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

JOHN M. PFIFFNER, University of Southern California; and
ROBERT PRESTHUS, York University, Toronto

The Fifth Edition of this famous text examines administration at all levels of government. It integrates descriptive-institutional materials of administrative science with behavioral analyses of administration in action. It analyzes such aspects as the historical and institutional framework, separation of powers, role of executives (particularly that of the modern specialist), and the problem of obtaining superior talent. Covers decision-making and the data-processing revolution, and incorporates recent research into group behavior, individual motivation, and leadership dynamics. *5th Ed., 1967. 567 pp.* *$8.00*

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

RUSSELL M. ROSS, University of Iowa; and
KENNETH F. MILLSAP, Assistant City Manager, Iowa City, Iowa

This text provides a thorough treatment of the governmental activities of the 50 states and their local governmental units. Although predominant emphasis is on administrative aspects of state and local government, the book also presents material on the structure of governmental units below the national level. The role of countries, the position of the municipalities and special districts, and the peculiar problems of metropolitan areas are examined in detail. The importance of intergovernmental coordination is stressed, as is the growing relationship between the national and local governments. *1966. 705 pp., illus.* *$8.50*

ESTABLISHED 1900

The Ronald Press Company

79 Madison Avenue • New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
OF NIJMEGEN • THE NETHERLANDS

At the FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
the chair of politicology
is vacant.

The appointed ordinary will be entrusted with the giving of lectures to students of Politicology and Sociology.

Those who want to draw attention to possible candidates or those, who would like to come forward as such, are requested to address themselves, preferably with extensive elucidatory remarks, to

Head of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Bijleveldsingel 70, Nijmegen.

THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

RESEARCH SCHOLARSHIPS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Applications are invited for scholarships in Political Science.

Applicants should be postgraduate students with capacity for research. Scholars will normally enroll for a Ph.D. degree, the course for which extends over three years. A scholarship is awarded initially for two years, subject to satisfactory progress, but normally will be extended for the whole period of the course.

The basic scholarship allowance is $A2,330 per annum. Married scholars with dependent children receive additional allowances. Fares to and from Canberra are paid.

Application forms and further particulars are available from the University. Applications should reach the University by 31 January, 30 April or 30 September in any year, although special consideration may be given to applications at other times. Scholarships may be taken up at any time after award, subject to agreement of the Head of the Department concerned.

C. G. Plowman
Academic Registrar

Box 4, P.O.,
CANBERRA. A.C.T. 2600. AUSTRALIA

October 1968

NEW and FORTHCOMING

MACROPOLITICS: Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Politics

by Morton Kaplan, University of Chicago.

A selection of essays by a pioneer in the application of systems theory to political analysis, *Macropolitics* develops the author's concern with the philosophical foundations of political science, and with the extension of philosophical principles into the realm of empirical analysis. *304 pp. $7.95.*

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN

by Robert D. Hess, Stanford University, and Judith V. Torney, Illinois Institute of Technology.

"The book . . . will be a central study in this literature for the next decade, at least."—*Harvard Educational Review.*

Based on a study of 12,000 elementary school children, this book presents the most complete and accurate information ever gathered on the political attitudes acquired before high school and the process by which this political socialization occurs. *288 pp. $9.75.*

THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

by Robert Crain, University of Chicago.

This book is the first genuinely scientific analysis of the political process by which school systems have been and can be desegregated. Fifteen case studies of northern and southern schools are documented and analyzed with the local school board emerging as the primary factor behind the decisions regarding desegregation. *390 pp. $7.95.*

THE LOGIC OF SOCIAL INQUIRY

by Scott Greer, Northwestern University.

A cogent examination of the rationale for social science from the perspective of the working social scientist, this book attempts to establish the fullest meaning of social science by exploring the roots of meaning in the basic philosophical processes of knowing, reasoning, and judging. *224 pp. $5.95. January.*

THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY: Readings with Interpretations

edited by David Minar, University of Washington, and Scott Greer, Northwestern University.

This collection of carefully selected readings explores the meaning and dimensions of the idea of community, with emphasis on community as an aspect of social organization and political life. *Pages and price to be announced. April.*

ALDINE PUBLISHING COMPANY, 320 W. Adams St., Chicago, Illinois 60606

Scott Foresman College Division

Forthcoming

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

By Thomas A. Flinn, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University

Based on the premise that policy-making by local government is determined by certain recurring actions and relations, this text introduces local government as *systems.*

The conceptual framework employed makes possible further exploration into other branches of political science, while concrete examples provide increased control of the material and suggest new directions for study.

A final section discusses the problems of local government in light of various contemporary proposals for reform and the increasing presence of the federal government.

The text is designed to be used in conjunction with other books in the American Government Series, as a supplement to a basic textbook, or as a core volume in advanced courses on local politics.

Ready spring, 1969, approx. 192 pages, softbound: $2.95, hardbound: $4.25.

THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC POLICY

Edited by Martin M. Shapiro, University of California, Irvine

This group of readings presents the Supreme Court as a political institution, describing the range of influences which affect its decision-making processes.

It is the author's intent that "the mixture of reading material will suggest to the student that the justices are neither oracles of a true and eternally fixed law nor predetermined creatures of their psychological and social environment, but political men seeking to reach wise political decisions."

Concerned with *today's* issues and the specific problems and controversies of the present court, the text makes vital supplementary reading for the introductory American Government course. *Ready spring, 1969, 176 pages, $2.95*

SCOTT, FORESMAN AND COMPANY College Division

Glenview, Illinois Atlanta Dallas Palo Alto Oakland, N.J.

ATHERTON PRESS

70 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10011

A NOTE FROM THE PUBLISHER ABOUT AN IMPORTANT NEW SERIES

THE ATHERTON CONTROVERSIES

We are proud to announce a new series of inexpensive textbooks, *The Atherton Controversies,* enabling college teachers to use a teaching technique reserved until now for those with few students and much leisure. Each volume in this series is devoted to a key controversial subject in political science and other fields, and is edited by a scholar intimately acquainted with the topic. The Editor's Introduction establishes the basis of argument and prepares the student for the conflicting viewpoints presented. Six or more authoritative articles follow, each stating a different view of the subject. By their juxtaposition these articles demonstrate to the student how an important issue is joined, how resolution is attempted, where the issue stands today, and how current thinking may affect future developments. We expect that *The Atherton Controversies* will provide a broad and stimulating basis for classroom discussion and student papers and a refreshing challenge to students as well as teachers. Your comments on the series are always welcome, and we will be glad to provide sixty-day examination copies on publication.

Charles D. Lieber

Available Winter 1968-69:

THE BIAS OF PLURALISM

WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY *University of Massachusetts*

BEHAVIORALISM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

HEINZ EULAU *Stanford University*

REPRESENTATION

HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN *University of California, Berkeley*

Each volume $6.95; $2.95 paper (for classroom adoption only).

Many other titles in preparation. Write publisher for complete list.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

An Introduction to Political Science

JOHN C. WAHLKE, *The University of Iowa*
and ALEX N. DRAGNICH, *Vanderbilt University, editors*

Random House; 618 pages; $8.50

A widely acclaimed book for introductory courses in political science. "The most thorough introductory text I have yet seen. I particularly appreciate the inclusion of the section on transitional politics."—Ray A. Geigle, *University of Washington*

"Excellent—successfully combines the country-by-country approach with the newer analytic approach to comparative politics."—Ole Holsti, *Stanford University*

THE FIFTY STATES AND THEIR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

JAMES W. FESLER, *Editor, Yale University,* KARL A. BOSWORTH, *University of Connecticut,* DAYTON D. McKEAN, *University of Colorado,* HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Columbia University,* ROBERT L. MORLAN, *University of Redlands,* ALLAN R. RICHARDS, *Louisiana State University,* VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, *Reed College,* YORK WILLBERN, *Indiana University*

Knopf, 1967; 616 pages; $8.50

An analysis of the fifty American states and their local governments in the context of modern federalism.

"A refreshing approach to a subject many authors have stereotyped."—William J. Dunham, *Seton Hall University*

THE STATE LEGISLATURE Politics and Practice

Second Edition, Revised

MALCOLM E. JEWELL, *University of Kentucky*

Random House, March 1969; PS-37; about 160 pages; about $2.25 paperbound

A thorough revision and updating of a wide-ranging survey of state legislatures and their role in American politics. New material includes chapters on reapportionment, legislators' roles, and legislative output.

CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE Beliefs and Strategies

JOHN W. KINGDON, *University of Michigan*

Random House, 1968; PS-59; 192 pages; $1.95 paperbound

This study probes candidates' beliefs about their constituencies and their channels of information, and the effects of these on the campaign strategies they choose.

THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE

Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936-1960

V. O. KEY, JR., *with the assistance of* MILTON C. CUMMINGS, JR.

Vintage, 1968; V-468; 184 pages; $1.65 paperbound

A classic study which concludes that there is a responsible electorate in America.

THE GREAT SOCIETY READER

The Failure of American Liberalism

Edited by MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN *and* DAVID MERMELSTEIN

Vintage, 1967; V-406; 480 pages; $2.45 paperbound

Focuses on the assumptions, values, and aims of the Great Society.

For your professional library . . .

FREUD

Political and Social Thought

PAUL ROAZEN

Knopf, 1967; $6.95

BORZOI College Textbooks

International Relations texts
of proven excellence . . .

WORLD POLITICS

Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged

A. F. K. ORGANSKI, *The University of Michigan*

Knopf, 1968; 544 pages; $8.50

The revision of this successful international relations text preserves the approach, structure, and lively, readable style that made the first edition so exciting. Professor Organski has reworked virtually every chapter and has added two completely new chapters on the process of national growth and the balance of terror.

POLITICS AMONG NATIONS

The Struggle for Power and Peace

Fourth Edition

HANS J. MORGENTHAU, *University of Chicago*

Knopf, 1967; 672 pages; $8.95

Professor Morgenthau's text remains what has been justly called "a landmark in American literature dealing with international politics." In this fourth edition particular attention is given to the United Nations, and to the issues of imperialism, prestige, nuclear war, alliances, and arms control.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE BIPOLAR WORLD

PETER J. FLIESS, *University of Massachusetts*

Random House, 1968; PS-55; 221 pages; $2.45 paperbound

THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE INTERWAR YEARS, 1919-1939

WILLIAM J. NEWMAN, *Boston University*

Random House, 1968; PS-60; 256 pages; $2.65 paperbound

WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC REALM

THOMAS R. ADAM, *New York University*

Random House, 1967; 256 pages; $2.95 paperbound

In preparation—an important new work
on modern nationalism

NATIONALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

KARL W. DEUTSCH, *Harvard University*
Knopf, Spring 1969; about 300 pages; about $5.95

RANDOM HOUSE, INC.
ALFRED A. KNOPF, INC.
The College Department, 501 Madison Avenue, New York 10022

New

Military Organization and Society

Stanislaw Andreski

"Dr. Andreski has made an important contribution to sociology and *a fortiori* to social anthropology. . . . He has evidently done a vast amount of scholarly hard work, the thinking is original and sophisticated, and the exposition concise and lucid. As Professor Radcliffe-Brown says, this is a remarkable book."—*Man*

New, enlarged edition LC: 68-27161 260 pages cloth, $6.00; paper, $2.45

Black Scare

The Racist Response to Emancipation and Reconstruction

Forrest G. Wood

Other studies of race relations during the Civil War and Reconstruction have usually focused on the Negro and his painful adjustment to freedom, or on the radicals' use of him for political gain. *Black Scare* looks at the opposition; it is about white men, not Negroes, revealing what is best described as the first "white backlash" in American history.

LC: 68-26066 275 pages illustrations $5.95

Punjabi Century, 1857-1947

Prakash Tandon

With a Foreword by Maurice Zinkin

"There is no comparable evocation of India as it used to be, except Kipling's *Kim. Kim* is one of the world's great stories, but Mr. Tandon writes from the inside."
—*Maurice Zinkin*

"Delightful . . . a book alive with information and glowing images. . . . On the simple foundation of birth, marriage, and death, Mr. Tandon builds a clear picture of the caste system and the pattern of Hindu family behaviour."—*Times Literary Supplement*

LC: 68-25959 272 pages cloth, $8.00; paper, $2.75

The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian

Nirad C. Chaudhuri

Because Mr. Chaudhuri has lived through great events and has observed them keenly, his book conveys a clear sense of what it means to grow up in an environment of social change. His unfailing sensitivity and the breadth of his interests enable the reader to appreciate many facets of Indian life and society that would otherwise remain unnoticed by even a careful foreign observer. His book, which has the makings of a latter-day classic, is an outstanding cultural history offering a unique view of life in Bengal and elsewhere in India during the first decades of this century.

LC: 68-25418 506 pages cloth, $8.00; paper, $2.95

from California

University of California Press • Berkeley 94720

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

The Limits of the Criminal Sanction

Herbert L. Packer. Crime in the streets, marijuana in the schools, civil disobedience—these are aspects of what seems a breakdown of social control. The criminal sanction, the imposition of punishment for the violation of criminal statutes, constitutes our primary control over behavior defined as antisocial. But how do we decide whether certain kinds of conduct, such as prostitution and narcotics offenses, ought to be subjected to it? Should we attempt to limit is use? $8.95

Cubans in Exile

DISAFFECTION AND THE REVOLUTION

Richard R. Fagen, Richard A. Brody, and Thomas J. O'Leary. This work seeks to discover who the exiles are and why they left Cuba, and to analyze the general phenomenon of self-imposed exile. The authors show that disaffection from the Castro regime is essentially an ideological response: exile is shown to be mainly an individual response to personal experiences. December. About $5.95

The American Occupation of Germany

POLITICS AND THE MILITARY, 1945-1949

John Gimbel. This study of American military government in Germany sharply contradicts the prevailing interpretation that American occupation policy and practice was unclear, vacillating, and contradictory. New material is presented on the origins of the Marshall Plan, the Bonn Government, and the Berlin Blockade. $8.75

The Japanese Communist Party 1922-1945

George M. Beckmann and Okubo Genji. The first detailed account of the founding and development of the Japanese Communist Party. Using Japanese materials that have only recently become accessible, the authors concentrate on the key period 1922-32, when the Party was at the peak of its influence. December. About $12.50

The Chinese Communist Movement

A REPORT OF THE U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT, JULY 1945

Edited by Lyman P. Van Slyke. This report, based on over 2,500 documents, is both a remarkably objective summary of the Communist movement during the Sino-Japanese War, and an invaluable source of specific military, political, and economic information about Communist-held areas in China during the period 1937-45. Paper, $2.95; cloth, $7.50

Order from your bookstore, please

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

ANNOUNCING THE MARKHAM POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES

Aaron Wildavsky, Editor

A PRIMER OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS

by Donald Strickland, Larry Wade and Ray Johnston with a foreword by Harold D. Lasswell

This brief paperback text is designed to introduce beginning students to the most advanced concepts of political science. The primer is written in ordinary language and is organized according to assumptions, definitions, theorems and proofs with heavy emphasis on deductive logic. Problems introducing the student to uses of data and research techniques are included.

published July 1968, $1.95 Paper Bound.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY

edited by Austin Ranney for the Social Science Research Council

A volume of original essays which explore the contributions the discipline of political science can make to the understanding of public policy content. Contributing authors are Austin Ranney, Vernon Van Dyke, Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Aaron Wildavsky, James W. Davis, Jr., Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Vincent Ostrom, Robert H. Salisbury, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, James N. Rosenau, Lucian Pye, Ralph K. Huitt and David B. Truman.

published September 1968, $5.95 Hard Cover.

ECONOMIC THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

edited by Bruce M. Russett

A collection of readings drawn from the literature of economics with extensive editorial comment by Professor Russett. The book clearly demonstrates the unique contribution economic analysis can make to the study of international politics. A valuable work for supplementary reading in courses on Contemporary Political Theory, Methodology, or a general course on International Politics.

published October 1968, $7.95 Hard Cover.

EMPIRICAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY

edited by Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer

This volume brings together articles which demonstrate newly emerging theories of democratic politics based on the findings of empirical research. The editors' original contributions break significant new ground and help to define rigorously the nature of empirical democratic theory. Major topics include: Defining Democracy; Structures of Democratic Government; Prerequisites of Democracy; Leaders and Citizens; Policy Outcomes; Methodology and Future Research.

publication January 1969, $7.50 Hard Cover.

SIMULATION IN THE STUDY OF POLITICS

edited by William D. Coplin

In this book Harold Guetzkow, John P. Crecine, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Rufus P. Browning and others demonstrate how simulation can contribute to research on international relations, urban affairs, elections, political recruitment, organizational behavior and political development. Papers and comments by non-simulationists provide useful interpretation and evaluation for the researcher or student who may wish an overview of simulation as a tool for political analysis.

published November 1968, $10.95 Hard Cover.

PLANNING–PROGRAMMING–BUDGETING: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO MANAGEMENT

edited by Fremont J. Lyden and Ernest G. Miller

A collection of readings exploring the usefulness of Planning-Programming-Budgeting Systems in governmental decision making. The volume includes explanations of the essential nature of PPB and descriptions of applications of these systems at various levels of government. The editors' intention is "to provide a starting basis for an educated understanding of PPB and its implications in managerial as well as policy contexts."

published March 1968, $4.50 Paper Bound; $7.50 Hard Cover.

MARKHAM Publishing Company
863 North Dearborn, Chicago, Illinois 60610

from Bobbs-Merrill

a brilliant new theory of political parties

The Goldwater Coalition

Republican Strategies in 1964

by **JOHN H. KESSEL,** Arthur E. Braun, Professor of Political Science, *Allegheny College*

"Professor Kessel ably recaptures the problems and strategies of the '64 presidential campaign, and so far as I can judge he does so with complete accuracy as to detail."

—DENISON KITCHEL

". . . a definite contribution to the field. At certain places it is highly original and breaks new conceptual ground and provides important new analysis."

—GERALD POMPER, *Rutgers University*

384 pp. $7.50 cloth $4.75 paper

forthcoming in March . . .

a new look at the job of government relations

How Organizations Are Represented in Washington

by

LEWIS A. DEXTER,

Winner of the Woodrow Wilson Prize, 1963

CONTENTS

1. It Is Not Just Lobbying: Government Relations and Washington Representation
   What This Book Is About and Whom It Is For
2. Who Is In Government Relations and Why
3. Means and Channels of Government Relations
4. When the Job Is Chiefly Lobbying
5. Helping and Seeking Help on Capitol Hill
   The Planning of Government Relations and Congressional Patterns in Favor-Handling
6. The Washington Representative and Clarification of Clients' Problems: "Guidance?"
7. Influence . . . Information . . . Intelligence
   What Government Relations Can Not and What It Can Provide
8. Characteristic Tensions Between Clients and Free Professionals
   Situations Where Washington Representatives and Their Employers Irritate Each Other
9. The Basic Public Service of Government Relations Programs
   Interpretation . . . Peacefulness . . . Towards a Wider System of Representative Politics

ca. 298 pp. Paper $3.75 Cloth $6.75

COLLEGE DIVISION

THE **BOBBS-MERRILL** COMPANY, INC.
A SUBSIDIARY OF HOWARD W. SAMS & CO., INC.
4300 WEST 62nd STREET • INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46268

Any reseller is free to charge whatever price it wishes for our books.

STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

A new paperback series from The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN ASIA
By Robert E. Osgood, George R. Packard III, and John H. Badgley
Presents three complementary views of Japan's emerging role as an Asian power and the consequences for United States interests. *$1.95*

CASTRO, THE KREMLIN, AND COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA
By D. Bruce Jackson
Delineates the issues and trends in the Soviet-Cuban contest for domination of revolutionary movements in Latin America, with special reference to Venezuela. *$2.45*

NATION OR EMPIRE?: THE DEBATE OVER AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
By Robert W. Tucker
Analyzes the background, development, and significance of the national debate over Vietnam and offers brilliant insights into the nature of American power and purpose. *$2.75*

WAR AND ORDER: REFLECTIONS ON VIETNAM AND HISTORY
By George Liska
Enlarges the historical and theoretical framework of the Vietnam debate and develops a reasoned case for the interventionist position. *$2.45*

Other titles in the series:

INTERVENTION AGAINST COMMUNISM
By Herbert S. Dinerstein *$1.45*

IMPERIAL AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF PRIMACY
By George Liska *$2.25*

CRISIS OVER RHODESIA: A SKEPTICAL VIEW
By Charles Burton Marshall *$1.45*

THE CHANGING STATUS OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION IN WESTERN DIPLOMACY, 1955-1966
By Charles R. Planck *$1.45*

ALLIANCES AND THE THIRD WORLD
By George Liska *$1.75*

FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
By Herbert S. Dinerstein *$1.95*

CYPRUS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
By Thomas W. Adams and Alvin J. Cottrell *$2.25*

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS, Baltimore, Md. 21218

COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

THE UN AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, 1967

ARTHUR LALL

In this book, Arthur Lall documents the role played by the United Nations in the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967, and presents important suggestions toward resolving the situation between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Mr. Lall's analysis of the reasons behind the moves and countermoves of the various UN delegations is based largely on his intimate personal knowledge of the inner workings of the UN, gained during his tenure as Indian Ambassador to the United Nations.
$10.00

THE POLITICS OF MENTAL HEALTH: ORGANIZING COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH IN METROPOLITAN AREAS

ROBERT H. CONNERY, CHARLES H. BACKSTROM, DAVID R. DEENER, JULIAN R. FRIEDMAN, MORTON KROLL, ROBERT H. MARDEN, CLIFTON MCCLESKEY, PETER MEEKISON, JOHN A. MORGAN, JR.

This study presents the political and administrative problems in the community mental health program set up by the Federal government in 1963 and 1964. The book contains a summary of the program; a section on the mental health facilities and administrative structure in Houston, Seattle, New Orleans, Syracuse, Boston, and Minneapolis-St. Paul; and an analysis of the problems of coordination raised by the fragmentation of government in metropolitan areas.
$10.00

THE WEB OF MODERN GREEK POLITICS

JANE PERRY CLARK CAREY and ANDREW GALBRAITH CAREY

In an attempt to find the reasons why modern Greece has so often been plagued by political turmoil, this book tells the story of modern Greek politics, from its nineteenth century beginnings through the recent military coup. Based not only on extensive research and numerous visits to Greece, but on the authors' conversations with Greeks from many different walks of life, the work explores the factors in the Greek background which have contributed to this lack of stability.
$6.95

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
440 West 110th Street
New York, N. Y. 10025

COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

Oxford University Press

Comparative Judicial Behavior:

CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES IN POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE EAST AND WEST

Edited by GLENDON SCHUBERT, *York University, Toronto; and* DAVID J. DANELSKI, *Yale University*. The first to focus cross-culturally upon judicial decision-making, utilizing theories and methods developed in the behavioral sciences, this book presents original empirical studies by authors who are political scientists or lawyers or both. The volume includes selections on judicial behavior in Japan, Australia, Canada, India, Korea, and the Philippines.

Spring 1969 350 pp. $7.50

The Impact of the Supreme Court Decisions:

EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Edited by THEODORE L. BECKER, *University of Hawaii*. This volume presents a unique and often lively collection of modern studies on the impact of Supreme Court decisions upon the President and Congress, the lower courts, state and local government and politics (school officials, police, state legislatures, etc.), and public opinion.

Spring 1969 approx. 250 pp. paper $2.25

In Defense of Sovereignty

Edited by W. J. STANKIEWICZ, *University of British Columbia*. This volume brings together eleven papers by leading jurists, philosophers, and political theorists on the concept of sovereignty. The anthology is conceived as a discussion in which the participants speak either for or against the concept; the editor appraises the 'debate' in his critical introductory essay. While bringing the most authoritative arguments into view, he also suggests a possible role of sovereignty in the light of the classical tradition.

Spring 1969 approx. 375 pp. paper $2.50

Political Socialization

By KENNETH P. LANGTON, *University of Michigan*. Focusing mainly on the influence of different social agencies in the political socialization process, this book is empirical and interdisciplinary in orientation and cross-cultural in scope. The author examines family structure and politics; the relative influence of mothers versus fathers in the formation of political orientations among pre-adults; the school: formal environment; the peer group and school: the informal milieu; the relative influence of different agencies. This book is the first volume in the series, *Studies in Behavioral Political Science*, edited by Robert Presthus, York University, Toronto.

Spring 1969 approx. 200 pp. tables, figures paper $1.95

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Oxford University Press

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRACY SERIES

General Editor: ROSCOE C. MARTIN, *Syracuse University*

Democracy in the Administrative State

By EMMETTE S. REDFORD, *University of Texas.* This book examines the possibilities for democracy in a society where the decisions affecting men's interests are made or carried out through public administrative institutions. Professor Redford first sets forth the basic tenets of democratic morality; then, discussing participation in the American political-administrative system, he presents a model of multidirectional influences on administration and proposes three levels of politics operating on it: micropolitics, subsystem politics, and macropolitics.

February 1969 approx. 250 pp. cloth $4.75 paper $2.25

Democracy and the Public Service

By FREDERICK C. MOSHER, *University of Virginia.* "An excellent and incisive analysis of the American public service with occasional comparative data. It is well written, analytical, and objective. He raises the pertinent issues and assesses our progress in alleviating them. An excellent survey."—GEORGE S. BLAIR, Clarement Graduate School

1968 232 pp. cloth $4.75 paper $2.25

Democratic Representation:

REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS

By ROBERT G. DIXON, *The National Law Center, The George Washington University.* "An imposing, comprehensive, scholarly, and exhaustive treatment of this knotty topic."—ALAN CLEM, University of South Dakota

1968 672 pp. text edition $8.00 trade edition $12.50

OXFORD READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY SERIES

Political Philosophy

Edited by ANTHONY QUINTON, *Oxford University.* "A judicious collection of articles and book excerpts, mostly written by British scholars since World War II, and dealing with selected contemporary aspects of political philosophy. The author has provided an excellent introduction to the 200-page volume of readings."—ROGER H. WELLS, MacMurray College

1967 198 pp. paper $1.95

The Notion of the State:

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL THEORY

By ALEXANDER PASSERIN D'ENTRÈVES, *University of Turin.* "The treatment of the State deserves careful reading and general recommendation for students and scholars alike."—K. Y. PAUL TSAI, Seton Hall University

1967 243 pp. cloth $5.60 paper $2.95

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

The Judicial Process:

AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE

SECOND EDITION

By HENRY J. ABRAHAM, *University of Pennsylvania*

1968 510 pp. paper $2.95

Freedom and the Court:

CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES

By HENRY J. ABRAHAM

1967 345 pp. cloth $7.50 paper $2.75

Punishment and Responsibility

ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

By H. L. A. HART, *Oxford University*

1968 283 pp. cloth $5.75 paper $2.50

Anglo-American Criminal Justice

By DELMAR KARLEN, *New York University; with* GEOFFREY SAWYER, *The Australian National University, and* EDWARD M. WISE, *Wayne State University*

1968 253 pp. cloth $6.00 paper $1.95

Basic Documents in International Law

Edited by IAN BROWNLIE, *Oxford University*

1967 251 pp. cloth $4.00 paper $2.50

The Democratic Civilization

By LESLIE LIPSON, *University of California, Berkeley*

1964 632 pp. cloth $10.00
A Galaxy Book, GB 268, paper $2.95

The Real World of Democracy

By C. B. MACPHERSON, *University of Toronto*

1966 70 pp. $2.40

The Nature and Function of International Organization

SECOND EDITION

By STEPHEN S. GOODSPEED, *University of California, Santa Barbara*

1967 745 pp. illus. $7.50

Documents in the History of the European Continent, 1815-1939

Edited by G. A. KERTESZ, *Monash University (Australia)*

Spring 1969 300 pp. cloth $9.95
paper $4.95

Essays on the Making of the Constitution

Edited by LEONARD W. LEVY, *Brandeis University*

Spring 1969 300 pp. paper $1.75

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Oxford University Press

Democrat and Diplomat
THE LIFE OF WILLIAM E. DODD

By ROBERT DALLEK, *University of California, Los Angeles.* "A warm, careful, readable portrait of a fine historian and significant public figure."—Frank Freidel, Harvard University. "I read Mr. Dallek's book with increasing interest and fascination. As biography, it is a work of art. As history, it is first-rate . . . particularly about his career as Ambassador to Germany."—Arthur S. Link, Princeton University $8.50

Boss Cox's Cincinnati
URBAN POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

By ZANE L. MILLER, *University of Cincinnati.* "Zane Miller's study of Cincinnati is the clearest account we have of a revolution that transformed the nineteenth-century city into the twentieth-century urban center."—Robert Wiebe, Northwestern University. "An enlightening study of a city in transition and of its encounter with modern urban problems." —Oscar Handlin, Harvard University. *8 maps. (Urban Life in America series.)* $7.50

"The Best Men"
LIBERAL REFORMERS IN THE GILDED AGE

By JOHN G. SPROAT, *Lake Forest College.* "Mr. Sproat's solid, literate analysis helps greatly at last to place into perspective that long-puzzling shift from Radical to Liberal Republicanism."—Harold Hyman, Rice University. "His dissection of the so-called liberal mind of the late 19th century is the fullest and most insightful that I know. . . . It throws light not only on the period directly discussed, but also on the problems of our own day."—John A. Garraty, Columbia University $7.50

American Catholics and Social Reform
THE NEW DEAL YEARS

By DAVID J. O'BRIEN, *Loyola College, Montreal.* "Mr. O'Brien's study deals with a significant period in recent American Catholic history; it covers the ground thoroughly and contains much useful information and judicious commentary. What makes it particularly valuable is that O'Brien brings to bear on the matters he discusses the perspective of the latest Catholic theological thinking and social criticism."—Philip Gleason, University of Notre Dame $6.50

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

Oxford University Press

The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights

By J. E. S. FAWCETT, *All Souls College, Oxford.* The European Convention on Human Rights has been in operation since 1954 and over 3,000 applications have been brought under it. This survey takes the Convention article by article and clause by clause, describing and analyzing the interpretation that has been given to them by the Convention bodies, and also by national courts in the countries in which the Convention is part of the domestic law. $8.75

Food, Farming and the Common Market

By MICHAEL BUTTERWICK *and* EDMUND ROLFE, *both of the Institute of Agrarian Affairs, Oxford.* Agriculture is a major obstacle in Britain's Common Market negotiations as well as a source of some contention within the Community itself. In this timely and valuable study the authors consider all aspects of the subject. They compare postwar development in Britain to the development of each country of the E.E.C. since 1958. An analysis of Britain's unsuccessful 1961-63 negotiations accompanies speculation as to what form pending negotiations might take. $7.75

Arnim and Bismarck

By GEORGE O. KENT, *Library of Congress.* This study analyzes the status of the office of the chancellor and the foreign minister of the German Reich. It discusses how the outcome of the struggle between Arnim and Bismarck settled the personal fate of the protagonists and determined the course of German foreign and domestic policies for some time. The book is based on a wide range of hitherto little known documents in the archives of the German Foreign Ministry in Bonn. $5.95

Canada in World Affairs

VOLUME XII: 1961-1963

By PEYTON V. LYON, *Carleton University, Ottawa.* This is a well-documented account of Canada's exceptionally controversial foreign and defense policies during 1961-63. The volume presents an analysis of Canada's uneven responses to the Berlin and Cuban crises; the Government's reluctance to act on defense commitments, and the ensuing row between Ottawa and Washington; the election of 1963, the first to be fought principally over foreign or defense policy since 1917; the decline in Canada's ability to influence the conduct of other countries; Mr. Diefenbaker's growing resentment of the military establishment, Washington, and many of his cabinet colleagues; and finally, a discussion of his relations with President Kennedy. $10.00

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Outstanding Books
from The University of Chicago Press

The Origins of British Sociology: 1834–1914

An Essay with Selected Papers
Philip Abrams

This book presents the development of a whole national school of sociology rather than the work of a single thinker. The material is diverse and shows a pattern of convergence and divergence between different strands of work. The introduction combines historical analysis with numerous short citations from representative works. Readings were selected from works which have been historically decisive or intellectually distinctive in the making of British sociology.

1968 LC: 68-54221 Details to be announced

Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building

Selected Writings, Edited and with an Introduction by
S. N. Eisenstadt

Max Weber's concept of charisma is of crucial importance for understanding the processes of institution building. The explication of the relations between charisma and institution building is perhaps the most important challenge Weber's work poses for modern sociology. The book relates charisma to the structure of social relations, institutionalization in the political sphere, the legal system, the economic sphere, the sphere of social stratification and the spheres of religion and culture.

1968 LC: 68-54221 350 pages Cloth $13.50 Paper $3.95

Roderick D. McKenzie on Human Ecology

Selected Writings, Edited and with an Introduction by
Amos H. Hawley

Roderick McKenzie wrote the first definitive statements of human ecology in the years when sociology was casting off its preoccupation with reform issues and emerging as a mature social science possessing a distinctive body of theory. The ideas set forth in his early essays soon came to be regarded as immutable doctrine. The main divisions covered in the book are Human Ecology, The Local Community, Interregional Expansion and Inter-Racial Contacts, and Dominance and the Region.

1968 LC: 68-9728 Details to be announced

E. Franklin Frazier on Race Relations

Selected Papers
Edited and with an Introduction by G. Franklin Edwards

E. Franklin Frazier, a pioneer Negro sociologist, was the first to uncover the structure of the Negro family under segregation. His studies focused on the impact of urbanization, and he analyzed the emergence of the Negro middle class. Ultimately his concerns led him to a broad and comparative study of race relations in the United States and elsewhere throughout the world. The present volume is a selection from his theoretical works and other writings on the Negro and race relations. *Heritage of Sociology Series.*

October 1968 LC: 68-8586 320 pages Cloth $13.50 Paper, P324, $3.95

HERITAGE OF SOCIOLOGY SERIES MORRIS JANOWITZ, GENERAL EDITOR

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

The Soviet System of Government
Fourth Edition Revised
John N. Hazard

The fourth edition of this book is a valuable guide to the nature of the Soviet system as it functions in practice and an indication of the direction in which it is moving on its fiftieth anniversary. The Soviet system, evolving from totalitarian "Stalinism" to a promised new "socialist democracy," is the Communists' chief instrument of change. Focal questions for this edition are: Is such change possible? Does the Soviet system differ qualitatively from authoritarian systems of the past or present?
1968 LC: 68-24557 288 pages Cloth $6.75 Paper $3.25

Justice on Trial
The Case of Louis D. Brandeis
A. L. Todd

Louis D. Brandeis was a man for the people in an age of monopolies, and the first Jew to be appointed to the Supreme Court. "In *Justice on Trial* Mr. Todd has provided an exciting and superlatively fair story of Brandeis' appointment . . . the four months of ugly opposition that it evoked in the smugger sections of Boston and Cambridge, and the victory for decency that emerged at last. From start to finish the episode crackles with drama, and the author recounts it superbly."—Edmond Cahn, *Book Week.*
1968 Paper, P321, $2.95

Fiscal Policy and Economic Development
A Primer on Fiscal Policy for the Emerging Countries
Robert B. Bangs

For students of developing nations, and for administrators and advisors of such countries, this book examines the relation between governmental fiscal policy and economic development. This relationship is examined in countries at various stages of development, from less-developed societies to affluent ones. The book focuses on such practical matters as tax and expenditure policy, trade policy, giving and receiving fiscal advice, monetary policy, and development planning.
1968 LC: 68-27292 212 pages, $7.50

The American Partnership
Intergovernmental Co-operation in the Nineteenth-Century United States
Daniel J. Elazar

Elazar challenges the theory that, until this century, the American governmental system was one of dual federalism. He presents considerable evidence that the pattern of American federalism—the American partnership—has been a constant one since the establishment of the Republic. By studying the activities of the American government in the nineteenth century, he shows that federal-state relations were already those of the co-operative federalism held to be a twentieth-century development.
1962 LC: 62-17132 358 pages, $6.95

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO 60637

Outstanding Books
from The University of Chicago Press

Double Jeopardy and the Federal System
Leonard G. Miller

Miller defends the constitutionality of successive prosecutions for the same offense by state and federal courts. His defense is based upon the legitimacy and necessity of the "two-sovereignities doctrine" in the American federal system. The possibility of multiple prosecution for the same offense is inherent in the federal system, and its constitutionality has continually been sustained at the same time that a body of rules to protect defendants has grown up.
1968 LC: 68-19095 136 pages, $9.75

Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics
Stanley I. Kutler

This book offers a new perspective on the Supreme Court during the Reconstruction period. Focusing on the Court's institutional and political status, the author suggests that the congressional Republicans were not united and that, despite the furor over the Dred Scott decision, the Court exhibited a remarkable tenacity and toughness. Contrary to the conventional view, Kutler concludes that the period represented continuity in judicial development, rather than a setback, and thus formed a more meaningful backdrop for understanding the later character and uses of federal judicial power.
1968 LC: 68-16702 192 pages, $5.95

Organized Crime in Chicago
Second Edition
John Landesco
With a new Introduction by Mark Haller

John Landesco's study of organized crime in Chicago during the 1910's and 1920's is probably the best analysis yet written of the place of organized criminal activity in the social structure of an American city. This work has not been readily available since it was originally published as part of the Illinois Crime Survey. Now reissued separately, Landesco's book presents a vivid history of Chicago crime that will interest the scholar and the general public alike.
1968 LC: 68-24353 322 pages, $7.50

Violence and Modernization
Henry Bienen

Bienen reviews present scholarly knowledge about violence and discusses it in relation to modernization. He looks at ghetto violence, excluding racial violence; internal war, excluding guerilla warfare, counter-insurgency, and civil war; revolution; works dealing with the structure, typologies, and romance of violence; and totalitarianism. He concludes by suggesting areas for further study. *Published for the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs by the University of Chicago Press.*
1968 LC: 68-56012 112 pages Cloth $3.95 Paper $1.25

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO 60637

Winner—1968 Woodrow Wilson Award

Parliament, Parties and Society in France 1946-1958

Duncan MacRae, Jr.

Duncan MacRae has won the 1968 Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award for this important case study in political sociology featuring an analysis of voting in the National Assembly of the Fourth French Republic in relation to party structure, constituency voting behavior, and social structure.
416 pp. $10.00

"[Professor MacRae] has immersed himself thoroughly in the literature on modern French politics and has distilled out the essence of that literature as it relates to his central quest—a search for the causes of cabinet instability. The result is about as readable and persuasive as this kind of monograph can be."

—Gordon Wright
—The *Annals* of the American Political and Social Science Association

New and forthcoming:

Studies in British Politics

Richard Rose, ed.

Now in paperback, this collection of articles is designed to portray the political behavior of the British public. Each of its five sections reflects a particular aspect of the influences on the British voter outside the formal machinery of government, and introductions and headnotes help place the selections in their proper social science contexts. 352 pp. $3.75

New Approaches to International Relations

Morton A. Kaplan, ed.

This volume, the product of the 1966 Conference of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation at the University of Chicago, contains definitive statements of the new approaches to international relations which political scientists have thus far recognized. Contributors: *Kaplan, Wohlstetter, Golden, Kahn, Alker, Burns, Guetzkow, Galtung, North, Falk, Chi, Franke, and Reinken.*
534 pp. $10.00

Political Change in Britain

The Factors Conditioning Electoral Choice

David E. Butler and Donald Stokes **May 1969**

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS

College Department **175 Fifth Avenue** **New York, New York 10010**

Now Issues from PEGASUS

The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

By William B. Bader, Consultant to the U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee

In this critical assessment of the United States' policy toward the proliferation of nuclear weapons, William B. Bader reviews and analyzes the shifting attitudes that have shaped and re-shaped that policy. Contending that valid attitudes toward one country cannot be assumed to be equally valid for another, Mr. Bader analyzes the special circumstances of each nation that will govern its decision to go or not to go "nuclear", and concludes with recommendations on how the spread of nuclear weapons can be slowed and American security interests preserved. Texts of nuclear weapons treaties and agreements signed by the U. S. to date included.

176 pages. Clothbound, $6.00; Paperback, $1.95

The New Marxism

Soviet and East European Marxism Since 1956

By Richard T. De George, University of Kansas

Since Khrushchev's 1956 speech against Stalin, significant changes have altered the political character of the Soviet-East European bloc. The New Marxism describes and evaluates the corresponding changes in Marxist and Marxist-Leninist theory, their relation to previous positions, and the resultant divergencies they have helped to create among the East European Marxists.

176 pages. Clothbound, $6.00; Paperback, $1.95

Lenin on Politics and Revolution

Selected Writings

Edited and introduced by James E. Connor, Columbia University

This superbly edited collection of Lenin's writings condenses into one volume the texts essential to an understanding of his revolutionary political thought. Spanning thirty years in Lenin's career, these key writings, together with Connor's invaluable introductory material and notes, provide an excellent introduction to the mind and method of the great revolutionist.

388 pages. Clothbound, $7.95; Paperback, $2.95

The Politics of Religious Conflict

By Richard E. Morgan, Columbia University

The bold new appeals for public funds by religious schools, hospitals and child care centers have dramatically rekindled a long sensitive issue in American politics: the proper relationship of church and state. This book surveys the contemporary issues and interest groups now triggering discord, and systematically analyzes why church-state conflicts arise, how, where and by whom they are carried on, and their consequences to the American political process as a whole.

160 pages. Clothbound, $5.95; Paperback, $1.95

A Conflict of Loyalties

The Case for Selective Conscientious Objection

Edited by James Finn, Editor of worldview

Does a young man have the same right to refuse to take part in a specific war that he has to refuse to take part in all wars? The Selective Service Law recognizes the rights of the general conscientious objector, but the principle of "selective conscientious objection" is nowhere accepted either politically or legally. The volume's editor and distinguished contributors—Michael Harrington, Arnold Kaufman, William V. O'Brien, Quentin L. Quade, Paul Ramsey, Everett E. Gendler, Jerome M. Segal, and Mulford Q. Sibley—explore the moral, philosophical, political and legal aspects of selective conscientious objection.

288 pages. Clothbound, $5.00; Paperback, $1.75

A Bentham Reader

Edited by Mary Peter Mack, Connecticut College

The first comprehensive selection of Jeremy Bentham's works to be published since his lifetime nearly a century and a half ago. Bentham's major ideas are presented here through selections from his principal works — *A Fragment on Government, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,* as well as from his writings on prison reform, psychology, the law of evidence and indirect legislation. Introduction and notes.

352 pages. Clothbound, $8.95; Paperback, $2.95

FORTHCOMING

Stalin and His Generals

Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II

Edited by Seweryn Bialer, Research Institute for Communist Affairs, Columbia University

This major new collection of excerpts from memoirs of key Soviet military men, diplomats and high ranking industrial managers gives the West the role of Stalin and his leaders in the conduct of World War II.

688 pages. Clothbound, $8.95

From War to War

The Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1948-1967

By Nadav Safran, Harvard University

A balanced account of the forces and events that have shaped the conflict between Israel and its neighbors over the last twenty years and an analysis of the complex political issues at stake.

448 pages. Clothbound, $10.00; Paperback, $2.95

BACKLIST

Vietnam Triangle

Moscow, Peking, Hanoi

By Donald Zagoria, Research Institute on Modern Asia, Hunter College

"Zagoria underlines with academic skill and persuasive documentation why the United States is really fighting a residual shadow of international communism. . . . Few American experts are more qualified . . ."

—The Washington Post.

288 pages. Clothbound, $6.95; Paperback $1.75

The Politics of Poverty

By John C. Donovan, Bowdoin College

"Highly recommended . . . helps us understand why the Negro poor are angry."—**Library Journal.**

160 pages. Clothbound. $5.75; Paperback, $1.45

At your bookseller's

PEGASUS

A DIVISION OF *Western Publishing Company, Inc., 850 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022*

CQ BACKGROUND TEXTBOOKS

Coming next month . . .

CQ GUIDE TO CURRENT AMERICAN GOVERNMENT - SPRING 1969

—updated and published twice yearly, January and September, to provide factual information on recent significant developments in American Government.

Election Results: Presidential, House, Senate, and Gubernatorial—Review of 90th Congress—Make-up of 91st Congress—Preview of New Administration—Review of 1968 Supreme Court Cases—Fortas-Thornberry Dispute—1968 Lobbying Activities—Federal-State Relations.
In print January 20, 1969, About 160 pages, 8-1/2" x 11", paper $2.50

NEW

U.S. DRAFT POLICY AND ITS IMPACT

Impact of Draft on Graduate Schools and Service Organizations—Lottery Pros and Cons—Nonmilitary Service Proposals—Legality of War—Draft Card Burning—Resistance to Military Service—History of Selective Service Law—Views on New Draft Policies.
July 1968, 48 pages, 8-1/2" x 11", paper $2.95

PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING CONVENTIONS - 1968

—An objective, accurate account of the official and unofficial events at the conventions in *permanent form—detailed, organized, and indexed for quick reference.*
October 1968, 304 pages, 8-1/2" x 11", paper $6.00

Revised and Updated . . .

LEGISLATORS AND THE LOBBYISTS

Second Edition: May 1968, 92 pages, 8-1/2" x 11", paper $2.95

Fourth Edition . . .

REVOLUTION IN CIVIL RIGHTS

June 1968, 120 pages, 8-1/2" x 11", paper $2.95

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE

1735 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006

BENJAMIN I. SCHWARTZ

COMMUNISM IN CHINA

Ideology in Flux

One of America's leading sinologists focuses on the ideas, attitudes, and policies of leading decision-making individuals and groups in Peking and in the Communist world. Mr. Schwartz has included articles written over a span of thirteen years, and a new introductory essay which reconsiders some of the concerns underlying the earlier articles. $5.95

ALEX INKELES

SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOVIET RUSSIA

In this collection of essays, representing more than twenty years of research, Mr. Inkeles covers a wide range of subjects with one primary purpose: to identify the main elements of the process of modernization in the Soviet social system. *Russian Research Center Studies, 57.* $12.50

MARILYN B. YOUNG

THE RHETORIC OF EMPIRE

American China Policy, 1895-1901

This book is a reappraisal of America's China policy at the end of the nineteenth century in which the author examines the effects of the confrontation between the two countries and provides a fresh perspective on America's role in the Far East. *Harvard East Asian Series, 36.* $7.50

DOROTHY BORG

THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS OF 1933-1938

From the Manchurian Incident Through the Initial Stage of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War

"If our society adequately rewarded achievement in the literature of history Miss Borg should win a decoration."—Edgar Snow, *Political Science Quarterly.* Winner of the 1965 Bancroft Prize. *Harvard East Asian Series, 14.* 2nd printing. $10.00

THE STRENGTH OF GOVERNMENT

McGEORGE BUNDY

Mr. Bundy here contends that our national government is dangerously weak. Attacking the common assumption that strong government is inconsistent with personal freedom, he calls for a new theory of government, reconciling strong political authority with widespread political participation. This book is Mr. Bundy's adaptation of his 1968 Godkin Lectures at Harvard. $3.75

VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR

The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities

JAMES Q. WILSON

Examining how the uniformed patrolmen in eight communities deal with common offenses, Mr. Wilson describes the problems that arise out of constraints imposed by law, politics, public opinion, and expectations of superiors. He isolates three "styles" of police behavior, and considers their relationship to local politics. *Joint Center for Urban Studies.* $6.50

THE METROPOLITAN ENIGMA

Inquiries into the Nature and Dimensions of America's "Urban Crisis"

Revised Edition

JAMES Q. WILSON, *editor*

This is an expanded version of a book that was first published in paperback in 1967 by the U. S. Chamber of Commerce. The contributors, selected by the Joint Center for Urban Studies and all distinguished experts in their fields, present a wide variety of incisive papers on today's urban problems. $7.75

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

JAMES DUFFY

"One of the most rewarding contributions to Africana in recent years."—*American Historical Review.* "Provides not only a comprehensive history of Portuguese rule in Africa but a dispassionate analysis of Portuguese colonial policy today and yesterday . . . well-written and timely."—*Political Science Quarterly.* 3rd printing. Illus. $7.50

In Canada/Saunders of Toronto, Ltd.

HARVARD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Virginia: Bourbonism to Byrd, 1870-1925

By Allen W. Moger, *Professor of History, Washington and Lee University. ix, 398 pp., illus., index. 6¾ x 9¾. L.C. 68-8538. $7.50*

This general history of Virginia from its restoration to the Union in 1870 to the election of Harry Flood Byrd as governor in 1925 illuminates the tools and conceptions of government which originated during the impoverished and bitter years after the Civil War and which remained useful and vital well into the twentieth century.

Allen W. Moger's account provides thorough details of the Bourbon debt policy and the neglect of the new "free public schools" which brought William Mahone and his Readjuster party to control from 1879 to 1883. Mahone's policies forced a complete reorganization of the Conservative-Democratic party to "redeem" the state. The fight against "Mahoneism" gave birth to the Democratic organization—the strongest and most famous political group in Virginia's history.

Old Virginia Restored: An Interpretation of the Progressive Impulse, 1870-1930

By Raymond Pulley, *Assistant Professor of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. x, 210 pp., illus. 6 x 9. L.C. 68-8539. $6.75*

As paradoxical as it may seem, the reforms undertaken in the Old Dominion during the progressive era returned the state to a political and social system as stable and resistant to innovation as any that had existed before the Civil War. In other words, the reform impulse sprang from the conserving or reactionary tendencies inherent in the culture of the Commonwealth rather than from a desire to reconcile the state to the march of modern America.

Read in conjunction with *Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966,* by J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Mr. Pulley's study illuminates the political history of the Old Dominion during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century.

Virginia in Our Century

New Printing with Supplementary Chapter

By Jean Gottmann, *Professor, School of Geography, Oxford University. Approx. 650 pp., illus., maps, graphs, index. 6⅛ x 9¼. L.C. 68-8541. $7.50*

The Press is pleased to announce the publication of a new printing with added material of Jean Gottmann's classic, now entitled *Virginia in Our Century.* The most comprehensive and the most popular account of the Old Dominion in our time, this book treats every aspect of the features and resources of the state and its people.

Virginia in Our Century will be welcomed by those interested in the study of history, geography, political science, and demography. The new material provides the best summary available of Virginia's current assets and attitudes.

University Press of Virginia Charlottesville

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

KOREA: TIME, CHANGE, AND ADMINISTRATION

BY HAHN-BEEN LEE Korea's social transitions since 1945, along with her rapidly expanding economy, are here interrelated with the political and administrative measures taken during the period. The author has served his country in posts ranging from budget director to ambassador, and is now dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration at Seoul National University. *$9.00*

THE INDIANIZED STATES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

BY G. COEDES India's civilizing influence beyond the Ganges is one of the outstanding events in history and, although the peak of her influence was over by 1500, the date Coedes' classic study ends, India's heritage permeates the art, law, literature, religion, and politics of present-day Southeast Asia. A translation of *Les Etats Hindouises d'Indochine et d'Indonesie,* it is considered by contemporary historians as the major source for study of the area. *$12.00*

FIJI GOES TO THE POLLS

BY NORMAN MELLER AND JAMES M. ANTHONY Giant steps toward Fijian autonomy were taken in 1963 when men and women of the crown colony's three major ethnic groups—locally born Indians, indigenous Fijians, and economically entrenched Europeans—went to the polls for the first time as equals to elect their Legislative Council representatives. *Fiji Goes to the Polls* views in depth this crucial moment and, in a postscript, the 1965 constitutional amendments and the 1966 election changes are analyzed to determine their effectiveness in improving ethnic voting behavior. *$5.50*

VIET-NAM: POLITICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

BY NGHIEM DANG "Students of Vietnamese politics and administration, or statesmen aware of the necessity to give sociological depth to their study or decisions, will find Mr. Dang's detailed analysis of the administrative process at the provincial, district, village, and hamlet levels awe-inspiring."—*Far Eastern Economic Review* *$10.00*

THAILAND: THE MODERNIZATION OF A BUREAUCRATIC POLITY

BY FRED W. RIGGS The author here traces the processes of change that have taken place in Thai politics and administration from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, then takes a close look at the contemporary Thai government as a bureaucratic polity. Taking the administration of the rice program as a focus, Riggs probes and dissects the cultural and social changes now taking place. *$10.00*

THE THAI BUREAUCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT

BY WILLIAM J. SIFFIN Complementing Riggs' study, Siffin here portrays in considerable historical depth the contemporary Thai bureaucracy as a social system and analyzes its development out of long-standing tradition, through a dramatic era of reform, into the present. *$8.50*

EAST-WEST CENTER PRESS
Honolulu 96822

CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL INTERCHANGE THROUGH BOOKS

COMMUNIST CHINA

The Domestic Scene: 1949-1967

by

Peter Tang and Joan Maloney
cloth, $10.00

Also Available:

C. Y. Cheng, Communist China's Economy, 1949-1962
cloth, $5.00

Mandarin Chinese Dictionary Series

Chinese-English paper. $5.50 ea.

Chinese Language Textbook Series
Three Sets, Twelve Volumes

SETON HALL UNIVERSITY PRESS, SOUTH ORANGE, N. J.

"Here is a book that should be within easy reach of all who would understand one of the great enigmas of democratic government."—**Hubert H. Humphrey**

DEMOCRACY'S DILEMMA

The Totalitarian Party in a Free Society

Benjamin Lippincott
University of Minnesota

"... exquisitely researched ... Dr. Lippincott has done his profession a real service."

—**Robert C. Hartnett,** *America*

"... in every respect a major contribution."

—**Arnold Brecht**

"Excellently and clearly written, it will be profitably read by juniors, seniors and graduate students. Superb bibliography."

—**CHOICE**

Here is a provocative analysis of one of the most crucial problems facing free societies today—the presence of totalitarian groups striving for political power. In examining the views of leading 20th Century political thinkers, the author shows that this problem has been evaded rather than squarely confronted. Italy in the 20's, Germany in the 30's and post-war Czechoslovakia are examined as specific examples of the inability of Western democracies to cope with an internal totalitarian drive to power. The emergence of new groups advocating extra-legal techniques—including the use of force—makes this study of power and freedom increasingly relevant.

1965. 246 Pages. $6.50

The Ronald Press Company
79 Madison Avenue • New York, N.Y. 10016

new . . . timely

ASPECTS OF MODERN COMMUNISM

Edited by Richard F. Staar

This penetrating study of modern Communism was published for the Institute of International Studies of the University of South Carolina. It is based on the proceedings of a symposium held in Atlanta, Georgia, under the auspices of the Department of Political Science at Emory University.

Footnotes, 35 tables, 2 charts, Notes on Contributors, Index
SBN 87249-136-6 LC 68-9362 448 pp. $7.95

"JUNE 22, 1941": Soviet Historians and the German Invasion

By Vladimir Petrov

This book contains a complete translation of JUNE 22, 1941, a controversial book by Russian historian A. M. Nekrich. The author presents a discerning and searching examination of the facts and issues involved in the relations between the Germany of Hitler and the Soviet Russia of Stalin.

Footnotes, Appendix
SBN 87249-134-X LC 68-9364 256 pp. $5.95

CHINA AND THE WEST

By Wolfgang Franke $5.95

Available at better bookstores.

THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA PRESS
Columbia, South Carolina 29208

The U.N. reference shelf

1. YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The annual editions of the *Yearbook* constitute the major reference work of the organization. They provide a year-by-year record of the multitude of activities which are dealt with in and through the United Nations. Twentieth edition: *Yearbook of the United Nations 1966*, fully indexed, 1226 pages. *Clothbound, $25.00.*

2. EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS

A basic history of the United Nations family from 1945 to 1965, presented accurately and without bias, which fulfils the needs of both the expert and the casual reader. Eighth edition, fully indexed, 634 pages. *Clothbound $6.00, paperbound $2.50.*

3. UNITED NATIONS MONTHLY CHRONICLE

Designed for everyone learning or teaching about the United Nations, every issue of the *Chronicle* contains a complete record of the month, describing the proceedings, decisions and resolutions of the main UN organs and committees, articles by distinguished contributors, a picture section and notes of the month. *Annual subscription in USA and Canada $7.00.*

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS, ROOM 1059, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

ALLYN AND BACON, INC.



Forthcoming 1969!

REFORM AND REVOLUTION: Readings in Latin American Politics

Edited by ARPAD VON LAZAR, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; and ROBERT KAUFMAN, Rutgers, The State University. Selections by some of the most important analysts in the field focus upon the reformist and revolutionary approaches to the burning political, economic, and social issues confronting Latin America in her developmental steps toward modernization. Est. 352 pp. Paperbound. 1969.

New!/EUROPEAN POLITICAL PROCESSES: Essays and Readings

Edited by HENRY S. ALBINSKI, The Pennsylvania State University; and LAWRENCE K. PETTIT, American Council on Education. Original essays and selected readings examine topics of paramount concern in Great Britain, Germany, France, and the Soviet Union. 448 pp. Paperbound. 1968.

READINGS IN COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Edited by NIMROD RAPHAELI, The Hebrew University. Countries are analyzed on a comparative basis which probes beneath the formal administrative organizations into the broader context of the social sciences: politics, sociology, economics, and anthropology. 490 pp. Paperbound.

BASIC ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by PETER A. TOMA, University of Arizona; and ANDREW GYORGY, George Washington University. Organized around 16 topics and emphasizing the scope and method of international relations, politics, organization, and law through concepts and clash of issues. 576 pp. Paperbound.

New!/APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF PARTY ORGANIZATION

Edited by WILLIAM J. CROTTY, Northwestern University. New collection of 10 original and comprehensive readings which relates "the political party" to broader concerns and empirically investigates problem areas within party organization. 412 pp. Paperbound. 1968.

New!/STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA, SECOND EDITION

By DANIEL R. GRANT, Vanderbilt University; and H. C. NIXON. Retaining a balance of traditional and behavioral approaches to the study of state and local government, the Second Edition increases emphasis on metropolitics and the problems of governing a metropolitan area. 596 pp. 1968.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Edited by WILLIAM J. CROTTY, Northwestern University; DONALD M. FREEMAN, University of Arizona; and DOUGLAS S. GATLIN, Florida Atlantic University. Designed to bring to the student's awareness the diversity of materials relevant to the understanding of political parties, this text makes available the most rewarding research yet undertaken in each area. 630 pp. Paperbound.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: Behavior and Controversy

Edited by LEWIS LIPSITZ, The University of North Carolina. Selected readings in the major substantive and institutional areas of American government. 678 pp. Paperbound.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE: From Burgess to Behavioralism

by ALBERT SOMIT, State University of New York at Buffalo; and JOSEPH TANENHAUS, University of Iowa. Describes how political scientists have viewed the scope and method of their field and analyzes the recurrent efforts to develop a "science of politics". 220 pp.

WORLD POLITICS: The Writings of Theorists and Practitioners, Classical and Modern

Edited by AREND LIJPHART, University of California, Berkeley. Classical and contemporary theorists in international relations and political practitioners who can speak authoritatively on world affairs provide perspective for the international relations and American foreign policy student. 448 pp. Paperbound.

New!/POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE

by WILLIAM H. FLANIGAN, University of Minnesota. The text relates the changing patterns of turn-out and partisan loyalty to social and economic factors and draws data from such sources as the four major national surveys of 1952, 1956, 1960, and 1964. 1968. 127 pp. Paperbound.

CENTENNIAL
1868 **ALLYN AND BACON, INC.**
470 ATLANTIC AVE., BOSTON, MASS. 02210



You mean I can get $50,000 of TIAA Life insurance for less than $100?

That's what an Assistant Professor asked us when he heard about TIAA's low life insurance costs.

It's true. At his age 30 the annual premium for a 20-Year Home Protection policy providing $50,000 initial amount of insurance is $159.00. The first-year dividend, based on our current dividend scale, is $61.00, making a net payment of $98.00. Dividends, of course, are not guaranteed.

The Home Protection plan is level premium Term insurance providing its largest amount of protection initially, reducing by schedule each year to recognize decreasing insurance needs. This is just one example of the many low-cost TIAA plans available. If you need more protection for your family, ask us to mail you a personal illustration with figures for a policy issued at your age. We'll also send the Life Insurance Guide describing other TIAA policies.

ELIGIBILITY

Eligibility to apply for this or other TIAA life insurance is limited to persons employed at the time of application by a college, university, private school, or other nonprofit educational or scientific institution that qualifies for TIAA eligibility.

tiaa

TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION
730 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017

eG

Please mail the new Life Insurance Guide and a personal illustration.

Name____________________ Your Date of Birth________

Address____________________ ZIP________

Dependents' Ages____________________

*Nonprofit Employer*____________________
college, university, or other educational or scientific institution

INDEX TO ADVERTISERS

ABC-CLIO 1472
Aldine Publishing Company 1493
Allyn & Bacon 1522, 1523
Appleton-Century-Crofts 1462
Atherton Press 1495
The Australian National University 1492
The Bobbs-Merrill Company 1502
University of California Press 1498
Catholic University of Nijmegen 1492
University of Chicago Press 1510, 1511, 1512
Columbia University Press 1504
Commentary Cover II
Congressional Quarterly 1515
Cornell University Press 1476, 1482
Walter de Gruyter, Inc. 1480
The Dorsey Press 1479
Doubleday & Company 1483
East-West Center Press 1519
The Free Press 1459, 1460, 1461
Harcourt, Brace & World 1464, 1465
Harper & Row 1089, 1458
Harvard University Press 1516, 1517
D. C. Heath & Company 1467
Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1470, 1471
Johns Hopkins University Press 1503
Houghton Mifflin Company 1489
University of Illinois Press 1488
J. B. Lippincott Company 1473
Little, Brown & Company 1484, 1485
The Macmillan Company 1474
Markham Publishing Company 1500, 1501
University of Massachusetts Press 1466
Charles E. Merrill Books 1480
National Press 1478
Northwestern University Press 1487
Ohio State University Press 1486
Oxford University Press 1505, 1506, 1507, 1508, 1509
F. E. Peacock Publishers 1468, 1469
Pegasus 1514
University of Pennsylvania Press 1457
Frederick A. Praeger 1463
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1092
Princeton University Press Cover IV
Rand McNally Company 1477
Random House—Alfred A. Knopf 1496, 1497
The Ronald Press 1491, 1520
St. Martin's Press 1513
Scott, Foresman & Company 1494
University of South Carolina Press 1521
Seton Hall University Press 1520
Stanford University Press 1499
TIAA 1524
United Nations Publications 1521
D. Van Nostrand Company 1475
University Press of Virginia 1518
John Wiley & Sons 1481
World Law Fund 1487
Yale University Press 1490

Chemical Warfare

A Study in Restraints

FREDERIC J. BROWN

The author investigates the nature of restraints—political, military, economic, and psychological—operative in varying degrees between 1919 and 1945, when U.S. chemical warfare policy was being formed. He offers the first critical analysis of the curious World War II phenomenon that a nation, in the midst of an unrestricted and vicious war, refrained from employing a weapon guaranteed to inflict massive casualties on the enemy. In the conclusion Major Brown relates his findings to contemporary conflicts. *$9.00*

Mr. Justice Murphy

A Political Biography

J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR.

This biography of the libertarian Supreme Court Justice casts new light on the politics of reform, America's colonial experience in Asia, the labor wars of the '30s, and the Roosevelt Administration; and presents new data on judicial decision-making in the '40s and the growth of civil liberties. It is based upon recently opened Murphy papers. *Photographs and cartoons* *$12.50*

Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1967

T. H. RIGBY

In this comprehensive and latest statistical profile of the membership of the Communist party Professor Rigby analyzes the history of party recruitment and composition. Since the party makes vital contributions to the performance of several basic tasks within the Soviet political system, he interprets his data mainly in functional terms. *Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University* *$15.00*

New Princeton Paperbacks

NEUTRALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS, by Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr, and Oran Young. *Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University* *$1.95*

ZANZIBAR: BACKGROUND TO REVOLUTION, by Michael F. Lofchie *$2.95*

MADISON'S "ADVICE TO MY COUNTRY," by Adrienne Koch *$2.95*

Princeton University Press

Princeton, New Jersey 08540